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 In 1960, as many Africans prepared for or celebrated their independence from 
colonial rule, inhabitants of Southern Africa continued to be governed by white minority 
regimes committed to retaining direct political control and suppressing resistance through 
violence. In this context, people from Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe began to travel into “exile,” a space located outside their country of origin. 
Most exiles settled in the “front-line states,” including Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia 
and, following their independence, Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, where those 
who represented national liberation movements were granted resources from various 
allies to lead a liberation war and to care for their fellow nationals in camps. Others 
received scholarships to study overseas, while still others represented their liberation 
movement in offices spread across the globe. As violence in Southern Africa intensified, 
so did migration of the region's people across international borders, with hundreds of 
thousands leaving their national “home” to live abroad over a period of thirty years.  
 By late 1990, when South Africa's transition to democracy was well under way, 
most Southern African exiles had repatriated to their countries of origin. Representations 
of the exile past, however, have continued to proliferate. In the region, as elsewhere, 
post-colonial states rely on the history of a nation, formed through colonial rule and anti-
colonial resistance, to govern their citizens. Central to the history of most Southern 
African nations is a narrative about the oppression which drove people into exile and the 
vi 
 
sacrifices made by exiles to liberate their country of origin. As people interact in, and 
make claims on, Southern African nation-states, they relate to the socially accepted 
history of exile in different ways. They may appeal to it when it strengthens their 
position, elaborate on it when they have been excluded from it, or challenge its authority 
when it associates them with stigma. In the process, happenings in the past become a 
basis for mediating relationships between people in the present. It is this relationship 
between the exile past and present which I call “exile history.” 
 This dissertation studies exile history through the camps administered by the 
South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), a Namibian liberation movement.1 
Founded in the late 1950s as the Ovamboland People's Congress (OPC) by Namibians 
living in Cape Town, SWAPO assumed its current name in 1960 shortly after several of 
its leaders left Namibia for exile.2 During the early 1960s the organization established a 
headquarters in Dar es Salaam and diplomatic offices at the United Nations in New York 
and in other urban centers, from where it lobbied support for the organization's aim to 
free Namibia from South African colonial rule.3 It also began, with the support of the 
                                                 
1 After Namibian independence “SWAPO” renamed itself “Swapo Party.” Given its focus on exile 
history, this dissertation refers to “SWAPO” unless a clear distinction between the pre-independence 
liberation movement and the post-independence political party is intended. 
2 The OPC was renamed the Ovamboland People's Organization (OPO) when it was founded in 
Windhoek on April 19, 1959. In June 1960 the name was changed again to SWAPO (Peter Katjavivi, A 
History of Resistance in Namibia (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1988), p. 45). 
3 In 1884 Namibia, then South West Africa, was declared a German colony at the Conference of Berlin. 
Germany's rule over South West Africa ended with the First World War and in 1919 the region was 
transferred to South Africa as a League of Nations Mandate. Following the Second World War, South 
West Africa's mandate status became an object of international controversy. Although the newly formed 
United Nations had established a trusteeship system to administer territories mandated to governments 
under the League of Nations, South African officials refused to hand over South West Africa to the UN, 
arguing that the mandate had expired with the League's dissolution and that South Africa should 
incorporate it into the country as its fifth province. Although the UN turned down South Africa’s 
proposal, it was unable to force the South African government to place South West Africa under the 
new trusteeship system. It is in this context that a variety of persons and organizations began to petition 




Organization of African Unity (OAU) and several allied governments, to train guerrilla 
soldiers for an armed struggle. In August 1966, shortly after the failed attempt by 
Ethiopia and Liberia to challenge the legal status of South African rule in Namibia at the 
Hague, the first skirmish took place between SWAPO guerrillas and the South African 
Police. SWAPO and South Africa continued to fight a war in northern Namibia4 and 
southern Angola until 1989, when exiles repatriated as part of a negotiated settlement 
through which Namibia held its first democratic elections and became an independent 
country in March 1990.  
 Over its three decades in exile, SWAPO was responsible for the welfare of 
roughly 60,000 Namibians, about 4% of the total Namibian population at independence, 
most of whom lived in camps.5 The first camp, Kongwa, was located in central Tanzania 
and granted  by the OAU to SWAPO, and several other liberation movements training 
guerrilla soldiers, in 1963. In the early 1970s SWAPO's center of gravity shifted to 
Zambia, where it established several camps for guerrillas near the Namibian border and a 
                                                 
4 “Northern Namibia” and “southern Namibia” are used in this dissertation to refer to two regions with 
distinct geographies and histories. Northern Namibia refers to the area north of the “Red Line,” a 
checkpoint established by the German colonial government in 1896 to protect cattle in southern 
Namibia, where settlers lived, from the Rinderpest epidemic which had broken out to the north. Unlike 
southern Namibia, areas north of the Red Line were never settled by Europeans and were administered 
by indirect rule. By this definition, “central Namibia,” a label used by some to refer to the area between 
Windhoek and the Red Line, is a part of southern Namibia.  
5 According to a report issued by the Namibian Institute for Social and Economic Research (Rosemary 
Preston et al., “The Integration of Returned Exiles, Former Combatants and Other War-Affected 
Namibians,” (Windhoek: NISER, 1993), pp. 5-21), nearly 50,000 Namibians had repatriated to Namibia 
by the end of 1991. While this number is considerably less than the 70,000 to 100,000 exiles that 
SWAPO claimed to be administering in its camps in various reports submitted to donors during the 
1980s, it exceeds the approximately 43,000 Namibians who repatriated prior to Namibia's democratic 
elections recorded by the United Nations and documented by NISER (p. 5-21) and others. The number 
50,000 does not account for those who died in exile, which, according to SWAPO's official record was 
7,792 (Swapo Party, Their Blood Waters Our Freedom (Windhoek, 1996)), or several hundred or 
thousand other people whose “disappearance” during the liberation struggle has not been officially 
recorded. For discussions of persons whose names have not been included in official UN and SWAPO 
records, see the Breaking the Wall of Silence Movement, “Namibia's Missing Persons,” (Windhoek, 
1996) and the National Society for Human Rights, “Critical Analysis: SWAPO's 'Book of the Dead'” 
(Windhoek, 1996).    
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camp outside Lusaka, where health and educational services were provided by SWAPO 
to non-combatants for the first time. In 1974, when the collapse of the Portuguese empire 
opened the Angolan border to Namibians, the number of exiles increased greatly with 
thousands migrating through Angola to SWAPO camps in Zambia. Over the next few 
years Eastern bloc and Scandinavian governments and Western church, solidarity and 
humanitarian organizations sent increasing quantities of aid to SWAPO, most of which 
were distributed to its exiled members in camps.6 By the late 1970s SWAPO had 
established scores of small, mobile camps in southern Angola, inhabited by exiles 
infiltrating or fleeing Namibia. Larger, semi-permanent camps were also established in 
Angola at sites further from the Namibian border. At the time when Namibian exiles 
repatriated in 1989, most were living in one of these camps, and almost all, including 
SWAPO officials and students based overseas, had spent time in one or another camp 
during their years abroad. The camps were, in short, the focal point for a Namibian exile 
community. 
 Nearly twenty years after independence, the SWAPO camps remain central to 
Namibian life. Some, such as Cassinga, which was the target of a South African attack in 
May 1978, figure prominently in the accepted history of Namibians' resistance to colonial 
rule. Others, such as the sites where people accused of spying for South Africa were 
detained near Lubango, have become the focal point of a counter-narrative, challenging 
Namibia's national history. Still others figure less prominently in public discourse but are 
invoked when people make claims on the SWAPO-led government and develop 
                                                 
6 Increasing aid was accompanied by declarations of support for SWAPO at the United Nations. In 1973 
the UN declared SWAPO “the authentic representative of the Namibian people” (UN General 
Assembly Resolution 3111, 12.12.1973), in 1976 “the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian 
people” (UN General Assembly Resolution 31/146, 20.12.1976). 
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relationships with other Namibians. The SWAPO camps, therefore, are central to 
Namibia's exile history, illuminating both this nation's recent past and the legacy of this 
past in the present.  
 At the same time, the camps highlight limits to the ways in which histories of 
exile and other national histories are often told. Although shaped by diverse individuals 
living outside Namibian land, the SWAPO camps are represented as part of a single, 
Namibian history. By focusing attention on the experiences of those who lived in the 
camps, it should be possible to return these sites from “Namibia” to other local, regional 
and global contexts in which they were formed. Moreover, one may draw from these 
experiences to illuminate fictions about “the nation” – about its continuity over time, 
about its association with a place, about its unity of meaning – that influence not only 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction: Reflections on an Exhibition1  
 For Namibia, August 26 is an important day. The marking of August 26 extends 
back to 1923, the year when the body of Samuel Maherero, the paramount Chief of the 
Herero, was returned to the country for burial. Maherero had fled to Bechuanaland in 
conjunction with the uprising of Otjiherero speaking groups against the German colonial 
government in 1904. Since Maherero's return, people have joined annually in the town of 
Okahandja, the burial site of the Herero paramount chiefs, to celebrate Herero tradition 
and resistance to colonialism. Forty-three years later, on August 26, 1966, the first 
skirmish took place between guerrillas belonging to the Namibian liberation movement 
SWAPO and South African Police at Omgulumbashe in northern Namibia. Thereafter, 
SWAPO members in exile began to commemorate August 26 annually as “Namibia 
Day.” Since independence in 1990, the SWAPO led Namibian government has continued 
to mark August 26th as a national holiday called “Heroes' Day.” 
  In 2007 I also participated in commemorations of August 26th. At the time I was 
living in Namibia, conducting research for this dissertation on exile history. Based in the 
capital, Windhoek, I was traveling around the country collecting knowledge about the 
thousands of Namibians who had lived in Tanzania, Zambia and Angola during the 
1960s, 70s and 80s. By then I had perused many documents related to Namibia's exile 
                                                 
1 A copy of the “Living in Exile” exhibition, discussed in this chapter, appears in Appendix 2. Photos of 
the exhibition appear in Appendix 3.  
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history in public and private collections available in Switzerland, Germany, South Africa 
and Namibia. And I was in the process of meeting Namibians who had lived in exile or 
people had some special relationship to Namibian exiles, asking them about their 
experiences during the liberation struggle and probing their knowledge of specific 
SWAPO camps. Research participants included persons whom I had known since 2000-
2001 when I worked as a volunteer teacher in Tses in southern Namibia, and 2002-2003, 
when I wrote and published a master's dissertation about the history of the school where I 
had taught and its former pupils, some of whom had lived in exile themselves.2 The 
majority, however, were new acquaintances whom I had met since returning to Namibia 
in January 2007 and were residing in Windhoek and the four administrative regions of 
northern Namibia still known as “Ovamboland,” where most former exiles live. 
   Heroes' Day presented a unique opportunity for me to meet former exiles who 
might like to participate in my research and to share my work with them and other 
interested Namibians. I had been planning to attend since March 2007 when I prepared a 
grant proposal for the Archives of Anti-Colonial Resistance and the Liberation Struggle 
(AACRLS), a government directed initiative to support research and dispersal of 
knowledge about the Namibian past. In my proposal, titled “Living in Exile,” I indicated 
that I would like to prepare an exhibition of photographs of Namibians living in the 
SWAPO administered exile camps for public display, first at the government's 
commemoration of Heroes' Day and thereafter in other interested Namibian communities. 
Photographs from the National Archives of Namibia and my private collection would be 
                                                 
2 “Remembering St. Therese: A Namibian Mission School and the Possibilities for its Students” (MA 
Dissertation, University of Cape Town, 2002); Remembering St. Therese (Windhoek: Out of Africa, 
2003); “Student Political Consciousness: Lessons from a Namibian Mission School,” Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 30,3, (2004) pp. 539-558. 
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reproduced for the exhibition and accompanied by captions created with material 
gathered from my interviews. In addition to providing information about the photos, 
captions would also ask viewers to share their knowledge of the photographs on display 
for a public record. AACRLS agreed to support the project and in March, June and July, 
during research trips to Ovamboland, I met with several government and SWAPO 
officials involved in planning the Heroes' Day activities scheduled to take place in 
Eenhana, the Ohangwena regional capital. Officials were presented with my proposal for 
“Living in Exile,” proofs of the exhibition's endorsement by the AACRLS and my 
affiliations with the University of Namibia, University of Michigan and the United States 
Fulbright Program, and reproductions of the photos that would be displayed in the 
exhibit. All appeared to receive the project favorably, and one, the SWAPO District 
Commissioner for Eenhana, indicated that he would introduce it to the Heroes' Day 
planning committee in their upcoming meetings. Thereafter, I called the Commissioner 
several times over the phone, and each time we spoke he assured me that regarding the 
exhibition there were “no problems.”   
 Nonetheless, as August 26 approached, I could not glean any information about 
the Heroes' Day program or how the exhibition would be incorporated into it. Even the 
week of the event, by which time I had relocated myself from Windhoek to Ovamboland, 
plans remained opaque. The forces constraining knowledge about Heroes' Day and the 
exhibition had started to become clearer, however. On Thursday, August 23, I 
accompanied the Commissioner to the Regional Office in Eenhana which since my 
arrival on Tuesday had transformed from a sleepy administrative hollow into a beehive of 
activity. Once in the building, the Commissioner deposited me at the front desk 
 4 
indicating that the person who could make arrangements for me was “the chairperson of 
the publicity sub-committee.” Over the next several hours, as I was shuffled from the 
office of one sub-committee chair to the next, it became clear that no one knew anything 
about the exhibition. Likewise, none were keen to insert it into the program although all 
took time from their seemingly hectic schedules to look through the photographs, asking 
where I had found them, and, in some cases, sharing knowledge about people or places 
pictured in them. As the chair of the entertainment sub-committee, who appeared 
particularly sympathetic, opined, he could not intervene “without the party.” The 
breakthrough moment seemed to come just before midday, when both the Commissioner 
and a more senior SWAPO official joined me in the entertainment sub-committee's 
office. After looking through the photographs and making some comments that I did not 
understand in Oshiwambo, the ranking official proclaimed in English that he liked the 
photos and that they should be put on display for Heroes' Day. Nonetheless, after the 
official had left the room, the Commissioner, the entertainment chair and another junior 
member of his committee could not agree on who should take responsibility for the 
photos, each pointing his finger at another. After lunch I returned to the Regional Office 
only to repeat the morning's steps.  
 When Saturday, August 25 dawned and I was still no wiser about the exhibition's 
place in the coming events, I made an alternate plan. Entering the office of the Eenhana 
Youth Centre, outside of which I had been permitted to pitch my tent the previous night, I 
introduced myself to the administrator and asked him if I might display the photo 
exhibition on the premises. Within five minutes, I had received permission to attach my 
photographs and captions to the walls of the Centre's glass foyer. The foyer soon proved 
 5 
an ideal spot for the photos. Visible from the Centre's central courtyard and only entrance 
and exit to its activity hall, all manner of visitors walked through the foyer and stopped to 
look at the photos. These included not only youth visiting the Centre to participate in 
various activities, but also persons who were staying at the Centre in conjunction with 
Heroes' Day, among them a group of about eighty persons who had been members of 
SWAPO's guerrilla army in exile during the 1960s and were to be singled out as “heroes” 
by the Namibian government the following day. Through the morning and early 
afternoon I remained in the foyer, observing or chatting with people who entered and 
listening to some as they shared their knowledge of the photos and experiences in exile. 
 The situation soon changed, however. In the middle of the afternoon a group of 
men in military uniform arrived at the Youth Centre and informed me that I would have 
to leave the foyer immediately in deference to “guests” who would soon be arriving. 
Walking out to the courtyard, I sat there on a picnic bench with a growing crowd of 
people as first the 2007 “heroes” and then Namibia's President, Hifikepunye Pohamba, 
passed through the foyer into the hall and the doors closed. Perhaps an hour later the 
doors opened and the former exiles emerged slowly, most of them taking time to look at 
the photos, gesturing at them while talking with companions. Meanwhile, several 
hundred Namibians and I sat on the outside, able to see every movement, but unable to 
hear more than the hum of the people speaking and an occasional word. Finally as the 
President stopped to make some remark about a photo with a colleague about ten meters 
away from me, I decided I should assert myself and ask someone for permission to enter 
the foyer. But no sooner had I stood up and opened my mouth, then a soldier standing 
next to my table stepped in front of me and told me in two words to “sit down.” Only 
 6 
after the foyer had been cleared of people was I able to return to the exhibition.   
 The following day, without the exhibition, I participated in the government led 
Heroes' Day ritual. Even just attending this program proved difficult. Despite my 
conversations with various persons involved in organizing the Heroes' Day gathering on 
Saturday, I was unable to ascertain when people would travel to the mass grave outside 
Eenhana. The grave site, which had been discovered by construction workers clearing 
land for a sewage processing plant in November 2005, was located close to a South 
African military base from the 1970s and 80s and held the remains of a large number of 
bodies of people, who, based on their clothes, appear to have been members of the 
People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), the guerrilla wing of SWAPO in exile. 
Apparently, early in the morning of the 26th, state dignitaries and members of the media 
traveled to the grave and dedicated the monument which had been erected there. A few 
hours later thousands of Namibians and I gathered in a field outside Eenhana to observe 
the nation in all its pageantry. Assembling around a parade ground, very much like 
Namibians first did while living in SWAPO's exile camps, we looked on as 
representatives of the country's recognized “tribes” performed and soldiers marched and 
aligned themselves in formation. We watched as the national flag was hoisted and sang 
the national anthem. And we listened as the President told a story about a nation which 
had freed itself from colonialism and as he exhorted us, without any hint of irony, to 
“remember our history.” 
 
Nations and their Exile Histories  
 For students of nationalism, irony embedded in the President's words will not be 
 7 
lost.  As Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm argue in their seminal 
works, nations are temporally derived forms of social identification, which associate a 
particular group of people with a state.3 Through narratives which trace the continuity of 
a predetermined national group over time and obscure the particular circumstances in 
which national ideologies have been formed, nations have been constituted as “natural” 
social units, structuring human relations. These narratives, like all histories, require their 
narrators to forget the past even as they remember it. More than that, national history 
requires narrators to deny that any past contradicting their stories about the nation has 
been forgotten.4      
 Exile may be a significant site in the histories of many nations. Whether it refers 
directly to a location, or to a category of people and state of being associated with it, exile 
is a widely utilized term, used to denote a space situated outside the boundaries of a 
national “home.” The word both assumes that a given nation exists and that it is unnatural 
for its members to live outside a geographical region associated with it. Nonetheless, it is 
precisely spaces such as exile where national communities,  collections of people who 
relate to one another through an accepted national history, are likely to form.5 As several 
generations of anthropologists have argued, such as Fernando Ortiz with respect to 
                                                 
3 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, 
(London: Verso, 1983, 1991); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Eric 
Hobsbawm, “Introduction,” in Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: 
Programme, Myth, Reality, (Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
4 Homi Bhabha discusses this “obligation to forget” in Nation and Narration (London: Routledge, 1990), 
pp. 308-311. 
5 My use of “national communities” is somewhat different than Benedict Anderson's term “imagined 
communities.” Whereas Anderson discusses communities which are naturalized through national 
narratives (Anderson 1991, pp. 199-205), I focus on communities whose social basis is the narrative 
itself, a common discourse through which all community members relate to one another.  
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“transculturation,” Fredrik Barth to ethnicity, and Liisa Malkki to refugees,6 crossing 
boundaries tends not so much to dilute social units as it does induce those who cross them 
to form different ones based on ideologies of belonging that are useful in their new social 
environment. Likewise, one would expect nationality to gain novel and heightened 
meaning for persons who, as soon as they cross international borders, become enmeshed 
in new social relations shaped by their common status as exiles. And yet, precisely 
because exile can be so formative for nations, histories of exile may present a special risk 
to them, threatening to unravel the carefully constructed narratives that are told about a 
given nation's past. As a result, most histories of exile are likely to be “exiled” –  expelled 
from the collective consciousness of a nation's members.    
 Such is the case in Namibia and neighboring countries. As the Foreword notes, 
Southern African states rely heavily on narratives of colonialism and anti-colonial 
resistance to shape and govern national communities. Central to any rendering of these 
resistance narratives are stories told about the years spent by members of the region's 
liberation movements in exile. From the “front-line states” guerrilla soldiers infiltrated 
their countries of origin while political leaders urged for interventions from governments 
and organizations abroad. First, while living in exile and then since exiles' repatriation, a 
single history of exile has been used to unite Southern Africa's national communities 
through stories of common struggle against colonial oppression.  
 Nonetheless, stories from exile that diverge from this dominant narrative are never 
far from the surface as even a cursory review of  the sites and people involved in Heroes' 
                                                 
6 Fernando Ortiz, Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar (Durham: Duke University Press, 1947, 
1995); Fredrik Barth, ed.  Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural 
Difference (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1969); Liisa Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, 
Memory and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania (University of Chicago Press, 
1995). 
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Day 2007 demonstrates. Since the mass grave had been uncovered outside Eenhana in 
November 2005, speculation had been rife that the bodies therein were killed on April 1, 
1989, when, after a cease-fire had been established, PLAN combatants deployed south of 
the latitudinal line set by the United Nations for their disarmament. The deployment 
resulted in several hundred deaths which, some argue, should have been prevented. In 
June 2007 ex-combatants, including some of those honored at Heroes' Day in Eenhana, 
demonstrated for a week in downtown Windhoek, clamoring for remuneration from the 
Namibian government to compensate for sacrifices made during the liberation struggle. 
Some of the demonstrators claimed that the UN mandated the Namibian government to 
provide ex-combatants with money and homes following independence, claims which the 
SWAPO-led Namibian government denies. In July the Namibian press reported on an 
application submitted by the National Society for Human Rights (NSHR) to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), implicating founding Namibian and SWAPO 
President Sam Nujoma and three others in human rights abuses committed in exile. In the 
weeks preceding Heroes' Day, “the ICC Issue” had been capturing headlines daily as 
various people and institutions voiced their opinions on it, and President Pohamba 
commented on the issue in his Heroes' Day speech, proclaiming NSHR's application 
“baseless and frivolous” and “a threat to peace and stability.” 
 One might be inclined to refer to such histories as “silenced.” This metaphor, so 
commonly employed to describe perspectives on the past that are excluded from a 
dominant narrative is misleading, however. Histories that are absent or muted in certain 
contexts, such as the government led commemoration of Heroes' Day, may be heard 
clearly across a range of others. For example, in the course of this thesis I discuss 
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histories that, while excluded from a widely repeated national narrative, have been 
accessed through autobiographies, newspapers, internal SWAPO documents, letter 
exchanges, diary entries, commemorations, rallies, funerals, conferences, formal recorded 
interviews and informal conversations. Some of these histories, like the aforementioned 
about April 1, 1989,  the promises made to PLAN combatants, and the human rights 
violations committed by SWAPO officials in exile, clearly contradict the national 
narrative, profaning the nation's heroic deeds and men. Others extend outside the 
narrative's parameters and unsettle it in more subtle ways. Such is the quality of many of 
the narratives which I heard while “Living in Exile” was on display at the Eenhana Youth 
Centre, when photographs prompted stories known only to small groups of former exiles 
who lived at particular times in particular places. Although part of Namibia's exile past, 
they are excluded from the dominant narrative told about it. 
 Moreover, nations frequently call silenced histories about exile, and other sites 
formative in the formation of nations, into being. For while certain historical narratives 
threaten a nation, uniting those with a vested interest in a national political order against 
them, unequal access to nationally distributed resources may also encourage people to 
assert these very same stories in efforts to redefine the order and their place within it. 
From this perspective one may begin to understand apparent contradictions in how people 
responded to “Living in Exile” and other aspects of my research. On the one hand, I 
struggled to display the exhibit on Heroes' Day. Although the material was carefully 
selected so as to be acceptable to government and SWAPO officials who were planning 
the commemoration, the officials made little effort to support it. Even the formal  
“approval” of two SWAPO officials seems to have been insufficient to assuage concerns 
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that officials must have had about an exhibit on exile assembled by a foreigner, whose 
interests were not easily discerned. On the other hand, some people were not only willing 
but also eager to participate in research on the same subject. Of the seventy-five persons 
with whom I held recorded interviews for this dissertation, many went out of their way to 
meet several times for multiple hours, to edit interview transcripts and chapter drafts, to 
introduce me to people who they thought would enhance my study, to host me in their 
homes and visit me in Windhoek, even to travel with me to the sites of former SWAPO 
camps in remote areas of southern Angola. Certainly, some of my most keen interlocutors 
are persons who have been explicitly stigmatized through a dominant history of exile, for 
whom establishing a counter-narrative about the exile past is central to their efforts to 
reshape their reputation in the present and future. Nonetheless, research participants 
included people with a wide range of relationships to the nation, even high ranking 
government officials, who repeat a dominant national history in many settings but during 
taped interviews for use in a public record shared stories that diverged from it. One of the 
reasons given by research participants to explain why they divulged such information to 
me was their hope that I would share my research with “the Namibian people” who, in 
turn, might better understand “their history.”   
 What differentiates a dominant history of exile from other histories, is not, 
therefore, the latter's exclusion from the discourse of a national community, but rather the 
status of these histories within it. Generally, narratives that confirm the authority of 
leaders with access to instruments of government become the official version of the past 
while those that undermine them are associated with stigma and rendered inaudible. 
Nonetheless, there is considerable variety in the status attributed to histories as members 
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of a national community establish social relations over time and space. Again, responses 
to “Living in Exile” are suggestive. Although organizers at Heroes' Day in Eenhana 
demonstrated interest in “Living in Exile” during one-on-one meetings, it appears to have 
been threatening to them in the context of the commemoration of a national holiday at 
which government sanctioned history would be presented. In contrast, for some people 
who viewed “Living in Exile” at the Youth Centre, the opportunity to rethink national 
history seems to have been liberating rather than threatening. As one woman said after 
sharing observations about an exile camp where she had lived that was pictured in a 
photo: “This is good. Namibians need to know these things. We're only told about the 
leaders, not the ordinary heroes.” Three weeks later, when two local research assistants 
and I displayed the exhibit on a wall along a sidewalk in the southern Namibian town of 
Keetmanshoop, “Living in Exile” was associated with the national narrative itself and 
was accused of excluding local histories. “Our people were also there, but they are not 
here [in the photos],” we overheard one man say and others repeat in different words. 
 The contrasting responses to one of the photographs in “Living in Exile” were 
particularly dramatic.7 Although the photo's caption at the National Archives refers 
generally to “Commanders... receiving... training at an Angolan base near the Namibian 
border,” some who viewed the photo were eager to associate it with particular names and 
places. Even before I assembled the exhibit, several research participants argued that the 
“Angolan base” could not possibly be located “near the Namibian border” since SWAPO 
members did not occupy any large brick structures there. It was far more likely, they 
suggested, that it pictured a building near the Angolan city of Lubango, where PLAN's 
military headquarters had been located during the late 1970s and '80s. In turn, these 
                                                 
7 NAN, Photo Archive, No. 12396. The photo appears in Appendix 2. 
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interlocutors and other viewers at Eenhana used their knowledge of the SWAPO camps 
near Lubango and their relationships with the people pictured in the photo to associate 
themselves with this image and, through it, with Namibians who resisted South African 
rule. In Keetmanshoop, however, the response was entirely different. No viewers drew 
from this photo to speak with me about Lubango, a site which many people there 
associate with the torture and murder of those from the town and surrounding region who 
joined SWAPO in exile. At one point a woman confronted me directly, asking in a loud 
voice so that all standing near the exhibit could hear, “Where is Lubango?” When I 
showed her to the photograph, which bears no obvious traces of the violent stories, which 
the woman had certainly heard, and the survivors' disfigured bodies, which she had 
probably seen, she responded, “That's not Lubango” and walked away.   
 This dissertation examines the structures which shape the social status of these 
and other exile histories. For even as there is variety in how Namibians relate to their 
recent past, there are patterns to the status attributed to stories told about it which are at 
once distinct to Namibia and inseparable from the larger political order of which Namibia 
is a part. By studying these patterns, “Exile History” not only highlights the suffering of 
particular communities whose members repeatedly find themselves marginalized by 
Namibia's dominant exile narrative, but also suggests how social relations are formed 
through national history across a range of contexts.   
 
An Ethnography of Camps 
 Of particular importance to this study is the structure of camps. As noted in the 
Foreword, from 1963 until 1989 SWAPO administered camps for about 60,000 
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Namibians living abroad in Tanzania, Zambia and Angola. There was considerable 
diversity to these sites. Some were small and mobile, catering to populations of guerrillas 
infiltrating Namibia and other Namibians fleeing the country, populations that were 
constantly in flux. Others were semi-permanent settlements8 for thousands that were 
further from the border and offered inhabitants a variety of services, including health and 
educational facilities. Some consisted of trained guerrilla soldiers bearing weapons while 
others had only a handful of guerrillas responsible for protecting mostly untrained  and 
unarmed people. A few prominent camps were visited regularly by foreign military 
advisors or aid workers, while many were rarely or never accessed by non-Namibians 
except for the local inhabitants who lived near by. 
 Despite such differences, these sites shared common features which distinguished 
them as “camps.” They were places where Namibian exiles lived under the direct 
oversight of SWAPO representatives, granted authority by the liberation movement to 
administer Namibians in a particular location. These representatives, usually referred to 
as “commanders,”9 were responsible for monitoring movement, distributing material 
resources, and dispersing knowledge among those under their care, and they wielded 
considerable control over each of these fields of activity. Although the rules applied in 
particular camps varied, “the parade,” the name of the meeting during which commanders 
and other SWAPO officials communicated with camp inhabitants and of the physical 
                                                 
8 As Liisa Malkki notes in Purity and Exile, her seminal work on “the camp,” organizations administering 
refugees and refugees themselves may distinguish between “a settlement” and “a camp,” the latter 
implying a less permanent living arrangement (p. 304) and/or a military command structure (p. 117). 
Throughout my research, Namibian former exiles made no consistent distinction between “camps” and 
“settlements,” and I use the terms interchangeably as well. 
9 Throughout this dissertation I use the term “commanders” to refer to those who were directly 
responsible for administering camps and “leaders” to refer to those who were representing the liberation 
movement in offices. When I do not wish to distinguish between commanders and leaders, I use the 
more generic term “officials.” 
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location where that meeting was held, was part of daily life in all of them. In these ways, 
“the SWAPO camps” not only resembled one another but also camps which Southern 
Africa's other liberation movements administered for their exiled members. Moreover, 
they approximate “the camp,” defined in Giorgio Agamben's influential work as “the 
pure, absolute and impassible biopolitical space.”10 
 It is significant, therefore, that scholarship on camps highlights the power of this 
space to shape national ideology. The first work to focus on this relationship between 
camps and nations was Liisa Malkki's Purity and Exile.11 Drawing from ethnographic 
research conducted in 1985-1986 among refugees in Mishamo, a camp in western 
Tanzania, Malkki discusses how Mishamo's inhabitants encountered “the national order 
of things” through the camp’s daily social interactions. Inhabitants, in turn, developed a  
national history, constituting themselves as members of an exiled Hutu nation that had 
been denied its own state by rival Tutsis, as a means of understanding and giving 
meaning to their lives in the camp. In contrast, people of similar background and 
experiences who migrated to the town Kigoma were not administered on the basis of a 
national identity and were more likely to improve their social status by integrating 
themselves into their new communities. Consequently, they eschewed Hutu nationalism 
and adopted a more “cosmopolitan” relation to difference. 
 The relationship between camp life and national ideology, identified by Malkki at 
Mishamo  and corroborated in its main point by subsequent research on other camps,12 is 
                                                 
10 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998) p. 123. 
11 Liisa Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in 
Tanzania, (University of Chicago Press, 1995). 
12 Jennifer Hyndman, Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000); Michel Agier, “Between War and City: Towards 
an Urban Anthropology of Refugee Camps,” Ethnography. 3,3 (2002), pp. 317-366; Michel Agier, On 
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central to claims made about the SWAPO camps here. As people fled Namibia for exile, 
they entered a space in which food, shelter, clothing, medicine and weapons – all 
resources necessary for their survival and for fighting a war –  were accessed by virtue of 
their association with a Namibian nation. They also became targets of South African 
violence due to their physical presence in a space administered by the Namibian 
nationalist organization challenging South African rule. Under the circumstances, “the 
nation” became the primary medium of social relations in “the camp,” irrespective of 
inhabitants' particular relationships to national and other ideologies before entering and 
their particular experiences while living there.  
 Nonetheless, the work of Malkki and others focused on camps does little to 
consider how social hierarchies within nations may develop in the camp space. As argued 
here, such hierarchies are a salient feature of the SWAPO camps, where commanders, 
and the internationally recognized leaders who granted them authority, were responsible 
for distributing material resources to most Namibian exiles. Through the control of 
movement and knowledge accessible to camp inhabitants, SWAPO officials also wielded 
considerable power to define who was working for and against the nation's interests. 
Those already culturally marked within the Namibian exile community were particularly 
vulnerable to accusations made by officials taking advantage of their positions and by 
other camp inhabitants trying to curry favor with elites. In this manner, the hierarchy of 
leaders, commanders and others, inherent to the structure of the camp, further 
differentiated itself according to social categories such as region, language, ethnicity, 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Margins of the World: The Refugee Experience Today (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2008); Aihwa 
Ong, The Buddha is Hiding: Refugees, Citizenship and the New America, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2003); Zygmunt Bauman, Wasted Lives: Modernity and its Outcasts. (Cambridge: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2004). 
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race, gender and class.   
 To some extent, Malkki and others' focus on how camps produce national 
communities, rather than hierarchies within nations, may be attributed to the kind of 
camps which they have studied. To date,  ethnographic literature on camps examines 
almost exclusively camps of refugees.13 Whereas Southern Africa's liberation movement 
camps were governed directly by the movements themselves often with little or no 
oversight from external donors, refugee camps are usually administered directly by a host 
nation and/or transnational humanitarian agencies. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
studies of refugee camps primarily consider the hierarchy of governed refugees and 
governing foreigners rather than on  divisions and inequalities developing among the 
refugees themselves.14 Mention of social differentiation among refugee communities is 
not entirely absent from the ethnographic literature. As Ilana Feldman argues, services 
delivered to refugees and others “in crisis” are, by nature, hierarchical, strengthening the 
authority not only of the governing body responsible for administering aid but also of the 
social networks through which aid is administered.15 Michel Agier and Aihwa Ong 
consider how such networks form in the particular camps which they study, noting how 
various groups of refugees access sources of capital from outside the camp and privileges 
                                                 
13 In his book Space in the Tropics: From Convicts to Rockets in French Guiana (Berkely: University of 
California Press, 2000), Peter Redfield considers life among French Guiana's prisoners, who were also 
organized in camps (pp. 76-108).  
14 See, for example, Liisa Malkki's discussion of the hierarchy that forms at Mishamo between the 
Burundian Hutu refugees governed in the camp and the Tanzanian officials authorized by the UN to 
govern them (1995, pp. 105-152), Jennifer Hyndman's of how refugee camps are “structured according 
to supralocal understandings of local needs” (2000, pp. 87-116), Aihwa Ong's of the relationships that 
formed among representatives of humanitarian agencies, Thai soldiers and the Cambodian refugees 
whom she studies (2003, pp.48-65) and Michel Agier's of relations among refugees and NGO workers 
in the Somali camp Dadaab (Agier 2002, pp. 324-332; 2008, pp. 50-57).  
15 Ilana Feldman, Governing Gaza: Bureaucracy, Authority and the Work of Rule, 1917-1967 (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2008). The formation of hierarchy through aid delivery is a central theme in 
Feldman's chapter titled “Service in Crisis” (pp. 123-154). 
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from administrators within it.16 These and other studies do not focus on the hierarchies 
that form among camp populations, however – perhaps because the social differences 
within these camps are negligible in comparison to the “powerlessness and uselessness” 
experienced by all the refugees who live there.17  
 It may also be, however, that the structures shaping knowledge produced in 
national communities inflect scholars' and their interlocutors' representations of camps. 
As Mia Green notes in her review of Purity and Exile, Liisa Malkki does not consider the 
possibility that her research participants, most of them highly politicized, adult men, may 
have used the camp to propagate their narratives of the Hutu nation at the expense of 
competing histories.18 If the camp, rather than the town, was the site in which such 
histories were articulated, it may be a reflection not only of the national ideology that 
formed there, but also of the ability of certain people to control the representations of 
camp and nation which Malkki heard within this space.  
 Certainly, representations of the SWAPO camps have been dominated by this 
organization and its supporters during the liberation struggle, who repeatedly presented 
the camps as models of and for a national community. As SWAPO wrote in its first 
proposal to establish a “Namibian Health and Education Centre” outside Lusaka in 1973: 
“The philosophical basis of this Center is to germinate a model nuclear community which 
would form a foundation for the future Namibian society... Through the project... 
SWAPO envisages to reorient Namibians with different cultural, social and educational 
                                                 
16 Agier 2002, pp. 329-332; Agier 2008, pp. 53-57; Ong 2003, pp. 53-55. 
17 Agier 2002, p. 329. 
18 Mia Green, “Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in 
Tanzania – Book Review,” Journal of Southern African Studies 23, 2 (1997), pp. 386-388. 
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backgrounds towards the ideals of one Namibia, one People and one Nation.”19 Similarly, 
the church, humanitarian and solidarity organizations supporting SWAPO in exile 
repeatedly portrayed its camps as sites where Namibians were transcending social 
barriers to create a nation of unified and committed citizens. Camp inhabitants were said 
to share work tasks  according to their abilities and material items according to their 
needs, which were met with remarkable efficiency despite the circumstances in which 
exiles lived. Women were taking a leading role in running the camps and accessing levels 
of education that previously had only been available to men. Tribal divisions, through 
which the apartheid regime had divided Africans, had become insignificant, if they 
retained any meaning at all. There were also differences in how SWAPO and its allies 
described the camps, particularly as they played to some audiences which saw SWAPO 
members primarily as “freedom fighters” and others which were more ambivalent about 
SWAPO's military aims but accepted that Namibian exiles needed assistance as 
“refugees.”20 Allies, however, consistently presented the camps as sites where a new, 
healthy nation was developing under SWAPO's care. As authors from UNICEF put it 
following a visit to the SWAPO camp at Cassinga, “Their speeches, their songs, their 
processions, the defence of their camps and the organization of their health services, their 
education and sanitation bore witness to or were presage of what an independent Namibia 
would be.”21   
 On the other hand, the camps were sharply criticized by those challenging 
                                                 
19 UNAM, Katjavivi Collection, Series B1, Category 2, “Namibian Educational and Health Centre,” 1973, 
p. 3.  
20 SWAPO also made efforts to reconcile these images, by defining “the Namibian refugee” as its own 
category, encompassing both the qualities of “refugees” and “freedom fighters”  (e.g. SWAPO, “The 
Namibian Refugee” (Luanda: SWAPO Dept. of Information and Publicity, 1988)). 
21 NAN, File A.614, UNICEF Area Office Brazzaville, “Report on a mission to swapo centres for 
namibian refugees in angola from 10 to 14 april 1978,” p. 7. 
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SWAPO's authority to represent “the Namibian people.” Although dissident views were 
expressed as early as the 1960s among Namibians living in the first SWAPO camp at 
Kongwa,22 during the 1970s and '80s they became more widely spread as those who had 
left SWAPO were dispersed abroad and as parties participating in and organizations 
supporting the government inside Namibia drew from them to undermine their main 
political rival. In 1985 a German human rights organization, the Internationalle 
Gesellschaft für Menschenrechte (IGFM), gained international attention when it issued a 
report challenging the idea that SWAPO was administering “refugee camps,” appealing 
to images of Nazi Germany to suggest that they were, in fact, “concentration camps” and 
“breeding camps.”23 There, people were said to suffer from hunger and poor health. 
Conditions were especially bad for those who were falsely accused of being “dissidents” 
or “spies” by leaders motivated by tribal interests and the pursuit of pure power. Women 
were also badly mistreated, forced to have sex with officials and to bear children, who 
were taken from them shortly after birth and indoctrinated into the party. Importantly, all 
these claims were based on the accounts of Namibians who had lived in the camps 
themselves. And yet, Namibian voices and eye-witness accounts were no less central to 
the dominant camp discourse as organizations sent representatives to the camps to see 
them for themselves and to write reports dismissing SWAPO's critics.    
   Scholarship on SWAPO and other liberation movement camps has also been 
shaped by national politics. Since the mid-1970s, when the national liberation movements 
first presented a formidable challenge to white minority rule in Southern Africa, the 
                                                 
22 For a discussion of Kongwa, see the section titled “Tate Nepelilo” in Chapter 6. 
23 IGFM, “Namibia: Human Rights in Conflict” (Frankfurt am Main, 1985). IGFM also had chapters in 
London and New York which were known as the International Society for Human Rights (ISHR) 
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concept of resistance has dominated the region's historiography.24  While liberation 
movement camps have been incorporated into national resistance histories written shortly 
before or after the region's countries achieved independence, camp life has not been the 
focus of any scholarly work.25 This omission is striking when one considers that the 
liberation movements, now ruling parties, first governed their citizens in camps, and it 
suggests that camps might reveal tensions within nations that are difficult to incorporate 
into a national resistance narrative. In the academy only political scientists have directly 
challenged resistance narratives of the recent Southern African past. Drawing from John 
Marcum's seminal work,26 they highlight how “the politics of exile” pushed liberation 
movements to focus their energies more on garnering external assistance than on 
mobilizing grass-roots support and, as a result, to concentrate power in the hands of 
foreign donors and those leaders who lobbied them.27 This literature, however, makes 
                                                 
24  Several works were particularly significant in developing this resistance historiography: Charles Van 
Onselen, Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia 1900-1933, (London: Pluto Press, 1976); 
Allen Isaacman, The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1976); Shula Marks and Richard Rathbone, eds., Industrialization and Social Change in South Africa: 
African Class Formation, Culture, and Consciousness, 1870-1930 (New York: Longman, 1982). In 
Namibia the central works were SWAPO, To Be Born A Nation: The Liberation Struggle for Namibia. 
(London: Zed Press, 1981) and Peter Katjavivi, A History of Resistance in Namibia (London: James 
Currey, 1988). 
25 In Kupilikula: Governance and the Invisible Realm in Mozambique (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005), Harry West discusses the “settlements” and “bases” in the liberated zones of northeastern 
Mozambique (pp. 133-163). Although the discussion is tangential to his larger arguments and does not 
consider exile camps specifically, it does offer insight into how social relations were shaped in a similar 
kind of space.  
26  John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Volume 2: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1978); “The Exile Condition and Revolutionary Effectiveness: Southern African Liberation 
Movements,” in Christian Potholm and Richard Dale, eds. Southern Africa in Perspective (New York: 
Free Press, 1979).  
27  For “the politics of exile” literature on SWAPO, see Franz Ansprenger, Die SWAPO: Profil einer 
afrikanischen Befreiungsbewegung (Mainz 1984); Lauren Dobell, Swapo’s Struggle for Namibia, 1960-
1991: War by Other Means (Basel: P. Schlettwein Publishing, 1991); Colin Leys and John Saul, 
Namibia’s Liberation Struggle: The Two Edged Sword, (London: James Currey, 1995). Justine Hunter 
is another political scientist who challenges official representations of Namibia's liberation struggle 
although her work (“Die Politik der Erinnerung und des Vergessens in Namibia seit der staatlichen 
Unabhängigkeit” (Doctoral Thesis, Universität Freiburg, 2005); Die Politik der Erinnerung und des 
Vergessens in Namibia: Umgang mit schweren Menschenrechtsverletzungen der Ära des bewaffneten 
Befreiungskampfes, 1966 bis 1989 (Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 2008)) draws more from recent 
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only passing mention of the camps in which most exiles lived, dismissing stereotypes 
about them without reconciling conflicting images or considering how camps relate to 
exile politics.  
 This piece not only focuses attention on life within liberation movement camps, 
but it also suggests a method for conducting research in and about this kind of space. 
Drawing from the premise that socially accepted representations of camps are constrained 
by the national political order in which they are produced, it maintains that this same 
order also evokes more complex images as citizens relate to one another in a national 
community. Studying camps, therefore, requires accessing or creating sites in which these 
complicating images may form. “Living in Exile” was an attempt to create such a site. 
Drawing from photos of daily life in camps and stories told to me about them during 
interviews with people who had lived there, the exhibition presented aspects of exiles' 
experiences that extend beyond national history or a counter-narrative which undermines 
it. Through the exhibit I hoped to encourage viewers to acknowledge these experiences 
and to articulate others which they thought were also worthy of recognition. At times 
“Living in Exile” seemed to achieve these goals, when pictures and captions elicited 
histories known only to narrow communities of exiles or when viewers discussed what is 
and is not said in public about what camp life was like. At others it appeared to fail, such 
as when people answered my questions about photos by reading from the captions which 
I had written or refused to engage with the images on the premise that they might threaten 
the ruling party or be endorsed by it at the expense of another group. The remark about 
the picture of Lubango seems to reflect both the success and failure of “Living in Exile,” 
an exhibit which could provoke a viewer to speak in public about one controversial 
                                                                                                                                                 
literature on “transitional justice” (see chapter 6) than it does from “the politics of exile.” 
 23 
history but which could not persuade her to consider another, which has also shaped her 
life in ways that she may not know.  
 Certainly, there are differences in the specific methods that may be employed to 
study camps in the past, like those considered here, and camps in the present, like those 
examined by most anthropologists. In a field-site such as Mishamo, where inhabitants are 
confined to the camp and the researcher permitted to visit them only at predetermined 
times and locations,28 there are likely to be limits to the views one can access about how 
people are getting along in the camp that do not confine the work of someone able to visit 
research participants in a variety of settings outside the camp itself. To be sure, moving 
with former exiles across contexts elicited perspectives considered in this dissertation that 
would have been inaccessible if my work had been restricted to sites where interlocutors 
felt threatened to express views diverging from national elites. From this perspective, 
spatial and temporal distance may offer a better vantage point from which “to see” the 
camp than if one were an eye-witness, better acoustics in which  “to hear” it than if one 
were listening to people talk inside that space.  
 Nonetheless, as anthropologists have often noted, ethnography, by its nature, 
presents opportunity for creating new sites of knowledge production. As the researcher 
interacts with research subjects over months or years in “the field,” pre-existing social 
relations are altered, rapport is established and networks are built which may open new 
vistas on social phenomena. Throughout the process the ethnographer is never a 
dispassionate observer in a static environment, but rather, as Johannes Fabian 
                                                 
28 Malkki discusses several conditions that shaped her fieldwork. These included regulations which made 
it necessary for her to leave the refugees before sunset and return to her assigned house, located next to 
the Settlement Commandant, and the refugees' sense that they were under surveillance, a sense which  
influenced both how Malkki was perceived by the refugees and how the refugees would and would not 
gather in groups (1995, pp. 47-51).   
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emphasizes, “a provider of occasions” involved in an on-going “conversation” with 
interlocutors.29 It follows that occasions which the researcher provides influence the 
quality of the dialogue which unfolds. “Living in Exile,” and this dissertation more 
generally, suggest ways in which a researcher might initiate a conversation about camps 
which is more intellectually rich and socially engaged than previous studies. For while 
the exhibit could not have been assembled or displayed in a SWAPO camp twenty years 
ago, its approach to knowledge production – presenting viewers with images which do 
not overtly threaten, but which do evade, narration in a national history – might be 
applied to study contemporary camps and similar settings where representations are 
deeply embedded in a nation.   
 
Chapter Summaries 
 This ethnography of the SWAPO camps begins with a study of Cassinga, the 
camp at the center of Namibia's national narrative. Since May 4, 1978, the day the South 
Africans attacked this site in southern Angola, Cassinga has been described by opposing 
sides in the Namibian liberation struggle as either a “refugee” or a “military” camp. In 
contrast, this chapter focuses on everyday life at Cassinga before the attack, drawing 
from stories told about its two administrative offices: a PLAN office involved in 
transferring combatants, supplies and information to and from the front and a camp office 
which administered new exiles arriving from Namibia who had received no military 
training. In so doing, the piece undermines the competing national histories that have 
defined Cassinga, each of which excludes the claims made by the other. At the same 
time, it illuminates the hierarchical national social structure which pushes histories of 
                                                 
29 Johannes Fabian, Power and Performance (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), pp. 4-7. 
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Cassinga towards a binary opposition and obscures other perspectives on the camp. The 
chapter thereby moves discussion of Cassinga from a set of questions about a particular 
camp in the past, to others about how one might study this and similar sites in the presen t. 
 Chapters 3 and 4 trace how the national hierarchy which shapes “Cassinga” and 
other Namibian histories formed in the camp space. Chapter 3 considers the development 
of this hierarchy through a narrative of the Namibian exile community, following its 
development from “the exodus,” when thousands of Namibians migrated into Zambia 
after the collapse of the Portuguese empire in 1974, through “the crisis,” when hundreds 
of SWAPO members were detained by the Zambian government at SWAPO leaders' 
request in 1976. By focusing on social practices in particular camps during this time, the 
chapter highlights the extent to which the camp enabled SWAPO officials to shape group 
allegiances and manage conflicts that developed between them. In so doing, the piece 
offers a new perspective not only on how some SWAPO members consolidated power 
during a period when their authority was contested, but also on qualities of camps which 
may empower other national elites who live in this kind of social space.  
 Chapter 4 further examines the formation of a Namibian national hierarchy 
through “the spy,” an invisible power used to explain events and legitimate cruelty in the 
SWAPO camps. There, where inhabitants were constantly at risk of South African 
violence, SWAPO officials drew from their control over public discourse to focus 
attention on the dangers emanating from outside the camp, which they were authorized to 
address as national leaders, and away from the dangers generated within them, which 
could implicate their leadership. At the same time, they played off of the ambiguities 
surrounding who spies were and how they accomplished their work to heighten fears and 
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direct them towards people already marginalized inside camps. To develop this point, the 
chapter draws from recent anthropological literature on witchcraft, which foregrounds the 
social conditions in which explanations for life's “unfortunate events” become plausible 
and powerful. It then applies this perspective to SWAPO's camps generally and the mass 
detention of spies in Lubango during the 1980s particularly, highlighting how spy purges 
need not have resulted primarily from the infiltration of spies or the manipulation of 
accusations about spies when “the spy” wielded such power in the camps. 
 Chapters 5 and 6 shift the dissertation's discussion from social hierarchies formed 
in SWAPO camps to histories told about them, which have sustained and subverted the 
hierarchies that formed there. Chapter 5 highlights efforts to challenge accepted histories 
about the SWAPO camps. First, it studies the Committee of Parents, a group of relatives 
of those detained as “spies” in Lubango, and how the Committee and its claims were 
discredited during the 1980s. Then it considers the Lubango “ex-detainees” following 
their repatriation in July 1989 until Namibia’s democratic elections the following 
November. Finally, it examines the Breaking the Wall of Silence Movement formed by 
some ex-detainees and others following the publication of a book about their experiences 
in 1995 and 1996. By juxtaposing the production of histories by these three groups at 
three points in time, the piece not only highlights, as several other publications have, the 
extent to which certain individuals and organizations obscured truth claims about 
SWAPO in exile, but also the power of the international political order to define socially 
acceptable and unacceptable histories over time and space.  
 Chapter 6 focuses attention on the state-sanctioned reconciliation discourse in 
Namibia, which legitimates a particular history of exile and shapes the terms on which all 
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Namibians relate to one another. The piece begins with an analysis of my interview with 
Tate Nepelilo, a man whose experiences are not only excluded from exile history, but 
also fall outside the awareness of most Namibian former exiles and who has, as a result, 
been abandoned by his family and the government. It is followed by the funeral service 
for Emil Appolus at Vaalgras and how controversies surrounding Appolus' and other 
local exile histories create tensions within this community and impair the ability of its 
members to make claims on the state. It concludes with a discussion of responses to 
“Living in Exile” and how viewers' reactions to it highlighted aspects of their relationship 
to other Namibians, including resentment and mistrust of various social groups and 
alienation from the national community. Through these cases, the chapter highlights not 
only how Namibians have been disadvantaged by a history of exile which does not 
acknowledge their experiences, but also how they use stigmatized histories to assert their 
position within a national community. In so doing, it problematizes the idea of “victims” 
whose histories have been “silent,” suggesting instead the need to study the terms on 
which people establish social relations through national history in and across social 
spaces. 
 Finally, Chapter 7 concludes by examining the relationship between the histories 
which Namibians and others tell about their nations and the texts which scholars write 
about national histories. As I observe, a tension exists in historical writing between the 
process of deconstructing a national narrative and of constructing a new one. Rather than 
attempt to write a new national history here, I have drawn from Namibian exiles' stories 
to highlight paradoxical qualities inherent to national history. Although this approach 
does not extricate this dissertation from the processes through which Namibians 
 28 
remember their past, it does suggest ways of approaching national history which are less 
likely to affirm nations than initiate critical thought about them and create space for 






     Chapter 2 
The Production of National History: Remember Cassinga? 
 Of Namibia's exile histories, none have been more significant for defining a 
national community than those told about the South African attack of May 4, 1978 on 
Cassinga, a SWAPO camp in southern Angola. Within a few days of the attack, news had 
spread through the exile community and around the world about the raid on SWAPO's 
“refugee camp,” which had left at least 600 dead and hundreds more wounded. In the 
years that have followed, Cassinga has been invoked by many Namibians to highlight the 
brutality not only of the South African regime on that day but also of colonialism more 
generally, the bravery of those who resisted it and, since independence, the magnanimity 
of those who have reconciled with their former oppressors. Meanwhile the former South 
African government dispersed its own version of events according to which it had 
attacked Cassinga “military camp,” a legitimate target. Some former paratroopers who 
participated in the raid continue to commemorate the attack on Cassinga quietly, 
remembering those who died and the tactical feat of having accomplished a difficult 
airborne assault.  
 In these and other contexts,30 threads of memory about Cassinga the event hang 
on claims that define Cassinga the camp as “refugee” or “military.” And while the 
historiography of  Cassinga pushes beyond these simplistic descriptions, scholars 
                                                 
30 The attack on Cassinga was also frequently invoked to support assertions that there were enemy agents 
working within the exile community since, allegedly, the attack could only have been accomplished 
with the aid of spies. For more information, see Chapter 4. 
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continue to employ the same language that confounds a more complicated understanding 
of the communities that developed in and around the camp. For example, in The Cassinga 
Event, the first scholarly monograph written about Cassinga,31 Annemarie Heywood 
observes that people inside the camp included “women and children, and adults too old or 
unfit for active combat” and that “most were teenagers in search of educational 
opportunities.”32 At the same time the camp “was under strict military control and was 
run on military lines” and  “appears to have been guarded by a unit of 200-300 armed 
cadres who had at their disposal two anti-aircraft guns.”33 Despite these and other 
observations that seem to defy a definitive application of words like military and refugee 
to describe Cassinga, Heywood concludes her discussion by stating, “There can be no 
doubt at all that [Cassinga]... was not primarily a PLAN establishment. Contrary to the 
South African version, it was not a heavily armed military strong-hold but essentially a 
well-established and orderly semi-permanent settlement for non-combatants who... had 
found uneasy refuge in a neighboring country.”34 Edward Alexander's master's thesis, 
“The Cassinga Raid,” the first scholarly piece to examine South African Defence Force 
(SADF) military archives, argues that at the least South Africa's operational planners 
thought “the objective they were attacking at Cassinga was a critically important and 
purely military installation” while also noting that “there were refugees at Cassinga.”35 
                                                 
31 Annemarie Heywood, The Cassinga Event: An Investigation of the Records (Windhoek: National 
Archives, 1994), pp. 5-9. Heywood was initially part of a group project sponsored by Swedish 
International Development Agency (SIDA) to write a book about Cassinga. The other researchers 
published their work separately from her own: Mvula ya Nangolo and Tör Sellstrom, Kassinga: A Story 
Untold (Windhoek: Namibia Book Development Council, 1995). SWAPO and the South African 
government published shorter pieces about Cassinga prior to Namibian independence in 1990. Some of 
these are discussed in the section of this chapter titled “Remember Cassinga?” 
32 Heywood 1994, p. 20. 
33 Heywood 1994, pp. 22, 23. 
34 Heywood 1994, p. 22. 
35 Edward George McGill Alexander, “The Cassinga Raid,” (MA Thesis, University of South Africa, 
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Other seminal pieces on the Namibian liberation struggle render Cassinga in similar 
language. Colin Leys and John Saul indicate that Army Commander Dimo Hamaambo 
had established PLAN's “Command Headquarters” at Cassinga in 1976 but that as many 
as 600 “civilians” died in the attack on the camp two years later because by that date it 
had become “a reception and transit camp for the continuing flow of exiles.”36  Justine 
Hunter organizes her discussion of Cassinga around evidence that suggests that Cassinga 
could not have been “purely military” or “purely civilian.”37 The South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) also offers a thorough critique of common 
representations of Cassinga, concluding ultimately that “Kassinga was thus both a 
military base and a refugee camp.”38 
 This chapter examines the SWAPO camp at Cassinga without using “refugee,” 
“military” or similar terms to describe it. For while these words have been useful for 
people seeking meaning in and justification for their relationship to the event that took 
place at Cassinga on May 4, 1978 they are an impediment to understanding the camp of 
Namibians that lived there and the broader communities of which it was a part. In 
contrast, this piece draws from available sources, including interviews with the surviving 
commanders who established and administered the camp and whose views have not been 
incorporated into previous written accounts, to offer a history of Cassinga from its 
                                                                                                                                                 
2003), pp. 49, 52-60. 
36 Colin Leys & John Saul, Namibia's Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword (London: James 
Currey, 1995), pp. 53, 54, 63. 
37 Justine Hunter, Die Politik der Erinnerung und des Vergessens in Namibia: Umgang mit schweren 
Menschenrechtsverletzungen der Ära des bewaffneten Befreiungskampfes, 1966 bis 1989 (Frankfurt am 
Main: P. Lang, 2008), pp. 57-58. 
38 TRC, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Volume 2, p. 50. The TRC is not 
alone in referring to “Kassinga” with a “K.” This use, common in many of the denotations of the camp 
following the South African raid, may derive from the German spelling since Krupp, a German firm, 
owned the mine at the time of Angola's independence (Gaetano Pagano, Letter in “The Kassinga File,” 
(Geneva: International University Exchange Fund, 1978); Alexander 2003, p. 41). There was a sign in 
the camp, however, that spelled Cassinga with a “C” and Angola's and Namibia's current governments 
both refer to Cassinga with a “C.” 
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founding in mid-1976 until May 3rd, 1978. The chapter particularly focuses on the 
development of two administrative offices at Cassinga: a PLAN office involved in 
transferring combatants, supplies and information to and from the front and a camp office 
which administered new exiles from Namibia that had received no military training. In so 
doing, the piece highlights the limits of the vocabulary foisted onto Cassinga in the 
aftermath of the attack. Moreover, it offers context for considering why, even since 
Namibian independence, histories of Cassinga remain fixed on a binary opposition that 
obscures what transpired at that place, suggesting that the binary and the means of 
challenging it are part of the structure of national history itself.   
 
A History of Cassinga 
 The origins of the SWAPO camp at Cassinga must be understood  in relation to 
the shift in  PLAN's base of operations from Zambia to Angola in 1976. Although by 
early 1975 the first PLAN combatants had begun to operate out of southern Angola,39 it 
was only in March 1976, after South Africa had withdrawn from Angolan territory, that 
SWAPO officially recognized the MPLA as the sovereign government of Angola and 
began to coordinate its military activities in the country with it.40 In the same month 
SWAPO transported the first group of PLAN combatants from the front in Southwestern 
Zambia to Dar es Salaam, from where they were flown first to Luanda and then to 
Huambo, Angola's second largest urban center. There they resided on a farm on the 
                                                 
39 Andreas Shipanga, In Search of Freedom (Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing, 1989), pp. 102-103; Andreas 
Shipanga, Interview 20.3.2007, pp. 5-6; Darius “Mbolondondo” Shikongo, Interview 26.3.2007, p. 2; 
Immanuel Engombe, Junius Ikondja, Ndamono Ndeulita and Hizipo Shikondombolo, Interview 
29.7.2007, p.  24. 
40 For more details about SWAPO's relationship to the Angolan liberation movements during the Angolan 
Civil War, see Chapter 3. 
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outskirts of the city, where they were joined by other PLAN combatants, some of whom 
were assigned to report to Huambo from the Zambian front and others which had been 
stationed with UNITA units, which they left in the course of Angola's 1975-1976 Civil 
War.41   
 At some point in April 1976, after SWAPO managed to secure and deliver a cache 
of weapons to the PLAN combatants assembled at Huambo,42 the first groups departed 
for the Angolan front, a network of mobile camps near the Namibian border to the west 
and east of Ondjiva. It is in conjunction with these trips  that Namibian exiles appear to 
have had their first encounter with Cassinga.43 According to Ben Ulenga, who was a 
member of the first group of combatants to leave Huambo, the trucks transporting him 
and his comrades to the front drove through Cassinga, a village located about halfway 
between Huambo and the Namibian border. It was nighttime and the truck stopped just 
south of Cassinga proper where Ulenga was assigned to stand on guard until the trucks 
moved on in the morning. Ulenga recalls that at that time, “There was actually no 
Cassinga. There was Cassinga on the map, there was a village, but we were totally 
uninterested in it because there were no Namibians living there.”44  
 Some weeks later, after several more groups had traveled from Huambo through 
Cassinga en route to the front, a group of PLAN soldiers led by Army Commander Dimo 
Hamaambo moved to Cassinga.45 According to Charles “Ho Chi Minh” Namoloh and 
Mwetufa “Cabral” Mupopiwa, both of whom accompanied Hamaambo to Cassinga in the 
                                                 
41 Mwetufa “Cabral” Mupopiwa, Interview 26.7.2008; Charles “Ho Chi Minh” Namoloh, Interview 
19.6.2008; Ben Ulenga, Interview 12.6.2008. 
42 According to Namoloh and Ulenga these weapons were given by the Nigerian government to President 
Nujoma (Namoloh 19.6.20; Ulenga 12.6.2008). 
43 Namoloh 19.6.2008; Ulenga 12.6.2008. 
44 Ulenga 12.6.2008. 
45 Theopholus Kalimba, Interview 2.9.2007; Mupopiwa 26.7.2008; Namoloh 19.6.2008. 
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first group from Huambo, when they arrived, the village was empty.46 Although there 
were subsistence farmers living across the Cuilonga River about 1 kilometer to the west, 
no people were living at Cassinga itself or on the low-lying hill on which it is situated. 
Nonetheless, the former inhabitants, who had been workers and administrators at a 
nearby iron mine before they fled during the Angolan Civil War,47  had left perhaps 
twenty brick buildings, which may have been used previously as offices, dormitories and 
warehouses.48 There was also a wide dirt road lined with gum trees that passed through 
the middle of the village, connecting Cassinga with Jamba (50 km) and the Angolan 
interior to the north and Techamutete (16 km) and the Namibian border 260 km to the 
south.   
 The fact that the first Namibians who resided at Cassinga indicate that the village 
was empty at the time of their arrival lends credibility to the widely accepted theory that 
the Angolan government gave Cassinga to SWAPO because it had been abandoned by its 
former inhabitants. The often associated claim that the government granted Cassinga to 
SWAPO because SWAPO requested a site where it could receive its “refugees” fleeing 
                                                 
46 T. Kalimba 2.9.2007; Namoloh 19.6.2008; Mupopiwa 26.7.2008.  
47 Heywood 1994, pp. 17, 20; Alexander 2003, p. 41; Pagano letter in “The Kassinga File.” Heywood 
indicates that Cassinga was “built around a deposit of high-grade iron ore.” According to Alexander and 
several sources he cites, the mine was closer to Techamutete, the town 16 kilometers to the south of 
Cassinga. Pagano writes that “originally Kassinga was inhabited by a few thousand Angolans, mostly 
workers at the iron mines in Techamutete 16 km away. The mines, once owned by Krupp and Japanese 
steel interests, never resumed work after the war and so Kassinga... had remained an empty town.”  
48 Heywood (1994) indicates that in colonial days Cassinga consisted “of a sprawl of houses and mine 
buildings” (p. 17). Pagano refers to “three or four brick houses and hundreds of straw and adobe huts” 
that had remained empty since the start of the war (letter in “The Kassinga File”). Alexander indicates 
that based on SADF aerial photographs Cassinga had no more than 30 permanent buildings in 1978 (pp. 
41-42). I draw my conclusions not only from interviews with Charles Namoloh (19.6.2008) and 
Mwetufa Mupopiwa (26.7.2008), but also from Canner Kalimba (Interviews 1.4.2007; 13.6.2007) and 
Darius “Mbolondondo” Shikongo (Interviews 26.3.2007; 11.6.2007; 20.8.2007; 3.9.2007), both of 
whom arrived at Cassinga shortly after Namibians took up residence there, and a trip that I took with 
Canner and Theopholus Kalimba to Cassinga in September 2007. Namoloh indicates that he thinks that 
some of the buildings that he found at Cassinga were dormitories. Shikongo refers to warehouses which 
were filled with timber that were cleared after his arrival (26.3.2007, pp. 4, 15). 
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from Namibia does not, however, follow.49 According to both Namoloh and Mupopiwa, 
the first Namibian inhabitants of Cassinga consisted entirely of trained PLAN 
combatants. Some of these were soldiers preparing to travel to the front. For example, 
Namoloh indicates that  other PLAN combatants who had been based with him at 
Huambo followed him to Cassinga where they waited for SWAPO to supply them with 
weapons. After some days, these weapons arrived and the soldiers moved to the front.50 
Meanwhile new groups, which had previously been stationed in Zambia, were arriving in 
Huambo. When they were armed, usually in Huambo, they too were transported in 
SWAPO trucks to the front, often stopping at Cassinga for a night en route.51 Eventually, 
a more permanent PLAN defense unit was established at the camp.52 
 Namoloh and Mupopiwa were given a special assignment at Cassinga: to help 
Dimo Hamaambo establish an administrative office for PLAN.53 The office was located 
in a Portuguese colonial edifice with white walls, red-tiled roofs and a wide archway 
supported on pillars located to the west of the main road on the southern side of the 
camp.54 Initially five people worked there: Hamaambo, his personal body guard and 
                                                 
49 E.g. The TRC Report states: “The site [Cassinga] was allocated to SWAPO by the Angolan government 
in 1976, after an appeal for help to cope with an inflow of thousands of refugees” (Volume 2, Chapter 2, 
p. 50). This claim, which is not supported with a citation, is, at the very least, problematic.  
50 Namoloh 19.6.2008. 
51 Namoloh 19.6.2008; Mupopiwa 26.7.2008. 
52 Namholo 19.6.2008; D. Shikongo 26.3.2007, p. 17; 11.6.2007, p. 42; Jesaya Nyamu, Interview 
3.4.2008, p. 19; Mwaanga Paulus Ngodji, cited in Alexander 2003, p. 49. Alexander discounts the often 
cited number of 30 personnel defending Cassinga, noting that “even pro-SWAPO sources put the figure 
at 200-300.” Nonetheless, the cited SWAPO officials, including a commander in the PLAN office, a 
commander in the camp office and a high ranking political official, all indicate that the number was less 
than 100. In these and other discussions of the defense unit at Cassinga, numbers are cited  in 
conjunction with stories about the PLAN presence at the time of the South African attack. No mention 
is made of when the defense unit was established exactly and any fluctuation in its numbers over time.  
53 Namoloh 19.6.2008; Mupopiwa 26.7.2008. 
54 Eventually some or all of the PLAN office's administrative work was transferred to a brick building that 
Cassinga inhabitants constructed for Hamaambo along a small road leading west of the main road that 
runs through Cassinga. Namoloh and Mupopiwa, however, had left Cassinga before Hamaambo's house 
was built (C. and T. Kalimba, 2.9.2007, pp. 2,3; D. Shikongo 11.6.2007; 3.9.2007, p. 69; Nyamu 
3.4.2007, p. 17; Namoloh 19.6.2008).  
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driver, Namoloh and Mupopiwa.55 Of these only Hamaambo, Namoloh and Mupopiwa 
were involved in the office's administrative work.56 Working out of their bedroom at the 
office,57 Namoloh and Mupopiwa began to record and file information about PLAN 
operations along the Angolan-Namibian border, such as where they took place, who was 
involved and who died in combat, as well as logistical matters, such as supplies of 
weapons, food and medicine. To accomplish this task without access to radio 
communication required both of them to drive frequently to and from the front.58 At the 
same time, they were communicating information that they gathered at the front to 
various officials and transporting requested supplies back there. To accomplish this 
communication and transport work, the office maintained a division of labor. Namoloh 
took most of the trips to the front and to Huambo, where most of the maize-meal for 
soldiers at the front was purchased.59 Mupopiwa, who had grown up partially in Angola 
and was fluent in Portuguese, was responsible for communicating with the Angolans. His 
tasks included corresponding with people administering the Angolan warehouses in 
Luanda, where donations of weapons and food arrived, by sending letters on trucks 
traveling to and from the Angolan capital. He was also in regular contact with Cuban 
                                                 
55  Later they were joined by PLAN Political Commissar Greenwell Matongo, who moved to Cassinga in 
late 1976 or early 1977 (Namoloh 19.6.2008; Mupopiwa 26.7.2008; Nyamu 3.4.2008). 
56 Namoloh 19.6.2008; Mupopiwa 26.7.2008. It should be noted that Hamaambo died in 2002 (and 
Matongo who later joined the PLAN office died in exile). Therefore, according to their testimony, 
Namoloh and Mupopiwa are the only two living persons with knowledge of the work done in and by the 
PLAN office during its first months.  
57 Namoloh recalls: “When I was there, we were... in this one administration [building]. It was both the 
office and where we were sleeping. Dimo [Hamaambo] was sleeping there, Green[well Matongo] was 
sleeping there, I was sleeping there, “Cabral” [Mwetufa Mupopiwa] was sleeping there. With Cabral [I 
was] sleeping in a very small – it was a kitchen I think. It should have been a kitchen. And we were 
sleeping there. He was sleeping on the stretch and I was sleeping also on the stretch.  So we were 
sharing this. And I had a table there, and I had a typewriter on that table, and I was typing on that table. 
It was the same, our office and our sleeping room.” (Namoloh 19.6.2008). 
58 Namoloh 19.6.2008; Mupopiwa 26.7.2008. Namoloh, Mupopiwa and D. Shikongo (26.3.2007) recall 
that at some point while they were at Cassinga, probably in early 1977, commanders at Cassinga began 
to access other commanders at the front and officials in Lubango and Luanda via radio communication.   
59 Namoloh 19.6.2008; Mupopiwa 26.7.2008. 
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soldiers based at Techamutete, who had maintained a base there since shortly after the 
Cubans' entry into Angola in 1975 and were assisting the Namibians at Cassinga with 
logistical support. After SWAPO Defense Headquarters was founded outside Lubango in 
late 1976 or early 1977,60 Mupopiwa also began to make regular trips to communicate 
with SWAPO and Angolan officials there.   
 The role of Cassinga for gathering and dispersing information, collecting and 
transporting materials, and accommodating soldiers moving to and from the front 
between 1976 and 1978 is confirmed by other sources. For example, Darius 
“Mbolondondo” Shikongo, a camp commander at Cassinga from November 1976 until 
February 1977 and again from January through May 1978, indicates that those working in 
the PLAN office were involved in the aforementioned activities and that commanders 
from the front would regularly visit Cassinga to share and collect information there as 
well.61 The South African Defense Force had also collected corroborating evidence prior 
to its May 4, 1978 attack. For example, in his discussion of materials that he uncovered in 
the SADF military archives, Edward Alexander cites a military appreciation document 
sent from the SADF Chief of Staff Operations to the Chief of SADF dated April 1, 1978 
which details activities happening at Cassinga that resemble those in which Namoloh and 
Mupopiwa claim to have been involved while they were working at the office. For 
example, it alleges that “Logistic planning and the provision of supplies, weapons and 
ammunition to insurgents operating in central and eastern Ovamboland were undertaken 
from Cassinga. Medical treatment of the seriously wounded as well as the repair of 
equipment and the assembly of newly trained insurgents on their way to bases in the East 
                                                 
60 Namoloh 19.6.2008; Mupopiwa 26.7.2008; Nyamu 2.4.2008. 
61 D. Shikongo  26.3.2007; 11.6.2007; 20.8.2007; 3.9.2007. See especially 3.9.2007, p. 76. 
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and West Cunene Provinces all took place in Cassinga.”62 Another document titled “8th 
Minutes of the Military Council” appears to be an internal SWAPO document from a 
meeting that took place January 1977 at Efitu, a southern Angolan camp. The minutes 
include several references to Cassinga, therein referred to as “Moscow CHQ.”63 It 
indicates that Cassinga should provide supplies to “five different active guerrilla areas” 
and that commanders at the front forward their “problems and requirements” to 
Cassinga.64   
 With the exception of its earliest days, however, Cassinga was not exclusively or 
even primarily inhabited by soldiers. As Namoloh, Mupopiwa and others indicate, it was 
not long before Namibians entering exile, i.e. persons without military training, began to 
enter Cassinga. Almost all of these newcomers at Cassinga were Oshiwambo-speakers 
who had crossed into Angola from Ovamboland, the central part of northern Namibia.65 
Usually those who fled were assisted by PLAN combatants who led them across the 
border and took them to the camps where combatants were living. After moving through 
several of these camps,66 each successively further from the border, newcomers were 
picked up  on SWAPO trucks and driven to Cassinga.67 According to Canner Kalimba, 
when she and her husband entered Cassinga during the dry season of 1976, the majority 
                                                 
62 Alexander 2003, pp. 52-53. 
63 “Moscow” was SWAPO's code-name for Cassinga. “CHQ” was probably an acronym for Command 
Headquarters. 
64 Alexander 2003, pp. 57-58. 
65 Most of those entering exile from the South during this period traveled through Botswana and were sent 
to SWAPO camps in Zambia. According to Kalimba and Shikongo, few, if any of these, arrived at 
Cassinga (D. Shikongo 26.3.2007, pp. 11-12; C. Kalimba 13.6.2007, p. 16). 
66 Some of those who entered exile during the outbreak of the Angolan Civil War seem to have lived in 
these small camps near the front for many months before being transferred to any settlement to the rear. 
For example, Theopholus and Canner Kalimba fled from Namibia to Angola in August 1975 (C. 
Kalimba 2.4.2007). Unlike research participants whom I interviewed who entered exile before August, 
the month when widespread violence broke out in Angola, the Kalimbas did not move onward into 
Zambia. Rather the couple moved between various camps in southern Angola until they were finally 
moved to Cassinga, shortly after Namibians' arrival there.   
67 C. Kalimba 13.6.2007, pp. 11, 15, 16; D. Shikongo, pp. 33-34. 
 39 
of the exiles whom they found there were newcomers from Namibia who had arrived at 
the camp in this way.68 Similarly, Jesaya Nyamu, then SWAPO's Deputy Secretary for 
Information and Publicity, who visited the Namibian settlements in Angola shortly after 
he traveled to Luanda to create an information office there in 1976, reports that the 
majority of persons that he found in Cassinga were Namibians without military training 
who had recently fled the country. By his estimate there may already have been 1,000 or 
more people living in Cassinga at that time.69  
 By 1977 SWAPO had begun to move some of those residing in Cassinga north to 
Jamba, where the liberation movement had gained permission to administer another 
camp.70 Most of those transferred then and over the following months were women and 
children, who had access to better medical facilities and school resources in the Angolan 
town, especially since SWAPO medical personnel and teachers were stationed there with 
them.71 Similarly, after SWAPO had established its offices in Luanda and Defense 
Headquarters in Lubango those who were seen as fit for military training or for secondary 
school or tertiary education abroad were transferred from Cassinga to other places. 
Nonetheless, from 1976 through 1978 the movement into exile continued unabated and 
numbers at Cassinga increased as all newcomers who crossed the Namibian-Angolan 
border had to pass through this camp before they were sent to other destinations.     
 The arrival of new exiles at Cassinga demanded an administration beyond that 
provided for combatants by the PLAN office. According to “Mbolondondo” Shikongo 
                                                 
68 C. Kalimba 13.6.2007, pp. 4-5. The dry season in Southern Africa generally runs from May until 
October or November when the first rains arrive in conjunction with the summer months.  
69 Nyamu 3.4.2007, pp. 12, 17.  
70 Kalimba 13.6.2007, pp. 1, 4, 10, 16; Shikongo 11.6.2007, p. 30; Nyamu 2.4.2007; Namoloh 19.6.2008. 
71 Notably,  Iyambo Indongo, a trained Namibian doctor, ran the medical center at Jamba. Canner 
Kalimba was a founding teacher at the school there (Kalimba 13.6.2007, p. 4). 
 40 
from the time he was appointed by the SWAPO leadership to be the deputy camp 
commander or “commissar”72 in November 1976, the camp was run by a staff of twenty 
to thirty persons.73 Together they worked out of an administrative office, another typical 
Portuguese colonial building located on the east side of the main road that passes through 
Cassinga.74  Each person in the office was responsible for a particular “department” of 
camp life: logistics, housing, transport, medicine, education, police.75 The leaders of 
these departments were appointed and overseen by Shikongo and the senior camp 
commander.76   
 The work of the camp office and all Cassinga inhabitants revolved around the 
daily ritual of the parade. Every morning at a regular time, Cassinga residents gathered 
outside the parade ground, which was located in a cleared area just south of the PLAN 
office, to the west of the main road.77 There they would assemble in the groups in which 
they had arrived at Cassinga, each of which was organized according to  “sections” and 
“platoons.” Groups would check for attendance and line up in the order in which they had 
arrived at the camp, with the earliest arrival queuing first and the most recent queuing 
last. They would then march, often in military uniform that they received from the 
Cubans and with wooden guns in tow,78 onto the parade ground, passing by the camp 
                                                 
72 In Shikongo's case the title commissar denoted that he was the deputy camp commander. Some 
commissars, especially after the increased involvement of the Soviet Union with SWAPO in exile, were 
responsible particularly for political education. See the discussion of commissars in Chapter 4.  
73 D. Shikongo 26.3.2007, p. 3. 
74 D. Shikongo 26.3.2007, p. 16; 3.9.2007, p. 77. 
75 D. Shikongo 26.3.2007, p. 15-16; 20.8.2007, pp. 65-66; 3.9.2007, pp. 76-77. 
76 Shikongo remembers the commander by his nom de guerre, “Nakombole.” He died in the South 
African attack on Cassinga (D. Shikongo 26.3.2007, p. 17). 
77 Accounts of the attack of Cassinga, which occurred while camp inhabitants were assembling at the 
parade, indicate that it took place variously at 6:00, 7:00, 7:30 and 8:00 in the morning. Some of the 
confusion around the time of the attack is likely to have resulted from the one hour time difference 
between South Africa and Angola.    
78 D. Shikongo 11.6.2007, p. 25; 3.9.2007, pp. 73-74; Namoloh 19.6.2007. In talking with Shikongo about 
photographs of Cassinga available at the National Archives of Namibia (NAN, Photo Archive, Nos. 
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commanders who stood on either side of the path leading there. Once the last group had 
entered, the commanders and any visiting SWAPO officials would proceed to the front of 
the parade. After leading the call and response chants and perhaps requesting the singing 
of a  liberation song or two, they would address the assembled. Central to the content of 
these addresses was the announcement of daily work assignments, which were given to 
all camp inhabitants with the exception of those who had particular responsibilities in the 
camp. Once these and other announcements pertinent to the camp's activities for that day 
had been made, the parade could be dismissed and inhabitants would proceed to their 
various assignments.79  
 Most work at Cassinga focused on gathering and preparing materials necessary 
for daily survival. Water could be collected in large buckets from the Cuilonga River. 
Wood was available in the moderately forested savanna surrounding Cassinga and was 
necessary not only for cooking and heating but also for housing. Whereas in the first 
months inhabitants had resided in buildings left by the Portuguese and Angolans, 
thereafter the numbers exceeded the available space.80 Thus, it was common for groups to 
be sent to collect wood  and grasses that others would use to make huts with wooden pole 
frames and thatch roofs like those which are common in rural Ovamboland.81 Some 
                                                                                                                                                 
14119, 14120; both appear in Appendix 2), he indicated that while people in the photos appear to be 
wearing military uniforms, most were probably not armed or militarily trained. Frequently, uniforms 
were donated  by Cuban soldiers to SWAPO commanders, who, in turn, distributed them to Namibian 
youth entering camps, many of whom wanted to wear military uniforms. Camp inhabitants would also 
take sticks and carve them to make them appear like guns. Per Sanden and I also discussed footage of 
Namibians marching, dressed in military uniforms and carrying sticks which he filmed while he was 
visiting Cassinga and which was used to produce “Here is Namibia: Inside the Liberated Areas and 
Beyond.” For more details, see the discussion of Sanden and the film below.  
79 D. Shikongo 26.3.2007, pp. 3, 15; 11.6.2007, pp. 38-39. 
80 C. Kalimba 13.6.2007.  
81 C. Kalimba 13.6.2007, pp. 9-10; D. Shikongo 26.3.2007, p. 19. It should further be noted that these and 
other research participants who lived at Cassinga all denied that any houses there used corrugated iron, 
despite a photograph at the NAN labeled “Cassinga” that depicts two persons outside a corrugated iron 
structure (NAN, Photo Archive, No. 12371, appearing in Appendix 2).  
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inhabitants also worked agricultural fields located to the west of the camp between it and 
the Cuilonga, where maize and possibly mahangu and vegetables were grown.82 Food 
was cooked in empty drums in the open air and served once or twice daily, with the main 
meal at midday.83 A workplace for a tailor, a garage and system of latrines were also 
created and maintained.84  
 Despite their efforts to achieve self-sufficiency, Cassinga's inhabitants were 
highly reliant on external aid. Shortly after the camp was founded, SWAPO trucks began 
to make regular trips from where materials earmarked for SWAPO were stored in 
warehouses in Luanda to Lubango, Jamba and Cassinga.85 The camp office was 
responsible both for requesting items needed in the camp and for distributing them to its 
residents.86 Even as numbers at Cassinga increased in 1977 and 1978, aid also expanded 
as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) pledged aid to “Namibian refugees” in 
Angola at the beginning of that year, followed by the United Nations High Commission 
for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), Nordic aid 
agencies and non-governmental organizations.87  Food consisted primarily of maize-
meal, powdered soup, dried fish and haricot beans. With the exception of  instances when 
the trucks were unable to deliver materials to Cassinga, food appears to have been in 
sufficient quantity to keep people fairly healthy.88 Although there may not have been any 
                                                 
82 C. Kalimba 13.6.2007, p. 8; ya Nangolo & Sellström 1995, p. 24. 
83 NAN, File A.614, UNICEF Area Office Brazzaville, “Report on a mission to swapo centres for 
namibian refugees in angola from 10 to 14 april 1978,” p. 13; C. Kalimba 13.6.2007, p. 25. 
84 Nyamu 3.4.2008, p. 15; C. Kalimba 13.6.2007, p. 15; Per Sanden, Interview 5.2.2008, p. 7; UNICEF 
Report, p. 9. 
85 D. Shikongo 26.3.2007, p. 19; C. Kalimba 13.6.2007, p. 11.  
86 D. Shikongo 28.8.2007, pp. 61, 64-65; Namoloh 19.6.2007.  
87 ya Nangolo & Sellström 1995, pp. 23-24. 
88 UNICEF Report, p. 13; C. Kalimba 13.6.2007, p. 25. 
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clothing distributed at the camp during its first months,89 by April 1978 visitors to 
Cassinga from UNICEF noted that donated woolen clothing, shoes, hats and blankets 
were protecting Cassinga's inhabitants from summer rains and chilly winter nights.90   
 A large number of Cassinga's inhabitants were also involved in health and 
education related work. In the camp there was a clinic, located near the PLAN office, 
where several trained nurses worked and patients stayed. The clinic held supplies of basic 
medicines, vaccines and first aid equipment which were applied not only to incoming 
exiles but also to injured PLAN combatants coming from the front. Facilities, however, 
were rudimentary and serious cases transferred as quickly as possible to Jamba or 
Lubango, where better medical facilities were available.91 There were also several 
schools in Cassinga aimed at improving inhabitants' literacy and numeracy skills. The 
first primary school for children was established by Canner Kalimba shortly after she 
arrived at the camp. According to her, the school was established under a few lemon trees 
growing in Cassinga and without books or teaching aids since none were available.92 In 
the afternoons Kalimba also worked with William Amagulu to begin an adult education 
program.93 When the new camp was established at Jamba, Kalimba and the school 
children moved there with her and there was a period of time when little or no formal 
education was offered at Cassinga. Later, however, schools for the children passing 
through Cassinga were re-established.94 By 1978 schools appear to have expanded to 
such an extent that visitors from UNICEF could talk about an “education system” of 
                                                 
89 C. Kalimba 13.6.2007, p. 26. 
90 UNICEF Report, p. 8. 
91 “UNICEF Report,” p. 11; Ellen Namhila, Interview 25.7.2008. 
92 C. Kalimba 2.4.2007, p. 1; 13.6.2007, p. 4. 
93 C. Kalimba 13.6.2007, p. 6; William Amagulu, Interview 29.5.2008. 
94 T. Kalimba 2.9.2007, pp. 2,3. 
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twenty-six classes some of which were being held in “converted store-houses” left by 
Cassinga's former inhabitants and newly built “straw structures strengthened with 
planks.”95 From sometime in 1977 “political education” classes led by trained PLAN 
members also appear to have met at Cassinga.96 
  Unlike Nyango and Kwanza Sul, SWAPO's largest camps in Zambia and Angola 
respectively,97 there were few organized activities for people living at Cassinga when 
they were not completing assigned tasks. Interviews provide some information about 
what people at Cassinga did during these times. It was common for people to request 
permission to visit the Angolan villages on the other side of the Cuilonga River. There, 
Namibians, especially newcomers who often traveled with some money or clothing 
which they could use to barter, might procure food, especially meat which was scarce in 
the diet at Cassinga.98 Some, especially the small number assigned to work at Cassinga, 
might also leave the camp to visit Jamba, where many had family living, or Techamutete, 
where some had befriended the Cuban soldiers.99 There were also people who left the  
camp without permission. According to Shikongo, it was the responsibility of members 
of the camp's “military police,” under the responsible member of the camp staff, to 
address such situations. Apparently, culprits were often discovered when the camp office 
                                                 
95 “UNICEF Report,” p. 16. 
96 T. Kalimba, 2.9.2007, pp. 2,3. According to one document that Alexander uncovered in a South African 
Ministry of Defence file containing documents allegedly captured from Cassinga, the camp had “four 
political instructors” in January 1978 (Alexander 2003, pp.  62-63).     
97 Nyango was founded in Zambia's Western Province in December 1975 and held several thousand 
inhabitants. Kwanza Sul was founded in the Angolan province of the same name within months of the 
attack on Cassinga and became  SWAPO's largest camp. By the mid-1980s it may have hosted as many 
as 35,000 inhabitants although population estimates made by SWAPO leaders and other visitors to the 
camp differed greatly (Leys and Saul 1995, pp. 63-64; Pekka Peltola, The Lost May Day: Namibian 
Workers Struggle for Independence, (Jyvaskyla: Finnish Anthropological Society and Nordic Africa 
Institute, 1995, p. 146)). Research subjects who lived in these camps discussed a variety of activities in 
which they participated there, including performance groups and “the Young Pioneers,” SWAPO's 
organ for youth programs.  
98 C. Kalimba 13.6.2007, p. 14; D. Shikongo 26.3.2007, pp. 19-20. 
99 C. Kalimba 13.6.2007, pp. 12-14; D. Shikongo 11.6.2007, p. 41. 
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received reports from neighboring Angolans about a Namibian drinking or fighting in the 
village. The military police would then detain the offenders, holding them in a dugout, a 
rectangular hole several meters deep like those later inhabited by SWAPO members in 
Angolan camps during the 1980s.100 The dugout was visible to all camp inhabitants and 
was located near the camp kitchen.101    
 In administering these various facets of life, the camp office could not always 
differentiate its work neatly from the office administered by PLAN. Although no research 
participants, including Namoloh, Mupopiwa and Shikongo, indicate that defense unit 
soldiers were leading military training courses for exiles arriving at Cassinga – an 
assertion made by the SADF in its internal documents from the period102  – there were 
joint meetings held by the PLAN and camp offices.103  Meetings might concern camp 
security, which was the responsibility of the PLAN camp defense unit as well as the 
camp's military police.104 The camp office was responsible for the well-being of the 
PLAN combatants living in the camp. These included the defense unit's members, who 
were semi-permanent residents of Cassinga, and any combatants passing through the 
camp on their way to and from the front, which the PLAN office might ask the camp 
office to feed and accommodate.105  
 These collaborations notwithstanding, the PLAN office was a different unit with a 
separate mandate from the camp office. This point appears to have been misunderstood 
by Cassinga inhabitants who accounted for Dimo Hamaambo's presence at Cassinga by 
                                                 
100 It also may have resembled the “dungeons” in which accused spies were later detained near Lubango, 
Angola as it was deep enough that those imprisoned could not easily escape. For more details about the 
dugouts and dungeons in  SWAPO's Angolan camps during the 1980s see Chapter 4. 
101 D. Shikongo 20.8.2007, pp. 64-66. 
102 Alexander 2003, p. 56; TRC Report, p. 47. 
103 D. Shikongo 20.8.2007, pp. 61-62; 3.9.2007, p. 76; Namoloh 19.6.2007. 
104 D. Shikongo 20.8.2007, pp. 64-65. 
105 D. Shikongo 20.8.2007, pp. 61-62; 3.9.2007, p. 76; Namoloh 19.6.2007. 
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indicating that he was involved in the same work as those working at the camp office, 
only at a more senior level. According to persons who worked in the PLAN office and 
the camp office from their beginning, however, the two had distinct origins and different 
functions for the Namibian exile community.  
 
February 18 to May 3, 1978  
 Most printed sources of information about the camp at Cassinga are atemporal 
accounts offered after the South African attack by persons who themselves spent only a 
few weeks, days or hours in the camp,106 Nonetheless, there are sources available which 
offer rich insights into how conditions in and around the camp were changing during the 
weeks preceding the attack. 
 According to “Mbolondondo” Shikongo, the numbers at Cassinga in May 1978 
were the largest they had been during the entire period that he had been a commander at 
the camp. He recalls that from early 1978 the flow of Namibians into exile and intake in 
the camps had been particularly high. Furthermore, while a truck usually picked up 
Cassinga residents traveling onward to Jamba and Lubango as soon as there were 
sufficient numbers to fill it, this was not the case during the weeks preceding the attack. 
The result was a bottleneck at Cassinga such that people who under other circumstances 
would have left the camp within days remained there for weeks or months.107 As a result, 
on the night of May 3, many were sleeping in the open air on blankets because the 
                                                 
106 See for example ya Nangolo & Sellström 1995, pp. 37-69. Similar accounts are available in SWAPO 
and solidarity literature following the attack and programs about Cassinga  broadcast on Namibia's 
Cassinga Day holiday available at the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC), Television and 
Radio Archives.   
107 D. Shikongo 11.6.2007, p. 35.  
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buildings and huts in the camp were unable to accommodate them.108 
 Shikongo further reports that some weeks before the attack, perhaps in February 
or March, he and others on the command staff observed “strange airplanes” flying over 
Cassinga for the first time.109 Although the identity and intentions of the  pilots were 
unclear, the camp command thought there might be a connection between them and 
Johann van der Mescht, a South African prisoner of war. Van der Mescht had been 
captured on February 18 in a PLAN raid on a SADF base outside Elundu in northeastern 
Ovamboland and was transported to Cassinga sometime thereafter where he was detained 
in the camp.110 Due to concern among the camp command that South Africa might launch 
an attack on Cassinga to free van der Mescht, arrangements were made to transfer him to 
Lubango, which was accomplished in conjunction with a trip made by President Sam 
Nujoma to Cassinga sometime before the attack.111 Other changes were also made at this 
time, apparently in response to the repeated sightings of strange airplanes. Whereas 
children, women with children and elderly inhabitants living in Cassinga had resided near 
the camp office, after the planes were observed, the office's staff began to arrange for the 
construction of a satellite camp, 1 km northwest of it, to accommodate persons who 
would be most vulnerable to a South African attack, which would likely target the 
office.112 At the same time, the camp office staff also began to build trenches to the 
                                                 
108 D. Shikongo 26.3.2007, p. 3; 11.6.2007, pp. 37, 43. Shikongo further notes that a group of eighty or 
more exiles arrived at Cassinga the night before the attack.  
109 D. Shikongo 26.3.2007, pp. 3, 17; 11.6.2007, pp. 32, 35, 36, 39, 40.  
110 UNAM, Katjavivi Collection, Series B1, Category 5, File No. 9, “For Immediate Release,” 4.5.1978; D. 
Shikongo 11.6.2007, p. 39. It should further be noted that freeing Johann van der Mescht was one of the 
reasons stated by the South African government for its attack on Cassinga.  
111 D. Shikongo 11.6.2007, pp. 39-40. 
112 D. Shikongo 11.6.2007, pp. 35, 36. When I showed Shikongo an SADF map of Cassinga (reprinted in 
Heywood's The Cassinga Event (p. 24), he referred to the location identified as “Recruits' tent camp” as 
the satellite camp for “the elderly, the women with children and children.” According to the scale on 
this map, the “Recruits' tent camp” is located about 1 km northwest of Cassinga. 
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southwest of the camp.113 Also, the office started digging a hole on the western side of 
the main road, intended to store food supplies that could survive an enemy raid.114 
 Shikongo's account is corroborated in many of its details by several other sources. 
From April 10 to April 14, 1978, UNICEF sent three representatives on a mission to 
SWAPO camps in Angola where UNICEF supported “refugees” were living. The 
subsequent report, which was submitted by UNICEF's Brazzaville office to the mother 
body on May 2, 1978, is a unique document, the only known published account of 
Cassinga, written by an organization external to SWAPO prior to the attack.115 According 
to it, in 1978 there had been a “rapid increase in the number of refugees” at Cassinga. 
Whereas Jamba had been the largest center in early 1977 when UNICEF first began 
sending humanitarian aid to SWAPO, by April 1978 Cassinga was larger.116 It should be 
noted that the empirical basis of some of the claims made in the UNICEF Report are 
dubious. For example, it maintains that it counted between 11 and 12,000 inhabitants at 
the camp, a figure which contrasts with most other figures for the camp at the time of the 
South African attack which place its numbers between 3000 and 5000.117 The Report also 
maintains that Jamba (which the authors misspell “Djamba”) “is the oldest centre” and 
Cassinga, “a much more recent centre” despite the fact that there is considerable evidence 
                                                 
113 D. Shikongo 11.6.2007, pp. 33, 35. The trenches are also clearly visible on Heywood's SADF map (p. 
24) and a frequently discussed feature in accounts of what happened at Cassinga on the day of the South 
African attack.  
114 D. Shikongo 26.3.2007, p. 15. According to Shikongo, the hole, which had been dug before May 4th, 
was used for the main mass grave after the South African attack.  
115 NAN, File A.614, UNICEF Area Office Brazzaville, “Report on a mission to swapo centres for 
namibian refugees in angola from 10 to 14 april 1978.” 
116 UNICEF Report, pp. 4-5; ya Nangolo & Sellström 1995, pp. 23-24. 
117 For a discussion of these numbers see Heywood 1994, p. 19. UNICEF's figure also seems implausible 
when put in relation to the number that the Report projects for Jamba (6000), the on-going mass 
migration of Namibians into exile during the 1980s and the number of exiles that repatriated to Namibia 
in 1989.  
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indicating that Cassinga predated Jamba.118 In fact, UNICEF's 1977 recommendation of 
aid for Namibian refugees in Angola, cited in the May 1978 UNICEF Report, makes no 
mention of Cassinga at all, only of “the refugee population... [in] Djamba (sic), Lubango, 
Huambo, Cudjiva (sic, Ondjiva?) and Luanda.”119 Nonetheless, the UNICEF Report does 
provide a general confirmation of the demographic trends which Shikongo described in 
Cassinga for 1978.  
 Shortly after the UNICEF representatives had departed from Cassinga, another 
delegation arrived at the camp. From April 29 to May 3, 1978 two Swedish filmmakers, 
Per Sanden and Tommy Bergh, accompanied by Jesaya Nyamu and several PLAN 
soldiers visited Cassinga.120 For weeks before their arrival, this group had been traveling 
by foot in southern Angola and northern Namibia, where Sanden and Bergh had been 
collecting material for a documentary film commissioned by the SWAPO leadership, the 
second of its kind.121 According to both Sanden and Nyamu, they were both eye-
witnesses to the attack on the outpost near Elundu in which Johann van der Mescht was 
captured.122 Thereafter, van der Mescht was transported to “Vietnam,” a SWAPO camp 
with a large number of trained PLAN combatants near Chetequera, a village some 30 km 
north of the Namibian border. At Vietnam van der Mescht became separated from their 
                                                 
118 Namoloh 19.6.2007; Mupopiwa 26.7.2007; C. Kalimba 2.4.2007; 13.6.2007; D. Shikongo 26.3.2007; 
13.6.2007; 20.8.2007; 3.9.2007. 
119 UNICEF Report, p.4. The fact that UNICEF did not have any information about Cassinga in its 1977 
report begs the question: Why did SWAPO not report Cassinga as a “refugee centre” to UNICEF at that 
time while it did so in April 1978?  
120 Per Sanden, Interview 5.2.2008, pp. 7, 9; Jesaya Nyamu, Interview 3.4.2008, pp. 15-16. Nyamu 
suggests that the trip might have been a few weeks before the attack, but Sanden's very specific 
narrative overlaps more closely with other accounts of the days just before the South African account 
and seems more plausible.  
121 Sanden and another cameraman, Rudi Speer, had first made films with PLAN in southwestern Zambia 
and the Caprivi Region of Namibia in 1973. Apparently, these are the first and only filmmakers to have 
worked inside PLAN for many years. Sanden developed personal relationships with Sam Nujoma and 
other SWAPO leaders from the early 1960s when he became involved in anti-apartheid activities as a 
student in Sweden (Sanden 5.2.2008, pp. 1-2). 
122 Sanden 5.2.2008, pp. 5-6; Nyamu 3.4.2008, p. 16. 
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group.123 Weeks later when Sanden and Nyamu arrived at Cassinga, they did not know 
Van der Mescht's whereabouts.124 What Sanden recalls most vividly about the camp are 
the activities which he filmed there such as marching, plowing, the administering of 
medical treatment and a special parade held on May 3 in honor of him and his Swedish 
colleague.125 Nyamu, on the other hand, who claims to have visited Cassinga once every 
two or three months since he had been assigned to the SWAPO office in Luanda in 1976, 
spoke only of the “reconnaissance plane” that he and some others observed flying over 
the camp the day after he and Sanden arrived. He recalls, “I remember Dimo 
[Hamaambo] himself jumping out of his room to look at it. And he told us that it has been 
a regular visit.”126  
 Another collection of sources confirming aspects of Shikongo's account are files 
which SADF allegedly captured from Cassinga during the attack. Among the 
documents,127 are two letters signed by Dimo Hamaambo. The first of these dated April 
10, 1978  appears to be a photocopy of a letter that Hamaambo sent from Cassinga to 
Defense Headquarters in Lubango. Therein, Hamaambo indicates his concerns about “an 
[i]mminent invasion intention of the enemy of our [camp] in Southern Angola.” The 
circulation of the second letter, dated April 18, 1978, is more ambiguous. Although 
addressed to “The Commissar, Cassinga Commune, Huila Province, People's Republic of 
Angola,” Hamaambo writes the letter as if he is informing someone traveling outside 
                                                 
123 Nyamu 3.4.2008, p. 16; Sanden 5.2.2008, pp. 5-6.  
124 Nyamu 3.4.2008; Sanden 5.2.2008, pp. 6-7. Sanden indicates that he later interviewed van der Mescht 
in Lubango. 
125 Sanden 5.2.2008, pp. 9, 15-16. 
126 Nyamu 3.4.2008, p. 19. 
127 For a discussion of various documents, see Alexander 2003, pp. 62-63 and Justine Hunter, Die Politik 
der Erinnerung und des Vergessens in Namibia: Umgang mit schweren Menschenrechtsverletzungen 
der Ära des bewaffneten Befreiungskampfes, 1966 bis 1989 (Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 2008), pp. 
56-58. 
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Cassinga, probably PLAN Commissar Greenwell Matongo, about developments in the 
camp: 
Dear Comrades, Our Revolutionary Greetings, please! I 
have the honour to inform your Office that we have 
removed from Cassinga, a portion of the Namibian 
Community and settled it about 7 km north of the existing 
camp. The reasons for this move are as follows: 1. With 
enemy (S.A.) Air-reconnaissance work going on 
continuously, we came to the conclusion that S.A. racsists 
[sic] intend to conduct an air-raid on this camp. 2. Jamba 
which is already overcrowded can no longer accom[modate] 
more of our people and worse there is a standing order for 
the removal of our people. The new camp is therefore a 
“security” place for children, mothers, the sick and 
expectants. Its [sic] not a military camp. Hoping that you 
will accept our explanation. I am, Yours for the 
eliminationof [sic] Imperialism, Dimo Hamaambo128   
 
 Here again Hamaambo suggests that the camp at Cassinga was at risk, this time 
making direct reference to the planes, “(SA) Air-reconnaissance work,” mentioned by 
Shikongo and Nyamu in their accounts. It seems likely that “the new camp... for children, 
mothers, the sick and expectants”  that had been “settled... north of the existing camp” 
refers to the satellite camp mentioned by Shikongo in our interviews although the 
distance of 7 km from the main camp differs greatly from the approximately 1 km 
indicated by both Shikongo and SADF military maps made before the attack.129 
Hamaambo also suggests an explanation for Shikongo's point that the trucks were not 
coming to Cassinga frequently to transport people from the camp in the weeks preceding 
the attack: namely, because Jamba was “overcrowded” and that there was “a standing 
order to remove our [i.e. Namibian] people.” Perhaps these conditions in Jamba are part 
                                                 
128 Justine Hunter, “Die Politik der Erinnerung und des Vergessens in Namibia seit der staatlichen 
Unabhängigkeit” (Doctoral Thesis, Universität Freiburg, 2005), p. 80. The letter has also been 
published in German translation in Hunter's previously cited book (p. 57). 
129 Shikongo 11.6.2007, pp. 35-36; Heywood 1994, p. 24.  
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of the reason there was an exceptionally large number of people, almost all without 
military training, residing in Cassinga on the night of May 3, 1978. 
 
Remember Cassinga?  
 South Africa's attack at dawn on May 4, 1978 at Cassinga resulted not only in 
mass carnage and destruction at one time and place, but also in diverging memories that 
have continued to proliferate over the more than thirty years since that day. It appears that 
the Angolans were the first to  produce a public account of the attack. According to 
information recorded in the SADF Archive, the Angolan Minister of Defense issued a 
communique about Cassinga at 19h00 Angolan time, which was then transmitted on 
ANGOP, the Angolan government radio station, at the top of the following hour. The 
message, translated by SADF staff from Portuguese to English, began:  
Once again the racist troops of South Africa have attacked 
Angola. At 0600 today, 4 May, South African paratroopers 
coming from occupied Namibia attacked the refugee camp 
at Cassinga after a bombardment by the South African Air 
Force. During the whole morning many paratroopers landed 
on the camp. This is another criminal attack against 
defenceless people, women and Namibian refugees.130      
  
   
 Soon SWAPO also began issuing public statements that supported and elaborated 
on the Angolan government's portrayal of what had happened at Cassinga. In its May 6 
press release, SWAPO refers to “the unprovoked attack on the civilian population in 
Angola” and “the cold blooded murder of Namibian women and children” although no 
reference to Cassinga itself is made in this statement or another one released the 
                                                 
130  Alexander 2003, p. 161. 
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following day.131 A May 8 press release refers both to the “refugee settlement at 
Kassinga” and “the Namibian civilian population at Kassinga.”132 An address presented 
by SWAPO Secretary for Information Peter Katjavivi at a conference in Basel from May 
18 to 21, 1978 offers a more detailed portrayal, according to which “the Cassinga 
settlement has always been a civilian one... It contained a school, clinic, and agricultural 
projects but not military installations and no combattants [sic] of the People's Liberation 
Army of Namibia.”133 Some SWAPO documents from the weeks following the attack do 
acknowledge the presence of PLAN combatants at Cassinga. For example, the issue of 
SWAPO's newsletter Namibia Today published shortly after the attack notes that “there 
were no military installations and no more soldiers than a small unit designated to protect 
the settlement.”134 A special bulletin published by SWAPO in June 1978 titled “Massacre 
at Kassinga” refers to a “camp defence unit of three hundred armed cadres.”135 
Nonetheless, these and other SWAPO accounts assert that Cassinga was “a refugee 
camp.”  
 In sharp contrast is the South African government's statement issued on May 5, 
1978 to the  governments of the United States, Canada, Britain, France and West 
Germany, the so-called “Western Five” then in the midst of intensive negotiations with 
South Africa and SWAPO over the timing and terms of Namibian independence. After 
introducing the brief with an account of “border violations by terrorists” that were 
                                                 
131  UNAM, Katjavivi Collection, Series B1, Category 5, File No. 9, “For Immediate Release,” 6.5.1978; 
“For Immediate Release” 7.5.1978. 
132  UNAM, Katjavivi Collection, Series B1, Category 5, File No. 9, “Press Release,” 8.5.1978. 
133  UNAM, Katjavivi Collection, Series B1, Category 4, “Address Given by Peter Katjavivi, SWAPO 
Secretary for Information and Publicity to the World Conference for the Eradication of Racism and 
Racial Discrimination, Basle, May 18-21, 1978.” 
134   Namibia Today, 2, 2 (1978), p. 5. 
135  SWAPO, “Massacre at Kassinga: Climax of Pretoria's All-Out Campaign against the Namibian 
Resistance,” (Special Bulletin, June 1978) pp. 16, 20. 
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supposedly undermining efforts to achieve “an internationally recognized solution in 
South West Africa” and a short description of the attack,  the document proceeds to 
describe the SWAPO camp at Cassinga: 
As expected the SWAPO base headquarters, Cassinga... was 
an extensive SWAPO military instillation [sic], it contained 
formidable defence works such as trenches, bunkers and 
underground shelters. It was established beyond doubt that 
this base constituted SWAPO's main operational centre, 
responsible for over-all planning, logistics, communications 
and strategy. Vast quantities of weapons and ammunition 
were found and destroyed and considerable documentation 
was found and removed. The SWAPO personnel included 
women, in uniform, fully armed and actually fighting in the 
trenches. The dead included some of these... There were also 
a number of camp followers, including women, who 
apparently lived in the confines of the base. Some of them 
might have become casualties. A number of the children 
who were hijacked across the border on 23 April were found 
and, at their request, these were going to be taken back. 
Unfortunately, just as the final evacuation was in progress, 
an armed attack from the direction of Techamutete 
occurred... In these circumstances it was not possible to 
evacuate the children.136  
 
 Clearly the Cassinga of South African propaganda could not possibly be described 
as a “refugee camp.” Nonetheless, its authors do attempt to reconcile the women and 
children whom they acknowledge were in the camp at the time of the attack with their 
description of “the SWAPO base” at Cassinga. The South African government clearly 
went to great pains to try to overcome such details that might be seen as contradicting its 
claims about the nature of the camp. Notably, when the first news reports about the attack 
were shown on South African television, photos and film taken by SADF during the raid 
on Cassinga were interspersed with images of Chetequera (aka “Vietnam”), which had 
also been attacked on May 4 as part of the same military operation despite being located 
                                                 
136  NAN, File A.614, Annex I to the “UNICEF Report.” 
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more than 200 kilometers from Cassinga.137 The Chetequera footage was useful for 
SADF because Chetequera was well armed with hundreds of PLAN combatants and the 
film of the fighting there included armored cars, personnel carriers and artillery. The 
interspersed images might appear to offer visual evidence that Cassinga was, in fact, a 
“military camp.”138 
 Although the South African government's portrayal of Cassinga and the attack 
was cheered widely by white South Africans,139 it is the Angolan/SWAPO version that 
became accepted abroad. Support came almost immediately from predictable quarters. 
For example, Radio Moscow transmitted a headline on May 5 describing how the “racist 
butchers carried out a massacre in the town where there were several thousand old men, 
women and children who had fled from the South African invaders.”140  
More significantly, on May 6 representatives of the Western Five were among those who 
endorsed a UN Resolution motivated by the African and non-aligned states which 
condemned the South African attack on Cassinga and threatened punitive measures 
should it carry out another operation in Angola.141 Over the following days UN Secretary 
General Kurt Waldheim and the Western Five nations also issued statements in which 
they expressed their dismay over the raid and highlighted the threat it posed to 
negotiations about Namibia. Although these statements may not have addressed the 
“refugee” or “civilian” quality of Cassinga specifically, they did undermine South 
Africa's efforts to define the camp as a legitimate “military” target, denying any authority 
                                                 
137  Heywood 1994, p. 8. 
138  Interestingly, SWAPO in its initial press statements and later renderings of May 4 almost never refers 
to the attack on Chetequera. Furthermore, the more than one hundred persons captured during the South 
African attack at Chetequera and later detained outside Mariental are consistently referred to in 
SWAPO and solidarity literature as the “Cassinga detainees.” 
139  Alexander 2003, pp. 162, 165-167. 
140  Alexander 2003, pp. 162-163. 
141  Alexander 2003, p. 164; UN General Assembly Resolution 428. 
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the regime might have achieved internationally to speak on behalf of Namibians in the 
preceding months through its participation in talks at the UN.  
 Material produced and distributed by journalists who visited Cassinga also 
defined the nature of the camp for many international observers. Two of the first people 
to provide “refugee” images of Cassinga were Per Sanden and Tommy Bergh, who had 
left Cassinga for Jamba late in the afternoon of May 3. According to Sanden, early in the 
morning of May 4 as he and his colleagues were approaching Jamba, they observed 
helicopters and airplanes flying overhead. Suspecting that they were South African but 
not knowing their destination, the convoy stopped outside Jamba and waited. On May 5 
the group was still there when PLAN dispatched several commanders to  collect Sanden 
and Bergh's film of Cassinga and transport it to Lubango. From there it was flown to 
Luanda and to London, where on May 6 Sanden was able to radio a BBC correspondent 
who developed some of the film for broadcasting. Sanden's images, including a 
photograph of women and children (and a few men far in the background) standing at the 
parade at Cassinga, were then circulated abroad widely.142 When Sanden was able to 
return to Sweden, he immediately began editing his material for a longer documentary 
which was released under the title “Here is Namibia: Inside the Liberated Areas and 
Beyond” and a publication of the same title which was jointly edited by Jesaya Nyamu.143  
The film was screened first in Sweden and thereafter all over the world, winning prizes at 
                                                 
142  Sanden 5.2.2008, pp. 7, 9-10, 15-16. The image is available at the NAN (Photo Archive, No. 12778) 
and was reproduced in several SWAPO publications, including on the front page of Namibia Today in 
the issue produced immediately after the Cassinga attack (Namibia Today, 2, 2 (1978)). The photo 
appears here in Appendix 2. 
143  Sanden 5.2.2008, pp. 12-13; Nyamu 3.4.2008, p. 15. The film and the publication are housed at the 
SWAPO Party Archive and Research Centre (SPARC) in Windhoek. Although SPARC's materials were 
not yet open to the public at the time of research, I received special permission to view the film footage.   
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documentary film festivals in Leipzig, Amsterdam and Ottawa144 and is cited in at least 
one piece of solidarity literature as proof that “Cassinga was a refugee settlement” and 
that “there were no military installations and no more soldiers than a small unit 
designated to protect the settlement.”145 Sanden and Nyamu also emphasize the 
significance of “Here is Namibia” the booklet, which, according to Sanden, “became the 
most distributed publication in Namibia” at that time.146    
 Sanden and Bergh were also part of a larger group of journalists who visited 
Cassinga after the attack. On May 6 the first reporters were flown from Luanda to 
Techamutete and driven to Cassinga, and Sanden and Bergh traveled from Jamba to 
Cassinga the following day.147 Articles subsequently written relay stories told by 
Namibians who were in Cassinga during the attack. Some emphasize narrators' testimony 
about their recent flight into exile and the short period of time, often only a few weeks or 
days, that they had been living in Cassinga. Among the objects most frequently 
photographed and described were the remains of “the” school, highlighting 
simultaneously a kind of activity that occurred at Cassinga and an identity of attack 
victims. One author writes: “Three walls remain standing. Inside is a jumble of broken 
desks and benches, home-made by the young people themselves. Textbooks in Afrikaans 
                                                 
144  Sanden 5.2.2008, pp. 12-13. 
145  Alexander 2003, pp. 45-46. 
146  Sanden 5.2.2008, p. 13.  
147  Although SWAPO publications state generally that reporters visited “the day after the attack,” those 
who participated in the visits remember the chronology differently and in more detail. Gaetano Pagano 
indicates that journalists “arrived at Kassinga at noon on May 6” (letter in “The Kassinga File”). Per 
Sanden narrates that on May 5th “the Angolan and Cuban troops came into Cassinga to secure the area. 
And the next day  the UNHCR started to send heavy aircraft to evacuate the place. And they also 
brought in some journalists from Luanda that day in those aircrafts.” Sanden himself says that he 
arrived at Cassinga on May 7 and filmed the mass grave on that day. Sanden further indicates that he 
was not aware of reporters who were at Cassinga on May 8, a statement which calls into question 
Annmarie Heywood's claim that most of the images of Cassinga “were taken on 8 May” (Sanden 
5.2.2008, p. 8; Heywood 1994, p. 10).  
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and English and exercise books litter the floor.”148 According to another: “The main 
school building is open to the hot wind. Nearby a group of more than 200 children, 
survivors of more than 500 primary school children at the camp, watch from the shade of 
eucalyptus trees.”149  A visit by UNHCR representatives to Cassinga between May 24 
and 28 further documented the destruction of objects identified as a “hospital, dispensary, 
schools, warehouse foodstuffs... medical and social equipment” as well as various 
“civilian” vehicles.150 
 It is the photographs that the journalists took of an open mass grave, however, that 
became the most enduring symbol of Cassinga.151 Taken from the grave's edge, the 
photos are close enough to the corpses that individual bodies, and in some cases the 
clothing, wounds and even the flies covering them, are discernible. The images demand a 
visceral reaction. In the weeks following the attack and for years to follow, SWAPO and 
solidarity organizations published texts alongside the photos that directed this reaction by 
imputing meaning to the bodies in the grave. In some cases, especially in the first 
publications about Cassinga after the attack, grave photos were placed alongside quotes 
from the reporters who had been eye witnesses to them, which highlighted the “civilian” 
or “refugee” quality of many of the victims. For example, the issue of Namibia Today 
published immediately after the Cassinga attack features a grave photo beneath a 
frequently cited text from “The Guardian (London) 10.5.78”: “First we saw gaily 
coloured frocks, blue jeans, shirts and a few uniforms. Then there was the sight of the 
                                                 
148  “Massacre at Kassinga,” p. 19. 
149  Alexander 2003, p. 169.  
150  NAN, A.614, “Joint United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and World Health Organization 
Representatives on their visit to Cassinga and to the Namibian Refugees.” During this visit one of the 
UNHCR representatives, Tor Sellström, took photographs, some of which have been donated to the 
NAN. 
151  Photographs of the Cassinga mass grave appear in Appendix 4. 
 59 
bodies inside them. Swollen, blood-stained, they were the bodies of young girls, young 
men, a few older adults, some young children, all apparently recent arrivals from 
Namibia.”152 Similarly, the front page of the SWAPO bulletin “Massacre at Kassinga” 
features a photo of the mass grave, which is followed later in the text by another 
journalists' eye-witness account of it: “It was a terrible thing to look upon as I arrived 
here shortly after the attack. Brightly coloured frocks of the young girls; jeans; checkered 
shirts of the boys; a few khaki uniforms and swollen bodies of the dead. The victims were 
mostly young, and had no defence. They had left home a few days or few weeks 
earlier.”153 
 “Massacre at Kassinga” does not stop at making claims about the identities of 
those lying in the mass grave; it also abstracts parallels between the Cassinga grave and 
other acts of violence committed by colonial or imperial governments against victims 
who might be called civilians. This abstraction of violence is evident on the document's 
cover where the picture of the grave is located beneath the sub-title “Climax of Pretoria's 
All-Out Campaign Against the Namibian Resistance.” The foreword of the document, 
written by President Sam Nujoma, goes on to link “These unarmed Namibians [who] 
were savagely butchered by racist South Africa's combat force” to “those Namibian 
patriots who were equally butchered during the Bondelswarts and Windhoek resistance in 
1922 and 1959 respectively,” a reference to two seminal events in the Namibian past in 
which non-violent African resistance to South African rule was answered with brute 
force.154 The body of the text continues: “The South African massacre of hundreds of 
                                                 
152  Namibia Today, 2, 2 (1978), p. 4. 
153  “Massacre at Kassinga,” pp.17-18. 
154  The “Bondelswarts resistance” refers to the rebellion of people in Warmbad, a community in the far 
south of Namibia, against South African legislation that was pushing community members into wage 
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Namibians this May, like the recent Nyazonia and Chimoio massacres of Zimbabweans 
by Rhodesian troops, the 1973 Wiriyamu massacre of Mozambicans by the Portuguese 
troops, the 1969 My Lai massacre of Vietnamese by U.S. troops and many other such 
carnages of human beings, has reminded the world, once more, that imperialism is what 
is rotten in the heart of humanity.”155 Although possibly the first document to link the 
events of May 4, 1978 in Angola with these other acts of violence, the same associations 
were made repeatedly in the years to come as is evident in articles published annually in 
SWAPO newsletters such as  Namibia Today and The Combatant as well as posters 
created by and distributed among SWAPO members and supporters abroad.156 
Frequently, these publications and posters featured images of the mass grave.  
 Nonetheless, there are possible readings of the mass grave at Cassinga that do not 
necessarily contradict, but do complicate, the ones presented above. Edward Alexander 
provides one in his dissertation, wherein he argues that “a detailed examination of the 
photographs indicates that the bodies are those of adults more than teenagers, though 
some of them are certainly young adults. The overwhelming majority of them are in 
addition men, with only a few women who can be identified amongst them. Most of the 
men are wearing uniforms and there is little evidence of the 'brightly coloured frocks' 
although several of the photographs are in color.” Although these assertions are not as 
                                                                                                                                                 
labor. South African forces bombed Warmbad in 1922. The “Windhoek resistance,” better known as the 
“Old Location Shooting” or “Old Location Massacre” refers to an event on December 10, 1959 in 
which South African troops fired on a crowd of Namibians resisting relocation from Windhoek's Old 
Location to Katutura, an ethnically divided township created by the apartheid government.  
155  “Massacre at Kassinga,” p. 3.  
156  For an analysis of Cassinga posters and their power to render Cassinga a refugee camp, see Nadja 
Borer, “Images of the Cassinga Massacre – Contested Visualties” in Giorgio Miescher, Lorena Rizzo 
and Jeremy Silvester, eds. Posters in Action: Visuality in the Making of an African Nation (Basel: 
BAB, 2009). Anna Vögeli also considers the reception of Cassinga posters in “'They gently bring back 
memories of those events'” another article in the same volume.   
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apparent to others as they seem to be for Alexander,157 Alexander's observations do 
highlight that, for someone willing and able to pore over the corpses in the mass grave, its 
demographics are ambiguous. Another object pictured in the grave photo interrogated by 
Alexander is the grave itself, which as Alexander notes, “judging by the photographs... 
was a massive excavation,” unlikely to have been completed in one or two days with 
picks and shovels as a SWAPO official had informed him. It is interesting to note, 
therefore, Darius “Mboldondo” Shikongo's claim that the hole used for the mass grave 
had been created originally as a food storage space in response to the threat of enemy 
attack heightened by “strange airplanes” that he and other had observed flying over the 
camp.158 Furthermore, although reporters at Cassinga on May 6 and 7 note that there was 
at least one other mass grave at the camp other than the one they photographed, which 
was closed by the time they arrived there, they appear to have accepted without question 
SWAPO representatives' claims that the 100 or more persons buried in this other grave 
were laid to rest in that location, separately from the other dead, because it was near the 
parade ground where they had been assembled when the South African planes arrived. 
None indicate, as did one former Cassinga inhabitant involved in preparing the graves 
whom I interviewed on site at Cassinga in September 2007, that the smaller grave was “a 
mixture of civilians and soldiers” as opposed to the larger grave which was for civilians 
only. They also do not speak to his and others' claims that both graves were, in fact, 
closed before the reporters arrived but the larger one was reopened for them.159 
                                                 
157  See, for example, Swapo Party's caption to the grave photo printed in Their Blood Waters our Freedom 
(Windhoek: Swapo Party, 1996): “The grave represents the most damning testimony to the heinous 
nature of the apartheid brand of racism. Apologists of that racist carnage are still trying to downplay the 
monstrosity of the crime by claiming that Cassinga was a PLAN military base. It is, however, clear 
from the photograph that the victims died and were buried wearing civilian clothes” (pp. xvi-xvii).  
158  D. Shikongo 26.3.2007, p. 15; 11.6.2007, pp. 32, 35, 36, 39, 40. 
159  Canner and Theopholous Kalimba and Galiano Ntyanba, Interview at Cassinga 2.9.2007, pp. 1-2. 
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 But why would someone be interested in such details about the grave at Cassinga? 
Or in what this and related evidence presented above suggest about the characteristics of 
the camp more generally? One might imagine that the apartheid South African 
government and its apologists would have pursued and distributed any knowledge that 
could confound descriptions of Cassinga as a “refugee camp.” Nonetheless, the South 
Africans engaged little with such details, perhaps because to do so would have also 
required acknowledging qualities of Cassinga that undermined the legitimacy of the 
attack and strengthened SWAPO's claims to represent the Namibian people. With the 
exception of references to women and children who were at Cassinga on May 4, 1978, 
the South African government disassociated itself from any details that could undermine 
its representation of the camp, going as far as to deny the authenticity of the mass grave 
photos. Commemorations in news programs in Namibia and South Africa and annual 
ceremonies organized by South African paratroopers constituted Cassinga as the kind of 
camp that could be described as the object of a daring airborne assault and worthy of the 
SADF members who died in the attack.160 
  As for other observers, once the link between Cassinga and “refugee” had been 
established, there was little impetus for anyone interested in Namibia's independence 
from South Africa to examine the complexity of Cassinga's past. The position of SWAPO 
and all the organizations and governments that were supporting it by 1978 benefited from 
the moral outrage incited by a “surprise attack” on a “refugee camp.” In the aftermath of 
the raid, SWAPO  received unprecedented support in the form of  humanitarian aid sent 
to its exile camps and offers from governments to educate Namibians in their countries. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Photographs which I took of the two mass graves at Cassinga appear in Appendix 4. 
160  Alexander 2003, pp. 5-6; see also programs commemorating the anniversary of the Cassinga attack 
available at  NBC Radio Archives. 
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Annual commemorations of “Cassinga Day” became powerful sites for rekindling 
support for the liberation struggle among diverse communities in Namibia and abroad. 
Moreover, the families, friends and community members of those who died in the South 
African attack were almost all living either in Ovamboland in northern Namibia, where 
SWAPO had overwhelming popular support, or in SWAPO administered camps in exile. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the process of grieving for and honoring loved ones 
who perished at Cassinga, which has touched thousands of Namibians, became  
intertwined with the national narrative told by SWAPO leaders about the camp. With 
these forces pushing interested groups towards consensus in remembering Cassinga as a 
“refugee camp,” the references to the PLAN camp defense unit, acknowledged in the 
issue of Namibia Today published following the attack and in“Massacre at Kassinga,” 
disappear from most subsequent literature.161   
 Namibian independence has also had little bearing on what is remembered about 
Cassinga even if independence has reshaped how it is remembered. In 1990 “Cassinga 
Day” was declared a Namibian national holiday. Since then, the government has 
organized annual commemorations and produced radio and television programs that have 
repeated the “refugee camp” story of Cassinga and made it accessible to increasing 
numbers of Namibians, even as the numbers attending these commemorations and 
viewing these programs have generally declined.162 The South African government's 
position on the camp changed with the end of apartheid, but former SADF paratroopers 
continue to commemorate the anniversary of the attack much the same way they had for 
                                                 
161  For a more detailed review of references to the camp in later SWAPO and solidarity literature see 
Alexander 2003, pp. 46-50. 
162  Conclusions are based on the English language programs about Cassinga and English language news 
broadcast on Cassinga Day available at NBC Radio Archives and NBC Television Archives.   
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years even if new political circumstances have forced their memory practices to take a 
more muted form.163 Also, as became evident in my research interviews, some SWAPO 
critics who lived in exile quietly question the dominant narrative about Cassinga and 
describe the camp in ways that resemble the South African alternative version of it.164 As 
noted above, an historiography of Cassinga has developed which complicates common 
representations of the camp's past. There is, however, little evidence that its interventions 
have influenced public discourse, and the literature itself remains entwined in the very 
same questions and language which have obstructed understanding Cassinga for years.    
  
The Production of National History  
 One might conclude from these trends in Cassinga's representation that the camp's 
history is inextricable from the binary which has bounded it since May 4, 1978. This 
conclusion, however, would at once grant too much power and too little power to the 
national political order in which histories of Cassinga are told. On the one hand, as 
demonstrated above, there are persons, documents, photographs and films with stories to 
tell that confound Namibia's national narrative about Cassinga. On the other, it is the 
value of these stories in a national community which so often both initiates and 
                                                 
163  In 1996 the South African paratroopers' annual commemoration became an international headline, 
pushing the Chief of the new South African National Defense Force to explain the custom to the South 
African government and the South African Minister of Defense to apologize to the Namibian 
government and its people. See NBC Radio Archives, CA96/103, News Broadcast 4.6.1996; CA96/115, 
News Broadcasts 6.6.1996, 7.6.1996; CA96/121, News Broadcast 8.6.1996; “Dis waarheid oor 
Cassinga – en los maar die askiese!” Rapport , 16.6.1996. Alexander notes that the paratroopers 
continued to commemorate “Cassinga Day” at the time he submitted his dissertation in July 2003 
(Alexander 2003, pp. 5-6).  
164  These counter-narratives are particularly common among those detained at Mboroma (See Chapter 3). 
According to many from this group who were interviewed and others (see Phillip Shuudifonya, 
Interview with Keshii Nathanael and Jimmy Amupala in A Journey to Exile (Abertswyth: Sosiumi 
Press, 2002, p. 184); Hidipo Hamutenya, Interview 2.4.2008, p. 4) hundreds who had been detained at 
Mboroma and returned to SWAPO were sent from Zambia to Cassinga shortly before the South African 
attack. Some suggest that SWAPO leaders knew about the attack and made the transfer to Cassinga in 
order to eliminate their rivals.  
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incorporates their production.     
 Consider, for example, Darius Shikongo, the Cassinga camp commander who 
offered much information presented above. During our first interview in March 2007, 
Shikongo volunteered that since returning from exile he had been approached only once 
to tell his story about Cassinga, a brief interview held with the Namibian Broadcasting 
Corporation's Oshiwambo radio service just after independence in 1990. For Shikongo, 
journalists' interest in others' stories at the expense of his own was clearly a point of 
concern: “Some you can hear talking about Cassinga... what they tell the people is 
sometimes not true... You cannot talk Cassinga without mentioning my name or else you 
don't know Cassinga.”165 Reasons  for Shikongo's concern became increasingly clear  as 
we met over the course of  the year. During our first meeting Shikongo mentioned that 
since independence he had been struggling to make ends meet through a combination of 
subsistence farming and self-employment, most recently by forming his own construction 
company. Although he had worked volunteer positions with SWAPO and had enough 
standing with the party to be invited to several Party Congresses, he had never been 
offered a paid appointment. Several months later, when we met again, Shikongo 
expressed his frustration with the Namibian government's treatment of PLAN “ex-
combatants,” some of whom were then demonstrating on the streets of Windhoek. 
According to him, the ex-combatants ought to be compensated for their sacrifices during 
the liberation struggle, particularly since many, like himself, had not had the opportunity 
to study abroad because of their duties with PLAN. If he and others were not qualified to 
take up posts in independent Namibia, it is because they were in the bush, risking their 
lives for the nation. Months later, after several more interviews, Shikongo made another 
                                                 
165  D. Shikongo, 26.3.2007, p. 5. 
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confession: that his fortunes with SWAPO had already begun to shift in exile in 1984.  
After returning from a military training course in the USSR, he was detained in a dugout 
on the outskirts of Lubango without any explanation other than that “the orders were 
coming from the [SWAPO] headquarters.”166 Two or three months later when Shikongo 
was released, again without explanation, he was appointed to work in a camp for vehicle 
repair near Lubango. For Shikongo this assignment was clearly a demotion after having 
served not only as a commander at Cassinga but also, thereafter, as senior commander at 
Kwanza Sul.167         
 Shikongo's background offers an important context for interpreting his stories 
about Cassinga. By foregrounding the role of the camp administration office, Shikongo 
highlighted his own responsibilities administering the most prominent camp in Namibia's 
national narrative. Part of establishing the administration office's role involved detailing 
its relationship to the PLAN office, highlighting the latter's little known activities in 
transporting soldiers, supplies and information to and from the front. Shikongo also 
narrated at length his actions on the day of the South African attack, describing how he 
and other commanders assisted residents as they fled from their assailants.168 For 
Shikongo, these stories, told to a researcher writing a thesis about Namibia's exile history, 
are part and parcel of his efforts to assert his place in the national community. In so 
doing, however, Shikongo shares strands of experience which do not easily fit into the 
refugee camp story about Cassinga and could be incorporated into an alternative to it.  
 Certainly there are others who inhabited Cassinga who appear to have less to gain 
                                                 
166  D. Shikongo 3.9.2007, p. 79. 
167  D. Shikongo, 3.9.2007, pp. 78-80. 
168  It should be noted that Shikongo is not alone in describing his bravery during the South African attack. 
His name was mentioned in conversations with several research participants, including a taped 
interview with Jessaya Nyamu (3.4.2007).   
 67 
and more to lose in telling stories about the camp that do not fit into the national narrative 
than does Shikongo. Nonetheless, if one reviews the citations above, which include 
extensive references to now Minister of Defense Charles Namoloh and Deputy 
Permanent Secretary to the Minister of Defense Mwetufah Mupopiwa, it should be clear 
that there is no direct correlation between a person's position in the government or 
SWAPO and the repetition of a narrow party line about Cassinga. The same may also be 
said of the social background of those who shared stories with me about the camp. As I 
observed, even  vulnerable former camp inhabitants located in very public settings may 
offer narratives that complicate Cassinga as they negotiate their relationship to other 
members within a national community.  
 On May 4, 2007 I participated in a government-sponsored Cassinga Day 
commemoration for the first time. In an open-air amphitheater at United Nations Plaza in 
Katutura, Windhoek's largest township, I gathered with 150 to 200 others. Although the 
numbers were a far cry from the hundreds that attended these events in the early 1990s, 
there were likely to be many more people watching on television or listening via radio. 
Most of those present appeared to be over forty years of age or young children, many 
were adorned with scarves and other clothing in SWAPO's characteristic red, green and 
blue colors, and I was the only white person in attendance. Approximately thirty, mostly 
middle-aged women, were seated together wearing identical white T-shirts. They, as I 
soon learned, were the “Cassinga survivors,” a prominent group in camp 
commemorations. Although there is evidence of persons who were at Cassinga on May 4, 
1978 sharing their experiences publicly in exile,169 since independence survivors had 
                                                 
169  E.g. The Combatant, “Cassinga Remembered: An Interview with a Survivor,” (May 1985), pp. 6-9. 
Although other articles in The Combatant and Namibia Today about Cassinga make reference to 
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become regular participants in the ceremonies and media programs commemorating 
Cassinga Day. Although the individuals representing the survivors have varied, some 
have been particularly involved in sharing their stories during these commemorations as 
well as for monographs, Namibian school textbooks chapters and public exhibitions about 
Cassinga.170  
 With the arrival of the dignitaries, the event began. All of us in the audience rose 
to our feet as SWAPO President Sam Nujoma, Deputy Prime Minister Libertine 
Amathila and other dignitaries entered the floor of the amphitheater and advanced to the 
seats set aside for them while, “We Remember Cassinga,” the name and refrain of a song 
first recorded by Namibians in exile, blared over the loudspeaker. After singing the 
Namibian national anthem and African Union anthem and listening to an opening prayer, 
the stories began. The first was delivered by Sophia Shaningwa, the Governor of the 
Khomas Region, who was responsible for the “introductory remarks.” After 
acknowledging the various dignitaries present, Shaningwa proceeded to narrate a story 
about Cassinga:  
At 7 am 30 minutes on a bitterly cold day...  SWAPO 
caders171 and supporters at the Cassinga refugee camp were 
gathered at the parade for their daily work assignments, 
unaware of South Africa's sinister plan to attack them. That 
early morning quiet was wrought havoc by the screaming, 
                                                                                                                                                 
survivors of the attack, “Cassinga Remembered” is the only article which I found that featured an 
interview with one. Stories, poetry and artwork of Cassinga survivors are also published in two texts 
edited by Henning Melber:  It is no more a Cry: Namibian Poetry in Exile (Basel: Basler Afrika 
Bibliographien, 1982, 2004) and Our Namibia: A Social Studies Textbook (Osnabrück: Terre des 
Hommes, 1983).  
170  Mvula ya Nangolo and Tor Sellström's Kassinga: A Story Untold (Windhoek: Namibia Book 
Development Council, 1995) was one such initiative. The text includes sixteen stories of Cassinga 
survivors transcribed in the text (pp. 38-69). A research project led by Jeremy Silvester at the History 
Department at the University of Namibia is another. Silvester describes this project in “Cassinga 
Revisited,” an article published in The Namibian on 7.5.1999. Ellen Namhila's autobiography (The 
Price of Freedom. Windhoek: New Namibia Books, 1997) also offers a survivor's account. 
171  In Namibia people who belonged to SWAPO before independence are frequently referred to as 
“caders” and occasionally as “cadres.”   
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rolling and diving of jet fighters... and other aircrafts. They 
were dropping bombs indiscriminately. Within a few 
minutes, everything was turned into a nightmare of 
destruction and human massacre. Hundreds of mutilated 
human bodies of women, children and elderly people were 
just what remained lying around. 
 
 Having presented listeners with this image of anonymous, disfigured corpses at 
Cassinga, Shaningwa abstracted meaning on their behalf. According to her, on Cassinga 
Day it was important to remember “the act of brutality against the Namibian people in 
particular, against human kind in general” and “our fallen heroes and heroines.” Libertine 
Amathila, who delivered the keynote address, offered a similar interpretation. Having 
rendered a story of the attack similar to Shaningwa's, Amathila stated that the anniversary 
of “the massacre” should be a “day of reflection” both on “the long and hard journey 
through which we have come to free this land” and “how we want the future of this 
country to be.” On the first topic, Amathila had little to say outside repeating assertions 
about the “cold-blooded” attack on the “refugee center.” On the second, Amathila 
maintained that “the victims of Cassinga and other victims of the liberation war” had 
sacrificed themselves for “our freedom” and it was the responsibility of the living to 
protect and further realize “their dream.” Whereas for the generation of Cassinga the goal 
had been political independence, it must now be “economic and social stability.” And the 
road to this social and economic stability was, as Amathila repeated, “the SWAPO party 
government's policy of national reconciliation” through which “we can build our nation 
together.” 
 The final speaker at the event was Agnes Kafula, a Cassinga survivor. With other 
survivors assembled in two lines standing behind her, Kafula offered a well worn story 
about the attack. In so doing, she contributed authenticity to claims about Cassinga 
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refugee camp made by politicians who never lived there – despite the fact that Kafula, 
like so many of the then teenage girls whose stories have been recorded, had only arrived 
at Cassinga a few days before the South Africans.172 Nonetheless, Kafula's narration of 
the events on May 4, 1978 also differed from Shaningwa and Amathila's stories in 
important ways. Consider, for example, her account of how Cassinga's inhabitants 
responded to the attack: 
We heard a strange sound approaching from the south[ern] 
and eastern side of the settlement. This strange sound was 
from the oncoming enemy jet fighters, and when they 
suddenly started bombing, tear-gassing and dropping 
soldiers, it became clear that the settlement was under attack. 
Our seniors, who were administering the settlement, gave us 
directions [about] where to run for safety. To be more 
specific... these were comrades: Darius Shikongo, he's still 
living, and he was well known as Mbolondondo; Comrade 
Max Nekongo, he is one of the councilors in the North; the 
late Dimo Hamaambo; the late Greenwell Matongo; Mocks 
Schivute, he was... the secretary of the camp; Anna 
Immanuel and Kauluma... While the jet fighters were busy 
bombing, a young, brave girl by the name of Paulina ran to 
the office to rescue the party flag. She grabbed it and 
wrapped it around her waist and she ran as fast as she could, 
not only to save her life, but also to save the party flag... 
Brave as she was, she managed to evade the enemy soldiers.  
Unfortunately, Comrade Paulina and many others would not 
live to see the independence of our country and enjoy the 
fruits of their bravery. 
 
 In contrast to those who have rendered Cassinga a symbol for anonymous 
refugees who sacrificed for the nation, Kafula presents the camp here as a site where 
particular persons lived who ought to be remembered by the nation's members. By 
mentioning camp commanders like Shikongo, by telling the story about Paulina, Kafula 
                                                 
172  For a record not only of personal accounts of the May 4 attack, but also of the limited experiences that 
many survivors had of the camp before the raid, see the testimonies in Mvula ya Nangolo and Tor 
Sellström's Kassinga: A Story Untold (Windhoek: Namibia Book Development Council, 1995, pp. 38-
69). 
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offers a glimpse of those who lived at Cassinga and their unheralded acts of bravery. In 
so doing, she not only incorporates the memory of these persons into a predictable 
national narrative, but also draws from them to assert the status of Cassinga survivors in 
the Namibian nation. This point is not only suggested by survivors' efforts to mark 
themselves as a distinct group and the histories that their representative told at the 
Cassinga Day commemoration, but also by Kafula's concluding remarks: “In light of the 
significant contributions and deep  psychological trauma [of Cassinga survivors], we call 
on our leaders to come up with any kind of recognition. We are not saying that Cassinga 
survivors should be compensated in monetary terms, but... we the Cassinga survivors 
should be consulted in what we think would be useful recognition.”  
 Kafula's comments strike at a fundamental contradiction of national history. While 
part of a political order in which they are reliant on “any kind of recognition” that 
national representatives grant them, Cassinga survivors, like so many groups that feel 
marginalized within a national community, are compelled by this same order to produce 
histories that may offer them some leverage over the recognition that they are granted. 
The resulting histories, while deeply embedded in the national narratives which invoke 
them, offer material which may be used to complicate and challenge these narratives – if 
one is only able to access them and willing to read them outside the binaries through 
which national communities define who does and does not belong to the nation. 
 This chapter draws from such strands of evidence to weave a  story about 
Cassinga that undermines the two dominant narratives about the camp. It does not aspire, 
however, to replace the “refugee” or “military” camp with a new national history that 
would be incorporated into one or another competing narrative. Rather, it suggests 
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multiple histories that might be told about Cassinga, that extend far beyond the Namibian 
nation to the many communities, events and memories entangled in this word. Moreover, 
it should highlight how new histories of this camp, and other sites similarly embedded in 
the nation, might be assembled by those who think that “Remember Cassinga” should be 





     Chapter 3 
Ordering the Nation: SWAPO in Zambia, 1974-1976 
 The mid-1970s mark a watershed in the formation of SWAPO and the Namibian 
exile community. On April 25, 1974 the Portuguese armed forces led by General António 
Spínola, overthrew Marcelo Caetano and his regime. Influenced by the pressures placed 
on Portugal over years of fighting liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and 
Guinea-Bissau, the interim government began to prepare its former colonies for 
independence. For people living along the Namibian-Angolan border and suffering from 
the violence that followed the Ovamboland election boycott of 1973,173 the revolution in 
Portugal presented an opportunity for the oppressed to flee into exile. From June 1974 to 
August 1975 between 4000 and 6000 Namibians fled through Angola to Zambia where 
previously only a few hundred SWAPO members had been living in several camps in 
southwestern Zambia and near the liberation movement's political headquarters in 
Lusaka.174 During and following this period of rapid expansion, tensions built within the 
Namibian exile community, reaching a climax in 1976. By March PLAN combatants near 
                                                 
173 In 1973 SWAPO led a boycott of elections for an independent government in Ovamboland, one of the 
homelands envisioned in the Odendaal Plan (1964), the South African government's blue-print for 
implementing apartheid in Namibia.  
174 Andreas Shipanga, In Search of Freedom (Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing, 1989), p. 98; Lauren Dobell, 
Swapo’s Struggle for Namibia, 1960-1991: War by Other Means (Basel, Switzerland: P. Schlettwein 
Publishing, 1991, 2000), p. 47; Colin Leys and John S. Saul, Namibia’s Liberation Struggle: The Two 
Edged Sword (London: James Currey, 1995), p. 130; Ailonga Collection, File Name: “Amnesty, 
International Community;” Salatiel Ailonga, “To the Members of the ICSWA Conference, Wuppertal,” 
12.2.1976. It should be noted that the exodus of Namibians into exile continued unabated in late 1975 
and early 1976, but the outbreak of violence in Angola in August 1975 appears to have hindered 
Namibians from traveling to Zambia after that time. 
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the Namibian border had imprisoned several of their commanders and requested meetings 
with leaders to express their concerns about conditions at the front. In April groups of 
SWAPO combatants and officials were arrested in Lusaka by the Zambian army on the 
request of SWAPO leaders. In July other combatants in southwestern Zambia, numbering 
over 1000 people, were also detained by Zambian soldiers. Only in 1977 and 1978, after 
the remaining SWAPO leaders had consolidated their power and pressure had been 
placed on them to release their prisoners, were various detainees permitted to rejoin 
SWAPO, register as refugees or granted political asylum.      
 Several histories of SWAPO's conflict in 1976 have been written. In the 
leadership's official narrative,175 the crisis is attributed primarily to SWAPO Secretary of 
Information, Andreas Shipanga, and the SWAPO Youth League (SYL), who, due to their 
aspirations for power and, in Shipanga's case, collaboration with West Germany, 
misguided the newcomers in exile. This version, referred to as “The Shipanga Crisis,” is 
also reflected in Peter Katjavivi's account,176  which, while reserving judgment, identifies 
Shipanga and the SYL as taking leading roles in fomenting discontent. Other histories 
focus on the new exiles' frustration with how SWAPO was administered during the 
period and the leadership's unwillingness to address these issues at a party congress 
which, based on resolutions passed at the previous congress in Tanga, Tanzania, should 
have convened by the end of 1974.177 It is from this perspective that Colin Leys and John 
                                                 
175 UNAM, Katjavivi Collection, Series B1, Category 3, File 2, “Report of the Findings and 
Recommendations of the John Ya Otto Commission of Inquiry into Circumstances which led to the 
Revolt of SWAPO Cadres between June, 1974 and April, 1976,” (a.k.a. “Ya Otto Report”) 4.6.1976.  
176 Peter Katjavivi, A History of Resistance in Namibia (London: James Currey, 1988). 
177 Franz Ansprenger, Die SWAPO, (Mainz: Matthias-Grunewald-Verlag, 1984); Shipanga 1989; Paul 
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without Democracy,” Journal of Southern African Studies. 20,1 (1994), pp. 123-147; Leys & Saul 
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Saul suggest that “The Shipanga Crisis” be renamed “The Democratic Crisis.” All studies 
of SWAPO in Zambia during the mid-1970s indicate that the crisis manifested itself in 
SWAPO administered camps. Sources, however, tend to depict the camps as a series of 
places where residents were influenced by persons, like Andreas Shipanga and SYL 
members, and ideological issues, like the call for the SWAPO congress, rather than as a  
kind of space which molded social relations among the entire Namibian exile community.  
 This chapter examines SWAPO in Zambia, 1974-1976 from the perspective of the 
camps. Drawing from stories about sleeping arrangements, parade announcements, food 
and weapon distribution, inhabitants' movements and detentions, it argues that camps did 
not reflect disputes which originated outside of them as much as they shaped a conflict 
which developed within them. Through their control of this space, internationally 
recognized SWAPO leaders and the commanders who administered camps on their 
behalf had considerable power to shape group allegiances and manage the resolution of 
conflicts, even at a time when leaders' authority was contested within the Namibian exile 
community. The camps, therefore, highlight how some members of SWAPO 
consolidated their power during a period when the liberation movement's form was 
especially fluid and its future contingent.  
 Moreover, the chapter considers how the 1974-1976 period in SWAPO's past may 
illuminate qualities of camps and global political structures more generally. Drawing 
from Liisa Malkki's notion that camps are part of the “national order of things,” an order 
which inflects life within and extends beyond the camps where many “refugees” and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Die Politik der Erinnerung und des Vergessens in Namibia: Umgang mit schweren 
Menschenrechtsverletzungen der Ära des bewaffneten Befreiungskampfes, 1966 bis 1989 (Frankfurt am 
Main: P. Lang, 2008), pp. 80-92. 
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other displaced peoples live,178 the piece considers how SWAPO's camps produced a 
social hierarchy within a national community. To this end, I draw from Malkki's and 
others' observations about camp service delivery, spatial control and social networks, 
highlighting how these qualities may empower national elites in the communities which 
live there. Thus, while acknowledging “the national order of things,” the chapter 
emphasizes how things in and around camps may order the social structure of a nation.  
 
The Exodus Arrives 
 In the memories of many of the first Namibians to travel to Zambia in 1974, the 
conflict started as soon as they entered the SWAPO camps.179 From as early as June they 
had begun crossing the border into Angola in small groups, which, in most cases, were 
picked up by the Portuguese authorities and transported to Luso (now Luena). By July, 
300-400 Namibians were assembled there, most of them young, secondary school 
educated and ethnically Ovambo. Many of them had led the resurgence of resistance to 
South African rule inside Namibia since 1971,180 and a sizable minority were women, 
perhaps as many as 20%.181 This group was then transported by Portuguese soldiers to a 
                                                 
178 Liisa Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in 
Tanzania (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995); Liisa Malkki, “Refugees and Exile: From 
‘Refugee Studies’ to the National Order of Things,” Annual Review of Anthropology 24 (1995), pp. 
495-523. 
179 The narrative that follows of the first exodus group's arrival is derived primarily from my interviews 
with persons who were part of this group: Abed Hauwanga (26.7.2007; 3.8.2007) Tangeni Nuukuawo 
(17.2.2007; 23.2.2007), Erastus Shamena (1.3.2007), Sheeli Shangula (25.3.2007) and Ben Ulenga 
(6.6.2008), as well as two published memoirs (Magdalena and Erastus Shamena, Wir Kinder Namibias: 
Eine Lebensgeschichte ausgezeichnet von Kirsti Ihamäki  nach Berichten in Ndonga (Wuppertal: 
Verlag der Vereinigten Evangelischen Mission, 1981, 1987); Nathanael 2002. Where individuals 
identify details that are not part of all these persons' stories, they are cited accordingly. 
180 In December 1971 Namibians began a strike in which many contract workers spread across the 
country's urban centers stopped working for two months. Many of the workers were later deported to 
Ovamboland where, in turn, many contested the South African government's efforts to implement the 
Odendaal Plan, culminating in the 1973 Ovamboland election boycott.  
181 Katjavivi 1988, p. 93; Dobell 1991, p. 47. 
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place in the bush near the Zambian border from where  the Namibians walked for three 
days until they reached a UNITA camp located near Kalabo, Zambia. There they were 
met by SWAPO officials, who transported them onward to Senanga, a SWAPO camp.  
 Senanga, which was located near the Zambian town of the same name along the 
banks of the Zambezi River, was established by SWAPO during the 1960s for members 
of the liberation movement traveling between the Namibian border and battlefront to the 
southwest and Lusaka and SWAPO headquarters to the northeast. The camp consisted of 
a few rudimentary buildings only – barely enough to accommodate the few men who 
were stationed there and the officials, also all male, who had come to collect the 
newcomers from Kalabo earlier that day. Thus, when the exodus exiles arrived in 
Senanga, there was uncertainty about where the newcomers were going to sleep. During 
the three days of walking from the Angolan-Zambian border, the new exiles had been 
sleeping together as a group in the bush. That first night in Senanga, however, some 
maintained that men and women should separate themselves and sleep on different sides 
of the camp. Sheeli Shangula, then SYL's Secretary General and a leader among the new 
exiles, recalls: 
[When we arrived at Senanga] they started with this, that 
boys should not [sleep] in close proximity with girls. They 
were saying that even at home that men are together with 
boys.  But the question was we were still in transit. There 
was no permanent structure to say this is the dormitory or 
the boarding of the girls... [Also,] on the way, maybe I had a 
bag. One girl just left like that [without a bag] or the bag that 
she had got torn up. My things and her things were together 
in one bag. And we didn't have many things. We slept with 
our clothing and maybe had only one towel to spare. And I 
remember some girls who would stay at the river washing 
and waiting for their underwear or panties to dry. Because 
Senanga is close to the river. So it was not so easy already 
there to introduce the question of separation... [Also] it was 
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just a question of security... We left together; now I only 
know you from my village. Those others, even if we speak 
the same language, I don't know them.182 
 
 From Shangula's perspective the matter of sleeping arrangements at Senanga was 
one to be considered in the context of the exiles' journey: the circumstances in which 
Namibians entered Zambia in July 1974 necessitated that men and women not be 
separated at night. Yet, as Shangula indicates, camp administrators saw the matter 
differently. Some drew from memories of life at home – “even at home... men are 
together with boys” – to justify separation. Nahas Angula, who would revisit the issue 
some days later when the new exiles came to Old Farm, the camp where he was an 
administrator, put the matter like this: “You had these people who came there. They 
wanted to have communal life, girls and boys sleeping together in the same sleeping 
quarters. And, of course, we said, 'No. Society is not organized like that.'”183   
 At the same time that SWAPO officials were appealing to gender social norms at 
Senanga, some were also flouting them. Keshii Nathanael, the President of the SYL, 
explains that before going to bed the first night it was noticed that some of the women 
from their party had been escorted by SWAPO officials to a bar in the town of Senanga. 
There they were given drinks and bedded in the officials' private quarters.184 Nathanael 
emphasizes that these practices, which continued over the nights that the group spent in 
Senanga, were a breach to courtship custom among the Ovambo. He writes that an 
Ovambo couple could only “afford to be seen together in public” and a man could only 
give “presents... to a woman not of his immediate family” once the relationship had been 
                                                 
182 Shangula 25.3.2008, p. 8. 
183  Nahas Angula, Interview 13.2.2008, p. 5. 
184 Nathanael 2002, pp. 64, 66. 
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sanctioned through a meeting of the couple's parents.185 What is more, Nathanael reports 
that he later learned from “married women,” in whom those who had visited the officials 
had confided, that the “young girls... had been forced into physical contact with men 
whom they regarded as their elders.”186 Not surprisingly, Nathanael and Shangula 
emphasize that the young men felt threatened by the officials and possessive of the 
women with whom they had traveled for weeks and, in some cases, had relationships that 
extended back to Namibia.187  
 The following afternoon the newcomers assembled at the parade. There, Peter 
Mueshihange, SWAPO's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the highest ranking SWAPO 
leader at Senanga at the time of the exodus' arrival and one of those implicated in the 
previous night's events, addressed them on behalf of the liberation movement. Nathanael 
recalls: 
When [Mueshihange] rose to speak we were shocked to hear 
what he had to say... He said he understood that there were 
intellectuals among us although he didn't say what was 
wrong with that. He did, however, warn that SWAPO was a 
movement of illiterate people – as if that was how he would 
have preferred us to be. “White belts,” he said again and 
again, were not for us, adding that he would take whatever 
measures were required to crush the “white belts” in the 
movement. A white belt we later learned was a term used in 
Eastern Europe for “intellectuals.” Mueshihange also warned 
that those who thought that they were popular at home to 
forget their popularity abroad. For abroad, he reiterated there 
was only one leader and he was the law. He demanded that 
we say after him, “One Namibia! One nation! One SWAPO! 
One leader!” Quite stunned by what I was hearing, I kept my 
mouth shut while some of the others shouted the slogans.188 
 
 It is likely that if Nathanael responded this way to Mueshihange's comments about 
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186 Nathanael 2002, p. 76. 
187 Shangula 25.3.2007, p. 8; Nathanael 2002, p. 66. 
188 Nathanael 2002, p. 65 
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“white belts,” that many others assembled at the parade had a similar reaction. As noted, 
many of them had attended secondary school and were seen by others at home as 
educated, and some, like Sheeli Shangula, had attended university in South Africa as 
well. Also, SYL members were accustomed to the language of participatory politics, 
which their leaders encountered during the contract workers' strike in Walvis Bay in 
1971-1972 and while studying in South Africa. This discourse could not have been easily 
reconciled with Peter Mueshihange's message about SWAPO's  “one leader.” According 
to Nathanael, he and several of the SYL leaders met after the speech to discuss their 
frustrations with how they had been received by the SWAPO leadership, but they had a 
greater wish “to reach Lusaka to be sent for military training, so... decided not to make an 
issue of what [they] had heard and seen.”189 Rather, a few days later, shortly before 
departing from Senanga, they wrote a letter addressed to SWAPO's leaders in Lusaka in 
which they declared: “Our wish, in fact our decision, is that each and everybody of us be 
trained militarily before he/she pursues any ordinary academic studies.”190  
 A few days later a fleet of Zambian trucks arrived at Senanga to pick up the new 
arrivals.191 When they boarded the trucks, many hoped and expected that they would be 
traveling to SWAPO's headquarters in Lusaka, but that evening they found themselves in 
northwestern Zambia, far from their desired destination. Upon hearing from a Zambian 
official that they had arrived at “Maheba Refugee Camp,” a commotion ensued. Only 
after Zambian soldiers stationed at the camp had coaxed them with food and threatened 
                                                 
189 Nathanael 2002, p. 65. 
190 UNAM, Katjavivi Collection, Series B1, Category 14, File No. 3, Keshii Nathanael and Sheeli 
Shangula, “A Statement from the SWAPO Youth League Members that Entered the Republic of 
Zambia,” July 1974. 
191 By the time the Zambian trucks arrived, several leaders among the new exiles had already been 
transported to Lusaka where they spoke with representatives of the United Nations Anti-Apartheid 
Committee. Thereafter they were flown to New York to brief the UN General Assembly on recent 
developments in Namibia (Nathanael 2002, p. 68; Nuukuawo, 17.2.2007, p. 3). 
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them with violence, did the Namibians finally disembark the trucks.192 Thereafter, Keshii 
Nathanael wrote a second letter to the SWAPO leaders in Lusaka, stating on behalf of the 
group that they were “freedom fighters” and therefore “wanted to be released [from 
Maheba] to receive military training and... fight the enemy.”193  
 A few days later Zambian trucks arrived at Maheba and transported the group to 
the Old Farm, a SWAPO camp near Lusaka. On August 26, two days after their arrival, 
SWAPO held a parade to commemorate “Namibia Day.”194 For the occasion SWAPO 
President Sam Nujoma traveled from Lusaka to Old Farm and addressed the newcomers. 
According to Nathanael, “Nujoma... spoke words of welcome and praise for those of us 
who had shown courage to organize political work at home and brave all manner of 
difficulties to come to Zambia... but he concluded his speech on a jarring note. He 
warned anyone who might be harboring ambitions to break away from the main body of 
the party that the Zambian Army would crush them.”195 Anita Ailonga, a Finnish women 
who was working at the Old Farm and would soon become entangled in the conflict, 
recalls Namibia Day 1974 similarly: “Nujoma spoke very harshly to [the youth] and 
[about] the papers they had written [to the leaders before arriving at the Old Farm]. And 
there was nothing to be angry about. They were not boasting or berating Nujoma.'”196 In 
contrast, Nahas Angula remembers the exodus' arrival at the Old Farm and subsequent 
parades as marked primarily by the SYL leaders' speeches, which suggested that “they 
                                                 
192 Shamena 1981, p. 58; Shamena 1.3.2007, p. 5. 
193 Nathanael 2002, p. 69. In this case, Nathanael is paraphrasing his letter from memory. The original was 
written in Oshiwambo. 
194 August 26 also marks the anniversary of the reburial of Samuel Maherero, an important event in the 
memory of Namibia's Otjiherero-speaking community. “Namibia Day” is now a Namibian national 
holiday, commemorated as  “Hereos' Day.” I begin the dissertation with a story about my experiences at 
the national commemoration of Heroes' Day in 2007.  
195 Nathanael 2002, p. 73. 
196 Salatiel and Anita Ailonga, Interview 23.3.2007, p. 11. 
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wanted to regard themselves as a party within a party” and undermined the SWAPO 
leaders' authority.197 
 This collective story of the exodus' arrival in the SWAPO camps may read as a 
portent of things to come. Indeed, the manner in which sources narrate these first 
encounters in 1974 tends to be teleological, presenting events in a way which justifies the 
sides which individuals took during the SWAPO crisis of 1976. The sides which people 
took in the crisis and the histories which are told about it were not set at the exodus' 
arrival, however. Rather, they were shaped over the following two years as a new 
community of Namibians interacted with one another in Zambia in various settings, 
above all  the camps. Through accounts of these interactions offered by sources with 
multiple relationships to the crisis, one can observe not only that encounters in camps 
generated conflict, but also how they shaped it as those who administered camps 
managed group allegiances within this space.  
     
Old Farm, Nyango and the Politics of the Belly 
 The origins of the Old Farm may be traced back to 1971 when Namibians who 
had fled violence in the Caprivi Region along the Namibian-Zambian border and been 
settled by the Zambian government in refugee camps during the late 1960s, began to 
present themselves at SWAPO's Lusaka office. According to SWAPO records from the 
time, the services being provided to refugees were inadequate, above all their rations of 
food.198 Furthermore, most of the Namibians in the Zambian refugee camps “were 
                                                 
197 Angula 13.2.2007, pp. 5-6. 
198 UNAM, Katjavivi Collection, Series B1, Category 15, “Application for Assistance South West Africa 
People's Organization,” 30.4.1971, p. 1; UNAM, Katjavivi Collection, Series B1, Category 2, 
“Namibian Educational and Health Centre,” 1973, p.2.   
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fishermen, unused to the rigours of farming and hence unable to cope with the 
situation.”199 It is in this context that SWAPO entered into negotiations with the Zambian 
government to purchase “a farm” where the liberation movement could assume 
responsibility for administering these Namibians. By 1973 SWAPO had purchased this 
land, and in early 1974 it established a school for a handful of youth at the farm which by 
then had been officially renamed “The Namibian Education and Health Center.”200    
 The arrival of the first exodus group at the Old Farm in August 1974 constituted a 
major change in the camp's demographics. Whereas there were, perhaps, 100 residents in 
the camp at the time the exodus arrived, the majority elderly women from the Caprivi,201 
more than 300 more exiles, mostly young and Ovambo, entered the camp in the first 
exodus group. Although many from this cohort quickly dispersed for military training, 
they were followed by waves of others. Most people in these groups would stay for a few 
weeks until they were sent away for military training, but some – children, women with 
young children, elderly and disabled persons –  remained at the Old Farm, which became 
a semi-permanent home. For those assigned to positions with SWAPO in Lusaka, the Old 
Farm was a place where they could visit fellow Namibians. Some, including several of 
the SYL and internal SWAPO leaders who entered exile in the exodus, drove the 26 
miles from Lusaka to Old Farm fairly often, visiting the camp once a week or more.202  
  Among the many encounters which occurred at the Old Farm in the months 
                                                 
199 “Namibian Educational and Health Centre,” 1973, p. 2. 
200 “Namibian Educational and Health Centre,” 1973, p. 3; Angula 13.2.2008. I retain the name Old Farm 
to refer to the center because there were SWAPO camps later established with the official name 
“Namibian Educational and Health Centre ” or “Health and Education Center.” Moreover, in popular 
use, the center outside Lusaka retained the name “The Farm” or “Old Farm.” 
201 In 1973 SWAPO estimates that there were “about 120 Namibians living at this Center” (“Namibian 
Educational and Health Centre,” 1973, p. 3). Nathanael maintains that his group was met by “some fifty 
to a hundred residents” (2002, p. 70).   
202 Andreas Shipanga, Interview 20.3.2007, p. 7; Shamena 1.3.2007, p. 9; Shangula  25.3.2007, p. 10. 
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following the exodus' arrival, the most contentious involved food and other commodities 
necessary for human survival. From the time the exodus began to arrive, SWAPO was 
hard-pressed to provide for all of those flooding into its camps. Although circumstances 
were generally better near Lusaka than in southwestern Zambia, where the liberation 
movement struggled to transport supplies to its soldiers,  conditions of scarcity also 
prevailed at the Old Farm. There, SWAPO officials began to practice “tactical 
government,” a term developed by Ilana Feldman to reference “a means of governing that 
shifts in response to crisis, that works without long-term planning, and that presumes 
little stability in governing conditions.”203 Unlike the cases of tactical government that 
Feldman considers in Gaza, however, in which organizations regularized service delivery 
to appease populations that might otherwise turn against them,204 SWAPO's tactical 
government involved sporadically delivering and withholding resources from camp 
inhabitants in an effort to make them pliable to their leaders' will.  
 Consider, for example, the work of the Chaplaincy to Namibians. In February 
1974 Salatiel and Anita Ailonga moved from Tanzania to Zambia, where they founded 
the Chaplaincy, a Christian ministry for Namibian exiles. From its origin the Chaplaincy 
was assisted by several organizations: the Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ), which 
connected the Chaplaincy with other Christian organizations working in the host country, 
the Evangelical Lutheran Ovambo-Kavango Church (ELOC), to which Salatiel belonged 
in Namibia, and the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), the Finnish Missionary Society 
and the Vereinigte Evangelische Mission (VEM), with which the Ailongas maintained 
connections through Salatiel's home church and Anita's previous work as a missionary in 
                                                 
203 Ilana Feldman, Governing Gaza: Bureaucracy, Authority and the Work of Rule, 1917-1967 (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2008), p. 3. 
204 Feldman 2008, pp. 123-154. 
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Tanzania.205 As such, the Chaplaincy received support for Namibian exiles from sources 
that were external to SWAPO, including, shortly after the exodus began, large quantities 
of “humanitarian aid.” But since the overwhelming majority of Namibian exiles belonged 
to SWAPO and inhabited SWAPO camps, the Chaplaincy needed to work through 
SWAPO to carry out its mission.  
 One might have expected that working with SWAPO would present no problem 
to the Ailongas. Salatiel was a founding member of the liberation movement, who had 
traveled with several of its leaders into exile in 1961 and had been endorsed by it to 
attend seminary in Tanzania. Anita also had long-standing relationships with some of 
SWAPO's most senior members and helped the liberation movement pay its rent and buy 
furniture shortly after it founded its office in Dar es Salaam in 1961.206 Despite these 
connections, the Chaplaincy found its work obstructed. Upon arriving in Zambia in 1974, 
the Ailongas were told by the liberation movement to take up residence in Lusaka, rather 
than at the Old Farm, where they had requested to live.207 With the support of donations 
from the  CCZ, LWF and VEM, the Ailongas managed to purchase a pick up truck and 
established a routine of visiting the Old Farm, especially on Sundays and other holy days 
in the Christian calendar, when Reverend Ailonga led worship services.208 But during the 
1974-1975 rainy season Ailonga reports that he and others had struggled to travel in and 
out of the Old Farm due to the effects of the rains on the road. The road was critical for 
                                                 
205 Ailonga Collection, File Names: “Chaplaincy Correspondence”and “General Files A,” Letter from 
Salatiel Ailonga to Pastor Groth, 20.11.1974; Ailonga Collection, File Name: “Political Matters 
Affecting the Chaplaincy,” Salatiel Ailonga, “The Work of the Chaplaincy to Namibians in Central and 
East Africa,” 5.5.1975. The Finnish Missionary Society missionized the northern part of Namibia where 
the ELOC was later founded. The VEM is the successor of the Rheinische Missionsgesellschaft which 
missionized the southern part of Namibia where the Evangelical Lutheran Church in South West Africa 
(ELC) was later founded.  
206 Ailongas 23.3.2007, pp. 1-2; Paul Helmuth, Interview, 13.7.2007, p. 7.  
207 Ailongas 23.2.2007, pp. 4, 6-7. 
208 Letter from Salatiel Ailonga to Pastor Groth, 20.11.1974; Ailongas 23.3.2007, p. 10. 
 86 
bringing food and other supplies to the Old Farm and for transporting sick people to 
Lusaka, tasks for which the Chaplaincy had primary responsibility at that time.209 Over 
the coming months Ailonga began to raise money for machinery and materials that could 
be used to improve the road, presumably for use in mid-1975 during the dry season. At 
some point that year, however, the project broke down. By way of explanation Ailonga 
says that while he was working on the road, he began to hear rumors that he was trying to 
undermine the SWAPO leadership –  or worse.210 At roughly the same time, the 
Chaplaincy was chastised by SWAPO leaders for a report submitted by a Namibian 
pastor affiliated with it to UNICEF and the United Nations Commissioner to Namibia.211 
Apparently the document, which attributes disease in SWAPO's southwestern Zambian 
camps to malnutrition, unhygienic water, poor accommodation and inefficient transport, 
was seen by some SWAPO leaders not as a cry to help suffering Namibian exiles but as a 
critique of the organization's leadership.212  
 The challenges that the Chaplaincy faced in doing their work may have resulted, 
to some extent, from deep-seated ideological or personal differences between the 
Ailongas and the people who were administering the Old Farm. Particularly, Nahas 
Angula, who was responsible for the Old Farm's school and, for a time, the entire 
settlement,213 was seen by some former camp inhabitants as “anti-Christian” and, 
                                                 
209 Letter from Salatiel Ailonga to Pastor Groth, 20.11.1974. 
210 Salatiel Ailonga, Interview 22.6.2007, pp. 27-28. 
211 In addition to Salatiel and Anita Ailonga, two other pastors also worked for the Chaplaincy following 
their flight into exile during the exodus: Oscar Shamwe and Jesaja Uahengo (Ailonga 22.6.2007, pp. 
29-30; Shipanga 20.3.2007, p. 7).  
212 Ailonga Collection, File Names: “S. Ailonga Chaplaincy to Namibians” and “General Files A,” Oscar 
Shamhe (sic), “Report,” 7.3.1975; “A short report concerning the situation of the Namibians,” 
18.3.1975; Ailongas 23.3.2007, p. 4. 
213 In several narratives research participants referred to Angula not only as the school principal but also as 
the camp administrator or commander. Angula indicates that there were several people who were 
responsible for administering the camp at different times, of which he was one (Angula 13.2.2008, p. 4). 
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allegedly, went out of his way to discredit and interrupt Reverend Ailonga's church 
services.214 Nonetheless, the Ailonga's aid, and the political effects that it could have on 
Namibians living in a space like Old Farm, must also be an important context for 
understanding why the ministry was obstructed. In the conditions of scarcity prevailing 
within SWAPO camps following the exodus, the Chaplaincy, with its separate access to 
donor networks, could be regarded as a rival to the liberation movement, which was 
struggling to provide for its people. Worship services might also be seen as bolstering the 
authority of Reverend Ailonga and other pastors who were leaders of a popular church 
rather than a national community.215  
 The Chaplaincy would have appeared particularly threatening if the Ailongas 
were thought to be sympathetic to those who from 1974 to 1976 were calling, with 
increasing alacrity, for a SWAPO Party Congress. Salatiel Ailonga, for his part, denies 
that he took sides in this or other conflicts within the liberation movement but volunteers 
that he was naive to leaders' political differences. According to him, he gave directly to 
different members of the National Executive Committee (Exco), SWAPO's highest 
organ, upon request: “Nanyemba [SWAPO's Secretary of Defense] came himself and 
asked to supply food...And Shipanga again himself, he came and asked if I had food... I 
thought they were working together.”216 And yet Nanyemba and Shipanga, as at least 
some Namibians living in Lusaka were aware, were on opposing sides of the party 
congress issue and had been part of estranged factions within SWAPO for years prior to 
                                                 
214  Ailongas 23.3.2007, p. 10; Shamena 1.3.2007, p. 9. 
215 The ELOC, to which Reverends Ailonga, Shamwe and Uahengo belonged, is Namibia's largest church.  
Most inhabitants of the Old Farm, who hailed from Ovamboland, where the ELOC is based, would have 
belonged to this church before entering exile.   
216 Ailonga, 22.6.2007, p. 26. 
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the exodus' arrival.217 By giving to Shipanga, Ailonga was effectively affirming 
Shipanga's authority as a legitimate SWAPO leader and threatening the monopoly that 
Nanyemba, Nujoma and those aligned with them otherwise had on the distribution of 
supplies in the SWAPO camps.  
 In the months preceding the crisis, SWAPO leaders continued to govern through 
distributing and withholding food in the camps although these tactics were increasingly 
contested and undermined. On December 14, 1975 at a meeting held on the Old Farm 
parade ground, SWAPO President Sam Nujoma denounced Keshii Nathanael and Sheeli 
Shangula in public for a statement which the two had published the previous month about 
the war in Angola.218  To critique the statement for the audience at Old Farm, Nujoma 
focused on how it related to Namibian bellies: “Those two... have written a paper in 
                                                 
217 Andreas Shipanga, Nahas Angula and Hidipo Hamutenya, former SWAPO leaders who took different 
sides in the 1976 conflict and have differing political allegiances in Namibia today, all confirm that the 
liberation movement's leadership was divided at the time the exodus arrived in 1974 (Shipanga, 
20.3.2007; Angula,13.2.2008; Hidipo Hamutenya, Interview 2.4.2008). According to Shipanga, from as 
early as 1970 there was discord within the National Executive Committee (Exco) around the issue of 
creating a steering committee for the next SWAPO Congress which pitted him against other Exco 
members, above all Sam Nujoma and Peter Nanyemba (Shipanga 1989, pp. 99-100). In 1973, as 
tensions over the congress mounted, the Exco stopped meeting altogether, and discussion of the 
liberation movement's business took place entirely through informal meetings among factions 
(Shipanga 20.3.2008, p. 8). Hidipo Hamutenya reports that, in the same year, several SWAPO leaders, 
including himself, Hifikupunye Pohamba and Jesaya Nyamu, were lobbying for the writing of a new 
party constitution and a congress, but higher ranking leaders within the liberation movement were not 
receptive (Hamutenya 2.4.2008, p. 4). Those who arrived in the exodus and who were given 
responsibilities with SWAPO in Lusaka also soon became aware of a conflict among SWAPO leaders. 
Tangeni Nuukuawo indicates that he first observed tensions in September 1974 when he was given a 
position distributing petty cash to SWAPO members living in Lusaka (Nuukuawo 17.2.2007, p. 3; 
23.2.2007, p. 5). While, in theory, Andreas Shipanga was the chair of a SWAPO Finance Committee, in 
practice, the SWAPO President, Sam Nujoma, and Vice-President, Mishake Muyongo, distributed all of 
the party's funds to individuals directly (Nuukuawo 23.2.2007, pp. 5-6). There were also stories that 
various SWAPO leaders were enriching themselves through the sale of humanitarian aid sent to the 
liberation movement and the management of two nightclubs, rumors that were widely circulated among 
SWAPO personnel living in Lusaka at the time.  
218 Since at least September 1975 fighting had broken out in Angola between its three liberation 
movements, Movimento Popular para Libertação da Angola (MPLA), Frente Naçional para 
Libertação da Angola (FNLA), União para Independençia Total da Angola (UNITA), and foreign 
governments supporting these forces. Angola became independent on November 11, 1975 and violence 
was on-going in December at the time of the parade. For further discussion of the Angolan Civil War 
and how SWAPO members in Zambia responded to it, see the discussion below.  
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which they accuse Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire of having been involved in war in Angola. 
Not knowing that all the food you eat comes from Mobutu, they want to sell you out 
because for them, they don't care because they have somewhere else to go.”219 
Nathanael's response, in turn, focused on an incident that occurred at the Old Farm the 
previous night in which food had been withheld from inhabitants as a punishment for 
alleged misbehavior: “Haven't we passed through difficulties together from the time 
when we started from home? Why didn't we sell you out then? Sam said that he wanted 
to warn you because he loved you. Isn't it true that you went to bed on empty stomachs 
last night?... Isn't it true that the store over there is full of food? Why didn't Sam Nujoma 
order his people to open that door to provide you with something to eat last night?”220  
 Within days of the confrontation at the parade, Nathanael and perhaps twenty-five 
others were sent on an assignment to Kaoma District, 600 kilometers west of Lusaka, to 
establish a new camp called Nyango.221 For several weeks the group worked alone, 
clearing the densely wooded bush and building houses with the saplings, and in early 
1976  the residents of Old Farm were transferred to Nyango. Food sources soon became a 
problem as numbers swelled in the camp.222 According to Nathanael, in January he and 
Sheeli Shangula managed to get a lift with Zambian army officials back to the SWAPO 
offices in  Lusaka, where they approached Deputy Secretary of Defense Richard Kapelwa 
to request food and supplies for the people at Nyango. When their request was denied, 
they turned to Salatiel Ailonga who told them that there “was enough food and clothing 
for Namibians at the World Council of Churches' local office merely waiting [to be 
                                                 
219 Nathanael 2002, pp. 114-115. Nathanael and Shangula's report had been critical of the FNLA on the 
basis that it was supported by the United States and Zaire. 
220 Nathanael 2002, pp. 114-116. 
221 Nathanael 2002, p. 117; Engombe 25.3.2007, p. 5; Shangula  25.3.2007, p. 2. 
222 Nathanael 2002, p. 117; Engombe 25.3.2007, pp. 5, 16. 
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collected by] SWAPO.”223 Ailonga, in turn, contacted Andreas Shipanga and together the 
two of them collected the aid and arranged for it to be transported with a Zambian truck 
to Nyango. Despite initial resistance from Erastus Haikali, the man assigned by the 
SWAPO leaders to administer the new camp, the aid was eventually distributed.224 Even 
afterwards, however, the food at Nyango was limited. According to Hans Beukes, a 
Namibian with whom Ailonga, Nathanael and Shipanga arranged a lift to Nyango shortly 
after the aid was distributed: “The effects of malnutrition were easy to see, even to the 
non-specialist. Tea for breakfast, weak and weakly sugared, nothing else, mealie-meal 
and kapenta (small dried fish boiled into a stew) for lunch and dinner was the regular fare 
for the five days I was there. Very little else seemed available to the people.”225 
 Allegedly, when Andreas Shipanga returned to Lusaka, he again tried to arrange 
supplies for the residents of  Nyango, by visiting several embassies. Eventually he was 
offered a large shipment of food from the West German government, but before Shipanga 
could send the food to Nyango, it was confiscated. In what was probably the first public 
denouncement of Shipanga, Nyango residents were told from the parade that Andreas 
Shipanga had collaborated with West German “imperialists” and that with the food he 
had gathered he intended to poison the Namibian people.226  
 
Détente and the Front 
 The coup in Portugal impacted SWAPO not only by enabling Namibians to flee 
into exile, but also by encouraging Southern African leaders to pursue new geopolitical 
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strategies. Among them was “the détente” entered by South Africa and Zambia's 
governments in late 1974 or 1975.227 The logic of a South African-Zambian détente at 
this time should be seen from the perspective of the two countries' converging interests 
vis a vis the contest for power in Angola. Neither the South African apartheid regime, 
which was adamantly anti-communist, nor Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, an 
outspoken critic of the Soviet Union, wanted to see the MPLA, with its clear Soviet 
leanings, rise to power in Angola. These circumstances, in conjunction with Zambia's 
vulnerability to South Africa as the dominant military and economic power in the region, 
begin to explain why the Zambians entered negotiations with a regime whose policies 
otherwise contradicted Zambia and the OAU's commitment to liberating the African 
continent from white minority rule.  
 With respect to SWAPO, the détente dictated that the Zambian government must 
halt the  operations of this and all other liberation movements from Zambian soil. As a 
guest in Zambia, SWAPO may have been pressured to align itself with other aspects of 
the détente, including the Zambian government's support of UNITA. Regardless of how 
various SWAPO leaders felt about these policies,228 the organization which they 
                                                 
227 There are different published accounts of when and how the détente was first negotiated. Historians 
David Martin and Phyllis Johnson refer to a meeting between Zambian and South African officials in 
New York as early as September 1974 (The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War (London: 
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228 Colin Leys and John Saul indicate that “Swapo leaders worried about the implications of Kaunda's 
machinations... for their own cause” (Leys & Saul 1994, p. 129) whereas Paul Trewelha maintains that 
SWAPO leaders, with their UN centered approach to liberation, actually embraced the détente with its 
potential for an internationally brokered resolution to Namibian independence (Trewelha 1991).  
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represented complied with them. SWAPO did not denounce the Zambian government for 
negotiating with its arch enemy, and it stopped delivering weapons and ammunition to its 
soldiers at the battlefront in southwestern Zambia. SWAPO avoided taking sides 
officially in the conflict between the three Angolan liberation movements, and it 
unofficially delivered weapons to, and fought alongside UNITA – probably even after 
September 1975, by which time South African forces had entered Angola and begun 
staging joint SADF-UNITA operations.229  
 Among Namibian exiles, those most directly affected by the détente were the 
soldiers based in southwestern Zambia, SWAPO's main battlefront at this time. 
According to PLAN combatants at the front between mid-1974 and mid-1976,230 they 
experienced shortages of supplies that became increasingly pronounced during these 
years. Most soldiers who had weapons used carbine rifles, which placed them at a great 
disadvantage vis a vis the South African troops armed with automatic weapons and other 
                                                 
229 SWAPO had a long history of close cooperation with UNITA necessitated by the fact that PLAN 
guerrillas were living and operating in UNITA controlled territories along the Angolan-Zambian border. 
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Interview 3.8.2007, pp. 21-22). As for the timing of the South African intervention in Angola in 1975, 
evidence is assembled by Paul Trewelha (1991, pp. 47-48, 56). 
230 The following description of conditions at the front in southwestern Zambia from 1974-1976 is drawn 
from the following soldiers who lived there at that time: Immanuel Engombe, (25.3.2007); Valde 
Penduleni Haikali (27.3.2007); Abed Hauwanga (26.7.2007; 3.8.2007); Junius Ikondja (18.3.2007; 
10.6.2007); Jackson Mwalundange (9.2.2007; 16.2.2007); Charles Namoloh (18.6.2008, 19.6.2008); 
Ndamono Ndeulita, (18.3.2007; 10.6.2007); Kandi Nehova (7.4.2008); Phillip Nekondo (24.3.2007); 
Tangeni Nuukuawo (17.2.2007; 23.2.2007; 10.3.2007); Erastus Shamena (1.3.2007); Hizipo 
Shikondombolo (17.6.2007); Darius “Mbolondondo” Shikongo (26.3.2007; 11.6.2007); Ben Ulenga 
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sophisticated machinery. Some trained soldiers did not have a weapon or ammunition for 
their weapon, and there were many stories of weapons received by soldiers that did not 
function properly. Shipments of food to the front were inconsistent and insufficient, and 
although soldiers could sometimes supplement their diets hunting game in the bush and 
trading commodities with local villagers, these practices were not always possible. 
Medical supplies were sparse or non-existent.  
 These conditions at the front affected all Namibians who lived there, including 
“the commanders,” who at this point in time were primarily exiles who had lived abroad 
since the 1960s and had been appointed by more senior SWAPO officials to train and 
lead the exodus exiles after they began to arrive in 1974.231 According to the soldiers 
from the exodus, they used to have frank conversations with some of their commanders 
about the problems they were all experiencing.232 Commanders also narrated stories 
about difficulties that they had suffered previously and how the leaders had responded 
when some among them had asked questions or offered criticisms. Some of these stories 
focused on Kongwa, the camp in Tanzania given by the OAU Liberation Committee to 
SWAPO and other liberation movements in 1963 to train guerrilla soldiers.233 Most of the 
                                                 
231 This overlap between the term “commander” and the PLAN combatants whom the exodus exiles found 
in Zambia upon their arrival was reflected in all of my interviews with soldiers stationed in 
southwestern Zambia from 1974 to 1976. On occasion, research participants referred to one of the 
exodus exiles as “commander” of a platoon, but the same person would be called a “soldier” in relation 
to the previous generation of exiles. As will be demonstrated, this distinction between the “1960s 
exiles” and “1974 exiles”, between “commanders” and “soldiers” is significant for understanding the 
SWAPO Crisis of 1976. Nonetheless, it has been largely overlooked in the scholarship on it. Only Colin 
Leys and John Saul identify two distinct groups of PLAN combatants, those trained both before and 
after the exodus, that were at odds with the SWAPO leaders (1994, p. 130; 1995, p. 48). Even Leys and 
Saul, however, do not indicate that the majority of each of the two generations of exiles living at the 
front took opposing sides to one another in the early months of 1976. Only one of my research 
participants, after revising transcripts of our original interviews and consulting a variety of people who 
had been at the front in Zambia in 1976, could identify a PLAN combatant who had been trained before 
1974 and who had been detained with “the rebels” at Mboroma (Ikondja 18.3.2007, pp. 8-9).  
232 Ikondja 18.3.2007, pp. 9-10; Engombe et al. 29.7.2007, pp. 26-27. 
233 Ikondja 18.3.2007, pp. 9-10; Engombe et al. 29.7.2007, pp. 26-27. 
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commanders had lived in Kongwa during the late 1960s when the camp was often a site 
of unrest, and some had probably been detained  following an incident there in 1971 
when a soldier attacked Peter Nanyemba with a knife.234 By narrating such histories, 
commanders highlighted common qualities of all PLAN combatants' experiences and of 
their collective relationship to the political leaders.  
 Nonetheless, qualities of the camp space created tensions between commanders 
and common soldiers. Like in other SWAPO settlements, commanders at the front were 
responsible for the distribution of  supplies and, as a result, had first access to them. They 
also controlled access to locations both inside and outside the camp. In practice, this often 
meant that commanders took meals in their own mess, where rank-in-file soldiers could 
not observe what they were eating or drinking, and had private or commander-only 
accommodations, where they could sleep with whom they wanted in relative privacy. 
Soldiers generally had to request permission from commanders to leave the camp 
whereas the more senior commanders could leave their camps at any time. Some senior 
commanders were also in direct  communication with the SWAPO political leaders about 
military affairs and could make requests to them during trips to Lusaka and during 
leaders' visits to the front.  
 Such differences, which would lead to social differentiation between commanders 
and other soldiers under any circumstances, could be expected to cause tensions under the 
conditions in which Namibians were living in Zambia in the mid-1970s. Soldiers might 
mistrust commanders' explanations about weapons and food and covet commanders' 
privileged access to these commodities. Women, who were also at the front after the 
                                                 
234 Kaufilwa Nepelilo, Interview 4.8.2007, p. 29-31; Jesaya Nyamu, Interview 2.4.2008, p. 5. For  more 
details about Kongwa and these and other incidents that occurred there, see Chapter 6. 
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exodus but in relatively small numbers, might also cause conflict as male soldiers envied 
commanders' access to them and as women begrudged the sexual advances of 
commanders. Some soldiers also resented the basis on which commanders had been 
granted their status, which seemed to leave no opportunity for exodus exiles to become 
commanders themselves.235 Commanders, for their part, risked their status and related 
privileges if they identified too closely with soldiers, particularly those who might be 
construed as inciting insurrection against the SWAPO leaders. Thus, when commanders 
shared their concerns about living conditions with common soldiers or told them histories 
of Kongwa, they did so in small groups, away from the parade and any more senior 
officials who could use these revelations to denounce them.236  
 Clearly, camp spatial practices not only normalized national categories, a theme 
which Liisa Malkki discusses in her work,237 but also shaped a national leadership 
structure. Moreover, as this structure became increasingly imperiled, SWAPO leaders 
and their Zambian government allies tried to use the social divisions produced both by 
the camp space and the spaces between camps to manage the emerging conflict. For 
example, in late July or early August 1975, the first groups of exiles to receive military 
training in Tanzania and the Soviet Union began returning to Zambia, among them 
members of that first cohort which arrived at Senanga a year earlier.238 Many expected 
that when these groups returned, they would be sent to the front to join the other soldiers 
in the fighting there. However, they were sent to Ruakera, a camp located 30 kilometers 
outside Mwinilunga in northwestern Zambia. Ruakera lay hundreds of kilometers from 
                                                 
235  Ikondja 10.6.2007, p. 34. 
236  Ikondja 18.3.2007, pp. 9-10. 
237 Malkki 1995, pp. 137-142. 
238  Ulenga 6.6.2008. 
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the front and was surrounded by Zambian soldiers, who were responsible for keeping the 
new trainees there.239 
 As it became clear that the new trainees were not to be sent to the front, the issue 
became a source of discontent among different groups of PLAN combatants. Ben Ulenga, 
one of the first trainees to return to Zambia, recalls his confusion and dismay when, as the 
truck carrying him from Tanzania to Zambia approached Lusaka, it turned north towards 
the Zambian Copperbelt, away from the front.240 Upon arriving at Ruakera, he and other 
soldiers began to ask the camp commanders about why they were there and when the 
weapons that had been promised to them by their trainers in Tanzania and the Soviet 
Union would be arriving.241 After staying at the camp for some months doing little more, 
according to Ulenga, than “playing cards and drinking honey beer,” some of them began 
to flee from the camp.  
 Commanders were also dissatisfied with the situation at Ruakera. Ulenga recalls 
that two days after the trainees' arrived there, Greenwell Matongo, the PLAN Political 
Commissar, delivered a speech to the new arrivals, in which he explained that he and 
other commanders had traveled to the Tanzanian-Zambian border to meet the newcomers 
but had been informed by Zambian officials that the newcomers could not travel to the 
front. According to Ulenga, in making this announcement to the soldiers, “[Matongo] 
wasn't making a SWAPO announcement. It was like he was washing his hands [of the 
                                                 
239 According to Andreas Shipanga, the placement of PLAN combatants at Ruakera resulted from a direct 
order of the Zambian government to the SWAPO leaders to comply with the détente policy: “The 
Minister of Defense, called us, the SWAPO leaders, to [him] and gave us orders that [our] guerrillas 
must be rounded up, must be photographed, must [have] their particulars [recorded] and sent to 
Ruakera, [in the] north, northwest of Zambia. I was there at the time... [as were] Peter Nanyemba, Peter 
Mueshihange and Mishake Muyongo” (Shipanga 20.3.2007, p. 2). 
240 Ulenga 6.6.2008. 
241  Ndeulita 10.6.2007; Shikondombolo 17.6.2007; Ulenga 6.6.2008. 
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situation],” distancing himself from the Zambian government and any others who 
supported its decision.242 
 Eventually, commanders took the Ruakera issue up directly with the SWAPO 
leadership. On October 28th 1975, the PLAN Chief in Command, the PLAN Political 
Commissar and a camp  commander drafted a document, which appears to have been 
addressed to the SWAPO leaders, about  the détente in general and Ruakera in particular. 
They write: 
1. The freedom fighters of Southern Africa, Rhodesia, 
Namibia are sold out by the African brothers to the racist 
Foster (sic) regime. 2. It is very clear we are being sold out 
by the Zambians... 3. Our people who were coming from 
USSR and Tanzania after their training are being kept 
between Zaire and Angola north from Mongu in Sakanya. 
They are being surrounded by the army of Zambia... 4. The 
People's Liberation Army of Namibia will never drop her 
guns until Freedom and independence is (sic) achieved... 5. 
Zambia has kept our weapons which have been coming from 
our friends for many years... 6. We want our trained 
compatriots to be handed over to us or to be sent back to the 
respective places from where they were coming, the same 
applies to our weaponseither (sic) to be handed to us or sent 
back but not to be kept by the Zambian government... 7.... 
(a) [We] respect the great leader of SWAPO, the People's 
Liberation Army of Namibia, the acting vice President, high 
Officers and Commanders of the People's army. (b) The 
President of SWAPO, the Vice President as well as all 
officials if you surrender and want us to drop our guns tell 
us as soon as possibleand [sic] we will know what to do.243  
   
                                                 
242  Ulenga 6.6.2008. 
243 Ailonga Collection, File Names: “SWAPO Office Zambia” and “Political Matters affecting the 
Chaplaincy,” “Very urgent attention is required to the following points,” 28.10.1975. The document is 
one of several distributed by a group of PLAN combatants at the front in 1976 to other Namibian exiles. 
It was probably confiscated from the Central Base office under circumstances that will be described 
below. The authors do not identify themselves by specific names but rather as “Chief in Commander,” 
“Political Commissar,” and “Chief Camp Commander.” Four research participants who were at the 
front in 1975 spoke with me at length about the specific commanders to which these titles refer 
(Engombe et al.  29.7.2007, pp. 23-25). Although Greenwell Matongo and others were identified as 
possible candidates, no consensus was reached. 
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   The clear focal point of the commanders' criticism here is the Zambian 
government. However, for grasping the situation in the camps, it is also important to note 
another object of critique: the SWAPO leaders. This reading of the document is 
suggested by the context in which it was written; it takes a defiant position vis a vis the 
Zambian government at the same time that SWAPO was officially toeing the line with its 
Zambian allies. Also, the authors call for a resolution of the situation at Ruakera, referred 
to in the document with reference to the nearby border town Sakanya, that involves that 
PLAN combatants stationed there be handed over “to us” (or “sent back to the respective 
places from where they were coming”). This “us” contrasts with “you,” which in point 
seven is clearly used to refer to “the President of SWAPO, the Vice President as well as 
all officials.” Finally, point seven concludes with a statement that appears to be a threat 
directed at the SWAPO leaders: “if you surrender and want us to drop our guns tell us as 
soon as possibleand [sic] we will know what to do.”  
 Despite the upset among various PLAN combatants about the group at Ruakera, 
however, little or nothing was known about this group by common soldiers at the front, 
and no official announcements about the détente had been made to them. It is only when 
the space was crossed between where the common soldiers at Ruakera and the front were 
living that they began to respond to their common predicament in new ways. Several 
weeks after the commanders submitted their statement to the SWAPO political leaders, 
the soldiers at Ruakera were transferred to the front. There they were assigned to Central 
Base, a SWAPO camp located less than 10 kilometers from the Kwando River near 
where the borders of Zambia, Angola and Namibia converge.244 Central Base was the 
                                                 
244  Engombe et al. 17.6.2007, pp. 9, 13, 32; Ikondja 10.6.2007, p. 20; Ulenga 6.6.2008. 
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home of senior SWAPO commanders and a point from which weapons and supplies were 
distributed to smaller camps located along the River, where PLAN  guerrillas were 
operating.245  Upon learning that a group had arrived at Central Base, some of these 
soldiers from the River, who were not involved in any military operations and not closely 
supervised by commanders at this time,246 made their way to Central Base where they 
managed to exchange news with the newcomers. Those who had been at the front learned 
about how their comrades had been held for months at Ruakera, and those from Ruakera 
learned about the problems soldiers had been experiencing at the front and news from the 
war in Angola.247  
 By this time the Angolan liberation movements had been fighting for several 
months. Although PLAN soldiers had been involved in the combat there, most were part 
of units that had been operating deep in Angola since early 1975, not soldiers who had 
been stationed along the Kwando River at Angola's southeastern edge.248 Nonetheless, 
there were some soldiers who had arrived at the Kwando River who had been sent on 
missions deep in Angola, especially truck drivers who had been commanded to deliver 
weapons to various units there. They bore stories of weapons intended for SWAPO being 
delivered to UNITA and of SWAPO soldiers fighting alongside UNITA – despite the 
latter's supposed alliance with South Africa.249 These stories must have placed additional 
pressure on soldier-commander relations. Whereas the commanders tended to speak 
                                                 
245  Engombe et al. 17.6.2007, pp. 9, 13; 29.7.2007, pp. 23-25. 
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249 The PLAN Fighter's Declaration,” April 1976; “To the President of SWAPO,” 23.3.1976; Engombe et 
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favorably of UNITA, alongside which they had been operating in the bush for years 
before the exodus' arrival, those soldiers recently trained in the Soviet Union or by Soviet 
influenced instructors in Tanzania had been instructed to see the MPLA as Angola's only 
legitimate liberation movement. Moreover, while SWAPO and Zambian officials had still 
made no announcements to soldiers at the front about the détente, the commanders had 
directly ordered soldiers to deliver weapons to UNITA and to join UNITA units in battle. 
Blame for these orders could only be placed unequivocally on the commanders 
themselves.   
  In February or early March 1976 relations between soldiers and commanders 
reached a tipping point. As many now tell the story, at Kaunga Mash, a SWAPO camp 
along the Kwando River, there was a chicken, which, while pecking for food one day, 
uncovered the edge of a box of weapons from the ground. When PLAN soldiers 
discovered the box, they called on Zambian military personnel stationed nearby to 
witness as they unearthed one container after another full of guns and ammunition.250 As 
research participants explain, the significance of the event was not that a cache of 
weapons was unearthed per se. Hiding weapons in the ground was standard practice for 
SWAPO guerrillas over many years and the knowledge of the locations of weapons 
would certainly have been restricted information. Rather, the weapons lit a fuse because 
of the context of their discovery at a time when soldiers' means to defend themselves 
were highly inadequate and rumors abounded about SWAPO delivering weapons to 
                                                 
250 E.g. Ailonga Collection, File Names: “SWAPO Office Zambia” and “SWAPO Conflict Zambia,” “Why 
we have to meet directly with the Liberation Committee of the OAU,” 23.3.1976, p. 1. One research 
participant presented an alternate version of the story, maintaining that the chicken story was an alibi 
created by soldiers at the site to protect his friend, who had, in fact, been cooking over the place where 
the weapons were located. After a commander warned her not to start a fire there, she began to dig and 
uncovered the weapons (Ikondja, 18.3.2007, p. 4; Engombe et al. 17.6.2007). 
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UNITA.  
 Shortly after the incident at Kaunga Mash, two PLAN commanders were blamed  
for concealing the arms and detained by the soldiers, and other commanders had begun to 
flee from their respective camps.251 Some of the soldiers proceeded to Central Base 
where they shared information about these happenings and created an “Investigation 
Committee,” representing various units across the front, and  an “Advisory Committee” 
to assist it.252 In the process the Investigation Committee became the de facto command. 
As one former solider put it, “[At that time] Central Base, Kaunga Mash was one house. 
Because it was under the same leadership... the Committee.”253 The Committee was 
charged by soldiers to search for more weapons and to investigate rumors circulating at 
the front. In turn, it held meetings with soldiers to share information and compiled reports 
that justified the soldiers' actions, discredited those of their former superiors and called 
for the party congress. With the commanders gone, the Committee used the typewriter at 
the Central Base office to print this information and attempted to circulate their 
documents to other Namibians through sympathetic truck drivers, who were traveling to 
and from the front.254  
 Even as camp structures at the front appeared to be breaking down, however, they 
continued to be used by SWAPO leaders to manage the conflict. Soon after the soldiers 
arrested the commanders whom they held responsible for hiding the weapons at Kaunga 
                                                 
251  “The PLAN Fighter's Declaration,” April 1976, pp. 3-4; Ndeulita 18.3.2007, p. 5; Shikondombolo 
17.6.2007, pp. 8-9; Engombe et al. 29.7.2007, pp.  19, 34. Many of those interviewed spoke of the 
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Mash, they called on their chief leaders, President Sam Nujoma and Secretary for 
Defense Peter Nanyemba, to visit them at the front and to account for this and other 
grievances. It was only when Peter Nanyemba arrived at Central Base, that the camp's 
chief commander, Haiduwa, fled the camp. According to soldiers at Central Base at that 
time, Haiduwa fled to save himself, not from the common soldiers but from the political 
leaders: “He did well because [the leaders] were going to kill him; they were going to say 
he's the one who was influencing the fighters.”255 By the time Nanyemba departed from 
Central Base, following a confrontational meeting with soldiers at the parade, most of the 
commanders and some loyal soldiers had assembled themselves at Oshatotwa, the camp 
for PLAN soldiers undergoing military training in Zambia. Located 20 kilometers 
northeast of Central Base and about 30 kilometers from the Kwando River, Oshatotwa 
was the first settlement reached when approaching the front from Lusaka.256 Thus, it was 
possible for SWAPO trucks to continue to transport food to those living at Oshatotwa, 
while cutting off supplies to all the other soldiers at the front and impeding their travel 
into the Zambian interior.257 Under these conditions some soldiers at Central Base slipped 
away from the camp and gave themselves over to the commanders at Oshatotwa, and, 
allegedly, physical coercion was used by people on both sides to keep inhabitants inside 
their respective camps.258 
 Threatened by the commanders and soldiers assembled under them at Oshatotwa 
and cut off from contemporaneous happenings in Lusaka and Nyango, the Investigation 
Committee wrote a series of statements in March 1976 which condemned the 
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commanders but withheld judgment on Zambia's and SWAPO's most senior officials. In 
one document, the Committee offers a history of the soldiers problems with weapons, 
food and medicine since the first ones arrived at the front in late 1974, concluding that 
“the commanders who are responsible for these deeds were not acting through ignorance, 
but that they were collaborating with the enemy.”259  The document continues: “Since the 
treacherous acts of the commanders of sending cadres into battle without weapons and 
food and burying arms and ammunition in the ground while the fighters are without arms, 
we have completely lost faith in them. We reject: A. Any mission assigned by them B. To 
be led into battle with them.”260 In contrast, the Committee emphasizes that the soldiers 
have “loyalty and confidence” in SWAPO President Sam Nujoma and that they would 
like the President “to come to negotiate with the fighters concerning the arrangement of 
temporary commanders” until new commanders can be appointed at the SWAPO Party 
Congress.261 In another document the Committee refers to  Andreas Shipanga and asks 
the President what he plans to do if Shipanga is, in fact, “collaborat[ing] with the 
enemy.”262  
 When, on April 11, 1976, a group from Central Base traveled to Oshatotwa to 
meet with people there,263 the commanders responded with violence. According to 
members of the group from Central Base, they were disarmed, beaten, stripped to their 
waist and tied to trees for the night. In the morning, after another group from Central 
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Base had come to check on them, the entire group, consisting now of several hundred 
soldiers, was lined up, tied one to another, led into the bush and threatened with their 
lives. Only after the Committee had released the two detained commanders were the 
soldiers able to return to Central Base.264 
 
“Conflict Resolution” in the International System 
 By April 1976 SWAPO was openly in conflict. At the main battlefront the 
majority of soldiers were in rebellion against the camp commanders. At the Old Farm and 
Nyango, SWAPO leaders had denounced Nathanael and Shipanga, and Nathanael, 
Shipanga and others had disobeyed the SWAPO leaders by distributing food there. 
Although SWAPO officials had been using the camps to assert their influence and 
manage tensions among Namibians, their control over those living in them appeared to be 
slipping. Whereas SWAPO leaders had managed to retain the allegiance of the 
commanders and to isolate other groups that were dissatisfied with their leadership, rivals 
continued to influence camp inhabitants and, at the front, the command structure in most 
camps had been overturned entirely.  
 Even at this moment, however, the SWAPO camps remained part of a global 
political order, most of whose constituent bodies both recognized SWAPO as 
representative of a Namibian nation and granted certain persons the authority and 
instruments to govern “their people” in autonomous settlements. This order, referred to 
by Liisa Malkki as “the system of nation-states,”265 not only affirmed nationalism as the 
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common ideology binding those living in SWAPO camps in Zambia, but also a particular 
hierarchy of persons administering Namibians within this space. It is precisely when the 
patterns of camp life were dissolving and the authority of the officials administering it 
were most contested that one can best see the resilience of the international system of 
which the camps were an integral part.      
 In April 1976 SWAPO's most immediate ally in the international system was the 
Zambian government. Despite whatever efforts Zambia had made to curtail PLAN 
operations during the détente, its government remained officially allied to SWAPO. As a 
member of the OAU, Zambia was part of the collection of nation-states which since 1964 
had given SWAPO money to support the training of guerrilla insurgents and since 1965 
had recognized SWAPO as Namibians' “sole and authentic” representative.266 This 
formal status, in turn, structured the personal relationships of Zambian and SWAPO 
officials. As the OAU's chosen liberation movement in Namibia, SWAPO and its 
President Sam Nujoma had represented the country at OAU functions that also included 
Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda and a close friendship had developed between 
them.267 According to Shipanga, Nathanael and others, as tensions built in late 1975 and 
early 1976 Nujoma, Kaunda and other leaders began to hold private meetings at friends' 
homes to discuss how to resolve the conflict.268  The Zambian Army commander Major 
Mulopa  also had a close relationship with some SWAPO leaders. Mulopa had been 
assigned by the Zambian government to monitor the activities of the liberation 
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movements operating in Zambia. He was based in Lusaka at the Liberation Centre, a 
complex where SWAPO maintained its head office alongside the other movements. 
According to Tangeni Nuukuawo, a SWAPO official who worked at the Liberation 
Centre, from September 1974 to April 1976, Major Mulopa was responsible for 
monitoring weapons dispersed to SWAPO, a task which he fulfilled with only a few 
SWAPO leaders. Mulopa also listened to and responded to the problems of the liberation 
movements on behalf of the Zambian government, which in practice meant conversing 
with President Nujoma and a few other individuals. Nuukuawo emphasizes that he and 
others within SWAPO who were pressing for a SWAPO Party Congress could not access 
Major Mulopa.269   
 In addition to these diplomatic and personal ties, the Zambian government and the 
Nujoma  faction of SWAPO leaders also had overlapping strategic interests. Although 
SWAPO leaders might have had conflicting responses to the détente when they became 
aware of this policy in 1974 or 1975, as tensions escalated among Namibian exiles, there 
was considerable reason for those supporting the established order to be concerned about 
distributing weapons to PLAN combatants. Also, the Zambian government had cause to 
be concerned about a conflict within SWAPO spilling out of its control. Since March 18, 
1975, when Zimbabwe Africa National Union (ZANU) leader Herbert Chitepo was 
assassinated in a car bomb attack in Lusaka, the Zambian government had been an object 
of criticism for not having intervened to stop violence within a liberation movement and 
the government was suspected by some of having perpetrated the violence itself.270 
                                                 
269  Nuukuawo 23.2.2007, pp. 9-10; 3.7.2008. 
270  The rationale for this argument is related to the politics of the détente. Chitepo is known to have 
resisted the Zambian government's attempts to halt ZANU military operations from Zambia. Also, he 
was a high-ranking official in ZANU, a rival to Kaunda's preferred Zimbabwean liberation movement, 
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Thereafter a state of emergency was declared in which the Zambian Army was granted 
extended powers to arrest anyone suspected of threatening national security.271 
Controversy around “the Chitepo affair” heightened again after March 8, 1976 when the 
commission of inquiry into Chitepo's assassination submitted its report to President 
Kaunda. Some saw the report simply as an attempt to clear the Zambian government's 
name with respect to Chitepo's murder.272   
 It is in this context that the Zambian government began to intervene in the 
SWAPO crisis. Sometime shortly after the Investigation Committee formed and began to 
distribute documents on behalf of the fighters, it became necessary for SWAPO officials 
wishing to travel outside Lusaka to request permission from Major Mulopa. This 
included not only officials wanting to visit Oshatotwa, Central Base and the front, where 
visits had been restricted by SWAPO prior to the new order, but all SWAPO camps, 
including Old Farm and Nyango.273 The Zambian Army then took action to disarm the 
soldiers at the front. Accounts of the disarming differ, perhaps due to the different 
methods employed at Central Base and along the Kwando River. Several interviewed at 
Central Base recall that they were told to hand over their weapons to Zambian soldiers by 
members of the Investigation Committee, following the Committee's first and only 
meeting with the Zambian government and OAU representatives in Lusaka in early 
                                                                                                                                                 
ZAPU. Some believed that Chitepo's assassination offered the Zambian government an excuse to crack 
down on ZANU (Martin and Johnson 1981; Trewelha 1991, pp. 45-47). 
271  Ailonga Collection, File Names: “Chaplaincy Letters” and “General Files A,” Salatiel Ailonga, 
“Memorandum,” 24.6.1976. 
272  Martin & Johnson 1981, pp. 183-184. 
273  On April 8, 1976 Salatiel Ailonga submitted a request to Major Mulopa to visit Nyango during the 
Easter holiday “in order to attend spiritually to the Namibians.” This request was rejected. See Ailonga 
Collection, File Names: “Chaplaincy to Namibians in Exile” and “General File A,” Letter from Salatiel 
Ailonga to Major Mulopa, 8.4.1976; Ailonga 22.6.2007, p. 34.  
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April.274 Apparently, the Commitee had agreed  that soldiers would do this in conjunction 
with promises from the OAU that soldiers would be given more arms, food and uniforms 
as well as be able to send another delegation to Lusaka to discuss their concerns in 
detail.275 Others, at the front indicate that they were disarmed by Major Mulopa and the 
Zambian Army directly,276 reportedly on the premise that otherwise “we were going to 
shoot ourselves, like the Zimbabweans did.”277 In both accounts, after the PLAN soldiers 
were disarmed, Zambian troops were placed around the SWAPO camps to guard and 
keep the soldiers there.278  
 Then, on April 21 before dawn, the Zambian army and police raided a series of 
Lusaka houses inhabited by SWAPO members, from which Andreas Shipanga, Sheeli 
Shangula and four others were arrested. From there they were transported to 
Nampundwe, a camp on the outskirts of Lusaka where they had detained members of 
ZANU suspected in the murder of Herbert Chitepo only months before. Over the coming 
few weeks, five other SWAPO officials, including Keshii Nathanael and Tangeni 
Nuukuawo, who had  eluded the initial arrest because they were representing SWAPO at 
a conference in the Hague, were detained and sent to Nampundwe.279  At the same time 
as the first arrests in Lusaka, a group of forty-eight soldiers representing the Investigation 
Committee was transported from the front on Zambian trucks on the premise that it was 
to hold more extensive meetings in Lusaka with the OAU. Instead, the group was 
                                                 
274 Ailonga, “Memorandum,” 24.6.1976, p. 5; Mwalundange 9.2.2007; Engombe et al. 29.7.2007, pp. 20-
21. 
275  Hauwanga 26.7.2007, pp. 9,10; Engombe et al. 29.7.2007, pp. 20-21. 
276  Ikondja 18.3.2007, p. 5; Nekondo 24.3.2007, p. 10; Haikali 27.3.2007, p. 7. 
277  Engombe et al. 29.7.2007, pp. 20-21. 
278  Mwalundange 9.2.2007, p. 5; Ikondja 18.3.2007, p. 7. 
279  Ailonga Collection, File Name: “SWAPO Conflict Zambia,” “Our Arrest and the Subsequent 
Detention;” Shipanga 1989, pp. 109-110; Nathanael 2002, pp. 138-145; Nuukuawo 17.2.2007, p. 4. 
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transferred onward to Ruakera where they were held under the guard of Zambian soldiers 
for the next several months.280 In June Salatiel and Anita Ailonga as well as Hans Beukes 
and his Norwegian wife Adel were deported from Zambia.281  
 The Zambian government was soon forced to legitimate these actions. Shortly 
after the arrests in Lusaka, Sheeli Shangula and Martin Taneni, another co-detainee, 
managed to escape from Nampundwe and with the help of sympathetic diplomats to 
release a statement to the international press.282 In response to this and other rumors that 
SWAPO members had been abducted, the Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a 
statement that “certain SWAPO individuals had been placed under protective custody for 
their own safety.”283 On May 14 Andreas Shipanga, whose wife Esme had hired a lawyer 
on his behalf, submitted an application to the Zambian High Court for a writ of habeas 
corpus.284 After the case was postponed for several weeks, Zambian Minister of Legal 
Affairs and Attorney General Mainza Chona presented the state's position that it had no 
case to answer since Shipanga had, in fact, not been arrested. Later the state changed its 
position maintaining that Shipanga had been arrested and that the grounds for arrest were 
legal due the declared state of emergency, under which the legal process only applied to 
Zambian citizens. Eventually, Shipanga's case was sent to the Zambian Supreme Court 
                                                 
280  Ailonga, “Memorandum,” 24.6.1976, p. 6; “Oh World Hear Our Cries,” 7.8.1976; “PLAN Fighters' 
Declaration,” April 1976, p. 2. In “The PLAN Fighters' Declaration,” which was written by the soldiers 
at the front in mid-April 1976, a “Brief Notice” dated, April 23, 1976 narrates how the Committee was 
deceived and sent to Mwinilunga, the town nearest to Ruakera. The authors of the “Brief Notice” are 
reportedly two members of the Committee who escaped when the committee passed through Lusaka en 
route to Ruakera (Hauwanga 26.7.2007, p. 10; Engombe et al.  29.7.2007). 
281  Ailonga Collection, File Names: “Chaplaincy – Relation to Namibians outside SWAPO” and “Political 
Matters Affecting the Chaplaincy,” “Two SWAPO Leaders Ordered to Quit Zambia,” Times of Zambia, 
7.16.1976; Ailonga, “Memorandum,” 24.6.1976, p. 7.  
282  Shipanga 1989, pp. 111-112; Shangula 25.3.2007. 
283  UNAM, Katjavivi Collection, Section B1, Category 16, “Zambians hold 40 members of Swapo,” The 
Cape Times,  5.5.1976; “Swapo Split,” Rand Daily Mail, 5.5.1976; “SWAPO men held,” Zambia Daily 
Mail, 5.5.1976. 
284  UNAM, Katjavivi Collection, Section B1, Category 16, “SWAPO official sues for 'habeas corpus,'” 
Zambia Daily Mail,  15.5.1976.  
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where it was successful but by that point Shipanga and the ten others detained with him at 
Nampundwe had been flown from Lusaka to Dar es Salaam and been imprisoned there. 
Despite the court's orders to the Zambian government to secure Shipanga's release, these 
were to no avail. As Chona maintained in a response to the court, SWAPO had informed 
the Zambian government that Shipanga should remain in Tanzania and “consistent with 
our obligations as a loyal member of the United Nations and of the Organization of 
African Unity, Zambia regards SWAPO as the authentic voice of the struggling masses of 
Namibia.”285 Later, when Chona explained to the court why it had not approached the 
Tanzanian government to mediate, he replied “SWAPO had refused to do so.”286 When 
the Zambian government finally made an official request to the Tanzanian government, 
the latter's reply stated, “There is no legal basis on which the request for his return could 
be granted”287 Only in May 1978, after considerable lobbying overseas and after political 
asylum had been granted to the detainees in several European countries, were Shipanga 
and the others released.  
 While the Zambian state wrangled with its courts over Shipanga's right to habeas 
corpus, SWAPO leaders began to legitimate the former's intervention on their behalf. On 
May 23, 1976, SWAPO Vice President Mishake Muyongo, standing in for President Sam 
Nujoma, who along with Peter Nanyemba had left Zambia shortly before the April 21st 
arrests, established a commission of inquiry. Named after John Ya Otto, the 
Commission's Chairman, the Ya Otto Commission was charged to: “(A) Investigate into 
                                                 
285  UNAM, Katjavivi Collection, Section B1, Category 16, “Move to have ex-Swapo official released,” 
Rand Daily Mail, 6.10.1976. 
286  UNAM, Katjavivi Collection, Series B1, Section 16, “[illegible]... Hostile Request,” Times of Zambia, 
15.10.1976. 
287  Ailonga Collection, File Names: “Articles, Cuttings,” and “Political Matters Affecting the Chaplaincy,” 
“Dar turns down plea for Shipanga return,” Times of Zambia, 8.2.1977. 
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the circumstances and the surrounding which led to the revolt of SWAPO Cadres 
between June 1974 and April 1976. (B) Recommend a programme and cause of action to 
prevent an event of similar nature occurring in the future.”288 As Nahas Angula, who was 
one of the commissioners, volunteered in our interview: “We had somehow to 
demonstrate to the [OAU] Liberation Committee, to our host in Zambia that somehow we 
are in control of the situation. So one way of legitimizing that was to have a commission. 
I think that's how the Ya Otto Commission came about.”289 The make-up of the 
commission and its methods of inquiry as detailed in its final report  seem to support 
Angula's point. The commission itself consisted of SWAPO leaders and commanders. It 
interviewed none of “the dissidents under detention.”290  The committee did visit the 
Ailongas the week before they were deported from Zambia. Anita Ailonga recalls, “They 
even came to us... But if you speak against SWAPO, what will they do?... They had a 
committee of just SWAPO leaders! (laughter)  [They were] asking, 'Why are you afraid 
or angry with the SWAPO leaders?' I mean it was nonsense. What would people dare to 
say?”291  
 The Ya Otto Commission's Report, submitted June 4, 1976, attributes “the revolt 
of SWAPO cadres” to several factors. The first part of the report focuses on “enemy 
intrigues and infiltration.” Therein, it alleges that “contrary to the decision of the National 
Executive Committee of SWAPO,” which had barred diplomatic relations between the 
liberation movement and the West German government due to the latter's ties with South 
                                                 
288  Ailonga Collection, File Name: “SWAPO Office” and “SWAPO Conflict Zambia,” Mishake 
Muyongo, “Commission of Inquiry on the Revolt of SWAPO Cadres at Central Base Zambia and 
Lusaka.”   
289  Angula 13.2.2007, p. 7. 
290  Ya Otto Report, p. 19.  
291  Ailongas 20.3.2007, p. 13. 
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Africa, “Shipanga in July 1975 had a working luncheon with the West German Foreign 
Minister, Herr Hans Dietrich Genscher. It was during this luncheon it is believed that 
Shipanga made a secret agreement resulting in a chartered plane full of food stuffs 
earmarked for SWAPO arriving at Nairobi at the end of last year, and a ship loaded with 
food stuffs still docked at Mombasa, Kenya.”292 Two leaders among the soldiers at the 
front, Karistus Shafooli and Jackson Hampembe, are also alleged to have been 
collaborators with the enemy. Elsewhere the Ya Otto Report identifies a “power struggle” 
led by some members of the SYL against SWAPO and a campaign of “lies, 
exaggerations and malicious rumours” resulting in “misguided elements” as contributing 
to the crisis.293 Towards the Report's end, the commissioners also include a section on 
“official shortcomings and incompetence.” Therein, the authors identify “operating for a 
very long time with neither a written constitution nor a political programme,” “poor 
channels of communication and mobilisation from the top down to the bottom,” “absence 
of the Treasurer General and the consequent lack of a sound centrally controlled system 
of receiving, expending, accounting and auditing Party funds,” and a “tendency to isolate 
those considered to be trouble makers with a view to silence or punish them”294  – all 
complaints previously articulated by Shipanga, those detained with him, and soldiers at 
the front –  as causes of the crisis. Thereafter, the report gives a series of 
recommendations for how shortcomings and incompetence might be addressed at “an 
enlarged extraordinary meeting of the Central Committee, Commanders, Party 
functionaries, Representatives and others to be invited.”295  
                                                 
292  Ya Otto Report, p. 7. 
293  Ya Otto Report, pp.13-14. 
294  Ya Otto Report, pp.11-13. 
295  Ya Otto Report, p. 18. 
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 When, on July 28 the enlarged Central Committee did meet in Nampundwe those 
who had been detained there a few months earlier were not among the invited. Drawing 
from the mandate of a congress convened by SWAPO's internal leadership at Walvis Bay 
in May,296 SWAPO's exiled leaders retained their positions. At the same time many of the 
Ya Otto Commission's recommendations were implemented and a new SWAPO 
constitution and political program were adopted. In conjunction with this meeting, 
President Nujoma offered his first account of the 1976 crisis to the international press: 
This problem came about as a consequence of a well-
coordinated, well financed conspiracy by the South African 
regime and its imperialist allies, especially West Germany, 
to destroy SWAPO as the only effective fighting force 
against South African occupation of our country. These 
enemy forces organized agents within our movement to 
create dissention (sic) and sabotage, calculated to confuse 
and demoralize our political and military cadres... Due to the 
vigilance of our cadres, both in the political and military 
fronts and with the co-operation of the host Government, 
namely, the Republic of Zambia, the sinister plot against our 
movement was crushed. The agents of the South African 
regime and imperialists have been routed out of our 
movement and the Central Committee meeting carried out a 
systematic purge of all the traitors. It has also put in a 
position of responsibility and authority, tested and reliable 
cadres in order to forge ahead with the liberation struggle.297 
 
 Clearly, Nujoma's story closely resembles that told in “the enemy intrigues and 
infiltration” section of the Ya Otto Commission. To it he attaches his and others' 
authority to lead SWAPO as well as justifies the Zambian government's intervention on 
                                                 
296 Although the Walvis Bay Congress addressed more than the election of SWAPO leaders,  the external 
leadership appears to have called for a congress inside Namibia that would re-elect them and bolster 
their position. The Congress re-elected three leaders: Sam Nujoma as President, Mishake Muyongo as 
Vice-President and David Meroro, who had fled into exile in late 1975, as Chairman. In turn, it called 
on these three people to make all other appointments within SWAPO on their behalf (Leys & Saul 
1995, p. 74; Erica Beukes, Interviews 10.3.2007, p. 1; 13.5.2008, p. 7).  
297  Ailonga Collection, File Names: “SWAPO Conflict Zambia” and “Political Matters Affecting the 
Chaplaincy,” “Statement by Comrade Sam Nujoma, President, SWAPO, to Members of the Press, 
Monday 2 August, 1976, Lusaka Zambia,” p. 2.  
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these leaders' behalf. In the months that followed this narrative was persuasive enough 
for SWAPO to retain its supporters abroad298 as well as to increase its following at home. 
In January the United Nations had passed Resolution 385, which called for UN 
supervised elections in Namibia to be held by the end of August 1976. Although the 
South African government refused to permit the United Nations to intervene in its 
“internal solution” to independence in Namibia, initiated in September 1975 with the 
Turnhalle Talks, by the end of 1976 the General Assembly had recognized SWAPO as 
“the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people” and that any talks 
“discussing the modalities for the transfer of power to the people of Namibia” must be 
conducted with SWAPO.299  
 There is ample evidence that SWAPO representatives were drawing from the Ya 
Otto Commission's account of the conflict in Zambia in mending relationships with long-
standing allies at home and abroad at this time. For example, Ben Amathila, SWAPO's 
Representative to Scandinavia, responded to an article in Dagens Nyheter, a Swedish 
newspaper, by defending the actions of the SWAPO leadership with references to the 
commission: “It is totally wrong that members of SWAPO detained in Tanzania have 
been kidnapped by the Tanzanian or Zambian authorities. The transfer was effected at the 
request of SWAPO when concrete evidence had shown that members of SWAPO 
connived with or unknowingly assisted hostile forces to bring about chaos and discord 
within SWAPO.”300 And again, “There has been genuine concern about some issues 
within SWAPO. But according to a commission of enquiries (sic) set up to investigate the 
                                                 
298  By 1976 SWAPO was receiving aid directly from African, Scandinavian and Eastern bloc 
governments, Western solidarity movements and humanitarian organizations, and the United Nations. 
299  UN General Assembly Resolution 31/146; Katjavivi 1988, p. 100. 
300  UNAM, Katjavivi Collection, Series B1, Category 14, File No. 3, Ben Amathila, Letter to the Editor, 
19.10.1976. 
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cause of the problem it was found that the grievances were exploited by people who had 
different aims and who connived with foreign forces to destroy SWAPO.”301 In another 
instance, President Nujoma addressed a letter to Lutheran church leaders in Namibia302 
with a narrative that closely resembles his August 2 press statement, but with added detail 
about the “reactionary elements” who had made false allegations about “'starvation and 
hunger' among our cadres, 'inadequate medical facilities', 'misuse of funds' etc.”303  
According to another source then working inside Namibia and sending reports on morale 
to SWAPO's London Office, “that [Shipanga's and others' arrest] has even taken place 
has been passed off among grassroot support as South African propaganda. That seems to 
be the stock answer to any news, propaganda or otherwise, which does not show SWAPO 
in a good light.”304 Nonetheless, the source noted that during his December 1976 visit 
SWAPO internal leader Tauno Hatuikulipi had received a copy of the Ya Otto Report, 
which might be used to respond to any people that “are still curious and ask what 
happened.”305       
 Meanwhile, as these and other ripples of the Ya Otto Report were spreading 
across SWAPO networks around the globe, nothing was said publicly about the largest 
scale and harshest detention of Namibians in Zambia. In July 1976 after having remained 
for months without weapons and under Zambian guard, the soldiers from Central Base 
                                                 
301  Amathila, Letter to the Editor, 19.10.1976. 
302  Since 1971 when the leaders of Namibia's two largest churches, the ELOC and the ELC had submitted 
an open letter to South African Prime Minister John Vorster, these churches had been outspoken critics 
of the South African regime.  
303  UNAM, Katjavivi Collection, Series B1, Category 15, Letter from Sam Nujoma to Dr. Leonard Auala 
and Dr. De Vries, 1.9.1976, p. 4. 
304  Peter Katjavivi, Interview 23.7.2008. 
305  UNAM, Katjavivi Collection, Series B1, Category 14, File No. 3, “Report on the morale, problems and 
needs of SWAPO internal,” p.3. 
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and the front, numbering 1000 or more,306 were transported on Zambian trucks to 
Mboroma, a camp in the Kabwe District, northeast of Lusaka.307 Within the next few 
weeks they were joined there by the forty-eight members of the Investigation Committee 
who since April had been held at Ruakera.308 Documents which the Committee 
eventually smuggled out of the camp and the memories of former Mboroma detainees 
paint a picture of the conditions in which they were living there.309 Guarded by Zambian 
soldiers “who admit readily that they were following orders as laid down by SWAPO top 
leaders in Lusaka”310 the soldiers were not permitted to move outside the camp nor were 
outsiders, with the exception of a few SWAPO leaders, able to communicate with those 
within it. At most, soldiers were given mealie-meal, without salt or cooking oil, once 
daily, and food was often withheld for days at a time. Commodities such as clothes, 
blankets, soap and tobacco were scarce, particularly since, as the authors of one 
document report, soldiers had “sold the rest [of the commodities they] had at the front in 
order to keep [themselves] alive during the cutting off of food supply.”311 On August 5, 
after consulting with the Zambian Captain in charge of Mboroma, soldiers arranged 
themselves in files to depart from the camp en route to Angola, where they hoped to join 
PLAN units fighting there. Before passing through  the camp gate, the Zambian army 
                                                 
306  In their documents the Investigation Committee usually refers to the soldiers as neighboring “more 
than 1000.” Colin Leys and John Saul project the number to have been 1600 to 1800 (1994, p. 138; 
1995, p. 49). 
307  Until shortly before their detention Mboroma had been inhabited by ZANU and ZAPU detainees, 
imprisoned in conjunction with the murder of Herbert Chitepo (Leys & Saul 1994, p. 138). 
308  Engombe et al. 17.6.2007, p. 15; Hauwanga 26.7.2007, p. 15; “Oh World Hear Our Cries” 7.8.2007. 
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310  “Appeal” 27.4.1977, p. 4. 
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fired into soldiers' ranks. Four were killed, as many as thirteen wounded.  
 Weeks later stories about Mboroma filtered into the international press. On 
October 10, 1976 the overseas edition of The Observer published an article about letters 
smuggled out of Zambia alleging that “1,000 trained Namibian guerrilla fighters are 
being illegally held under military guard in Zambia, because of their opposition to the 
leadership of SWAPO” and that “Zambian guards had opened fire on the prisoners.”312 A 
later article in Africa Confidential, reporting on the same documents written by the 
Investigation Committee,  notes that “the letters contain the first news of the large-scale 
round-up of SWAPO fighters” and first reached Britain “in the first week of September” 
although the article offers no explanation as to why the letters were not reported in the 
press until weeks later.313  
 Only in May 1977, after two soldiers, Sakarias Elago and  Hizipo 
Shikondombolo, managed to escape from Mboroma and travel across northeastern 
Zambia and Tanzania to report their stories to a BBC reporter in Nairobi, Kenya314 was 
the Zambian government pressured to intervene. Even then, however, the manner of the 
detainees' release from Mboroma evaded the critique of foreign journalists and others 
who might have applied pressure on SWAPO leaders to adhere to any principle other 
than preserving their own power. Although the travel of two hundred Mboroma 
inhabitants to Maheba, where they were declared refugees, was covered in the press,315 
                                                 
312  UNAM, Katjavivi Collection, Series B1, Category 16, “Guerrillas held in Zambia,” The Observer, 
10.10.1976.  
313  UNAM, Katjavivi Collection, Series B1, Category 16, “Zambia and SWAPO: Plenty of Strife,” Africa 
Confidential, 22.10.76.  
314  Ailonga Collection, File Names: “Chaplaincy – Relations to Namibians outside SWAPO,” “Political 
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the “rehabilitation” of the remaining Mboroma inhabitants was not reported. Detainees 
were pressured to sign “a confession,” indicating among other things, that they “had been 
misled by Andreas Shipanga” and that they “had collaborated with the enemy” in a South 
African attack on Oshatotwa, which had occurred on July 11, 1976 – at roughly the same 
time the combatants were transported from the front to Mboroma.316 Most who signed 
were sent to Nyango where they lived in a separate location from others in the camp and 
were stigmatized as “Shipanga's people.”317 In 1978 several hundred from this group 
were allegedly sent to Cassinga where some died in the South African attack.318  As for 
members of the Investigation Committee living at Nyango, they simply “disappeared.”319 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Guardian,11.6.1977.  
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     Chapter 4 
           An Anthropology of “the Spy” 
 In early November 1976 Joseph “Pereb” Stephanus departed from Namibia for 
exile.320 Over the preceding months Stephanus had been mobilizing fellow students at St. 
Therese in Tses and southern Namibia's other secondary schools to organize a strike of 
the final exams, thereby marking their rejection of Bantu Education and solidarity with 
the students of Soweto, South Africa.321 After being expelled from school for these 
activities, Stephanus made his way, with the help of SWAPO contacts, to a point near the 
Buitepos border post, where he crossed over to Mamuno, Botswana and registered as a 
refugee. Over the following weeks he was joined there by about fifty others who had 
participated in the November strikes, the first large cohort of exiles from southern 
Namibia.322 They were transported by SWAPO to Maun and, a few months later, to 
Zambia, where they underwent military training at Oshatotwa with Stephanus appointed 
as “group commander.” Later that year Stephanus was selected to attend the United 
Nations Institute for Namibia (UNIN), a tertiary institution which had been established in 
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education at UNIN and his detention at Lubango overlap with many other sources that are cited in this 
chapter.  
321 Christian A. Williams, “Remembering St. Therese: A Namibian Mission School and the Possibilities for 
its Students” (MA Dissertation, University of Cape Town, 2002); Remembering St. Therese 
(Windhoek: Out of Africa, 2003); “Student Political Consciousness: Lessons from a Namibian Mission 
School,” Journal of Southern African Studies, 30,3, (2004) pp. 539-558. 
322 As noted in the Foreword, “northern Namibia” and “southern Namibia” are used in this dissertation to 
refer to two regions with distinct geographies and histories.    
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Lusaka in 1976. Upon completing his studies and a brief internship in Benin, he was sent 
for military training again, this time outside Lubango, Angola, where, since the late 
1970s, SWAPO had maintained a network of camps, including the Tobias Hainyeko 
Training Centre. Thereafter, he was given a position as political information officer for 
the SWAPO Youth League. First from Lusaka and later from Luanda, he edited  the 
SYL's newspaper and represented the organization in meetings at SWAPO's larger 
settlements and at conferences organized by the liberation movement's allies around the 
world.   
 On March 9, 1985, just after celebrating his thirtieth birthday with friends at his 
Luanda apartment, Stephanus was arrested by SWAPO. After being held at a SWAPO 
owned house for several days, he was escorted by two armed guards on one of the 
liberation movement's supply convoys to Lubango. Almost a week later the convoy 
arrived and Stephanus was dropped at SWAPO's Karl Marx Reception Centre where he 
was put in a solitary cell and told to write a statement about his life. After several days 
soldiers returned to his cell and escorted him to a chamber where he sat in front of a 
group of PLAN commanders. There Stephanus was informed that in his statement he had 
forgotten to mention something – his “life as a South African spy.”323 When Stephanus 
denied the accusation, he was stripped naked and his hands were tied to the ceiling. 
Suspended from the ground, the soldiers beat him with bundles of freshly cut sticks while 
insulting him for his alleged spying, his education and for his cultural background. He 
was later sent back to his cell where hot water was applied to his fresh wounds and where 
he waited until he was led out again for another session.  
 At some point Stephanus was visited by one of his interrogators, whom he had 
                                                 
323 Stephanus 31.5.2005, p. 11. 
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recognized as the former bodyguard of a friend on the Political Bureau, SWAPO's 
highest organ.324 The man came to Stephanus alone and advised him:“You just lie to 
these guys or they will kill you. Then you will go to where your brothers and friends 
are.”325 After enduring torture almost daily for a month, Stephanus “confessed” that he 
was a spy. In turn, he was asked several questions: “Who recruited you? Who was your 
contact in exile? Who were you trained with? What was your mission?” In his responses, 
Stephanus told stories which anyone with basic knowledge of his personal history and the 
places where he had lived in Namibia could easily have contradicted but which his 
interrogators accepted without question. After the interrogators had transcribed 
Stephanus' story and Stephanus had signed it, he was taken to one of the “dungeons,” 
rectangular underground holes covered with corrugated iron where other accused spies, 
including many from his 1976 exile cohort, were detained. For the next four-and-a-half 
years, Stephanus lived in one or another dungeon administered by SWAPO outside 
Lubango, where he suffered from poor health and many died from illness. Some of his 
fellow detainees were also commanded to leave the dungeons and subsequently 
“disappeared.”  
 Two decades since his release from the dungeons and repatriation to Namibia, 
Stephanus still reflects on why and he and others were accused of spying and submitted 
to such brutality in Lubango. The structures shaping national history pull against a 
thorough inquiry into this topic, however. Those implicated in spy accusations and 
detentions have hidden themselves behind an official history, according to which a large 
                                                 
324 The Political Bureau or “Politburo” replaced the National Executive Committee as the body responsible 
for the day-to-day administration of SWAPO following the liberation movement's Enlarged Central 
Committee Meeting in July 1976. 
325 Stephanus 31.5.2005, pp. 11-12. 
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number of South African spies infiltrated SWAPO in exile during the early 1980s and the 
liberation movement responded to this threat with appropriate measures. Others who 
benefit from SWAPO's patronage tend to parrot the accuracy of these claims while those 
aligned with opposition parties have used national leaders' involvement in human rights 
abuses in Lubango as a way to undermine Namibia's ruling party. Ex-detainees, in turn, 
must choose between the risks of publicly challenging national history and accepting it in 
order to ingratiate themselves with their powerful accusers.326 These social dynamics 
push Namibians to narrate stories focused on who was or was not a spy and on who was 
or was not responsible for falsely accusing others of spying – stories through which they 
can make claims on other members of a national community. And yet, as Stephanus' 
narrative suggests, there was often no relationship between how “spies” were identified 
in Lubango and attempts to gather verifiable evidence of these persons' collaboration 
with the enemy.327 Moreover, many exiles, including those directly involved in spy 
detentions, seem to have thought that, among those detained, were people who could 
cause harm to Namibians through spying. If we accept these points, grasping what 
happened to Stephanus and others in Lubango requires more than information about the 
physical spies or security operatives involved. It requires knowledge of “the spy,” an 
invisible power through which events were explained and cruelty legitimated in a 
national community.  
 This chapter examines “the spy” from the perspective of the SWAPO camps. 
                                                 
326 The ways in which former “spies” and others marginalized through their experiences in exile negotiate 
their relationship  to other Namibians and the stakes involved are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.  
327 This point is supported not only by my research detailed below but also by the secondary literature on 
SWAPO's Lubango detentions: Paul Trewelha, “A Namibian Horror.” Searchlight South Africa, 4 
(1990), pp. 78-93; Colin Leys & John S. Saul,  Namibia's Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword 
(London: James Currey, 1995), pp. 53-58, 63-65; Justine Hunter, Die Politik der Erinnerung und des 
Vergessens in Namibia: Umgang mit schweren Menschenrechtsverletzungen der Ära des bewaffneten 
Befreiungskampfes, 1966 bis 1989 (Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 2008), pp. 92-107. 
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Drawing from anthropological literature on witchcraft, above all Adam Ashforth and 
Harry West's work,328 I consider qualities of the camps which made spying a plausible 
and powerful explanation for the misfortunes which people could experience while living 
in this space. There, where inhabitants were constantly at risk of South African violence, 
SWAPO officials drew from their control over public discourse to focus attention on 
dangers emanating from outside the camp, which they were authorized to address as 
national representatives. At the same time, they played off of the ambiguities surrounding 
who spies were and how they accomplished their work to heighten fears and direct them 
towards people already marginalized inside camps. The chapter then applies these 
observations to circumstances in Lubango during the 1980s, considering how “the spy” 
became an agent which SWAPO officials could use to coerce and eliminate rivals but 
which no one could ever entirely control. In this manner, I focus discussion of Stephanus' 
and others' experiences away from the actions of a few persons and towards a kind of 
social space in which fears are likely to be expressed and may be abused in particular 
ways.  
  
“The Notion of [Spying] explains Unfortunate Events” 
 In anthropology the study of misfortune and its social meaning has long been 
associated with E.E. Evans-Pritchard and his ethnography Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic 
among the Azande.329 Therein, the Oxford scholar argues that when the Azande attribute 
certain happenings to witchcraft, they are not practicing bad science, as many Europeans 
                                                 
328 Adam Ashforth, Witchcraft, Violence, and Democracy in South Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005); Harry West, Kupilikula: Governance and the Invisible Realm in Mozambique (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
329 Evans-Pritchard, E. E. Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande (Oxford: Clarendon, 1937). 
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presumed, but rather responding to questions about life's “unfortunate events” that extend 
beyond the pale of scientific inquiry. To illustrate this point, Evans-Pritchard considers 
the example of a collapsing granary.330 When a granary collapses, “every Zande knows 
that termites eat the support in course of time and even the hardest woods decay after 
years of service.” If, however, people are sitting beneath the granary at the moment of its 
collapse and are injured, the event raises questions that evade science: “Why should these 
particular people have been sitting under this particular granary at the particular moment 
when it collapsed?” Once it is accepted that witches exist and may cause such 
happenings, a “belief” whose logic is confirmed by all aspects of Azande life, witchcraft 
may provide a coherent explanation for why the granary collapsed on certain persons at a 
certain time. And whereas the reader may see “coincidence in time and space” rather than 
witchcraft in the granary's collapse, the broader questions it raises about why bad things 
happen to good people are fundamentally human and should be studied, therefore, from 
an anthropological perspective.331  
 Evans-Pritchard's contribution to understanding witchcraft and other cultural 
expressions which colonial powers used to render Africans less rational, and therefore 
less human, than their European counterparts is not disputed here. Nonetheless, by 
depicting witchcraft as a “belief,” he cast a long shadow which has obscured other 
possible approaches to the study of this subject and misfortune more generally. As Adam 
Ashforth notes in his recent work, statements like those made by Evans-Pritchard and 
others about belief tend to assume that a given notion is part of a logical system of ideas 
                                                 
330 Evans-Pritchard 1937, pp. 18-32.  
331 As Max Weber famously argued, it is this question, “the question of theodicy,” to which all religious 
thought responds as it explains the imperfections of a divinely ordered world (The Sociology of 
Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1922, 1993), pp. 138-150). 
 125 
shared by a distinct “culture.”332 And yet contemporary urban South Africans, about 
whom Ashforth writes, have no common body of thought about witches but do attribute 
misfortune to, and actively try to avoid, witchcraft. In such circumstances, it is not 
helpful to think about witchcraft belief as such but rather “the reasons that people accept 
as plausible the general possibility of occult action.”333 And to understand these reasons, 
Ashforth emphasizes, it is necessary to examine daily life in the townships, where most 
urban South Africans live.   
 Ashforth's critique of Evans-Pritchard suggests new possibilities not only for the 
study of witchcraft but also for social responses to misfortune generally. By describing 
witchcraft as a belief, Evans-Pritchard had not only considered this phenomenon from a 
narrow perspective, as Ashforth emphasizes; he had also cordoned off the study of topics 
that might be characterized as beliefs from other explanatory frameworks which could 
never be thought of entirely as systems unto themselves. Among these frameworks is the 
notion of spying. Although few would deny that spies  exist as physical entities in the 
world, spying may be used to account for misfortune without any verifiable evidence that 
the persons given that label are, in fact, spies. Certainly this use of “the spy” was 
common within the Namibian exile community considered here. With the possible 
exception of instances in which SWAPO officials collected verifiable evidence about 
enemy collaborators, exiles' knowledge of South African spies relied on the mere 
possibility that they could exist. From this perspective the difference between witchcraft 
and spying is one of idiom rather than mode of thought or social function.334   
                                                 
332 Ashforth 2005, p. 123. 
333 Ashforth 2005, p. 123. 
334 In his essay on “African Traditional Thought and Western Science,” Robin Horton makes a similar 
point, arguing that there is a fundamental similarity between all attempts to provide causal context for 
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 Ashforth's intervention also has other ramifications for how we conceive human 
responses to life's “unfortunate events.” If explanations for misfortune are not part of 
separate systems of belief, it follows that the idioms through which they are expressed 
may inter-penetrate and alter the qualities of one another. It is this point which Harry 
West develops in Part II of Kupilikula, his ethnography of “the invisible realm” among 
people on the Mueda Plateau in northern Mozambique. As West highlights, Muedans 
have encountered a variety of exogenous people and ideas over the past century which 
have attempted to eliminate umwavi, an endogenous sorcery discourse, and yet, 
repeatedly Muedans have incorporated these ideas into their own and seen in them novel 
possibilities for umwavi itself. West's analysis of Muedans' participation in the liberation 
movement FRELIMO and Mozambique's war for national independence is particularly 
striking for our discussion here. As he notes, FRELIMO officially referred to “sorcery 
belief” as a form of “false consciousness” that must be overcome in a liberated 
Mozambique. Nonetheless, Muedans repeatedly interpreted FRELIMO officials' 
powerful forms of knowledge, especially their capacity to identify and capture people 
deemed responsible for enemy attacks in and around the FRELIMO bases where many 
Muedans lived, as evidence of their leaders' umwavi powers.335 Such examples highlight 
the need  to study witchcraft and spying not as distinct and contradictory idioms 
distinguishable by their “supernatural” and “natural” modes of explaining misfortune, but 
as inter-penetrating discourses which may jointly shape how people respond to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
happenings that are not directly observed although each must draw from a “particular theoretical idiom” 
to explain causation (Robin Horton, “African Traditional Thought and Western Science,”in Bryan R. 
Wilson, ed. Rationality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977), pp. 35-40). In making this point, however, 
Horton, like others who have debated the rationality of African thought, assumes that distinct systems 
of thought, like “African” and “Western,” exist.  
335 West 2005, pp. 150-163. 
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unfortunate events they encounter in new social settings. 
 For Namibian exiles, the setting which shaped the misfortunes they experienced 
and their responses to them was the camp. This anthropology of the “the spy” begins, 
therefore, by considering the circumstances in which camp inhabitants lived and the 
kinds of people and discourse which could command authority within this space.  
 
Explaining Misfortune in the Camps   
 To understand the power of “the spy” among Namibian exiles, it is important, 
first, to highlight that the SWAPO camps were an insecure space in which there was 
much fear of external violence. Many of those who entered the camps had been harassed, 
imprisoned or tortured by South African officials before departing from Namibia, and all 
came from a country in which physical violence was inflicted on blacks who openly 
resisted the apartheid government. Exiles also encountered or risked encountering 
violence during their journey abroad when they escaped over the Namibian border and, in 
many cases, traveled through combat zones. For those who had passed through 
considerable danger prior to reaching the camps, these settlements may have seemed 
relatively secure, especially those located some distance from the front. And yet 
inhabitants knew that as members of SWAPO living in exile, they were at risk. SWAPO 
camps were attacked by South Africa, including those with a high percentage of people 
without military training located far from the front-line, such as Cassinga.336 And from 
1976 SWAPO camps located in Angola were also targeted by South Africa's ally UNITA 
as were the convoys which carried people and supplies between SWAPO's Angolan 
camps.  
                                                 
336 For details about Cassinga and the attack on the camp, see Chapter 2. 
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  Many of these misfortunes that Namibians experienced before and after arriving 
in the camps could be attributed to spying. Some events such as enemy surprise attacks 
and ambushes particularly lent themselves to spy explanations because of the insider 
knowledge of SWAPO that seemed necessary for their implementation. Namibian exiles 
would be unlikely to discount the possibility that South Africa had a hand in any setbacks 
which they encountered, however. Many had personal experiences with or deep 
suspicions of people in their home communities who had informed the police about 
SWAPO meetings or about PLAN soldiers infiltrating the northern part of the country.337 
Thus, the notion that the South Africans were sending agents to inflict harm on 
Namibians living in SWAPO camps would have seemed both plausible and likely.      
 The impetus to attribute misfortunes to “the spy” did not come solely from 
dangers emanating outside the camp, however, but also from those inherent to it. The 
hierarchical social order of camp life made those on its bottom rungs vulnerable. All were 
to follow the orders of the camp commanders and, when they were visiting, the political 
leaders. Questioning orders from these officials was frowned upon on the premise that to 
do so threatened Namibians' unity of purpose in resisting South African rule. There was 
generally no place for appealing to personally held moral values or rights in resisting 
camp authorities' commands. And officials controlled the distribution of food, shelter, 
clothing, medicine and weapons –  all essential resources for survival and for conducting 
the war. These differences could cause resentment between SWAPO officials and rank-
in-file members, and on several occasions, such as those considered in the previous 
chapter on SWAPO from 1974 to 1976, erupted in open conflict and attempts to alter the 
                                                 
337 In her MA thesis, “Our Memories of the Liberation War: How Civilians in Post War Northern Namibia 
Remember the War,” (University of the Western Cape, 2003) Martha Akawa specifically examines 
suspicions and accusations about  South African collaborators in Ovamboland.   
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liberation movement's leadership.  
 Under these conditions SWAPO officials had strong impetus to project exiles' 
fears onto “the spy.” By attributing misfortunes in the camps to South African spying, 
officials focused attention on a threat to national security which they, as the nation's 
representatives, were authorized to address, and away from inequalities and conflicts in 
the camps, which might undermine their authority and endanger their lives. In turn, they 
used the fear of spies to coerce other Namibians to align with their will and to eliminate 
rivals for  power in a national community. In the process, “the spy” became a weapon in 
power struggles occurring within the camps even as it presented itself always as a danger 
originating outside of them.  
 To understand how SWAPO officials projected exiles' fears onto spies, the camp 
is, once again, an important context. Through announcements at the daily parade, 
officials could shape a discourse on spying among members of an exile community, all of 
whom interfaced in the camp space. Generally SWAPO officials spoke about South 
African agents who had been sent into exile to undermine SWAPO and endanger 
Namibians.338 Exiles, in turn, were exhorted to be vigilant and report suspicious behavior 
to camp authorities so that all might avoid future catastrophes, especially a “second 
Cassinga.”339 In some instances, announcements focused on specific individuals who 
were accused of spying, including high ranking SWAPO officials and others known to 
                                                 
338 See, for example, Hans Pieters, Interview 9.9.2007, p. 29; Steve Swartbooi, Interview 21.9.2007, p. 21; 
Oiva Alikie Angula, “Brutalised Innocence: The turns of destiny and tyranny,” (unpublished 
manuscript, given to the author in 2008), p. 64; “Comrade President Attends SWAPO Camps,” The 
Combatant,  2, 4 (November 1980), pp. 4-5; “President Nujoma Visits SWAPO Camps,” The 
Combatant,  2, 10 (May 1981), p. 7. 
339 “SWAPO President Visits Southern Angola,” The Combatant, 3, 2 (September 1981), p. 4. Many 
research participants mentioned the South African attack on Cassinga in connection with spying, 
including Sam Nujoma himself (Interview 4.3.2008, pp. 4-5). 
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smaller groups of exiles.340 At the same time, officials encouraged exiles to imagine 
spies' hidden and maleficent powers, the possibility that they might be anywhere and do 
anything that could cause harm to SWAPO and Namibia.   
  Much of the specific content of officials' speeches played off of pre-existing 
sources of suspicion among camp inhabitants. Significantly, most individuals accused of 
spying were minorities in an exile community that consisted predominantly of 
Oshiwambo-speakers from rural, northern Namibia.341  In the context of fear prevailing in 
the camps, cultural differences might easily become sources of mistrust. Several research 
participants indicated that they felt mistrusted by “people from the North,” who 
interpreted what participants saw as benign questions or reasonable grievances as signs of 
disrespect. Urban, educated women were particularly likely to violate prevailing social 
taboos if they asked questions to older men or looked men directly in their eyes when 
                                                 
340 Three high ranking SWAPO officials were frequently associated with spying: Mishake Muyongo, 
Andreas Shipanga and “Castro.” Muyongo was the Vice-President of SWAPO when he and several 
other officials from the Caprivi Region were dismissed in 1980 on the premise that they were trying to 
revive the Caprivi African National Union (CANU) which had merged with SWAPO in 1964. Shipanga 
was SWAPO's Secretary of Information at the time he was arrested in 1976. The Ya Otto Report held 
him and his “enemy intrigues” responsible for “the rebellion” in 1976 (See Chapter 3).“Castro” is the 
nom de guerre of the first Deputy Commander of the South West African Liberation Army, Leonard 
Philemon Nangolo. Soldiers began to suspect Castro of spying after he infiltrated Namibia and returned 
to SWAPO in 1966. Although Castro later confirmed that he, like others in his group, had been captured 
by the South African Police, how he managed to secure his release while others were detained and tried 
in the 1967-1968 Terrorism Trial remains a matter of contention (See, for example, Leonard Philemon 
Nangolo, “My History,” 1994, gift to the author and Helao Shityuwete, Never Follow the Wolf 
(London: Kliptown Books, 1990), pp. 124-130, 141-142). In 1969 Castro was arrested by the Tanzanian 
government where he remained until 1986 when the Norwegian government granted him political 
asylum. To see how Muyongo, Shipanga and Castro could be linked to one another in a seamless 
narrative of South African spying see “Racist Hopes Surviving on Malicious Propaganda,” The 
Combatant, (February 1986), pp. 10-11.  
341 It should be further noted that many Oshiwambo-speaking, northern Namibians had never traveled 
outside the Ovamboland region to southern Namibia, where people spoke different languages and lived 
in segregated townships in towns and cities. The majority of those had lived outside Ovamboland would 
have been adult men traveling to work in the South, and workers' access to those living there would 
have been tightly regulated by the contract labor system, which required workers on contract to live 
separately from local people and restricted movements outside the compounds or farms to which they 
were assigned. Thus, Ellen Namhila was not the only exile to discover upon on first arriving in a 
SWAPO camp that “there were other language groups in Namibia besides Oshiwambo to which I 
belonged,”  (The Price of Freedom (Windhoek: New Namibia Books, 1997), p. 12). 
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they spoke.342 Some southern Namibians were ostracized because of the way they 
responded to camp food, which often consisted of porridge, garnished with beans or 
kapenta, components of traditional diets in the North but not in the South.343 Race too 
may have been a source of mistrust. Several interviewees suggested that they were not 
entirely accepted by other exiles because of their skin color, which in the case of  
“Namas,” “Coloureds” and “Basters” tended to be considerably lighter and less “African” 
than most Namibians.344 As individuals from minority groups were identified as spies, 
their cultural practices and racial features also become associated with spying and used to 
justify the persecution of those who possessed them.   
 Language appears to have been a particularly significant marker of difference and 
source of suspicion in the camps. Although officially the language of SWAPO as an 
organization and its proposed language for independent Namibia was English, most 
exiles had little exposure to English before traveling abroad. Therefore, in day to day 
conversation, Oshiwambo was primarily used. Those who felt left out of conversation 
because they could not speak or understand Oshiwambo well or who sought the company 
of others with whom they could communicate more easily often associated with people 
who spoke their mother tongue. Such practices, like when people speaking the same 
language gathered around one another at the time of eating a meal or moved from one 
section of a camp where they were assigned to live to another to meet with their same-
language friends, could result in accusations that these groups were being “tribalist.”345 If 
                                                 
342 Emma Kambangula, Interview 15.2.2007. 
343 E.g. Steve Swartbooi, Interview 29.1.2007, p. 12. 
344 “Nama,” “Coloured” and “Baster” are categories that were used by the South African government to 
classify Namibia's inhabitants and which Namibians often use to identify themselves. As suggested, 
they all have a racial component.  
345 Pauline Dempers, Interview 23.5.2007; Pieters 9.9.2007; Stephanus 31.5.2005. 
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groups of exiles spoke in Afrikaans, the lingua franca in southern Namibia, they were 
particularly susceptible to suspicion since many northern Namibians did not speak the 
language and had come to associate it with the Afrikaner colonizer.346 Particular groups 
of people were also associated with derogatory terms in Oshiwambo based on their use of 
language. For example, Stephanus and others who spoke Khoekhoegowab were 
frequently referred to as “kwangara,” a word used to refer to “Bushmen” and others who 
spoke Khoisan languages.347 Those who spoke Oshiwambo in a manner considered 
improper by people raised in the North might be called “mbwiti,”348 a term for Ovambos 
who had settled in the South and whose Oshiwambo had incorporated elements of 
Afrikaans and other languages to which they had been exposed there. Accused spies 
report that during their interrogations and detentions in Lubango they were often mocked 
for being either “kwangara” or “mbwiti.” 
 SWAPO officials played off of other sources of camp inhabitants' fears during 
their parade announcements as well. In describing how spies accomplished their work, 
officials spoke of  items hidden inside spies' bodies which were used by them to transmit 
messages to the South Africans or to kill Namibians directly. Scars on the body and large 
breasts were identified as locations where people could hide radios and send messages to 
the enemy.349 On at least one occasion it was announced that a spy had a hollow wooden 
leg, which appeared to look like a normal leg while the man did his activities during the 
day, but which he would dismantle at night, using the radio inside to communicate with 
                                                 
346 E.g. Pieters 9.9.2007, p. 27. 
347 Joseph “Pereb” Stephanus and Steve Swartbooi, Interview 25.4.2009.  
348 The word “mbwiti” literally refers to “weeds” and connotes impurity.   
349 Kambangula 15.2.2007, p. 12; Pieters 9.9.2007, p. 28 
 133 
his South African colleagues.350 Weapons might also be hidden in or near the body, such 
as a pistol attached to the  head of a woman whose hair was particularly long and 
wavy.351 Some women were also alleged to have inserted poisoned razor blades in their 
vaginae. After enticing a SWAPO official to have sex, the official's penis would be cut in 
the act of intercourse and he would be poisoned or bleed to death.352  
 Parallels between such claims made about spies in the SWAPO camps and 
ethnographic literature on witchcraft in northern Namibia are striking. As Maija Hiltunen 
details in her study of Finnish missionary writings on witchcraft (“uulodhi”) in 
Ovamboland during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the evil power (“iigwanga”)  
possessed by a witch (“omulodhi”) was understood to reside physically in the witch's 
body.353 Although claims about the content of this substance and its location varied, it 
was sometimes said to be located in a small bag in a woman's breast.354 The methods by 
which witches did their work were mysterious and always enacted at night.355 It was 
thought, however, that they did not go to the persons whom they bewitched directly but 
rather communicated with the ancestral spirits  (“aathithi”) who were then sent to those 
whom witches wanted to harm.356 One source indicates that a witch “is able to release her 
arms, legs and head from her body when falling asleep” and in the morning “joins them 
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 134 
together becoming a whole human being again.”357 Another notes that witches may 
“shoot a small magical arrow” or “inject poisons” into their victims.358 Although both 
men and women could be witches, women were generally seen as “better mediums” for 
harnessing the power of the ancestral spirits for harming living men than men were 
themselves.359  
 It would be misleading to infer from Hiltunen's research that Namibians accepted 
what SWAPO officials said about spies from the parade because the content of their 
messages confirmed what they already “believed” about witchcraft. In fact, several 
research participants who recounted officials' claims about how spies did their work 
mentioned these incidents to register their skepticism. One said that he doubted the 
claims because neither the radios and weapons nor the bodies of the spies into which they 
were allegedly inserted were ever shown to people at the parade.360 Another noted that 
the officials who were killed through hidden weapons were never identified.361 They and 
others questioned whether it was biologically possible for spies to carry radios and 
weapons inside their bodies, drawing in some cases from scientific theories which they 
had learned in school to discredit these claims.362 As for the SWAPO officials making the 
announcements at the parade, they did not refer to witchcraft directly in their speeches 
but rather used a distinct terminology for spying. When addressing gatherings in 
Oshiwambo, the words “espy,” “omatuma,” (“someone who has been sent”) and 
                                                 
357 Hiltunen 1986, p. 62. 
358 Hiltunen 1986, p. 63. 
359 Hiltunen 1986, pp. 24-25, 46. It also should be noted that in some Southern African witchcraft 
traditions, witches may harm their victims through sexual intercourse by means of a “tokoloshe,” a 
familiar which works on the witch's behalf. Hiltunen, however, does not identify this as one of the 
powers of owls, the Ovambo familiar (pp. 65-67). 
360 Kati 8.12.2007, p. 28. 
361 Stephanus 31.5.2007, p. 10. 
362 Pieters 9.9.2007, p. 29. 
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“omapuli” (“traitor”) were generally used.363 On the far fewer occasions when officials 
referred to  “uulodhi”/”witchcraft,” they appear to have done so primarily to denounce it 
as superstition. As the authors of one particularly urgent report to the SWAPO President 
noted, efforts to educate the rank-in-file in SWAPO's 1976 political program had been 
impeded because “a very large section of our cadres... are deeply stopped [sic] in 
superstition (the numerous cases of with-craft) [sic].”364 
 But who could afford to discredit or discount the claims which SWAPO officials 
made about spies, especially if their powers might overlap with those of witches? As 
suggested, witches were sources of fear among people living in the camps. While cases of 
witchcraft uncovered in this research involved breaches of social taboo involving small 
groups of people, witchcraft accusations sometimes focused on marginal figures in the 
exile community, the same people who also bore the brunt of spy accusations.365 By 
describing spies in a manner that resonated with an Oshiwambo discourse on witchcraft, 
SWAPO officials simultaneously played off of exiles' fears and affirmed officials' 
authority to confront agents who were, first and foremost, a threat to a national 
community. Moreover, an explicit discourse on witchcraft, with its connotations in the 
West of superstition, could only be a liability to SWAPO as it represented itself to an 
international community, whereas spying could be used abroad to justify all manner of 
                                                 
363 According to one research participant, Jackson Mwalundange, the use of these words evolved during 
the years Namibians lived in exile. In 1974 when Mwalundange entered Zambia in the exodus, leaders 
were referring primarily to “omatuma,” a word which all Oshiwambo speakers knew and did not have 
negative connotations. Some people, especially those who liked to mix English with Oshiwambo, might 
refer to a “spy” or “espy.” Only later, in the 1980s did people begin to use “omapuli,” a term which 
became associated with the spies detained in Lubango specifically (Interview 23.4.2009). 
364 UNAM, Katjavivi Collection, Series B1, Category 3, File 1 “Report to the President: Office of the 
Administrative Secretary,” 1977. 
365 E.g. Namhila 1997, pp. 45-47; Swartbooi 29.1.2007, pp. 15-17. In one particularly striking instance, an 
interlocutor narrated a story about an Ovambo man from the North accusing an Ovambo woman from 
the South of witchcraft because, after going to bed with him, the woman had offended him by “touching 
him on his genitals.” Thus, “the mbwiti woman,” one of the chief objects of the spy discourse, had been 
declared a witch.   
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happenings in an internationally recognized liberation movement.366   
 It must also be noted that even the most skeptical exile could not easily question 
what was said about spies from his or her location in a camp. Classrooms in camps, such 
as those where commissars taught scientific socialism during the late 1970s and '80s, 
were likely to corroborate claims about spies dispersed at the parade.367 Some persons 
had access to radio, but ability to listen to news was impaired by the location of the 
camps themselves, which were often far from the urban centers, by the language skills of 
inhabitants and by the suspicions of other camp inhabitants.368 The socially acceptable 
radio station which exiles often could access and understand was SWAPO's Voice of 
Namibia, which, predictably, confirmed claims made in the camps about spies.369 Few 
exiles would have had the opportunity to hear the perspectives of the “spies” themselves 
after they had been accused. Although several who lived in SWAPO camps during the 
mid-1970s reported instances in which accused spies were tied to gates and trees in 
places where all camp inhabitants could see them,370 most were taken to separate camps. 
There they lived apart from the rest of the exile community with the exception of the 
commanders and soldiers who were assigned to guard people in these camps. The 
locations where accused spies were moved were not publicly announced, and free 
movement inside and outside of SWAPO camps was generally restricted to a few senior 
                                                 
366 For more details, see Chapter 5. 
367 It should be noted that SWAPO had been using the term “commissar” to refer to the deputy commander 
in a camp since the 1960s. These commissars, like Darius “Mbolondondo” Shikongo discussed in the 
chapter on Cassinga, were often responsible for administering all manner of activity in the camp, not 
political education specifically. In contrast, during the late 1970s commissars became associated with a 
more specific role in camp life. Most were trained in scientific socialism and other curricula determined 
by SWAPO's Soviet allies and were appointed to teach classes  in camps. By the late 1970s most camps 
had an appointed commissar and some, like the Tobias Hainyeko Training Centre, had several of 
varying ranks (Hans Pieters, Interview 21.5.2007, p. 8). 
368 E.g. Swartbooi 21.9.2007, p. 24. 
369 E.g. Swartbooi 21.9.2007, p. 21. 
370 E.g. Ndamono Ndeulita, Interview 18.3.2007, p. 2; Phil Ya Nangoloh, Interview 19.2.2007, p. 4.  
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officials. It was also not unusual for people to “appear and disappear” from camps. Camp 
residents rarely knew where they were going when they were commanded to leave a 
given settlement, and information about other exiles' location was often unavailable even 
to their closest family members.  
 All this movement in and out of the SWAPO camps did open camps to knowledge 
exchanges occurring outside of them. Especially when SWAPO members returned from 
assignments abroad to one of the camps, there was opportunity to share information 
between Namibians living primarily within the camps and SWAPO political leaders and 
students living primarily outside of them, where information tended to flow more 
freely.371 Nonetheless, any knowledge that people did have about spies that contradicted 
official claims was constrained by the fears which surrounded “the spy.” Questioning 
claims could be seen as an affront to the authority of figures making them and  mark one 
as a potential spy, especially if SWAPO planted spies to identify those who asked 
subversive questions as some suspected.372 In such a context, like the circumstances in 
which people gossip more generally,373 it was necessary that any exchange of information 
relating to spies and varying from the official discourse occur within a group of people 
who trusted one another. It is not surprising, therefore, that when research participants 
mentioned conversations that they had with others about spies, these were almost always 
held with people they knew before entering exile or with whom they shared a common 
language and ethnic identity. Even instances in which they mentioned speaking privately 
                                                 
371  For one example of how information could flow among the broader exile community see the section of 
Chapter 5 on “The Committee of Parents.”  
372 Immanuel Engombe, Junius Ikondja, Ndamono Ndeulita, Hizipo Shikondombolo, Interview 29.7.2007; 
Swartbooi 21.9.2007, p. 38. 
373 Ashforth 2005, p. 66; Max Gluckman, “Gossip and Scandal,” Current Anthropology, 4, 3 (1963), pp. 
307-316. 
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with senior SWAPO officials about spy accusations, these conversations usually occurred 
on tribal lines.374 Counter-evidence and alternative theories about spying could, therefore, 
travel along personal networks shaped by region, language and ethnicity, but were 
unlikely to extend outside this range. 
 Under these circumstances, exiles might privately question aspects of the spy 
discourse, but they were unlikely to dismiss its content altogether. In turn, “the spy” 
could become an agent with powers of its own. “Spies” influenced to whom exiles spoke, 
what they said and where and how they said it. They encouraged people to mistrust others 
with different cultural practices and racial features and to entertain ideologies derived 
from witchcraft that might explain how the enemy was threatening people's lives. They 
changed forms as individuals imagined spies being places and doing things which only 
those persons could conceive. And, as we shall see, they crossed social boundaries, 
threatening or attacking officials who had done much to heighten the fear of spies and 
make dubious accusations in spies' names.  
 
Lubango and the 1980s 
 Although “the spy” was part of the lives of all Namibians living in SWAPO 
camps during the 1960s, '70s and '80s,  the purge which enveloped Joseph Stephanus and 
others in Lubango should also be understood in terms of a more specific history. 
Following the coup in Portugal on April 25, 1974, Angola became accessible to 
Namibians fleeing their country of origin for exile and PLAN combatants returning from 
exile to infiltrate Namibia. In March 1976, after South African forces retreated from 
                                                 
374 Andries Basson, Interview 30.5.2007, pp. 15-16, 21-22; Kandi Nehova, Interview 7.4.2008, pp. 14-15; 
Pieters, 21.5.2007, p. 1; 9.9.2007, p. 27; 11.14.2007, p. 36; Stephanus 31.5.2005. 
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Angola following the Angolan Civil War, SWAPO pledged its allegiance to the MPLA, 
establishing an office in Luanda and a network of camps in southern Angola with the 
support of the Angolan government.375 For the next several years PLAN combatants 
operated out of a variety of mobile camps near the Angolan-Namibian border from which 
they regularly infiltrated Namibia and easily received Namibians fleeing across the 
border into exile.376  These camps were supported by others further removed from the 
front, including the Defense Headquarters, Tobias Hainyeko Training Centre  and other 
specialized logistical camps, all of which were clustered between 12 and 30 kilometers 
northeast of Lubango.377    
 At the turn of the decade, the war's tide began to change.378 From May 1978, when 
SADF raided Cassinga, South Africa launched attacks deep into southern Angola almost 
every year,379 utilizing its superior military technology, including its air force, 
mechanized units and ability to monitor some SWAPO radio communications,380 to push 
PLAN back from the border. By 1982 SADF occupied much of southern Angola, 
resulting in the relocation of PLAN's southern-most camps 100-150 kilometers north of 
                                                 
375 For more details on the Angolan Civil War, see the discussion in the section of Chapter 3 titled 
“Deténte and the Front.”  
376 Susan Brown, “Diplomacy by Other Means,” in Colin Leys and John S. Saul, Namibia's Liberation 
Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword (London: James Currey, 1995), p. 27. 
377 The exact locations of all the SWAPO camps outside Lubango are noted in Annex I to “The Report of 
the United Nations Mission on Detainees,” 11.10.1989 (VEM, Groth Collection, File No. 1335). 
378 It should be noted that the change in the war paralleled changes in diplomatic negotiations over  
Namibian independence. Whereas by 1978  Resolution 435 had been accepted by SWAPO and the 
South African government as a blue print for implementing Namibian independence, the South African 
government did not follow through on the terms of the resolution until 1989. Ronald Reagan's election 
as US President and his administration's “linkage” policy, which required that the Cuban soldiers based 
in Angola since the Angolan Civil War depart before implementing Resolution 435, are usually credited 
for the breakdown in negotiations and South Africa's military strategy during the 1980s.  
379 Brown 1995, pp. 30, 32; Leys & Saul 1995, p. 55. 
380 Apparently, the SADF was monitoring SWAPO radio communications to an extent that SWAPO 
officials did not grasp at the time (Leys & Saul 1995, p. 55).  
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the border and making combatants' attempts to enter Namibia much more difficult.381  At 
the same time, UNITA, which had been forced to withdraw to southeastern Angola 
following the retreat of its South African allies from the country in March 1976, was 
becoming an increasingly strong presence in southern and central Angola and UNITA 
ambushes of SWAPO convoys were a common occurrence. By the early 1980s all 
SWAPO settlements, including those outside Lubango and in Kwanza Sul, seemed 
increasingly vulnerable to enemy attacks.382  
 As setbacks mounted, developments both external and internal to SWAPO 
influenced how the liberation movement's members understood and responded to their 
misfortune. In 1978 the South African government established its counter-insurgency unit 
Koevoet.383 Known for the reign of violence that it unleashed in northern Namibia, 
Koevoet pressured civilians to provide information about the activities of PLAN 
infiltrators and those assisting them and is likely to have heightened anxieties about 
South African informers entering exile. In 1980 the government extended conscription to 
all young men in southern Namibia to create the South West African Territorial Forces 
(SWATF). From thenceforth PLAN found itself facing a black and white army. The 
formation of SWATF also increased  the number Namibians from south of the Red Line 
living in exile, which had expanded gradually since  1976, when students involved in 
mobilizing southern Namibia for SWAPO and organizing strikes following the Soweto 
Uprising fled the country. These newcomers from the South carried many of the 
characteristics that marked people as different in the SWAPO camps. Many did not speak 
Oshiwambo but all spoke Afrikaans. Some had light skin and other physical features that 
                                                 
381 Brown 1995, pp. 27, 29; Leys & Saul 1995, p. 55.  
382 Brown 1995, p. 35; Leys & Saul, p. 55. 
383 “Koevoet” is Afrikaans for “crowbar.”  
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differed significantly than those already living in exile. Almost all had some education, 
and many were secondary school students who through schooling had been exposed to 
Namibians from a wide range of backgrounds and communities.  
 The migration of Namibians fleeing conscription coincided with the development 
of a conflict within the SWAPO military. By 1980 PLAN had begun to respond to SADF 
attacks by establishing a more conventional army, transforming its small, mobile guerrilla 
platoons into larger units and, eventually, mechanized brigades.384 In this context there 
was impetus for the liberation movement not only to increase the number of 
combatants,385 but also the number of educated persons working in PLAN, which to that 
point had consisted primarily of exiles who were unable to access the scholarships which 
the international community had made available to SWAPO.386 At the same time 
SWAPO Secretary for Defense, Peter Nanyemba, placed a large number of secondary 
school educated exiles, most of whom were from southern Namibia, at the Defense 
Headquarters outside Lubango. Nanyemba rationalized these appointments much the 
same way that he and others did the move of educated persons to the front more 
generally, that SWAPO “can no longer have an illiterate army.”387 Nonetheless, they also 
precipitated a conflict between the Defense Headquarters and Command  Headquarters, 
                                                 
384 Brown 1995, p. 31; Stephanus 29.5.2007, p. 5; S. Swartbooi 21.9.2007, pp. 19-20. 
385 One source indicates that in 1981 President Nujoma issued a “general mobilisation order” which 
expanded the age of SWAPO members available for military service from sixteen to fourteen (Political 
Consultative Committee, “A Report to the Namibian People: Historical Account of the SWAPO Spy-
Drama,” (Windhoek: Breaking the Wall of Silence Movement, 1989, 1997)). According to another who 
was teaching at Kwanza Sul at the time, the number of school learners recruited for military training did 
increase in the early 1980s, but not because recruiters were following any age-based criteria. Rather, it 
seems that physical size of potential recruits and the desired number of military trainees at a given time 
were the basis for selecting people for the camps (S. Swartbooi 21.9.2007).  
386 Apparently, most of the UNIN class of 1981 was called to the front immediately after graduation. 
Nanyemba is reported to have announced at a parade, “Those of us who are coming from UNIN, there's 
not going to be any secondment for you. Your next secondment will be inside the country” (Michael 
Kahuika and Joseph “Pereb” Stephanus, Interview 20.9.2007, p. 2). 
387 Leys & Saul 1995, p. 55. 
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from where PLAN coordinated military operations closer to the front.388 According to 
research participants stationed at both Defense and Command, Nanyemba's appointments 
were threatening to officials at Command Headquarters because they reproduced the 
same structures of authority that had already been established there.389  At the same time 
they created a stark dichotomy in the educational and regional backgrounds of the two 
headquarters with Defense made up primarily of educated Namibians from the South led 
by Nanyemba, an Ndonga, and Command consisting largely of uneducated Namibians 
from Ovamboland led by PLAN Army Commanders, Dimo Hamaambo and Solomon 
“Jesus” Hawala, both  of whom were Kwanyama.390  
 By this time the Soviet Union and its allies had become actively involved in how 
SWAPO was conducting all aspects of the war, including maintaining the liberation 
movement's security. Although the Soviet government had supported SWAPO 
diplomatically and militarily as early as 1964, during the late 1970s, when SWAPO 
shifted its operations to Angola, the personal exchanges between the liberation movement 
and its Soviet allies increased greatly. In addition to Soviet and Soviet allied officials 
interfacing with SWAPO leaders in Luanda, Soviet advisors were assigned to a  range of 
units stationed at Defense Headquarters and the Tobias Hainyeko Training Centre.391  
Based in Lubango proper, they traveled to and from their homes and the SWAPO camps 
where they trained PLAN commanders in various fields, including organizational 
security.392 At the same time SWAPO members were selected to attend military training 
                                                 
388 The actual location of Command Headquarters shifted repeatedly in response to the war (Brown 1995, 
p. 31; Willy Swartbooi, Interview 12.12.2007; Charles Namoloh, Interview 9.7.2008). 
389 Pieters 21.5.2007, p. 3; W. Swartbooi 12.12.2007, p. 8. 
390 Leys & Saul 1995, p. 55; Pieters 21.5.2007, p. 3; Andries Basson, Interview 22.9.2007. Ndonga and 
Kwanyama refer to the two largest sub-ethnic groups among the Ovambo. 
391 Basson 22.9.2007, p. 18; Kahuika & Stephanus 20.9.2007, pp. 3-4; Pieters 21.5.2007, p. 8. 
392 Basson 22.9.2007, p. 18; Pieters 21.5.2007, p. 8; Hunter 2008 pp. 95-96. 
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courses in Eastern bloc countries, including classes held in East Germany between 1979 
and 1984 aimed at preparing military personnel for security work.393 Allegedly, persons 
involved in these classes were incorporated into the SWAPO security apparatus, when it 
was established by the Central Committee under the command of Solomon Hawala in 
1981.394  
 It is in these circumstances that the first “spies” were interrogated and detained in 
SWAPO's Lubango camps. One well documented instance, involving six PLAN 
members from southern Namibia stationed at Tobias Hainyeko Training Centre, occurred 
in the middle of 1980.395 Told that they were being sent on a party mission, the group was 
led to a deep underground dugout, or “dungeon,” on the outskirts of the camp where 
members were detained for four weeks. Detainees were later ordered to exit the dugout 
one-by-one and pressured through torture to admit that they had been sent by South 
Africa to spy on SWAPO. According to Oiva Alikie Angula and Hans Pieters, two of the 
six who were detained, the group was released after a delegation from the Defense 
Headquarters, led by its chief commissar, Tauno Hatuikulipi, intervened on behalf of the 
detainees, several of whom Hatuikulipi knew both through their joint activities with 
                                                 
393 Hunter 2008, pp. 95-96. 
394 Basson 30.5.2007, pp. 8, 13; Kahuika & Stephanus 20.9.2007, p. 4; Pieters & W. Swartbooi 9.9.2007, 
p. 36; Leys & Saul 1995, pp. 55-56; Hunter 2008, p. 99. It should be noted that since at least the mid-
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395 Oiva Angula offers a very specific narration of the timing of his detention, indicating that it began in 
July 1980 and ended four weeks later on August 26, the day when Namibian exiles celebrated “Namibia 
Day” (Angula 2008, pp. 72-84; Oiva Angula, Interview 14.7.2008). Hans Pieters indicates that he was 
detained in 1979, but a review of his complete biography suggests that 1980 is more likely (Pieters 
21.5.2007, pp. 1-2; Pieters 9.9.2007, pp. 19, 31, 35). “A Report to the Namibian People” indicates that 
this detention occurred in June 1980 (pp. 16-17).  
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SWAPO inside Namibia and their work as commissars in the camps. Thereafter the six 
learned from Hatuikilipi and some of their interrogators that they had been accused of 
spying by another detainee who had implicated as many as seventy others under the 
influence of torture.396  
 Clearly this group was not the only one imprisoned in Lubango on spy 
accusations during the early 1980s. Pieters notes that while he was detained he 
discovered that there were other people accused of spying held in the same area outside 
Hainyeko, and after his initial interrogation he was held for a short time with about thirty 
others there.397 At least some of these early detainees were exiles from southern Namibia 
who were imprisoned immediately after arriving in the SWAPO camps. As survivors of 
the detentions at Lubango (“ex-detainees”) discovered following their imprisonment, 
many of those from the South entering exile in the early 1980s were  intercepted at the 
Karl Marx Reception Centre, where they were  interrogated and tortured until they 
confessed to being spies.398 From there they were sent to the dungeons without having 
entered any SWAPO camps other than the small, mobile ones they might have passed 
through between the Namibia-Angolan border and Lubango. Although most exiles were 
not aware of these detentions at the time, some, including friends and family of the 
newcomers stationed at SWAPO camps in Lubango, clearly were. Andries Basson, 
PLAN's Chief Protocol Officer stationed at Defense Headquarters, indicates that he knew 
of Namibians arriving at the Reception Centre who then “disappeared.”399 In several 
                                                 
396 Angula 2008, pp. 72-84; Pieters 21.5.2007,  pp. 1-2; Pieters 9.9.2007, pp. 19, 31, 35; “A Report to the 
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meetings held at Defense during Basson's tenure there from 1981 to 1983 the matter of 
disappearing people was discussed. Meetings included not only the administrative staff at 
Defense Headquarters proper, but also PLAN commanders based at Defense, who were 
responsible for security and whose immediate superior officer was Solomon Hawala.400 
While the security officers indicated that those detained had been identified as enemy 
agents, they would not offer additional detail, even when the “spies” were people that 
Basson and Hatuikulipi, who also attended these meetings, knew from their work leading 
SWAPO activists in the Namibian South.401 It appears that even Peter Nanyemba was 
excluded from information about the disappearing persons. According to Basson, in these 
meetings Nanyemba questioned security officers about how they knew that certain 
persons were sent by the enemy and was privately furious about developments in PLAN 
occurring outside his control.402 It is also alleged that Nanyemba tabled the issue for 
discussion in December 1982 at a meeting of the Political Bureau but that the issue was 
not discussed on the premise that it should be addressed directly by “the comrades in 
PLAN.”403   
 On April 1, 1983, on the eve of a SWAPO Central Committee meeting in which 
PLAN's command structure was to be discussed,404 Peter Nanyemba died in a car crash. 
Namibians living in the Lubango camps who were later detained remember Nanyemba's 
death as a turning point, after which people whom they knew living in those camps began 
                                                 
400 Basson 30.5.2007, p. 13; 22.9.2007 pp. 20-21, 23. Apparently, Solomon Hawala was not part of these 
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401 Basson 30.5.2007, pp. 8, 15, 16; 22.9.2007 pp. 21-22. 
402 Basson 22.9.2007, p. 21. 
403 “A Report to the Namibian People,” p. 17. 
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to vanish.405 According to Hans Pieters, who was then working at Defense Headquarters 
as political editor of The Combatant, the permanent staff at Defense Headquarters was 
gradually arrested after Nanyemba's death. By the mid-'80s most of its fifty members had 
“disappeared.”406 Those arrested included the highest ranking officials from the 
Namibian South based at Defense, Andries Basson and Tauno Hatuikulipi. According to 
Oiva Angula on the morning of November 8, 1983, only hours after he had last seen 
Basson while working on guard duty at Defense Headquarters the previous night, he 
learned from a PLAN commander that Andries Basson had “defected to the enemy.”407 
Over the coming weeks the story of Basson's defection was announced from Lubango 
camp parades and inhabitants warned that Basson could lead the South Africans to them 
at any time, a claim which seemed to be confirmed in December by Operation Askari, an 
offensive, in which SADF bombed the SWAPO settlements outside Lubango and caused 
extensive damage to Defense Headquarters.408 Within weeks Tauno Hatuikilipi also 
disappeared. In July 1984 in an address at a  Lubango parade, SWAPO President Sam 
Nujoma announced that Hatuikulipi had been identified by SWAPO Security as a traitor 
and that when apprehended he had committed suicide by swallowing a poison capsule 
hidden in a gold-filled tooth.409   
 From 1983 Namibian exiles living outside Lubango were also brought to the 
camps there and detained.410 In some cases, people were arrested directly by SWAPO 
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Security. For example, a number of SWAPO officials living in Luanda and Lusaka, such 
as Joseph Stephanus, were captured directly. Students studying in Eastern bloc countries 
were arrested by the police there and flown to Luanda where they were handed to 
security and transported in SWAPO convoys headed to Lubango.411 Others were told 
through official SWAPO correspondence to return to Angola, where they were detained 
either after they had been sent on a mission to Lubango or immediately upon their arrival 
in Luanda. Among these detainees were a large number of students studying in Western 
countries and at UNIN in Lusaka as well as teachers working at the SWAPO 
administered schools on the Isle of Youth in Cuba, established in 1978.412 In the latter 
cases, some disobeyed orders and left SWAPO because they had  heard of people 
disappearing in SWAPO's Angolan camps and wanted to avoid this fate.413 Many, 
however, elected to return, citing confidence in their ability to defend themselves against 
spy accusations and fear that if they did not return that they would be accused of spying 
and forced to leave SWAPO to support their actions.  
 Those detained or who left SWAPO to avoid detention included a very large 
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Kambangula 15.2.2007; Willem Meyer, Interviews 16.6.2005; 17.6.2005; “I left the country on the 15th 
of November, 1976,” 1990 (personal document, given to the author); Pieters 21.5.2007; Pieters and W. 
Swartbooi 9.9.2007; Stephanus 29.5.2005; 31.5.2005; 18.9.2007; S. Swartbooi 29.1.2007; 21.9.2007; 
W. Swartbooi 12.12.2007. Where individuals identify details that differ from the experiences narrated 
in all the aforementioned  sources, they are cited accordingly.  
411 Before being transported to Lubango accused spies sometimes were taken to Viana, a town and 
SWAPO camp located about 20 kilometers southeast of Luanda. The camp was used by a variety of 
SWAPO members who were traveling through Luanda en route to other locations.  
412  The creation of two schools on Isle of Youth, Hosea Kutako Primary School and Hendrik Witbooi 
Secondary School, was a direct response to the South African attack on Cassinga on May 4, 1978 (See 
Chapter 2). Two of the principals of Hosea Kutako, Ben Boys and Steve Swartbooi, were detained in 
Lubango and the principal of Hendrik Witbooi left SWAPO and traveled abroad to Europe to avoid 
detention (S. Swartbooi 21.9.2007; Erastus Shamena, Interview 1.3.2007). 
413  For more details see Chapter 5. 
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number of the educated southern Namibian leaders and students living abroad.414 
Namibians from the South were not the only ones who were accused and detained, 
however. Following Mishake Muyongo's expulsion from SWAPO in 1980, persons from 
the Caprivi region were accused by the security apparatus of attempting to revive CANU, 
which was allegedly working with the South Africans.415 Among the detainees were a 
number of prominent Ndonga officials, such as SWAPO camp chief administrator and 
Central Committee member Victor Nkandi, fueling theories that spy accusations were 
also motivated by an ethnic rivalry between Solomon Hawala and other Kwanyamas at 
Command  Headquarters and Peter Nanyemba's Ndonga allies. Well educated SWAPO 
leaders, especially those who had received scholarships to study in the United States 
during the 1960s, were frequently named in  accused spies'  interrogations as being 
responsible for leading the collaboration with the enemy.416 High ranking officials within 
SWAPO Security were arrested by others in the apparatus.417 And in 1988 even President 
Sam Nujoma's wife, Kowambo Nujoma, and brother-in-law and Central Committee 
member, Aaron Muchimba, were detained in Lubango.  
                                                 
414  For example, in preparing my master's thesis on St. Therese, one of four secondary schools offering a 
standard 10 (grade 12) education to black students in southern Namibia by 1976, I learned that twenty-
three of the twenty-seven former students who traveled into exile were detained as accused spies. One 
of the four who was not detained died in exile before 1980; the other three left SWAPO, apparently to 
avoid detention (Remembering St. Therese, Windhoek: Out of Africa, 2003). 
415  Alex Kamwi, Interview 26.2.2007, pp. 3, 8-9; Pieters 9.9.2007, pp. 4, 19; “A Report to the Namibian 
People,” pp. 20-21; Leys & Saul 1995, p. 63.  It may be, as some allege, that Caprivians were among 
the first to be accused as spies and detained in dungeons during the early 1980s.  
416  During the 1960s Namibian exiles were offered scholarships to study in the United States through the 
African-American Institute. The names of members of the SWAPO Central Committee and Political 
Bureau accused of spying during interrogations mentioned by  ex-detainees during our interviews are: 
Nahas Angula, Hage Geingob, Theo-Ben Gurirab, Hidipo Hamutenya, Nicky Iyambo, Nangolo 
Mbumba and Mose Tjitendero. With the exception of Nicky Iyambo, who undertook all of his medical 
studies at the University of Helsinki in Finland, all of these persons studied in the United States through 
African-American Institute scholarships. 
417 Among the most commonly mentioned are James Hawala and “Babino” Khaibeb, who according to 
research participants based at Defense Headquarters and Command Headquarters, were responsible 
during the early 1980s for PLAN intelligence and counter-intelligence (Pieters 21.5.2007; Pieters & W. 
Swartbooi 9.9.2007). 
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 The methods of interrogation and detention experienced by “spies” were very 
similar. Having been separated from all other camp inhabitants by armed PLAN 
personnel, the accused was led to a group of commanders for questioning, usually at the 
Karl Marx Reception Centre.418 There he or she was asked to offer an account of 
experiences before and since entering exile. When the accused was told that he or she had 
forgotten to mention his/her work as enemy agents and denied these claims, torture 
followed until a confession was made. Torture took place over days, and sometimes over 
weeks and months, and usually involved the accused being stripped naked and tied to 
poles while interrogators beat him/her with sticks.  It was also common for accused spies 
to have hot water and painful ointments applied to their torture wounds, to be told to 
build their own graves and be buried in them until they were unconscious and to have 
close friends and family members living in exile threatened with death.  
 During their ordeal some accused spies were approached individually by an 
interrogator who indicated that that they should fabricate a story about their collaboration 
with the South Africans. Those who did provide a fictional account, indicating where and 
when they were trained and their fellow agents, usually other Namibian exiles whom 
their interrogators pressured them to name, were taken to camps near to but separated 
from the other SWAPO settlements outside Lubango.419 There they were detained in 
various dungeons with anywhere from a handful to more than one hundred others who 
                                                 
418  Soldiers who guarded accused spies during their interrogations and led them to and from questioning 
did not interrogate or apply torture themselves. There were instances in which guards tortured accused 
spies after their detentions, however (Pieters 9.9.2007, p. 27; Swartbooi 21.9.2007, pp. 25, 38).  
419  The names and locations of the primary camps where most detainees were held are Etale (a.k.a. Etare), 
c. 15 km northeast of Lubango, Minya (a.k.a. Ominya, Security Prison), c. 16 km north of Lubango, and 
Mungakwiyu (a.k.a. Bwana's Base), Shoombe's Base and Ethiopia Camp, all of which are within a 
kilometer of one another at least 20 km, possibly 25 km northeast of Lubango, on the edge of the Tobias 
Hainyeko Training Centre. Estimates are based on the “Report of the United Missions on Detainees,” 
conversations with ex-detainees and a trip made by the author to Lubango in December 2007.  
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had also been accused of spying. Movement into and out of the dungeons was restricted 
by their physical structure, which, at 3-4 meters deep, could only be entered and exited 
through a sink plate at one end where guards inserted a ladder. Also, the camps in which 
the dungeons were located had their own commanders and guards, who ensured that 
detainees would not leave and outsiders would not enter the camp premises. At least 
twice a day inmates were permitted by guards to vacate their dungeon and use toilet 
facilities in the camps. Otherwise they were usually confined to their dungeon or assigned 
manual labor by the guards or commanders.420 Detainees took their meals in the 
dungeons, usually left over mealie-meal, rice and soup which they were given once or 
twice daily, and slept in sacks that had carried food donated to SWAPO. With little 
access to ventilation, nutrition and medical care, many suffered from poor health and died 
from illnesses thought to have been asthma, beri-beri, cholera and tuberculosis. Other 
detainees were commanded to leave the dungeons and never returned to them.421 
Hundreds of persons that were detained in Lubango remain missing.422 
  
Who is Responsible? 
 Given the nature and brutality of the spy purge in SWAPO's Lubango camps, it is 
not surprising that much of what has been written and said about them focuses on who is 
responsible. With regard to SWAPO Security there is consensus. In “A Report to the 
                                                 
420  Women inmates detained at Minya Base usually spent the day outside their dungeons and helped with 
various projects.   
421  Ex-detainees narrate numerous occasions in which those imprisoned in the camps were called out and 
then disappeared, several of which Hunter narrates (2008, pp. 104-105). 
422  Ex-detainees under the aegis of the Breaking the Wall of Silence Movement published a document 
titled “Lists of Namibia's 'Missing Persons,'” (Windhoek: BWS, 1996). The lists name 708 people, 
including 554 SWAPO detainees who have not been accounted for and 93 SWAPO detainees whose 
deaths were witnessed by repatriated detainees. For more details on “the missing persons” and the 
debates surrounding their numbers, see Chapter 5. 
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Namibian People,” an account of the Lubango spy detentions written by survivors in 
Angola shortly before their repatriation and Namibia's first democratic elections in 
1989,423 blame is laid, first and foremost, at the feet of SWAPO Security and its leader 
Solomon Hawala, “the Butcher of Lubango.”424 This analysis is supported by scholars 
Colin Leys, John Saul and Justine Hunter, whose writing links the Lubango detentions 
with the formation of the SWAPO Security led by Solomon Hawala and its unchecked 
abuse of power.425 It is also affirmed by ex-detainee participants in my research, who 
detailed the involvement of known security officials in their ordeals and indicated that 
Hawala, specifically, had led some of their interrogations, was a regular visitor in their 
detention camps and was involved in soliciting “confessions” from all detainees who 
were released in conjunction with the implementation of Resolution 435 in 1989.   
 Where sources differ is in the extent to which they portray senior SWAPO leaders 
as aware of, and/or actively involved in supporting these abuses.  For example, “A Report 
to the Namibian People,” emphasizes President Nujoma's responsibility: “Despite 
incessant appeals by members of the Organisation, including those under detention, to the 
leadership of SWAPO especially its President, to act timely and decisively in resolving 
the [early 1980s spy] crisis through investigation, the leading clique... led by Sam 
Nujoma utterly and deliberately (italics mine) failed to launch an investigation, thereby 
exacerbating the crisis to the point where no solution could be found to avert it. The 
problem was in fact left in the hands of the... so called SWAPO security.”426 The authors 
further maintain that the SWAPO President used Hawala and his subordinates to drive “a 
                                                 
423  Hans Pieters, Interview 22.7.2008. For more information about the circumstances in which “A Report 
to the Namibian People” was written, see Chapter 5. 
424  “A Report to the Namibian People,” pp. 13, 15. 
425  Leys & Saul 1995, pp. 55-56; Hunter 2008, pp. 97-100. 
426  “A Report to the Namibian People,” p. 13. 
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wedge.. between the political leadership and the military one” as a means of securing his 
own power. Colin Leys, John Saul and Justine Hunter's work  provides another 
perspective. Whereas they note that Nujoma was the only person who had authority over 
SWAPO Security, they also suggest that Security's activities were beyond his control and 
he may have been threatened by them, an argument strengthened by the fact that 
Nujoma's wife and brother-in-law were both detained.427 In a similar contrast, “A Report” 
emphasizes the culpability of all SWAPO leaders for not launching an investigation to 
resolve the spy crisis, while Leys, Saul and Hunter note that political leaders, especially 
those named during the interrogations, may have been directly threatened by it. My 
research participants also offer their own theories to account for the awareness and 
involvement of the leaders in the abuses at Lubango. Some maintain that Nujoma and/or 
other SWAPO leaders were fooled into believing that those detained were spies through 
false information planted in SWAPO by the South Africans.428 Others insist that, in 
addition to Solomon Hawala, there was some person or faction in the SWAPO political 
leadership deliberately using false claims about spies to eliminate rivals, especially those 
belonging to other tribes.  
 That some senior political leaders were aware of particular people who were 
detained and the location of camps where detainees were held is beyond question. In late 
1984 or early 1985,429 Hidipo Hamutenya, SWAPO Secretary for Information and 
Publicity, visited Lubango, where he and others were involved in filming several 
                                                 
427  “A Report to the Namibian People,” p. 14; Leys & Saul 1995, p. 56; Hunter 2008, pp. 99-100. 
428  One piece of evidence supporting this claim which merits further scrutiny is “Spies from Nowhere,” an 
article published in Times of Namibia (23.11.1990). Therein the author offers an account of how the 
South African government planted false information about spies in SWAPO. The article is based on the 
testimony of a Cuban officer who liaised between SWAPO, Angolan and Cuban forces in Angola and 
later defected to a Western country.  
429  Hidipo Hamutenya, Interview 2.4.2007, p. 5; Groth 1995, p. 115. 
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detainees' confessions. According to Hamutenya, he was commissioned to this task by 
the SWAPO Political Bureau whose members were discussing whether “all those people 
that were being picked up were the agents of the enemy.”430 It was thought that as 
Secretary for Information and Publicity, he and others trained in recording and film-
making “should go record these people, put their voice on tape... so people are able to 
judge whether they were indeed credible.”431 Those whose stories were recorded during 
Hamutenya's visit recall being pressured to reproduce their confessions in front of either 
him or other members of his entourage.432  
 Detainees also remember visits by three other members of the Political Bureau, 
President Sam Nujoma, Secretary of Defense (after Nanyemba's death) Peter 
Mueshihange and Administrative Secretary Moses Garoeb, each of whom addressed 
them at the parade ground.433 Of particular significance to many ex-detainees is President 
Nujoma's April 21, 1986 visit which they remember as the first time that they saw 
Nujoma at one of the detention camps. Oiva Angula's narration of Nujoma's speech 
delivered at Mungakwiyu, a camp located just outside the Tobias Hainyeko Training 
Centre, closely resembles the accounts of others who were present on that occasion:  
When Nujoma arrived in the company of Hawala and senior 
security officers, the whole atmosphere was tense. We were 
made to line up a hundred meters from the dungeons... The 
SWAPO leader stepped forward..., “Viva SWAPO! Viva 
PLAN!... I greet you in the name of the Mandumes, the 
Witboois, the Mahereros and the Ipumbus that you have 
                                                 
430  Hamutenya 2.4.2007, p. 7. 
431  Hamutenya 2.4.2007, p. 6. 
432  Basson 22.9.2007, p. 27; Groth 1995, p. 115. 
433  Basson 22.9.2007, p. 27; Kahuika & Stephanus 20.9.2007, pp. 11-12, 12-13; Meyer, “I left the country 
on the 15th of November, 1976,” p. 3; Stephanus 18.9.2007, p. 38; Swartbooi 21.9.2007, p. 31; Angula 
2008, pp. 152-153; Groth 1995, p. 107; Trewelha 1990, pp. 89-90. According to one source, Sam 
Nujoma and Peter Mueshihange were accompanied on one of their visits by Peter Tsheehama, SWAPO 
Representative to Central Africa, and Ananias Angula (Trewelha 1990, pp. 89-90). 
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betrayed...434 When Namibia is freed, SWAPO will parade 
you at Freedom Square. The Namibian people will decide 
what to do with you.” Before the SWAPO leader could 
finish... some detainees raised their hands. “Can I ask the 
President a question?” a detainee said. “No, it's no time for 
questions” [a commander] intervened... Hawala then 
motioned Nujoma that it was time to go. They left 
unceremoniously.435 
 
For  some ex-detainees this speech was a turning point in their understanding of their 
detention. Whereas previously many imagined that President Nujoma was unaware of 
what was happening in Lubango and that, once he knew, he would intervene on 
detainees' behalf, Nujoma's 1986 visit and subsequent ones disabused them of this hope. 
 Nonetheless, it seems likely that there were limits to SWAPO leaders' knowledge 
of happenings in Lubango. Hamutenya indicates that he visited the detention camps only 
once, on which occasion he met only a few detainees and did not visit the places where 
they were imprisoned.436 Based on ex-detainees' testimonies it may be that Nujoma 
visited only a fraction of the total number detained, and he might never have seen the 
dungeons himself.437 There is no evidence that SWAPO political leaders were part of the 
interrogation of accused spies. Security appears to have maintained some contact with 
political leaders, at least with President Sam Nujoma, but the dispersal of information 
may have been limited. Certainly, its content remains opaque. According to Hamutenya, 
“Hawala was reporting to Sam Nujoma. But I don't think anybody else in the Politburo 
knew the truth... unless in private somewhere.”438 According to Nujoma, “one cannot say 
                                                 
434  “The Mandumes, the Witboois, the Mahereros and the Ipumbus” refer to prominent figures in the early 
resistance to colonial rule in Namibia. They were leaders of several of Namibia's largest ethnic groups.   
435  Angula 2008, pp. 137-138. See also Groth 1995, p. 125; Trewelha 1990, pp. 89-90; Gertze 21.2.2007, 
p. 6; Kahuika & Stephanus  20.9.2007, pp. 11-12, 12-13; S. Swartbooi 21.9.2007, pp. 30-31. 
436  Hamutenya 2.4.2007, pp. 5, 6. 
437  Gertze 21.2.2007 p. 6;  S. Swartbooi 21.9.2007, pp. 30-31. 
438  Hamutenya 2.4.2007, p. 9. 
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really you are aware of what happened [with SWAPO Security in Lubango]. Unless 
something serious happened. Then you will know; you will receive the report.”439  
 Even Solomon Hawala is unlikely to have known about all the activities of 
SWAPO Security members. In the case of Pieters' and Angula's four-week detention 
outside Tobias Hainyeko some months before the new SWAPO Security under Solomon 
Hawala was formally established, the matter appears to have been resolved when Tauno 
Hatuikulipi intervened with “Lawrence,” the nom de guerre of the man responsible for 
security at Tobias Hainyeko camp. Although the interrogation and detention methods  
used on this occasion resemble those experienced by detainees across the 1980s, Pieters 
doubts that Solomon Hawala or any security officials outside Hainyeko were aware of his 
1980 detention.440  Even after Hawala became the head of SWAPO Security in 1981 he 
did not live primarily in Lubango, but rather at Command Headquarters near the front, 
where he was responsible for coordinating day-to-day operations with PLAN.441 When he 
visited Lubango for PLAN meetings or other business, he stayed with security officials 
who were living at the edge of Defense Headquarters in part of a collection of bunkers 
reserved for commanders who were passing through.442 He could not easily know what 
all of these officials were doing while he was at the front, let alone more junior personnel 
responsible for maintaining security in particular camps.  
 Although such ambiguities make it difficult to apportion blame for what 
transpired in SWAPO's Lubango camps, they are critically important for understanding 
                                                 
439  Nujoma 4.3.2008, p. 5. The quote was Nujoma's response to my question: “Did you become more 
aware of what [SWAPO Security] was doing after the struggle ended or were you equally aware during 
the 1980s of what that apparatus was doing?” 
440  Pieters & W. Swartbooi 9.9.2007, p. 35. 
441  Basson 21.5.2007, p. 8; Pieters 9.9.2007, p. 21. 
442  Basson 22.9.2007, p. 23; Pieters 9.9.2007, p. 21. 
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how a spy discourse achieved its power there. In the Namibian exile community and 
especially the camps, where inhabitants were at constant risk of South African violence 
and reliant on commanders to access information and other resources, a few officials 
need not have naively believed in or knowingly manipulated a story about spies to create 
conditions for a purge. They need only have drawn attention to the threat of spies and 
played on exiles' fears of who these spies could be and the methods which they might be 
using. In turn, senior SWAPO officials used spy accusations to coerce and eliminate 
rivals in a national community. But they could never entirely contain the ambiguity of 






     Chapter 5 
“Wall of Silence”: Challenging National History in the International System 
 Challenges to national history in Namibia are as old as the idea of a Namibian 
nation itself. After the Second World War the United Nations established a trusteeship 
system to administer South West Africa and other territories mandated to governments 
under the League of Nations and to prepare these territories for national independence. In 
opposition, the South African government maintained that South West Africa was not an 
independent territory destined for nationhood but rather a part of South Africa that should 
become the country's fifth province. By the late 1950s, South Africa stood opposed not 
only to the UN but also to nationalist organizations which, drawing from history, 
competed with one another to represent a Namibian nation. In the 1960s, following the 
flight of nationalist leaders into exile, SWAPO became the most widely recognized 
organization representing Namibians both at home and abroad, achieving the status of 
“sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people” from the UN in 1976. 
Thenceforth, challenging national history in Namibia became tantamount to contesting 
the story told by SWAPO leaders about Namibian resistance to colonial rule. And 
narratives of conflict in SWAPO administered  exile camps became the focal point of the 
most volatile alternative histories.  
 From at least the mid-1970s, rumours began to spread outside the exile 
community that SWAPO was committing human rights violations against its own 
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members in its camps. By 1985 these rumours, and supportive evidence, were being 
circulated through Namibia and abroad by a group of exiles' relatives, who became 
known as the Committee of Parents (CP), and by a German pastor, Siegfried Groth. 
SWAPO’s official response was two-fold. On March 4, 1985 hundreds of SWAPO 
members gathered at the United Nations Institute for Namibia (UNIN) in Lusaka to 
watch a film, in which prominent exiles “confessed” to their activities as South African 
spies. On February 16, 1986, almost a year later, SWAPO announced at a press 
conference in London that it was detaining a “South African spy network numbering at 
least 100 people,” but denied that any human rights abuses had been committed, decrying 
such rumors as “a well calculated campaign organized by South Africa.”443 The February 
16 press conference and later SWAPO representations of its detentions were generally 
accepted and reproduced by SWAPO’s allies despite the fact that some of these allies had 
access to contradictory information.  
 Only in 1989 did discrepancies between dominant exile representations and reality 
become widely apparent. In that year, exiles were repatriated to Namibia in the lead-up to 
United Nations monitored national elections as arranged by UN Resolution 435. On May 
23 SWAPO announced that it had released its prisoners, and on May 25 journalists met 
with about 200 people in SWAPO camps outside Lubango, Angola, where they had been 
detained. At this event, and at a press conference held shortly after their return to 
Namibia on July 4, 1989, “ex-detainees” shared their experiences – of torture, forced 
confession and imprisonment by SWAPO’s security branch, and of the murder and 
disappearance of hundreds of comrades. The stories and pictures of the ex-detainees’ 
                                                 
443  The Namibian, 21.2.1986. The article has been copied in NSHR, “Critical Analysis: SWAPO's 'Book 
of the Dead'” (Windhoek, 1996), Appendix A. 
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wounds were, in turn, published and circulated widely. Although individual SWAPO 
leaders reacted to the detainees’ return in different ways, the party as a whole responded 
by associating detainees' stories with South African propaganda and touting its 
reconciliation policy, according to which the histories of these and other human rights 
violations in Namibia's exile past was a threat to the new nation. Since then there have 
been attempts to make such histories accessible and accepted in Namibia, led most 
visibly by the Breaking the Wall of Silence Movement (BWS), an organization of ex-
detainees and others, formed after the publication of Siegfried Groth's book, Namibia –  
The Wall of Silence, in 1995.444 Nonetheless, almost twenty years since independence, 
Namibian leaders continue to resist public discussion of abuses that occurred within the 
liberation movement and those who were abused or “disappeared” in exile are still widely 
associated with stigma.  
 This chapter focuses on the Committee of Parents, “the ex-detainees” and the 
Breaking the Wall of Silence Movement, considering how each community, during a 
distinct period of time, was able to disperse alternatives to Namibia's dominant exile 
narrative and how, repeatedly, these alternatives have  been rendered socially 
unacceptable. To this end, the piece draws from an existing literature about those who 
have declared and obscured “the history” of SWAPO in exile,445 while placing these and 
                                                 
444 Siegfried Groth, Namibia – The Wall of Silence: The Dark Days of the Liberation Struggle, 
(Wuppertal: Peter Hammer Verlag, 1995). 
445  Erica Thiro-Beukes, Attie Beukes and Hewat Beukes, A Struggle Betrayed, (Rehoboth: Akasia 
Drukkery, 1986); Committee of Parents, “Report on SWAPO Leadership Abuses” (Windhoek, 1987); 
Nico Basson and Ben Motinga, eds., Call Them Spies: A Documentary Account of the SWAPO Spy 
Drama, (Windhoek: Africa Communications Project, 1989); Paul Trewelha, “SWAPO and the 
Churches: An International Scandal,” Searchlight South Africa, 7 (1991), pp. 65-88; Phillip Steenkamp, 
“The Churches,” in Colin Leys and John S. Saul, Namibia's Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged 
Sword, (London: James Currey, 1995), pp. 94-114; Lauren Dobell, “Silence in Context: Truth and/or 
Reconciliation in Namibia,” Journal of Southern African Studies, 23, 2 (1997), pp. 371-382; Colin Leys 
and John S. Saul, “Lubango and After: ‘Forgotten History’ as Politics in Namibia,” Journal of Southern 
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other sources in a broader context. In turn, the chapter argues that the on-going 
association of certain histories from exile with stigma in Namibia has resulted, not just 
from the decisions of a few persons but rather from a “system of nation-states,”446 
wherein certain kinds of representations are readily accepted and others easily 
discounted. The chapter, thereby, refocuses the moral issue surrounding SWAPO's 
detentions away from the failure of isolated individuals and organizations and towards a 
constellation of social entities, which, in the name of resisting apartheid and protecting 
human rights, allowed national elites to perpetrate violence against people whom they 
were permitted to represent.   
   
The Committee of Parents 
 Well before the Committee of Parents was formed in 1985, some parents of exiles 
were developing a critical perspective on SWAPO's practices abroad. On May 4, 1976 
Mrs. Hermanus Beukes flew from Windhoek to visit her son Hans in Lusaka.447 Although 
Hans was a long-standing SWAPO member and one of the first people to petition the 
United Nations on Namibia's behalf,448 he had spent most of his years abroad as a student 
in Norway and had only returned to Africa with his Norwegian wife some months before 
his mother's arrival. During her visit Mrs. Beukes became aware of conflicts within 
                                                                                                                                                 
African Studies, 29, 2 (2003), pp. 300-325; Justine Hunter, “Die Politik der Erinnerung und des 
Vergessens in Namibia seit der staatlichen Unabhängigkeit” (Doctoral Thesis, Universität Freiburg, 
2005); Justine Hunter, Die Politik der Erinnerung und des Vergessens in Namibia: Umgang mit 
schweren Menschenrechtsverletzungen der Ära des bewaffneten Befreiungskampfes, 1966 bis 1989 
(Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 2008). 
446 Liisa Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in 
Tanzania (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 5. Malkki also develops this and similar 
notions in her article “Refugees and Exile: From ‘Refugee Studies’ to the National Order of Things,” 
Annual Review of Anthropology 24 (1995), pp. 495-523. 
447 Erica Beukes, Interview 10.3.2007, p. 1; Erica Beukes, Interview 13.5.2008, pp. 7-8. Erica Beukes is 
the same person as Erica Thiro-Beukes, one of the author's of A Struggle Betrayed.    
448 Peter Katjavivi, A History of Resistance in Namibia, (London: James Currey, 1988) p. 39. 
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SWAPO through conversations with her son and his friends in the SWAPO Youth 
League, several of whom were fleeing arrest and were ultimately detained in May 
1976.449 When she returned from Zambia to Namibia, Mrs. Beukes traveled with 
documents hidden in the heels of her shoes, including papers  written by the SYL and 
PLAN combatants, who were then complaining about the practices of various SWAPO 
officials and clamoring for a party congress.450 Thereafter, Martha Ford, who was Mrs. 
Beukes' daughter and a prominent SWAPO activist inside Namibia, organized a meeting 
between her mother, father and several political leaders who were affiliated, or were soon 
to affiliate with, SWAPO. Later meetings were held among a wider range of concerned 
SWAPO members who had learned of Mrs. Beukes' experiences as well.451  
 Few SWAPO members living in Namibia, even among the organization's leaders, 
are likely to have had access to the kind of information that Mrs. Beukes transported prior 
to her return. Although the South African media reports, which publicized the SWAPO 
conflict in Zambia following the arrest of Andreas Shipanga and others on April 21, 
would have been known to many, direct communication between Namibians in exile and 
                                                 
449 For more details about the SWAPO conflict in Zambia from 1974 to 1976, see Chapter 3.  
450 E. Beukes, 10.3.2007, p. 1; Colin Leys and John S. Saul, Namibia’s Liberation Struggle: The Two 
Edged Sword (London: James Currey, 1995), pp. 74, 90. Although these sources do not indicate which 
documents Mrs. Beukes brought back to Namibia, they are likely to have included several mass 
produced documents discussed in Chapter 3. Their titles are: “Why we have to meet directly the 
Liberation Committee of the OAU,” “To the President of SWAPO,” “To the President of SWAPO and 
other Office Bearers,” and “The PLAN Fighter's Declaration,” all of which are available in the Ailonga 
Collection, Files: “Political Matters affecting the Chaplaincy,” “SWAPO Conflict Zambia.” Also, in the 
Katjavivi Collection at UNAM (Series B1, Category 15), there is a typed letter dated May 14, 1976, 
written by Hans Beukes and addressed to “Bishop Auala, Daniel Tjongerero and Other members of 
SWAPO,” wherein Beukes details his observations of the conflict within SWAPO in Zambia. Although 
I was unable to collect information about the circulation of this letter, it seems likely that Mrs. Beukes 
traveled with it to Namibia. Clearly, Peter Katjavivi, SWAPO's Secretary for Information and Publicity 
based in London, eventually received it. 
451 Erica Beukes, Mrs. Hermanus Beukes' daughter-in-law, indicates that the first meeting included 
Hendrik Witbooi, Jöel Stephanus, Stephanus Goliath, Eric Biwa, Ben Boys and Lukas Stephanus (E. 
Beukes 10.3.2007, p. 1; E. Beukes 13.5.2008, p. 8), all of whom were or soon became prominent 
SWAPO supporters in Khoikhoi-speaking communities south of Windhoek. Later, Erica Beukes and 
her husband, Hewat learned about the meeting and were involved in organizing others with the internal 
leadership (E. Beukes 13.5.2008, p. 7; Thiro-Beukes et al. 1986, pp. 21-22).   
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at home was constrained by the distance, the wars, and the awareness that any mail 
carried by post could be monitored by SWAPO, the Zambian government and the South 
African government. Under the circumstances there was little opportunity for “the 
dissidents” to control how and where their stories were told in Namibia, except through a 
trusted source like Mrs. Beukes, who not only had the resources to fly between Zambia 
and Namibia but also the connections to gain an audience with SWAPO's internal 
leaders. 
 Nonetheless, the leaders reacted to Mrs. Beukes' information with skepticism 
and/or caution. According to some who participated in the meetings between Mr. and 
Mrs. Beukes and SWAPO internal, the leaders were not willing to consider the 
allegations made about what was happening in the movement in exile.452 Perhaps, they, 
like others listening to the government's version of events, viewed her stories as more 
South African propaganda.453 Even those who may have taken a  different view were 
under pressure to promote unity within SWAPO, especially at that time when the 
Turnhalle Talks, South Africa's attempt to create an independent  government in 
Namibia,454 were meeting. The paucity of  sources and the politically charged context in 
which they were clearly produced may also have influenced the way that people  
responded to them.455 Still, by sharing these sources, Mrs. Beukes exposed some people 
                                                 
452 E. Beukes 13.5.2008, p. 7; Thiro-Beukes et al. 1986, pp. 21-22.  
453 According to one source, reporting on morale inside Namibia for SWAPO's London office, “that [the 
arrest of SWAPO members in Zambia] has even taken place has been passed off among grassroots 
support as South African propaganda.” (UNAM, Katjavivi Collection, Category 14, File No. 3, “Report 
on the morale, problems and needs of SWAPO internal,” p.3). 
454 The Turnhalle Talks were initiated by the South African government in September 1975 as an “internal 
solution” to the question of Namibian independence. The Talks did not involve SWAPO and preempted 
UN Resolution 385, according to which UN supervised elections should be held in Namibia by August 
1976.   
455 As Erica Beukes later wrote on behalf of the Committee Parents in a narrative about the Committee's 
formation: “Details remained scanty and the members inside the country were left confused as to the 
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living in Namibia to dissident stories from Zambia, including several SWAPO activists 
within her own family who would draw from them and other accounts456 to challenge the 
liberation movement's representation of exile in later years. 
 During the 1980s new information about conflict within SWAPO in exile began 
to reach Namibia, especially stories about the detention of accused spies in SWAPO's 
Lubango camps.457 One event that hastened the spread of these stories in Namibia and the 
formation of a community committed to dispersing them further was the Lusaka 
Conference in May 1984. The Conference was organized by the South African 
government as part of its efforts, on-going since the Turnhalle Talks, to find an “internal 
solution” to Namibian independence that would be seen as acceptable to the international 
community. SWAPO members participated in the Conference, including representatives 
from its exiled and internal wings. In the course of the conference proceedings some 
exiles shared stories with Namibians coming from home about the disappearance of 
SWAPO members in the movement's Lubango camps, rumors of imprisonment and 
torture, and their own personal fears.458  
 Among those who listened to the stories in Lusaka was Attie Beukes. Although 
not related to the family of Mr. and Mrs. Hermanus Beukes, Attie supervised  their 
                                                                                                                                                 
real state of affairs. There was always the possibility of sensation in the rumours which could grossly 
distort facts... Such uncertainty hardly gave the opportunity for drastic action” (CP 1987, p. 1). 
456 Colin Leys and John Saul indicate, that in addition to the material delivered by Mrs. Hermanus Beukes 
that some additional “evidence from sources close to the dissidents in Zambia did reach Namibia, such 
as letters brought by friends from those who had recently gone into exile” (Leys and Saul 1995, p. 74). 
One letter that was eventually accessed by the Committee of Parents was sent to Bishop Auala of the 
Evangelical Lutheran Ovambo-Kavango Church (ELOC) by Salatiel Ailonga, a pastor who 
administered a chaplaincy for Namibians in Zambia from 1974 to 1976 (see Chapter 3). The text 
narrates the conflict within SWAPO and encourages Auala to visit those detained in Zambia and 
Tanzania, actions which the Bishop did not take (The letter is reproduced in “Breaking the Wall of 
Silence: Statements and Clippings, February- April 1996,” (Windhoek: BWS, 1996), pp. 70-71. See 
also Siegfried Groth's discussion  of the letter in Namibia – The Wall of Silence (1995), pp. 61-63.    
457 For a detailed account of the detention of “spies” in Lubango during the 1980s, see Chapter 4. 
458 Thiro-Beukes et al. 1986, pp. 27-28; CP 1987, p. 5; E. Beukes 10.3.2007, pp. 3-4; E. Beukes 13.5.2008, 
p. 11. 
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daughter-in-law, Erica, at the Development Office at the Council of Churches of Namibia 
(CCN) and was a friend to the family.459 When Attie returned to Namibia, he shared what 
he had learned with Erica, including the news that her brother, Walther Thiro, was among 
those thought to be detained.460 In turn, Erica approached several pastors and Andimba 
Toivo ya Toivo, the founder of SWAPO's predecessor, the Ovomboland People's 
Congress (OPC), who had recently been set free after eighteen years at South Africa's 
notorious Robben Island Prison.461 At the same time, she also began to share stories 
openly among colleagues at the CCN office in Windhoek, and people there and elsewhere 
began to contact her, asking her what she knew and telling her what they had heard and 
who might have more information.462  
 In some respects  the conversations in which Attie and Erica Beukes participated 
following the Lusaka Conference must have resembled those held by others in Namibia 
at that time. Apparently, there were a number of people who had approached church and 
political leaders following the Lusaka Conference, and Erica Beukes herself was 
surprised to learn what others had heard about the detentions, in some cases, years 
earlier.463 Moreover, there were other social networks in which people were discussing 
abuses happening in exile independently of Beukes and the Lusaka Conference 
participants. Take, for example, the Thomas and Isaacks families of Keetmanshoop, a 
town in southern Namibia. In July 1978 Samuel Thomas, his younger brother Cornelius, 
his younger sister Wilhelmina and his neighbor and family friend Maria “Amies” Isaacks 
                                                 
459 E. Beukes 10.3.2007, p. 4. 
460 E. Beukes 10.3.2007, p. 11. 
461 Thiro-Beukes et al. 1986, pp. 28-29; CP 1987, pp. 6-7 ; E. Beukes 13.5.2008, p. 12.  
462 E. Beukes 10.3.2007, p. 4; E. Beukes 13.5.2008, p. 12. 
463 Thiro-Beukes et al. 1986, pp. 28-29; E. Beukes 10.3.2007, p. 4; E. Beukes 13.5.2008, pp. 12, 13. I have 
heard other accounts of people in Namibia discussing rumors of  happenings in SWAPO's Angolan 
camps in the early 1980s but not from sources willing to go on a public record.  
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departed for exile. In 1985, members of the Thomas family received a copy of a letter 
from Amies, who was then living in a UN refugee camp outside Lusaka, addressed to 
Wilhelmina, who was then living in England, where she had previously received a 
scholarship.464 Both Amies and Wilhelmina had recently left SWAPO, and the letter 
focuses on Amies' perceptions of what was happening to people that they both knew who 
had disappeared in Angola, including Samuel Thomas, with whom the Thomas family 
had lost contact the previous year.465 Although it is not entirely clear how the letter was 
sent from Wilhelmina in England to her family in Namibia,466 once it had arrived it 
became a source of conversation among Samuel Thomas' siblings, Amies Isaack's mother 
and a group of others with whom they thought they could discuss it in confidence. They 
also took the letter to Hendrik Witbooi, a high ranking SWAPO leader inside Namibia 
and the chief in the Thomas' native village, Gibeon, and asked him what he knew of their 
family members in Angola.467 Eventually, a member of the Thomas family living in 
Windhoek also shared the letter with Erica Beukes and the group then meeting with 
her.468  
 What distinguished Erica and Attie Beukes' group from others forming at this 
time was its ability to collect and disperse a wide range of stories. Within months of the 
Lusaka Conference, the Beukeses had become a hub for the knowledge of various 
                                                 
464 Julia Thomas, Interview 20.9.2007, pp. 2-3. 
465 Letter from Amies Isaacks to Wilhelmina Thomas, 4.3.1985. A copy of the letter is in my possession. It 
has also been reproduced in Thiro-Beukes et al. 1986, pp. 130-135 and in Nico Basson and Ben 
Motinga, eds., Call Them Spies: A Documentary Account of the SWAPO Spy Drama, (Windhoek: 
Africa Communications Project, 1989), p. 41. N.B. The documents cited in this chapter from Basson 
and Motinga 1989 are not photocopies of the original but rather have been typed into Basson and 
Motinga's text. Where possible I have checked Basson and Motinga's version of a document against the 
original or a photocopy .  
466 Julia Thomas believes that the letter was delivered by Willem Konjore, a SWAPO member, well known 
to people in southern Namibia, where he was a school principal (Thomas 20.9.2007, p. 3). Konjore, 
however, does not recall the letter (Willem Konjore, Interview 22.7.2008). 
467 Thomas 20.9.2007, pp. 3-4. 
468 Thomas 20.9.2007, p. 4. 
 166 
Namibians about exiles disappearing in Angola and for the communities that were 
already discussing what was happening there. In collecting this knowledge and 
establishing these links, the Beukeses' position at the CCN was critical. Not only did it 
provide them with a space in the capital wherein people could share their stories, but it 
also linked them to a range of people involved in resisting South African rule at home 
and abroad who worked with the CCN.469 Of particular importance was a CCN fund-
raising trip taken by Erica and Attie Beukes to Western Europe in February and March 
1985. At a distance from Southern Africa's wars, Erica and Attie met both with Namibian 
exiles who had made their way to Europe and Europeans following events in Namibia. In 
the process, the Beukeses learned more about the stories coming from Namibians living 
in Angola and Zambia. Moreover, they accessed  letters from exiles, many of which, had 
been sent to church leaders in Namibia but had received no response.470  
 One particularly important source of information whom Erica Beukes contacted 
during the trip  was Siegfried Groth, a German pastor.471 In fact, Beukes and Groth had 
known one another since the 1960s when Beukes was training to become a nurse in 
Germany.472 By that time Groth was the representative of the Vereinigte Evangelische 
                                                 
469 The CCN was founded in 1978, following the move of most of Namibia's churches to oppose South 
African rule in Namibia. During the 1980s many SWAPO office bearers were employed at the CCN, 
and the CCN was involved in channeling funds from foreign donors to SWAPO affiliated projects in 
Namibia.   
470 Thiro-Beukes et al. 1986, p. 30; CP 1987, p. 7; Groth 1995, p. 141. 
471 There are two published sources which describe Groth's relationship to Namibia and its exile 
community in detail. These include the previously cited Namibia: The Wall of Silence (Wuppertal: 
Peter Hammer Verlag, 1995) and a book written by Groth's colleague, Klaus Gockel, Mission und 
Apartheid: Aus der Arbeit der Rheinischen Missionsgesellschaft (RMG bis 1971) bzw. der Vereinigten 
Evangelischen Mission (VEM ab 1971) in der Zeit nach dem 2. Weltkrieg bis zur Unabhängigkeit 
Namibias (Wuppertal: Archiv- und Museumstiftung VEM, 2006). In addition, the Siegfried Groth 
Collection at the VEM has an extensive record of his correspondences with Namibians and experiences 
in Africa.  
472 Groth 1995, p. 141; E. Beukes 10.3.2007. Groth and Beukes were again in regular contact during the 
late 1970s when the VEM administered a scholarship for her to study in the UK (Groth 1995, p. 141). 
There are two files of their correspondence accessible at the VEM, Siegfried Groth Collection, File No. 
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Mission (VEM), the mission society that had worked in South West Africa since the 19th 
century, to Namibia's Lutheran churches, the largest denomination in a predominantly 
Christian country.473 During the 1960s Groth was a regular visitor to Namibia, but in 
1971 his passport had been revoked by the South African government due to his critical 
position on apartheid. Thereafter, he was commissioned by the VEM's partner churches 
in Namibia to minister to their members who were living in exile and, following the 
detention of SWAPO members in Nampundwe and Mboroma in 1976, was given the 
special assignment to work with exiles who had left SWAPO. Despite the fact that Groth, 
like most foreign pastors, was not permitted to work in any SWAPO administered camps 
following the 1976 conflict, he did travel to Zambia (and frequently Botswana) annually 
to meet with Namibian exiles. By the time Siegfried Groth and Erica Beukes met on 
March 15, 1985, Groth had amassed a great deal of information about the exile 
community, including extensive accounts of human rights abuses occurring in exile, and 
he would share much of his information with her in regular correspondence during the 
following year.      
 Shortly after Erica and Attie Beukes returned from Europe on March 21, 1985, the 
two approached Namibian church leaders again, including the Bishop of the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church (ELC),474 Hendrik Frederick, the Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of 
Windhoek, Bonafatius Haushiku and the General Secretary of the CCN, Abisai Shejavali, 
                                                                                                                                                 
1387; “Erica Beukes;” File No. 1388, “Parents' Committee E. Beukes.” 
473 The Vereinigte Evangelische Mission was previously the Rheinische Missionsgesellschaft, the main 
mission society working in southern Namibia from the early 19th century. It has been estimated that 
90% or more of Namibia's population belongs to a Christian church, the highest rate in Africa (E.g. 
Leys and Saul 1995, p. 11) 
474 The Lutheran Church in Namibia is divided into three parts that align with Namibia's colonial history. 
During the apartheid era the Evangelical Lutheran Church (ELC) was the name of the church formed by 
German missionaries in the South, the Evangelical Lutheran Ovambo-Kavango Church (ELOC) the 
name of that founded by Finnish missionaries in the North and the Deutsche Evangelisch-Lutherische 
Kirche (DELK) for German-speaking Namibians. 
 168 
and discussed the possibility of a meeting between clergy and the families of the missing 
exiles.475 When the leaders did not follow up on these conversations, the families began 
to take matters into their own hands. On May 9, 1985 they sent a telex to UN Secretary 
General De Cuellar requesting a meeting and again on May 16, but they received no 
reply.476 On June 2, they issued a memorandum to the leaders of all the large Christian 
denominations in Namibia detailing information that they had gathered about abuses in 
exile and demanding a meeting with them.477 On July 9, they sent a similar detailed 
account to a variety of church and solidarity organizations that were supporting SWAPO 
overseas.478 The June 2 document was signed by 132 persons and introduces the authors 
as “the worried and concerned parents and family members of Namibian refugees in 
Zambia and Angola;” the July letter similarly refers to “the mothers and relatives of 
Namibian refugees.”479 Later that year, the group began to refer to itself in its writings 
more succinctly as “the Committee of Parents.”480 According to Erica Beukes, the name 
was not only practical for the purposes of signing letters but highlighted that the group 
only consisted of family members of those affected and was not a political organization. 
To maintain this image many of those most involved, such as Attie Beukes and Erica's 
husband Hewat, never signed documents written by the Committee of Parents because 
they were not “blood family” of any persons who had disappeared.481     
                                                 
475 Thiro-Beukes et al. 1986, p. 31; CP 1987, p. 8; Groth 1995, pp. 141-142. 
476 Thiro-Beukes et al. 1986, p. 31; CP 1987, p. 8. 
477 Ailonga Collection, File Name: “Political Matters affecting the Chaplaincy,” “Memorandum, Junie 
1985, Aan die Namibiaanse Kerkleiers.”  
478 “Memorandum from mothers and relatives of Namibian refugees to solidarity groups in Namibia on 
July 9, 1985” in Basson and Motinga, 1989, p. 43.  
479 The June 2 memorandum was written in Afrikaans. It refers to the “verontruste en bekommerde ouers 
en familieled van Namibiaanse vlugtlinge in Zambia en Angola.” 
480 The group appears to have referred to itself in its writings as “The Committee of Parents” for the first 
time in September 1985 (Basson and Motinga 1989, pp. 44-46). 
481 Beukes 13.5.2008, p. 12. 
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 Finally, on September 9, 1985 a meeting was held between representatives of 
Namibia's two largest Lutheran churches, the Catholic Church, the African Methodist 
Church, the CCN and twenty-four members of the Committee of Parents. Despite their 
expressions of good will, the church leaders left the meeting without committing to a plan 
of action other than that they would meet again as a group to discuss the Committee's 
concerns.482 Ten days later, when the Committee received a letter from CCN General 
Secretary Abisai Shejavali, suggesting that no plans had been made,483 the Committee 
launched its own. On September 20 Committee members sent a new series of letters to 
SWAPO’s allies, this time including Sam Nujoma, Eduardo dos Santos, Kenneth Kaunda 
and Fidel Castro in the list of recipients.484 Therein they criticized the SWAPO leadership 
and called again for an international investigation of SWAPO’s camps. In the same 
month Attie Beukes returned to Europe again on behalf of the CCN and collected 
additional information. 
 Clearly, by the end of 1985, considerable information had been exchanged about 
abuses occurring in SWAPO camps among a variety of communities involved in 
supporting Namibia's liberation struggle in Namibia and abroad. Nonetheless, on 
February 16, 1986, when SWAPO announced in London that it had uncovered a “South 
African spy network, numbering at least 100 people,” and indicated that “the rumours 
and allegations against SWAPO” were part of “a well calculated campaign organized by 
                                                 
482 CP 1987, pp. 10-11. 
483 “Letter from the Council of Churches in Namibia to Stella M. Boois on September 19, 1985” in Basson 
and Motinga 1989, p. 44,   
484 Basson and Motinga 1989, pp. 44-46. Nujoma, dos Santos, Kaunda and Castro were the presidents of 
SWAPO, Angola, Zambia and Cuba respectively. Castro was an important recipient, not only because 
of Cuban soldiers deployed in Angola in conjunction with the Angolan Civil War, but also due to strong 
links between SWAPO and Cuba, where, for example, hundreds of Namibian exiles attended school on 
the Isle of Youth. 
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South Africa,”485 members of the international community did not raise critical questions. 
Ten days later, when the Committee of Parents released its own press statement, offering 
in print for the first time its own history as well as an interpretation of SWAPO's press 
release, the group found itself isolated from the allies it had once had as SWAPO 
supporters. Setbacks to the organization and its leaders were immediate and harsh. In 
March, Erica and Attie Beukes were dismissed from their CCN jobs.486 Shortly 
thereafter, Oxfam Great Britain removed funding from a township teaching project which 
Erica Beukes was coordinating. In May, pamphlets were distributed in Windhoek 
townships labelling members of the Committee of Parents “traitors” and calling on 
Namibians to “Stay Away from South Africa’s Poison!”. In August, Erica Beukes’ house 
was fire-bombed.487  
 To understand why, despite the available evidence, the Committee of Parents and 
their truth claims became associated with stigma, it is important to recall their relation to 
the social structure of global politics. As previously noted, by 1976, the year the United 
Nations legitimated SWAPO as “the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian 
people,” the constellation of international institutions supporting the movement was 
firmly in place. Thereafter, any government, solidarity movement or church which 
criticized SWAPO publicly risked being seen as undermining Namibian liberation and 
                                                 
485 The Namibian, 21.2.1986. Apparently, in late 1985 or early 1986, the Committee of Parents began to 
seek funding to travel to New York and meet directly with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar. 
Although the money did not materialize, the Committee sent a fax to de Cuellar on February 9, 1986 
indicating their plans to come.  Erica Beukes believes that this fax prompted SWAPO to make its 
announcement about “the South African spy network” several days later (Beukes 10.3.2007, pp. 5-6).  
486 On May 20, 1986 Abisai Shejavali wrote a letter addressed “To all our pardners (sic) and donor 
agencies,” indicating that Attie and Erica Beukes had been “dismissed from the services of the CCN.” 
The letter is available at the NAN in the  Collection of the Holland Committee for Southern Africa 
(HCSA).  
487 Paul Trewelha, “Swapo and the Churches,” Searchlight South Africa, 7 (1991), pp. 75-76; Beukes 
13.5.2008, p. 14. 
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being called a collaborator with, or puppet of, South Africa – the international pariah. 
Under these circumstances, there was little impetus for international institutions to look 
closely into the allegations made by the Committee of Parents about SWAPO abuses in 
exile.  
 The Committee of Parents and their claims were not discounted out of hand, 
however. They were discredited through arguments made and evaluated by 
representatives of SWAPO and its constellation of allies. Especially in the months prior 
to SWAPO's London announcement, when the liberation movement took a stance on the 
Committee of Parents and received no rebukes from its allies,488 members of SWAPO 
and the international community would have been relatively free to assess the Committee 
openly, especially in their private correspondence. Nonetheless, then as later, the 
Committee of Parents occupied a precarious position in an international system, where 
the authority to speak for or to a nation and the authority to present “the truth” are so 
closely intertwined. As a result, the Committee's representations of SWAPO's camps 
were vulnerable to any argument that questioned its relationship to “Namibia” and the 
well-being of “its” people. 
 Consider, for example, the following correspondence that passed between several 
church leaders and heads of state towards the end of 1985. Faced with contradictory 
reports over what was happening in SWAPO's exile camps, the President of the World 
Council of Churches (WCC), Ninan Koshy, sent a letter on November 12 to the Secretary 
General of the CCN, Abisai Shejavali, requesting an appraisal of the Committee of 
                                                 
488 In its press release and briefing SWAPO appears to have made no direct reference to the Committee of 
Parents, but it does indicate that “it was revealing this information [about the spies] because rumours 
and allegations against SWAPO had already begun circulating in Namibia and Europe, claiming that 
SWAPO was involved in 'fascist' activities against the Namibian refugees” The Namibian, 21.2.1986. 
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Parents and documents that Koshy had received from them. On December 23, Shejavali 
wrote a reply which, although addressed  to Koshy, was sent to all of the recipients of the 
Committee of Parent's September 20 letter.489 The reply is noteworthy, not only because 
of the authority that the CCN, as a Christian and Namibian organization, wielded among 
many SWAPO allies, but also due to how this authority was used to undermine the 
Committee of Parents and its claims.  
 Uniting all of the particular points in Shejavali’s letter are two basic arguments: 
that the Committee of Parents lacks the authority to represent exile and that what the 
Committee of Parents claims to know about exile is unimportant in comparison to, and is 
intended to undermine, the larger goal of achieving Namibian independence. To advance 
each point, Shejavali draws from specific anecdotes which call into question the 
Committee of Parents' position in a Namibian national community. For example, the 
letter begins with a story about how the Committee of Parents brought its concerns to 
other people’s attention. According to Shejavali, when church leaders and Committee 
delegates met on September 9, the former discovered that the latter “already had done 
their homework of teaching people outside Namibia without the prior notice (italics his) 
of the church leaders concerned.” Shejavali takes this discovery, and other similar ones 
that he notes in the letter, to be a breach of protocol, presumably because the Committee 
should pass all of its correspondence through the CCN, the ecumenical body representing 
the nation’s churches. Certainly he recommends that the CCN take the Committee's 
claims directly to the Namibian people’s official representative, SWAPO, for an 
assessment: “the church leaders… agreed among each other to have a meeting with 
                                                 
489 Ailonga Collection, File Name: “Articles, Cuttings,” letter from Abisai Shejavali to Ninan Koshy, 
23.12.1985. The letter  is also included in Basson and Motinga 1989, pp. 47-48. 
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SWAPO leadership… to ensure whether there is any substance in the allegations raised.”   
A similar concern is evident in Shejavali’s statements about whom the Committee 
of Parents does and does not represent. According to the author, after the September 9 
meeting one delegate from the Committee informed him “that she did not know why she 
was called to the meeting, which means that some of the people were drawn into the 
group without knowing what was it (sic) all about.” The way in which Shejavali frames 
his observation seems to call the Committee's authority into question in two respects. 
First, it is possible that the number of people belonging to the Committee of Parents is 
inflated, and, therefore, that it does not have sufficient numbers of people to corroborate 
its own claims about what is happening in exile. Second, it is possible that those in the 
Committee have been manipulated by others, perhaps apologists for South Africa, whose 
interests are less valid than the Committee of Parents' would seem to be as 
representatives of families whose sons and daughters were SWAPO members in exile. 
Both of these points seem to be implied again in one of Shejavali’s later comments: “it is 
not even known to us on behalf of how many Parents this committee is acting.”  
 As for the particular truth claims that the Committee of Parents makes, Shejavali 
addresses few of them directly. The points that he does mention are discounted on 
ideological grounds rather than through a discussion of evidence that the Committee had 
presented. For example, in response to the Committee's claim that SWAPO’s exile 
leadership was characterized by “tribalism,” Shejavali responds that “SWAPO is a 
National Movement, it is not a tribal or tribalistic organization.” More often, the 
Committee's claims are not discussed in their specifics at all, but are rather measured 
against the goals which the CCN and SWAPO have set for themselves and, in this way, 
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minimized. Referring to the tone of the letters received by the WCC and others, Shejavali 
notes “the spirit is not reconciling at all. It’s (sic) mood is bordering near hate. In this 
time in Namibia we need to struggle for unity, which is very important on the eve of 
independence.” Here Shejavali takes Namibia’s need for “unity” for granted as well as 
the pre-eminence of “Namibia” and its needs versus other kinds of communities. 
Shejavali’s concluding remarks further accentuate the tacit comparison between the 
Committee of Parents' interests with the higher goals of Namibian liberation: “I really 
request that those who have been supporting SWAPO financially to continue to do so, 
which is in my opinion a valuable contribution towards the exiled and suppressed. These 
allegations should not stop us nor threaten us from doing the charity work for our fellow 
men and women.”   
 It is difficult to ascertain exactly how various persons received Shejavali’s letter. 
But the silence of church and solidarity organizations in public media following the 
Committee of Parents' September 20 letter and SWAPO's February 16 press conference is 
suggestive – if not of the persuasive quality of its arguments, then of the arguments' 
acceptability for organizations whose members did not want to criticize SWAPO. 
Certainly, the kinds of arguments, and sometimes the specific points, which Shejavali 
makes were repeated to discredit the Committee of Parents in the months and years to 
come.490 
 At the same time that the Committee of Parents was being discredited in this 
manner, organizations drew from their close relationship with SWAPO and ability to 
access SWAPO camps, however superficially, to reinforce the liberation movement's 
                                                 
490 See, for example, The Windhoek Advertiser, “Swapo hits back over atrocity allegations,” 14.4.1986, 
reproduced in Thiro-Beukes et al. 1986, p. 86. 
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representation of the exile community. Although reports were made following trips to the 
camps from as early as 1985,491 none received more attention than that of the Lutheran 
World Federation (LWF). On February 16, 1987, the LWF, the Namibian churches and 
SWAPO held a meeting in Geneva during which the Committee of Parents' September 
1985 letters were discussed and SWAPO President, Sam Nujoma, accepted an offer by 
the LWF to visit the SWAPO camps.492 Later that year, from December 1 to 6, a 
delegation of six LWF members,493 travelled to Angola where they spoke to 
representatives of SWAPO, the Angolan government and the Christian Council of 
Angola in Luanda and visited Kwanza Sul, a camp composed primarily of women, 
children, elderly persons located in the Angolan province of the same name. On March 
24, 1988, the delegation issued a report about its trip, which states that the delegation was 
“unable to substantiate the allegations” made by the Committee of Parents but did 
observe the efficiency with which Kwanza Sul was administered, its effective system for 
distributing food, and the quality of health services and pastoral care provided there. The 
report goes on to add that “after such a short visit we would not presume to come to 
definite conclusions with regard to the allegations made” and that according to SWAPO, 
                                                 
491  For example, in 1985 members of “435,” a Lutheran church affiliated solidarity group in Germany, sent 
members to visit Nyango, a SWAPO camp in Zambia, in response to the IGFM's first report on Namibia 
titled “Namibia: Human Rights in Conflict” (Frankfurt am Main, 1985), which had likened Nyango to 
“a concentration camp.” During 1987 reports from eye witnesses to the SWAPO camp, Kwanza Sul, 
were also published in The Namibian (“Visit to Kwanza,” 5.6.1987; “SWAPO's Socialist Tendencies 
Hailed by Exile,” 4.12.1987).  
492 Lutheran World Information, “LWF Delegation to Angola Submits Report on December Visit to 
Namibian Refugee Settlements,” 11 (1988), pp. 11-12;  “Report in The Namibian, February 20, 1987” 
in Basson and Motinga 1989, pp. 59-60. 
493 The delegations' members included Reverend Ruth Blazer of the Evangelical Lutheran  Church of 
Canada, Olle Eriksson of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, Hanne Sophie Greve of the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Norway, Rev. Helmut Jehle of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
Bavaria, Bodil Sollig of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Denmark and Dr. Ishmael Noko, director 
of the LWF Department of Church Cooperation (LWI 1988, p. 11). Apparently, the VEM had requested 
that Siegfried Groth be included in the delegation, but  this was not possible due to the SWAPO 
leadership's mistrust of him (Groth 1995, p. 163). 
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exiled members “accused of major crimes such as espionage are not... tried by the 
civilian but by the military courts” and “that these courts were not at Kwanza Sul.”494 It 
might have further added, if the delegates were aware of documents circulating among 
other Lutheran clergy abroad, that the focal point of the alleged human rights abuses was 
not Kwanza Sul but Lubango, where PLAN maintained its headquarters hundreds of 
kilometres away. Despite such caveats, stated and unstated, SWAPO supporters drew 
from the report to make bold claims. In his oft cited response, LWF President Gunner 
Staalsett indicates that “the report made clear that the accusations of human rights abuses 
were not substantiated” and that “those who have levelled the accusations against 
SWAPO” were “part of the ongoing South African propaganda war aimed at discrediting 
the liberation movements.”495     
 With such statements being made by widely respected sources, the Committee of 
Parents struggled to respond persuasively. And, ironically, in its attempts to do so, the 
organization sometimes played into the hands of those determined to discredit it. Even 
before the organization went public, the Committee of Parents was making statements in 
its written correspondence that exceeded what the organization could establish through its 
documentary evidence or argue effectively. For example, the Committee wrote in at least 
two of its September 1985 letters that it suspected SWAPO Administrative Secretary 
Moses Garoeb and Secretary for Information and Publicity Hidipo Hamutenya to be 
“agents of South Africa.”496 Apparently a response to the role the two leaders played in 
                                                 
494 LWI 1988, p. 11. 
495 LWI 1988, pp. 11-12. 
496  “Letter to Sam Nujoma, 20.9.1985,” “Letter from the Committee of Parents to the Secretary General of 
the UN, 20.9.1985” in Basson and Motinga 1989, pp. 44-45. 
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filming and screening of the films of  accused spies,497 the accusation was rejected by 
Shejavali in his December 23 letter and probably by others who respected the two 
SWAPO leaders. In June of the same year Erica, Hewat and Attie Beukes published A 
Struggle Betrayed, a book, which, according to the Committee of Parents' February 26 
press release, would “provide irrefutable truth that the SWAPO leadership is trying to 
cover up the sordid truth.”498 Although the book’s 92 pages of documents demonstrate 
that the Committee of Parents wielded considerable evidence about happenings in the 
camps at this time, the accompanying text makes blanket, unreferenced and pejorative 
statements about SWAPO leaders and their allies which, when challenged, could 
discredit the Committee's authority to make any claims about abuses occurring in exile at 
all. Moreover, much of the documentary evidence published in the book had been stolen 
from Siegfried Groth's office during Attie Beukes' trip to Europe in September/October 
1985.499 On the one hand, this material, including letters written by exiles addressed to 
family members and church leaders in Namibia and Siegfried Groth's record of his 
conversations with Erica Beukes during 1985, offers some of the most persuasive 
evidence of human rights abuses then occurring in exile camps and of the organizations 
                                                 
497 On one occasion, probably at the beginning of 1985, Hidipo Hamutenya traveled to the SWAPO camps 
near Lubango and participated in filming some of those who were detained as spies there (Andries 
Basson, Interview 30.5.2007, p. 27; Hidipo Hamutenya, Interview 2.4.2008, p. 5). Hamutenya, along 
with SWAPO Foreign Relations Secretary, Theo-Ben Gurirab, led the February 16 press briefing at 
which SWAPO not only announced the “spy network” but also screened some of the film that had been 
taken in Lubango (Hidipo Hamutenya, Interview 2.4.2008, p. 7; Kandi Nehova, Interview 7.4.2008). 
The films were also screened elsewhere in Europe thereafter and, apparently, Hamutenya and Moses 
Garoeb were involved in these screenings (Leys & Saul 2003, p. 340). 
498 Thiro-Beukes et al. 1986. The announcement of the book's release was originally printed in the 
Windhoek Observer (“SWAPO is Accused of Crimes and Abuse,” 1.3.1986). The article has been 
copied in Thiro-Beukes et al. 1986, p. 77.  
499 E. Beukes 10.3.2007, pp. 5-6; Groth 1995, p. 144. Attie Beukes spent part of October 1985 with 
Siegfried Groth at the VEM in Wuppertal. According  to Erica Beukes, during the visit Attie 
encouraged Groth to make the information that Groth had more widely accessible, including records 
from meetings with Namibian exiles, which Groth had promised would remain confidential. When 
Groth refused to change his course, Attie took the files himself, which he was able to access directly 
from Groth's office, where Groth had provided Attie with a space to work.   
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then aware of it. On the other, its publication may have impaired Groth's ability to work 
with the UNHCR, AI, Lutheran World Federation (LWF), the VEM and the Namibian 
church leaders, all of which he had been informing about the abuses in SWAPO camps 
and hoped would influence the SWAPO leaders to change their course.500    
At the same time, members of the Committee of Parents were making 
associations that gave its critics new ammunition. Shortly after the Committee's February 
26 press release, it received an invitation from the Internationalle Gesellschaft für 
Menschenrechte (IGFM)501 to visit its offices in Frankfurt. Although the Committee of 
Parents declined due to the IGFM's “right wing links,” three of of its members travelled 
with the IGFM's support to West Germany and Britain, attending a conference on March 
27 on human rights abuses in Namibia. Thereafter, the IGFM became a primary vehicle 
through which the Committee of Parents' members knowledge of abuses within SWAPO 
camps was dispersed internationally. At the same time, the involvement with the IGFM 
was used repeatedly to link the Committee of Parents with South Africa and its 
apologists. Moreover, it precipitated a split between those who opposed working with the 
IGFM, centred around the Committee's de facto leader Erica Beukes, and those who 
participated in the IGFM meetings: Stella Maria Boois, Stella Gaes and Talida Schmidt. 
In turn, the latter three established their own committee, “the Parents' Committee,” which 
operated separately from the Committee of Parents although the names of the two 
became conflated in many subsequent publications.502   
                                                 
500 There is a variety of evidence of Groth's correspondence with these people and organizations in the 
Siegfried Groth Collection at the VEM. Some of this material was reproduced in Thiro-Beukes, et al. 
1986, pp. 93-106.   
501  IGFM also had chapters in the USA and Great Britain that went by the name International Society for 
Human Rights (ISHR). 
502 E. Beukes 13.5.2008, pp. 14-15; Phil Ya Nangoloh, Interview 19.2.2007, pp. 5-6. At the time that the 
Committee of Parents was formed, Phil Ya Nangoloh was living in the United States. There he began 
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 Why would the Committee of Parents/Parents' Committee make dubious 
assertions and affiliations when they could offer so much evidence to support their most 
basic claim: that human rights abuses were occurring within SWAPO in exile? Again, it 
is important to consider the Committees from the perspective of the international political 
order. In the mid-1980s relatives of Namibian exiles gathered extensive knowledge about 
happenings occurring in SWAPO's exile camps. In turn, they attempted to make that 
knowledge socially acceptable by approaching various leaders, above all, SWAPO's most 
accessible and influential ally: the churches. When the churches and others would not 
accommodate them, these families were compelled to take increasingly drastic measures: 
communicating directly with the leaders of institutions and governments overseas, 
challenging the moral authority of those who did not respond to them, and aligning with 
former enemies who were willing to give them a platform from which to expound their 
knowledge. However, without prominent SWAPO members or supporters standing up for 
the Committee members' bona fides, these efforts further distanced them from SWAPO 
and the organizations they most wished to influence.   
 This is not to say that the Committee of Parents/Parents' Committee's efforts had 
no effect. With information provided by members of the Committees, Siegfried Groth 
and the IGFM, Amnesty International published a report on SWAPO human rights 
abuses in 1987. Although UN Secretary General De Cuellar had not responded to 
previous pleas made by the Committee of Parents and IGFM, he did respond to Amnesty 
                                                                                                                                                 
corresponding with the Committee of Parents, sharing with the Committee his experiences as an exile in 
Zambia during the mid-1970s and publicizing them more widely. Following his return to Namibia in 
late 1986, Ya Nangoloh became the spokesperson for the Parents' Committee and at independence 
formed the National Society for Human Rights (Ya Nangoloh 19.2.2007; Phil Ya Nangoloh, “A Foreign 
Education – Angola, USSR, USA” in Colin Leys and Susan Brown, ed. Histories of Namibia: Living 
through the Liberation Struggle (London: Merlin Press, 2005).  
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and raised concerns with SWAPO President Sam Nujoma, resulting in a more wide 
ranging debate over how to gain more information about the conditions among SWAPO 
in exile. In 1989, when plans were made for implementing Resolution 435, the release of 
“the SWAPO 100” was an issue of broad international concern. More than that, the news 
of the Committee of Parents/Parents' Committee made its way to the detention sites 
outside Lubango where “spies” were being held. According to Beukes and some ex-
detainees, the knowledge that there was an organization, especially an organization of 
Namibians that detainees knew and trusted, that was working on their behalf was a source 
of hope.503 Nonetheless, the Committee of Parents/Parents' Committee and its claims 
remained stigmatized through independence. As a result, the Committee was unable to 
garner support for an investigation of SWAPO's camps that might have challenged the 




 Between May and July, 1989 the axis of debate about human rights abuses in the 
SWAPO camps shifted. According to the provisions for Namibian independence outlined 
in UN Resolution 435, both South Africa and SWAPO were obliged to release their 
political prisoners prior to UN supervised elections. On May 25, 1989, less than six 
months prior to the November election date specified by the Geneva Accord, an 
entourage of international journalists, Angolan government officials and SWAPO 
members, led by Secretary General Andimba Toivo Ya Toivo, Administrative Secretary 
Moses Garoeb, Secretary of Defense Peter Mueshihange and PLAN Deputy Commander 
                                                 
503 E. Beukes 13.5.2008, pp. 15-16.  
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Solomon “Jesus” Hawala, traveled to the camps outside Lubango to confirm the release 
of SWAPO's “ex-detainees.”504  
 The group drove first to a camp near the Old Tobias Hainyeko Training Centre 
about 15 kilometers northeast of Lubango, where they met a group of about 100 women 
and children. After assembling and greeting the visitors in chorus, the group was 
addressed by Toivo Ya Toivo, who announced that he was accompanied by journalists 
who would like to interview them.505 According to Pauline Dempers, one of the detainees 
assembled, it was at this moment that a reporter intervened: 
It [was] a lady from France... [who] said, 'Tell us, who are 
these?' She asked Ya Toivo. But Ya Toivo didn't want to say 
it. He said, 'No, you will hear from them.' And she insisted 
saying that you are leading this delegation, you have to tell 
us who these people are. And that's when he started saying 
that 'these are the spies.' Then the lady... asked, 'Did you also 
imprison children?' Then Ya Toivo just couldn't answer that. 
I remember he could not say anything. He just said, 'You 
will hear from them.' That is what he was saying. And with 
that the whole chaos started.506  
 
 “The chaos” to which Dempers refers was an eruption of histories. Women began 
                                                 
504 Most of the information about the ex-detainees' release that follows is gleaned from discussions with 
former exiles about a collection of thirty-two photographs taken by John Liebenberg on May 25, in 
conjunction with his trip to Lubango as a journalist for The Namibian. Ex-detainees were consulted at a 
variety of venues, including at the “Strategic Planning Retreat” of the Breaking the Wall of Silence 
Movement held at Rock Lodge outside Okahandja from November 24-25, 2007, when the photos were 
put on display for the weekend and discussed by more than thirty retreat participants.  Five ex-detainees 
were also formally interviewed about the photographs (Pauline Dempers, Interview 21.11.2007; Emma 
Kambangula, Interview  26.11.2007; Hans Pieters, Interview 19.11.2007; Joseph “Pereb” Stephanus, 
Interview 18.11.2007; Willy Swartbooi, Interview 12.12.2007) as was the leader of the SWAPO 
delegation, Andimba Toivo Ya Toivo (3.7.2008). Where points represent the views of a particular 
research participant or of a journalist who wrote about the May 25 encounter, the reference is cited 
below. Several of these photos appear in Appendix 5. 
505 Apparently, Toivo Ya Toivo had announced to the women the previous day that there were journalists 
in Lubango who would be coming to speak with them (Dempers 21.11.2007, p. 13; Kambangula 
26.11.2007, p. 21). Male detainees indicate that they were similarly informed that they would be 
interviewed by foreign journalists (See below).  
506 Dempers 21.11.2007, p. 15. For another account of the French journalist's intervention, see Kambangula 
26.11.2007, p. 17. 
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to shout in protest they were not spies and that they had been mistreated by those who 
had accused and detained them. In turn, the reporters moved away from the SWAPO 
leaders and interacted with the ex-detainees, recording and photographing them as 
individuals recounted their personal experiences. Later, John Liebenberg, who with Raja 
Munamava was covering the ex-detainees' release on behalf of The Namibian,507 would 
describe “the angry, frustrated-looking women standing with arms crossed in front of 
reporters, some with children and babies in their arms, were all adamant that they were 
innocent of any charges against them and that they had been imprisoned without 
reason.”508 Similarly, the French journalist, Marie Joannidis, reported that the women 
“want above all to denounce the bad treatment and clear their names of all suspicion.”509 
One women told a German television crew that the child she was carrying was conceived 
when she was raped by a camp guard.510 Another child allegedly walked over to Toivo 
Ya Toivo, tugged at his sleeve and asked, “Did you kill my father?”511  
 The journalists encountered a similar scene at Nakada Base, a camp where 100 
male ex-detainees were being held approximately 15 kilometers beyond the women's 
camp. After being introduced to the journalists by Toivo Ya Toivo, the detainees 
responded by delivering a statement that a group of them had prepared the previous 
evening shortly after they had learned of the journalists' pending visit.512 The statement, 
delivered by Riundja Ali Kaakunga, began: “For more than ten years we have been 
                                                 
507   The Namibian is a widely read English language daily newspaper, which, in 1989, was seen by many 
as a critic of the South African government and supportive of SWAPO.   
508 John Liebenberg, “Detainees Speak of Ordeal,” The Namibian, 9.6.1989. The article is also included in 
Basson and Motinga 1989, pp. 87-88. 
509 “Report by AFP on May 27, 1989” in Basson and Motinga, pp. 86-87. 
510 The Namibian 9.6.1989. 
511  David Lush, Last Steps to Uhuru: An eye-witness account of Namibia’s transition to independence, 
(Windhoek: New Namibia Books, 1993), p. 199. 
512 Joseph “Pereb” Stephanus, Interview 29.5.2005, pp. 2-3; Stephanus 18.11.2007, p. 45. 
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forced to incriminate others, and told that we are agents of the South African regime. We 
have suffered harassment and torture in order to cow us into submission.” Recently, 
Kaakunga continued, SWAPO had announced that the detainees had two options for their 
repatriation: “either to agree to imposed re-integration into SWAPO, or to be handed over 
to South Africa, which would prove our collaboration with the South African regime. We 
rejected that option and we agreed to be re-integrated into SWAPO. Both these options 
are unacceptable to us. We want to be released from those who call us South African 
spies.” Thereafter, the spokesman described the conditions of their detention: the 
“dungeons,” or underground pits, in which they had lived, the poor food and lack of 
medical supplies and the methods of torture. In response to the latter, “one of the 
detainees pulled down his trousers to display a wound that he had incurred during 
interrogation.”513 Throughout all of this, the SWAPO leadership stood by silently. 
However, when the journalists were eventually urged to leave, the detainees “became 
agitated… One after another the ex-prisoners undress[ed] to show marks and scars… left 
by torture.”514  
Reports of the journalists and detainees' encounter did not circulate immediately. 
Although the journalists represented papers from several countries, including France, 
East Germany, the USSR and Namibia,515 groups following “the detainee issue” were 
only able to trace two articles in which journalists described their visit. Liebenberg's 
piece “Detainees Speak of Ordeal,” was not published in The Namibian until June 9, 
1989 and Joannidis' article for the AFP, while dated May 27, 1989, only became known 
                                                 
513 The Namibian 9.6.1989. 
514 AFP 27.5.1989.  
515 Although sources frequently mention the reporters from France, East Germany, USSR and Namibia, 
some also thought that Britain, Portugal and Angola were represented (Willem Meyer, “I left the 
country on the 15th of November, 1976,” 1990, (gift to the author); Pieters 19.11.2007, p. 48). 
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to the IGFM on June 2.516 In the interim, reports about the detainees that did circulate 
highlight confusion over who and where the detainees were, what they had experienced 
and what they wanted. According to a report written by UNCHR Base of Operations 
Angola, Toivo Ya Toivo contacted its Lubango office on May 19, indicating that those 
who had been imprisoned by SWAPO  had been released and were at that moment 
registering at UNHCR's provisional site on the edge of SWAPO's Lubango camps.517 
However, UNHCR officers involved in the registration “were not aware of the particular 
identity of the caseload, who were mixed with normal SWAPO-affiliated refugees.”518 
On May 23, 1989 the SWAPO Central Committee released a press statement from 
Luanda announcing “a policy of national reconciliation” in accordance with which all 
detained enemy agents “have been freed and are already registered with the UNHCR to 
return to Namibia like all other Namibians.”519 The following day, however, when a 
spokesperson for UNHCR was asked about the detainees' release, he could not confirm 
                                                 
516 “Extracts of the report  'No Escape from Misery,' by the International Society for Human Rights on 
August 6, 1989” in Basson and Motinga 1989, p. 104. 
517  VEM, Groth Collection, File No. 1311, UNHCR BO Angola, “Notes on Issue of Ex-Detainees,” p. 1; 
UNHCR, “Voluntary Repatriation to Namibia Registration Form” for Joseph “Pereb” Stephanus, 
19.5.1989 (gift to the author). The detainees' release occurred in a series of stages before the United 
Nations became directly involved. On January 10, 1989, Moses Garoeb visited the detainees, informing 
them of plans to implement Resolution 435 (Andries Basson, Interview 22.9.2007, p. 27; Michael 
Kahuika & Joseph “Pereb” Stephanus, Interview 20.9.2007, pp. 11-12, 12-13; Meyer 1990, p. 3; Joseph 
“Pereb” Stephanus, Interview 18.9.2007, p. 38; Steve Swartbooi, Interview 21.9.2007, p. 31; Oiva 
Alikie Angula, “Brutalised Innocence: The turns of destiny and tyranny,” 2008 (unpublished 
manuscript, gift to the author), pp. 152-153; Groth 1995, p. 107; Paul Trewhela, “A Namibian Horror,” 
Searchlight South Africa, 4 (1990), pp. 89-90. On April 19 the male detainees were told by SWAPO 
that they had been released and were moved from the detention camp at Ethiopia to another camp 
known both as Nakada Base and Production Centre, also located outside Lubango (Meyer 1990 p. 3; 
Stephanus 18.11.2007, p. 48; Angula 2008, pp. 154-155). The women were similarly “released” in May 
and moved from the detention camp at Minya to a camp near the Old Tobias Hainyeko Training Centre 
also outside Lubango (Dempers 21.11.2007, pp. 13; Pieters 19.11.2007, pp. 46-47; Kambangula 
26.11.2007, p. 18).  
518 UNHCR BO Angola, p. 1. 
519 BAB, SWAPO of Namibia Collection, 89fSLuPR1, “SWAPO Press Release on the Resolution of the 
Central Committee of SWAPO Luanda, May 23, 1989.”  
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that this had occurred.520 On May 25, 1989, the day of the journalists' visit, Cedric 
Thornberry of UNTAG, the United Nations team responsible for implementing the 
transition in Namibia, announced in Windhoek that UNTAG observers in Angola had 
“come across” and recorded the names of 199 ex-detainees, adding that they were “well 
looked after” although he would not add any other details about the encounter.521 
Thereafter, SWAPO issued another press statement from Luanda, indicating that the  
former prisoners had, in fact, “voluntarily rejoined the organisation.”522 
In fact, the day after the journalists' visit a group of PLAN soldiers led by 
Solomon Hawala tore down the male detainees' camp, forcing them to flee into the 
surrounding bush. In turn, detainees renewed their efforts to make their voices heard. 
Three of the men walked the thirty kilometers from Nakada Base to Lubango proper, 
where they made their way to the offices of the Red Cross, asked for protection and 
requested their intervention to protect the other detainees.523 Independently, three of the 
female detainees also traveled to UNTAG's offices in Lubango, while several others 
walked to and from the men's camp assessing the situation.524 After “an unofficial visit” 
from UNHCR to the men's camp confirmed the men and women's allegations, a joint 
                                                 
520 ISHR, 6.8.1989, p. 103. 
521 ISHR, 6.8.1989, p. 103. Ex-detainees recall that prior to the journalists' visit they were visited by a 
UNTAG delegation led by Colonel Moriarty, at which time some of them requested that the UNTAG 
take responsibility for their protection (Kambangula 26.11.2007, p. 21; Stephanus 18.11.2007, p. 48; 
Pieters 19.11.2007, p. 47; Meyer 1990, p. 3; UNHCR BO Angola, p. 1; The Namibian, 9.6.1989). 
UNHCR BO Angola indicates that the UNTAG and journalists' visit occurred on the same day, May 24, 
but most ex-detainees and Ya Toivo himself (3.7.2008) remember the UNTAG visit occurring the day 
before the journalists' visit. Moreover, the AFP reporter Marie Joannidis indicates that the reporters 
visited the camps on a Thursday, which, if correct, must refer to Thursday, May 25, 1989 (AFP 
27.5.1989). 
522 ISHR 6.8.1989, p. 103. 
523 Hans Pieters, one of the men who walked to Lubango, offers a brief account of this experience in one of 
our interviews (Hans Pieters, Interview 21.5.2007). 
524 Theresia Basson, one of the women who walked to Lubango, offers a brief account of this experience in 
our interview (Theresia Basson, 1.6.2005); Pauline Dempers and Emma Kambangula offer accounts of 
their own and other women's movement around Lubango during the week following the journalists' visit 
(Dempers 21.11.2007, pp. 17-18; Kambangula 26.11.2007, pp. 19-20).    
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meeting was held between UNHCR, the Angolan government and SWAPO whereat 
arrangements were made for Angola to receive the detainees and UNHCR to offer them 
humanitarian aid.525 On May 31, the Angolan government picked up 153 of the 199 
detainees who had indicated that they wanted to leave SWAPO and transported them 
from Old Hainyeko and Nakada to Lubango where they were accommodated by the 
Angolan Provincial Department of Social Welfare and received visits from UNHCR and 
the Red Cross.526 The following day SWAPO indicated for the first time that some of the 
detainees were “unrepentant” and had therefore been handed over to other organizations 
in Lubango.527 In the following weeks, news about the journalists' visit finally began to 
spread through discussions of Joannidis and Liebenberg's articles and through letters 
written by the detainees delivered by the Red Cross to detainees' families in Namibia.528  
A month later, SWAPO's released detainees became the focus of news again. On 
July 4, 1989, the group of 153 was flown to Namibia, and on July 6 its members held a 
press conference with the Parents' Committee and Committee of Parents in a community 
center located in Khomasdal, a Windhoek township. There, Othniel Kaakunga read a 
press statement, in which he narrated a history of “the SWAPO spy-drama.”529 Kaakunga 
explained that between 1980 and 1989 a hunt for South African spies  had developed in 
the Namibian camps. Those who were accused were taken to the SWAPO military 
                                                 
525 UNHCR BO Angola, pp. 1-2. 
526 UNHCR BO Angola, p. 2. Those from the group of 199 registered with UNTAG who were not picked 
up by the Angolans on May 31 repatriated to Namibia with members of SWAPO.  
527 ISHR 6.8.1989, p. 104. 
528 Maria Higoam, Sophia Kahuika and Emma Motinga, Interview 14.92007, p. 4; T. Basson, 1.6.2007, p. 
10.  
529 This press statement as well as “A Report to the Namibian People: Historical Account of the Swapo 
Spy-Drama” (Windhoek: 1989, 1997) were written by Hans Pieters and several others while the group 
of 153 were in Lubango awaiting their repatriation to Namibia (Hans Pieters, Interview 22.7.2008). “A 
Report” was printed and distributed in Namibia a few weeks after the detainees' return and offers a 
more detailed history of “the spy-drama.” Unlike the press statement, however, “A Report” appears not 
to have received much attention in the media. In 1997 “A Report” was published by BWS and the PCC 
(see below) identified as the document's author.     
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headquarters in Lubango, Angola where they met with members of SWAPO’s security 
apparatus, who told to them to narrate their life story. When the accused did not confess 
to spying activities, they were beaten either into submission or to death. Upon confession, 
written statements were taken and the detained were moved to the dungeons where other 
accused spies were living. According to Kaakunga, the leaders of SWAPO’s security 
apparatus were directly responsible for the purge, but the broader SWAPO leadership had 
failed to respond to the situation, allowing the security apparatus to carry out a purge with 
impunity. Victims, Kaakunga explained, were primarily young intellectuals whom 
SWAPO leaders viewed with suspicion and fear. By focusing their attention on these 
people, the leadership diverted attention from its own incompetence and justified their 
own fear of spies. Kaakunga concluded his remarks by stating, categorically, that the 
detainees had never been South African spies and remained “faithful to the cause of total 
liberation of our country.” Therefore, the group had constituted itself as the Political 
Consultative Council of ex-detainees (PCC). The PCC, Kaakunga emphasized, was not a 
political party but rather a pressure group committed to three objectives: to inform 
Namibians about “the SWAPO spy-drama,” to prevent SWAPO from coming to power 
and to demand the release of hundreds of other detainees that had last been seen in 
SWAPO camps near Lubango.530 After Kaakunga had finished his remarks, the 
conference was opened to the press, but this exchange was soon quieted when seventeen 
detainees undressed, revealing deep wounds on their backs, legs, breasts and buttocks.531 
The resulting photographs were circulated throughout Namibia and in many foreign 
                                                 
530 “Press Statement by the Political Consultative Council on July 6,1989” in Basson and Motinga 1989, 
pp. 92-93. Some of the detainees last seen in Lubango who did not return at independence were, 
according to repatriated detainees, together with them as late as April and May 1989 – well after the 
peace process in Namibia was underway. 
531  “Einigen weht nun der Wind ins Gesicht,” Allgemeine Zeitung, 7.7.89. 
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papers.532 
  SWAPO’s official response to the ex-detainees' revelations was to deny some of 
them and to belittle the significance of others. Immediately after the May 25 meeting 
between journalists and detainees in Lubango, Moses Garoeb offered journalists an 
interpretation of what they had heard and seen. According to Garoeb, SWAPO wanted 
the truth to be known. “Mistakes” were made, Garoeb admitted, “but SWAPO has been 
fighting a war of survival. Our camps have been bombed and many innocent lives have 
been lost… as a result of the activities of South African agents.” “If these people have 
suffered, it is nothing in comparison to what has been happening to our people in SADF 
camps.”533 On July 9, shortly after the ex-detainees' press conference, the SWAPO 
election directorate declared that all those who had been detained were South African 
spies and that any torture resulted from the “extreme conditions of a brutal war.”534 At no 
point did SWAPO acknowledge detaining more people than it had released. This position 
did become tenuous when, between July 12 and July 15, sixteen persons, all claiming to 
be  “ex-detainees of SWAPO” arrived at the UNHCR's offices in Lubango. When 
questioned about this group and sixty-eight others, all of whom had been held since May 
isolated from other accused spies at a camp outside Lubango, SWAPO President Nujoma 
and Secretary of Defense Mueshihange denied that SWAPO still held detainees. Later, 
however, SWAPO and the Angolan government issued a statement, clarifying that 
members of the group that had come to UNHCR's attention were “not prisoners but 
dissidents.” Thereafter, arrangements were made for “the dissidents” to repatriate to 
Namibia although, with the exception of the sixteen who made their way to UNHCR's 
                                                 
532 Trewelha 1991, p. 68. 
533  The Namibian 9.6.1989. 
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Lubango offices, the others returned to Namibia with SWAPO as common Namibian 
refugees.535  
 Despite the efforts of SWAPO leaders to maintain a consistent party line on the 
ex-detainees, individual responses differed. Referring to his experience on May 25, 1989, 
Toivo Ya Toivo recalls: 
 It was terrible. Because when I was there, I knew some 
people who were detained there, and I started asking for 
them... [After the meeting with the journalists] I received a 
telex from Sam Nujoma that he was going somewhere, that I 
must go back to Luanda... I think that this was just 
something cooked up because [Solomon] Hawala and Peter 
Mueshihange reported to [Nujoma] that I was asking things 
that they didn't want me to ask and that I must go back... 
And then these people, after I left, they [raided the 
detainees'] homes.536 
 
As Ya Toivo and other SWAPO leaders were discussing the detainees amongst 
themselves, some also made public statements which undermined the liberation 
movement's official position. Most notably, at a rally in Rehoboth, the hometown of the 
Beukes family, SWAPO Foreign Secretary Theo-Ben Gurirab announced that “as a 
SWAPO leader I will never defend the humiliation and suffering of torture. If the 
allegations are true, I apologize to the victims and to their parents and pledge to you now 
that the SWAPO leadership will take the necessary steps to bring those involved to 
book.”537 According to one of Gurirab's colleagues, Hidipo Hamutenya, “Ben was 
reprimanded [for this statement in Rehoboth], not directly, but his story was not 
                                                 
535 UNHCR BO Angola, p. 3; VEM, Groth Collection, File No. 1335, “Ex-SWAPO Detainees, Press 
Statement August 10, 1989;” Joseph “Pereb” Stephanus, Interview 17.6.2005, p. 25. It should be further 
noted that other persons detained in Lubango by SWAPO repatriated as ordinary refugees.  
536 Toivo Ya Toivo 3.7.2008. 
537 Leys and Saul 2003, p. 340, quoted from Times of Namibia, 19.7.1989. 
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welcomed by [some SWAPO leaders]. And therefore it was not pursued.”538 Meanwhile, 
there were SWAPO leaders that went out of their way to meet detainees following their 
return to Namibia, both to express sympathy and to suggest ways that SWAPO and the 
detainees might achieve perceived common interests. According to one ex-detainee, these 
leaders argued that “priority number one was to get rid of the colonial situation and then 
the issue about our detention and human rights abuses would get attention on a national 
scale.”539 
 At the same time, the constellation of organizations which had supported SWAPO 
for years appeared to be breaking ranks with the party. On July 14, a press release by 
Father Steegman of the Commission of Justice and Peace, a Namibian ecumenical 
organization, was published in Times of Namibia indicating the Commission’s “pain” 
and “disappointment” in listening to “reports of former detainees about their suffering in 
camps in Angola” and demanding that “those responsible for any kind of torture… be 
called to account and the victims duly compensated.”540 Over the following weeks and 
months other organizations in Namibia and abroad expressed similar sentiments, 
including staunch allies such as West Germany's Green Party and the LWF.541 At the 
same time, these and other organizations began to ask questions about persons who, 
according to the detainees, had been imprisoned by SWAPO but had not yet returned to 
Namibia. In response to SWAPO President Sam Nujoma’s argument that the so-called 
“missing detainees” could be attributed to South African propaganda, UN Secretary 
                                                 
538 Hidipo Hamutenya, Interview 2.4.2008, p. 8.  
539 Stephanus 15.6.2005, p. 19.  
540 “Torture must be condemned,” Times of Namibia, 14.7.1989. Times of Namibia was an English 
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541 “Greens Rebuke SWAPO,” The Namibian, 21.8.1989; “LWF admits shock and dismay at reports of 
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 191 
General De Cuellar was unapologetically opposed: “I think it is not only a concern of the 
South African Government, but the [Namibian] population would like to know the 
whereabouts of 2,000 men.”542 
There is no question that the ex-detainees had several advantages in shaping 
perceptions of what had happened in exile over those who had been opposing dominant 
representations since the mid-1980s. First, they had their bodies. For Joannidis, the story 
behind “the marks and scars” on the men is self-evident; they are “left by torture” 
presumably at SWAPO’s hands.543 The detainees’ actions, as narrated by Joaniddis, 
assume a similar link between signifier and signified: “The group becomes agitated when 
the journalists are urged to leave. One after another the ex-prisoners undress to show 
marks and scars.”544 In subtle contrast, Liebenberg is more cautious in how he interprets 
what he sees, indicating that the detainees’ wounds “were obviously the result of 
lashes.”545 However, his informants, who accompany the marks and scars with a 
collective story of how they were experienced, assert that the wounds stand for more than 
this. For the female detainees meeting the press, it is not the wounds which are made to 
tell a story or affect sympathy, but rather their bodies’ new appendages – their babies. 
According to Liebenberg, “one of the saddest and most moving moments was when one 
women (sic) in her twenties pointed towards the baby she held in her arms and told a 
German television crew that the child was the product of rape by one of the camp 
guards.”546  
The use of the detainees’ wounds and babies as evidence of a history of violation 
                                                 
542 “De Cuellar and Nujoma at Odds,” The Namibian, 27.7.1989. 
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544 AFP 27.5.1989. 
545 The Namibian 9.6.1989. 
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is also evident in the knowledge production about the detainees immediately after their 
return to Namibia. For example, during the weekend following the detainees’ press 
conference Die Republikien printed an enlarged photo of the detainees’ unclothed bodies 
with the following caption: “The naked facts (italics mine) of the cruelty suffered by 
detainees in SWAPO’s hell camps in Angola.”547 The Allgemeine Zeitung takes a 
slightly different approach, accompanying its three page article on the detainees’ press 
conference with four blown up pictures, each of which is interpreted for the reader 
through short narratives taken from the pictured detainees’ testimony.548 Several months 
later, South African reporter Nico Basson and former detainee Ben Motinga published a 
book titled Call them Spies in which photographs of detainees’ bodies are put to similar 
use. The book, most of which consists of detainees’ accounts of their experiences and 
documentary material about their detention is prefaced by two page-size photographs. 
The first pictures an infant of approximately one year with a sign in her hand that reads “I 
was born IN JAIL.”549 The other is a photo taken from the July 6 press conference of an 
unidentified wounded detainee which, according to the captions, “reveal[s] the horrors of 
the notorious SWAPO security service.”550  
 In addition to their bodies, detainees' reputations enhanced the truth-value of their 
stories. Already during the 1980s, when letters began circulating in Namibia and abroad 
about abuses within SWAPO in exile, authors repeatedly used certain names as evidence 
that those accused of spying were innocent of that label. Among these names was Ben 
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Boys. Boys had played a leading role in mobilizing Nama-speaking communities south of 
Windhoek to support SWAPO before departing for exile in 1978 and becoming a 
member of the SWAPO Central Committee.551 According to some former exiles, when 
Boys “disappeared” in Angola in 1984 and rumors spread that he was a spy it provoked 
critical questions for them, especially among those who knew him prior to his departure 
for exile. Theresia Basson, who shared family with Boys and studied at the St. Therese 
mission school in Tses just after Ben Boys had attended there, recalls “I wasn’t sure what 
was happening. But then Ben Boys disappeared. And so I began asking questions.”552 
The authority of Ben Boys opened more questions when SWAPO leaders presented their 
film of detainees’ “confessions” to audiences in Lusaka on March 4, 1985. Although 
explicitly intended to account for those “disappearing” in Angola among the exile 
community, for some the testimony presented by Ben Boys had just the opposite effect. 
People may have struggled to believe the testimony given Boys’ background. As one 
person told Siegfried Groth, who arrived in Lusaka for his annual trip fifteen days after 
the screening, “it was… obvious that the man was under great pressure and that he was 
making his confession under compulsion. Ben had been a member of the SWAPO 
leadership, a highly intelligent person with great responsibility.”553 Others who watched 
the films would have known for certain that much of Boys’ testimony was fabricated. As 
Joseph Stephanus, an exile who also studied at St. Therese, recalls, Boys was implicating 
people he had allegedly trained in South Africa at the same time that these people were in 
                                                 
551 Boys, together with Eric Biwa, Lukas Stefanus and Andries Basson played leading roles in establishing 
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school with Stephanus in Tses.554  
 In the lead-up to Namibia's 1989 elections, detainees' reputations continued to 
impact on how others understood what had happened to them. David Lush offers several 
insights into these dynamics in Last Steps to Uhuru (1993), an account of the author’s 
work as a journalist with The Namibian during Namibia’s transition to independence. 
According to Lush, when Liebenberg returned to Windhoek with his materials from the 
May 25 visit to Lubango, the reporters were ready to accept Garoeb’s justifications for 
detaining SWAPO members: these persons were spies and any mistreatment they had 
experienced was attributable to a harsh war. When reporters began to recognize the 
detainees in Liebenberg's photographs, however, their understandings were challenged: 
“‘Hey this is my cousin,’ one staff member said in amazement, pointing to one of the 
photographs… ‘he was a serious comrade, he suffered for the struggle, that’s why he 
went into exile.’” Thereafter, other reporters also discovered ex-detainees whom they 
knew and trusted, resulting in a row among the staff about whether and how The 
Namibian should present the story which was eventually printed on June 9.555 Lush 
continues on to narrate his conversations with colleagues and acquaintances over the 
following weeks in which family and friends of ex-detainees began to question 
SWAPO’s representations of the detentions on the basis of their personal knowledge of 
those who had been accused.556 According to ex-detainees, there were similar reactions 
shortly after their return to Namibia when they were received by their communities of 
origin. In Gibeon, Vaalgras and Gainachas, villages with strong ties to SWAPO and 
where thirty or more repatriated detainees and many more “missing persons” had family, 
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receptions were held to welcome and honor exiles returning home. During these events 
“returnees” told stories about their and others' detentions, which, as first-hand accounts 
delivered by people known personally to most community members, are likely to have 
been very persuasive.557  
 However, despite the persuasive powers of their bodies and their reputations, the 
detainees faced obstacles to shaping publicly endorsed knowledge about their detentions 
that proved insurmountable. As noted, after the detainees’ press conference, SWAPO 
reiterated its stance that all those released had been spies and claimed that the stories of 
abuse were exaggerated as part of a South African propaganda onslaught. As a result, for 
many Namibians, accepting the detainees’ stories was taken as sympathy for South 
Africa and a betrayal of the Namibian nation in utero. This association was strengthened 
by a history of SWAPO opposition parties raising “the detainee issue” as a political 
platform during the late 1980s and climaxed in 1989 in the lead up to the Namibian 
elections. On July 4 when the 153 detainees returned to Namibia, seven political parties 
were present in Windhoek at the airport to receive them, including the Democratic 
Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), a party launched during the Turnhalle Conference of 1975-6 
and SWAPO’s wealthiest competitor.558 Thereafter, the DTA joined the Parents' 
Committee as a highly visible non-detainee organization clamoring for further 
investigation into SWAPO detentions and the release of the hundreds of political 
prisoners that were unaccounted for.  
 Under the circumstances, few persons who had been affiliated with SWAPO, 
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including many of the closest friends and family of detainees, were willing to support the 
PCC’s objectives. Some detainees returned to home communities which would not listen 
to their stories or even allow them to reside there. As one woman told Siegfried Groth: 
“When I returned home in July 1989 sick after all the torture and imprisonment, I was 
ordered to go to the SWAPO leadership and ask for forgiveness for talking publicly about 
SWAPO’s violations of human rights. I was innocent, and therefore I refused to take such 
a step. My family therefore asked me to leave the house…  I am often overcome with 
fear, and I feel like a stranger in my own country.”559 Although better received elsewhere, 
ex-detainees struggled to gain public support for their initiatives among historically 
SWAPO supporting groups. Many communities, especially in southern Namibia, were 
split between those who felt that they could no longer support SWAPO after hearing the 
detainees' revelations and others who maintained that SWAPO was the only party which 
could effectively challenge South African interests in Namibia and therefore must be 
supported at all costs. Like those SWAPO leaders from exile that approached ex-
detainees, leaders in communities at Gibeon, Vaalgras and Gainachas argued that 
SWAPO would address the PCC's agenda but could only do so once it had come to 
power.560 Even those who embraced the detainees were not likely to openly challenge 
SWAPO's authority to represent Namibia or exile history. David Lush reports, for 
example, that the returned detainees’ families and friends whom he knew living in 
Windhoek believed the detainees’ stories and, as a result, decided not to vote for 
SWAPO. They did not, however, campaign against SWAPO or publicly contest the 
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party’s official justification for its detentions.561 Similarly, family members of ex-
detainees and “missing persons” interviewed in Vaalgras, Gainachas and Keetmanshoop 
indicate that since 1989 they have rarely spoken about their exiled family members 
experiences and, when they have spoken, it is usually only among their closest 
relations.562   
The ex-detainees were, in any event, not well equipped to mobilize dissidents 
among historically SWAPO supporting communities. When they returned to Namibia, 
most had no money and few possessions. As a result, they could do little to publicize 
their experiences, let alone to pay for basic necessities.563 And although political parties 
rivaling SWAPO offered the detainees financial support, the PCC would not accept this 
as a group although individual members apparently did accept DTA offers to pay for their 
shopping trips and doctors appointments.564 Some of the detainees also expected that, 
based on their reputation when they had been activists in the country, that they would 
wield more political influence upon their return than they, in fact, did. Joseph Stephanus, 
who had been a leader in the SWAPO Youth League in the mid-1970s, remembers that 
he and other detainees were surprised to see how much the composition of people and 
political dynamics had changed inside the country since they had left more than ten years 
before.565 And, after years living abroad and imprisoned, the detainees had also changed. 
Stephanus recalls how he and some other detainees responded to their home communities 
at the time of their return: “We were malnourished, disoriented, confused, rebellious, 
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disrespectful to the norms and values of our society. Because we were exposed to so 
many things. The older values no longer made any sense to us. We were disrespectful of 
the older values in terms of how you are supposed to be as a community member. So, 
[many in our home communities] just wrote us off.”566 
 In this environment the ex-detainees split over political strategy. On July 20, 1989 
a group of ex-detainees established the Patriotic Unity Movement (PUM). Although the 
group of 153 had united  around the PCC, opinions differed on the PUM. Some ex-
detainees thought that participating in a party would associate their stories with political 
motives even more than they already were. Others were concerned about an alliance that 
the PUM soon made with the United Democratic Front (UDF), which had been able to 
assemble the necessary signatures to register as a party and raise funds for months before 
the ex-detainees' return from exile. Although the alliance with the UDF was necessary for 
PUM to be able campaign, it also attached the party to the UDF's main source of funding, 
the Namib Foundation, which was suspected by some Namibians to have links with the 
South African government.567 Also, the UDF was widely seen as a “tribal party” 
representing Namibia's Damara community, an association which ruptured cleavages 
among the ex-detainees'  ethnically and linguistically diverse but predominantly Damara 
and Nama members.568 Moreover, there were ideological differences among ex-detainees, 
shaped by periods of extended training and study in countries on opposite sides of the 
Cold War, which, for some, came to a head when the PUM's leadership was selected and 
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its platforms were written.569 Due to such tensions, many ex-detainees did not unite 
behind the PUM, but rather joined other political parties or distanced themselves from 
political affiliations altogether.     
 At the same time, organizations which had formally distanced themselves from 
SWAPO following the detainees' release made little effort to make ex-detainees' histories 
more widely accepted. This point is evident in the interactions of various ex-detainees 
and church leaders following the former's repatriation. Although the CCN was 
responsible for administering the Repatriation, Resettlement and Rehabilitation program 
for Namibian exiles, no CCN representatives were at the airport on July 4 to receive the 
ex-detainees.570 Thereafter, when some ex-detainees approached church leaders to share 
their experiences and concerns with them, the ex-detainees did not feel accepted by 
them.571 A number of detainees were in contact with Siegfried Groth following their 
repatriation and urged him to make the information about their detentions public.572 
When, on September 18, 1989, Groth published a report, he was chastised for it by 
colleagues in Namibia and Germany.573 In a letter sent by the ELC's Hendrik Frederik to 
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Groth, the Bishop argued that Groth's publication and subsequent interview was 
undermining “arrangements... which could lead to open discussions and steps toward 
reconciliation” which were being made “at the local level.”574 New articles in late 1989 
similarly emphasized church leaders' commitment to promoting dialog between 
conflicting groups in Namibia although no details about how this would be achieved were 
forthcoming and claims by Groth and others that the churches continued to shirk their 
responsibility to confront SWAPO about human rights abuses in exile were consistently 
denied.575   
 Particularly troubling for ex-detainees were unanswered questions about those 
who had been imprisoned in Lubango with them but had not yet returned to Namibia and 
the inability of international institutions to help them answer these questions. Following 
their return on July 4, the Political Consultative Council and the Parents' Committee 
issued a list of 530 names of persons who had been detained in Lubango but had not 
repatriated, including information about each detainee's age, place of residence, year of 
arrest, year and place of detention in which last seen and, in some cases, date of death.576 
In August, as more ex-detainees repatriated, additional lists were written and meetings 
held between ex-detainees and UNTAG officials, resulting in the formation of the United 
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 201 
Nations Mission on Detainees (UNMD).577 In turn, UNMD compiled two additional lists: 
a list of all of the 1,077 persons who had allegedly been detained and a list of 32 sites 
where detainees had allegedly been imprisoned.578 Despite the involvement of ex-
detainees in shaping the knowledge that the UNMD took with it on its mission, detainees 
had little influence over the UNMD's research in the field or its final report. On 
September 2, 1989, the UNMD, departed from Windhoek with ten UN officials, but no 
ex-detainees, members of human rights organizations, or persons with prior knowledge of 
the areas of detention were included.579 SWAPO officials, however, were consulted in 
Lubango, offering the UNMD a list of ex-detainees “which corresponded almost entirely 
with the lists relating to the group recorded by UNTAG observers in May 1989 and the 
group of 84 detainees whose release came to light in August 1989.”580 Although the 
mission toured Angola and Zambia for nineteen days, only September 6 was spent at the 
sites outside Lubango where most ex-detainees had been imprisoned and most of the 
missing persons were last seen.581 It is not surprising, therefore, that some ex-detainees 
found the UNMD's research, which concluded that “there were no detainees in any of the 
alleged detention centres and other places which it visited,” not only inconclusive but 
also “a useless effort.”582  
  Despite such obstacles the ex-detainees did manage to achieve some of the goals 
outlined by the PCC at the time of their return. From July to November 1989, ex-
detainees shared their experiences at political rallies across Namibia. Although SWAPO 
                                                 
577 UNMD p. 3; Putz, Coplan and von Egidy, p. 324. 
578 UNMD p. 3. The detention sites are listed in Annex 1. 
579 UNMD, Annex 2; “Commission challenges Swapo to come clean,” Times of Namibia, 16.10.1989. 
580 UNMD, p. 5. 
581 UNMD, Annex 3. 
582 UNMD, p. 8; Dempers 21.11.2007, p. 24. 
 202 
won the November elections, it did not achieve the two-thirds majority that many had 
predicted and which would have given the party a free-hand to write the Namibian 
Constitution and implement its policies in Parliament.583 Although it is impossible to 
know how ex-detainees’ stories  influenced voters’ choices, SWAPO’s failure to win a 
two-thirds majority has been attributed to how Namibians reacted to the ex-detainees' 
return.584 The PUM-UDF received sufficient votes for the PUM's President, Eric Biwa, to 
be given a seat at the Constituent Assembly, where the Constitution was drafted, and in 
Parliament. Even the UNMD's report could be interpreted as supporting ex-detainees' 
claims, for it identified 315 persons from the comprehensive list of detainees “whose 
present status is unknown and requiring further investigation.”585 
 Nonetheless, public discussion of the ex-detainees' experiences subsided after 
1989. By then, the PCC had dissolved as a political lobby. Some ex-detainees faced 
pressures to integrate themselves in home communities where their stories were not 
welcome. Many, who were in their thirties at the time of their release, had professional 
and family goals that were often difficult to pursue while living in exile and nigh 
impossible during their detention. SWAPO also began to recruit ex-detainees for mid-
level government jobs, which were appealing to many who were financially vulnerable 
and had been educated in exile to work as public servants upon their return. Under the 
circumstances there was little impetus for ex-detainees to continue to share their stories 
                                                 
583 The following are percentages of the national vote which Namibia’s three largest parties received in the 
first national election:  SWAPO (56.9%), DTA (28.3%), UDF (5.6%) (Henning Melber, ed. Re-
examining Liberation in Namibia. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab, p. 17).  
584 Dobell 1997, p. 373. 
585 Having discarded the names of “some 110 duplicated entries,” the UNMD's Report accounts for the 
1,077 persons on its comprehensive list of detainees in this way: “(a) 484 persons released and/or 
repatriated; (b) 71 persons reportedly not detained, including SWAPO officials; (c) 115 persons 
reported dead; (d) 52 persons who could not be identified due to insufficient information; (e) 315 
persons whose present status is unknown and requiring further investigation” (UNMD, p. 9). 
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openly. Moreover, while “the missing persons” was a topic of debate in Parliament when 
it convened in 1990,586 the ensuing investigation of the issue by the Red Cross was 
limited by the same structures that had hindered the UNMD. As the ICRC notes in its 
June 1993 final report to the Namibian government, which had solicited its intervention, 
international humanitarian law stipulates that it could only liaise between “the families of 
missing persons” and the governments and liberation movements which were “parties to 
[the] conflict.” Therefore, when “relatives of the missing who had 'last been seen in 
SWAPO hands' or 'last been seen in SWAPO prison'” did not receive a reply from 
SWAPO or learned vaguely that “their family member had... 'succumbed to illness in the 
vicinity of Lubango,'... the concerned families... had to satisfy themselves with such 
replies, as no more straightforward information was ever available.”587  Despite the Red 
Cross's own prognosis that, given such replies, its investigation “can hardly be considered 
satisfactory,” Parliament defeated Eric Biwa's motion to table the ICRC report for 
discussion.588    
 
Breaking the Wall of Silence 
 In 1995 Siegfried Groth published a book, titled in its English translation Namibia 
– The Wall of Silence.589 Therein, the retired pastor shares stories that he had collected 
while serving as the VEM's representative to Namibia from 1961 to 1990, many of them 
told by persons detained in Zambia and Angola during the 1970s and '80s. As several 
                                                 
586 For a discussion of how “the missing persons” were discussed in Parliament from 1990 to 1994, see 
Leys & Saul 2003, pp. 340-342. 
587 ICRC, “Missing Namibians: I.C.R.C. Final Report,” (Geneva, 1993), pp. 1,3. 
588 ICRC, p. 5; Leys & Saul 2003, pp. 341-342. 
589 The book was first published in German with the title Namibische Passion: Tragik und Grösse der 
namibischen Befreiungsbewegung and was translated into English in the same year. 
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reviewers of the book noted590 and as this research confirms, details about Namibia's 
exile past narrated in The Wall of Silence were not novel to many Namibians and others 
following Namibian news from abroad. Groth himself had previously published an 
account of human rights abuses in the SWAPO camps and of the churches' knowledge of 
these abuses in his September 18, 1989 report, and this report had received attention at 
the time in Namibia.591 Nonetheless, the launch of the English translation of The Wall of 
Silence in Windhoek  sparked a new initiative to challenge Namibia's national narrative 
and to erase the stigma associated with histories of detention in SWAPO's exile camps.   
 Central to this initiative were two Namibians: Christo Lombard and Samson 
Ndeikwila. Lombard, who was teaching theology and directing the Ecumenical Institute 
for Namibia (EIN) at UNAM at the time, obtained a copy of the German version of 
Groth's book and was the first person in Namibia to respond to it publicly. In a review 
printed in the Windhoek Observer on June 24, 1995, Lombard encouraged SWAPO and 
the churches to take the book's publication as an opportunity to acknowledge their 
responsibility for abuses committed during the liberation struggle and, in so doing, to 
promote “reconciliation.”592 Shortly thereafter, Lombard met with Samson Ndeikwila, his 
colleague at the CCN and a former exile, who had been imprisoned by SWAPO in 
                                                 
590 UCT African Studies Library, BAP 322.42 DAU, Timothy Dauth, “Namibia – the Wall of Silence – 
review,” an e-mail submitted to “NUAFRICA: Program of African Studies Mailing List”; Heribert 
Weiland, “Namibia – The Wall of Silence. The Dark Days of the Liberation Struggle – Book Review” 
Journal of Southern African Studies, 22, 3 (1996), pp. 501-503; Lauren Dobell, “Silence in Context: 
Truth and/or Reconciliation in Namibia,” Journal of Southern African Studies, 23, 2 (1997), pp. 371-
382. 
591 Groth 18.9.1989. In addition to the letter from Bishop Hendrik Frederik to Siegfried Groth cited above, 
Groth's report also received attention in the Namibian papers at the time as well.  
592 Christo Lombard, “Alarming Stories from the Darker Side of the Struggle,” Windhoek Observer, 
24.6.1995 in  “Breaking the Wall of Silence: Statements and Clippings, February – April 1996,” 
(Windhoek: BWS, 1996), pp. 1-4 and in “Namibische Passion: Chronik einer Debatte,” (Wuppertal: 
VEM, 1997), pp. 6-9. 
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Tanzania from 1968 to 1970.593 Ndeikwila soon acquired an English translation of 
Groth's book, copies of which were first supplied by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation to a 
small group, including several ex-detainees and church leaders, in mid-1995.594 Together, 
Ndeikwila and Lombard decided to contact people they knew who had been affected by 
histories described in the book and ask them if they wanted to meet and share their 
experiences. 
 Over the next several months a group of ex-detainees and others interested in their 
experiences assembled on Saturdays in the main hall at the CCN's offices in 
Windhoek.595  As participants in the sessions would later write: 
We held long and moving meetings, listened to individual 
stories. We chose the premises of the CCN as our venue 
because we all felt most more at home there. We sat in a big 
circle, starting with a prayer and short bible reflection. 
People are bitter towards those who had ordered their arrests 
and detentions, who had smeared their names and caused 
their rejection by families and friends. Some cried when 
telling their stories and many of us shared in their tears. This 
served as healing to the people who have been traumatised 
for a long time and whom nobody wanted to listen to.596 
  
By November 1995 participants in these meetings must also have been discussing 
strategies for confronting the stigma associated with the stories they were telling. In that 
                                                 
593 Samson Ndeikwila, Interview 9.2.2007, p. 7; Christo Lombard, Interview 5.5.2009. Ndeikwila was one 
of a group of exiles known as the “Seven Comrades” or “Chinamen.” After living together in  Kongwa 
for several months in 1968, the group presented a memorandum to the camp leaders in which they 
expressed their frustrations with how the camp was being administered and requested a party congress 
at which these matters could be discussed. The commanders at Kongwa handed those who had 
presented the memorandum to the Tanzanians, who instead of transporting them to SWAPO leaders as 
the group had hoped, sent them directly to prison in Dar es Salaam. The group was eventually released 
from detention in 1970. For Ndeikwila's account of his experiences in exile, see Ndeikwila 9.2.2007, 
16.2.2007. 
594 “Breaking the Wall of Silence – A New Initiative,” 10.2.1996 in “Breaking the Wall of Silence” 1996, 
pp 8-9. Lombard also makes mention of copies of the book “now also available in English” in his book 
review in the Windhoek Observer. The Friedrich Ebert Foundation is a German non-profit organization 
affiliated with the Social Democratic Party in Germany. 
595 Ndeikwila 9.2.2007, p. 7; Gertze 21.2.2007, pp. 9-10; Lombard 5.5.2009. 
596 BWS, “Annual Report 1996,” in “Chronik einer Debatte,” p. 167. 
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month, some attended the CCN's annual general meeting, suggesting that the Council 
launch the book, which would become available commercially in Namibia the following 
year, and thereby “initiate a process of reconciliation and healing.”597 On February 21, 
1996, shortly after the CCN indicated that it would not participate in the book launch, 
Lombard issued a media release announcing a “Breaking the Wall of Silence Committee” 
and stating that the Committee would take responsibility for launching the book itself, a 
position reiterated in a media release by Ndeikwila the following month, announcing a 
“Breaking the Wall of Silence Movement” (BWS).598     
 On Saturday, March 30, at the Kalahari Sands Hotel in downtown Windhoek, the 
book and BWS were both officially launched. There, in a packed hall, Samson Ndeikwila 
introduced BWS as “a civil rights pressure movement promoting a democratic culture of 
openness, freedom, peace and human fellowship.”599 He also offered an account of the 
Movement's genesis, narrating it through Salatiel Ailonga, the Parents' Committee and 
Siegfried Groth, each of whom was presented “The BWS Award of Merit.”600 Ndeikwila 
was followed by seven ex-detainees, who gave accounts of their experiences in exile, and 
by Christo Lombard who officially launched the book. Finally, the meeting was opened 
for questions and BWS' future was discussed, including plans to translate Groth's book 
into Afrikaans and Oshiwambo, to document the experiences of Namibians during the 
                                                 
597 “Breaking the Wall of Silence – A New Initiative,” p. 8. On November 28, 1995 forty-two ex-detainees 
also addressed a letter to CCN General Secretary Ngeno Nakamhela which also requested that the 
Council organize a book launch although the letter was apparently not delivered to him until mid-
January the following year (Letter to Ngeno Nakamhela in “Chronik einer Debatte,” p. 17 and 
“Statements and Clippings, ”, p. 5).  
598 “Media Release: Breaking the Wall of Silence Committee,” 21.2.1996 in “Statements and Clippings,” p. 
15; “Media Release: Breaking the Wall of Silence Movement (BWS),” 20.3.1996, in “Statements and 
Clippings,” pp. 51, 51a, 52. 
599 “Wounds reopened,” Tempo, 31.3.1996; “Detainee book sparks strong public interest,” The Namibian, 
1.4.1996; “Walls Movement wants to practise (sic) civil action,” The Windhoek Advertiser, 1.4.1996.   
600 BWS, “Annual Report 1996,” p. 170. Ailonga's 1977 letter to Bishop Aula was also read publicly at the 
launch. 
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liberation struggle and to facilitate “national reconciliation,” possibly through a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.601    
 In some respects BWS was very similar to organizations which had come before 
it. Many of those who had been most involved in the Committee of Parents, Parents' 
Committee, the PCC and the PUM took positions of leadership in BWS.602  Especially, 
among the Lubango ex-detainees, the first meetings at the CCN rekindled relationships, 
bringing together many of those then living in Windhoek and connecting them through 
mutual friends to others who had settled in different parts of the country.603 There were, 
however, a variety of new people, who also had been detained or felt mistreated by 
SWAPO in exile and participated in BWS. For example, Tangeni Nuukuawo and Sheeli 
Shangula, both of whom fled Namibia in “the exodus” and were imprisoned with 
Andreas Shipanga from 1976 to 1978, were founding members as, of course, was Samson 
Ndeikwila, who was well known to the hundreds of Namibian exiles who had left 
SWAPO and migrated to Kenya in the late 1960s and early 1970s.604 Nuukuawo, 
Shangula and Ndeikwila were, thus, part of their own social networks of exiles who had 
become alienated from SWAPO. Nonetheless, these networks had remained distinct from 
one another, due to such factors as different experiences of mistreatment by SWAPO, 
different places where people had lived following their expulsion from SWAPO, the 
                                                 
601 Ndeikwila comments on these and other plans discussed at the book launch in BWS' post-launch media 
release (BWS, “Media Release,” 11.4.1996 in “Statements and Clippings,” p. 84). BWS also did some 
research before the launch compiling a  “Lists of Namibia's 'Missing Persons,'” (Windhoek: BWS, 
1996) . The lists name 708 people, including 554 SWAPO detainees who had not been accounted for, 
93 SWAPO detainees whose deaths had been witnessed by repatriated detainees and 61 South African 
detainees who had not been accounted for.  
602 One might compare for example the leadership listed for the PUM, PC and PCC, (Pütz, von Egidy, 
Caplan 1989 pp. 216, 323, 326) with that of the first “Management Committee” of BWS (BWS, 
“Annual Report 1996,” p. 173).  
603 Dempers 21.11.2007, pp. 21-22.  
604 Dempers 21.11.2007, pp. 21-22; Tangeni Nuukuawo, Interview 10.3.2007; See Chapter 3 for 
discussions of Shangula, Nuukuawo and the 1976 conflict. Detentions in Tanzania during the 1960s are 
also considered briefly in Chapter 3 and at greater length in Chapter 6. 
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stigma attached to “SWAPO dissidents” of previous exile generations, and different 
ethnic and regional affiliations, which for those dissidents from the 1960s and '70s 
centered around an Ovambo majority from the North and for those from the 1980s, 
centered around a Nama/Damara majority from the South. At the meetings that 
precipitated BWS, participants crossed these divides, sharing their particular histories 
from exile and establishing solidarity around the shared aim of erasing the stigma which 
had been attached to all of them. In addition, some SWAPO activists who had remained 
inside Namibia attended the meetings as did some family and friends of exiles who had 
not participated in the Committee of Parents/Parents' Committee, thereby further 
expanding the communities involved and the perspectives considered.605   
 The goals and strategies pursued by BWS also differed from its predecessors in 
subtle but significant ways. Although from its founding BWS publicized the experiences 
of persons abused in SWAPO's exile camps and pushed the liberation movement for 
answers about the “missing persons,” it averred from denouncing or affiliating with 
political parties, presenting itself as an organization  addressing a human rights issue 
from a neutral political ground.606 According to Pauline Dempers, the founding vice-
chairperson and current chairperson of BWS,  this shift in focus was a result of ex-
detainees' experiences since their return, during which time “political parties [had] used 
this issue for their political gains, not really to bring this to a serious debate with the 
intention or aim to resolve it.” She also argued that Groth's book, which framed “the wall 
of silence” as a human rights issue that Namibia as a society needed to resolve, impacted 
                                                 
605 Dempers 21.11.2007, p. 22; Ndeikwila 9.2.2007, p. 7; BWS, “Annual Report 1996,” p. 169. 
606 See for example, BWS's founding mission statement: “BWS is a movement of concerned Namibians 
who endeavor by PEACEFUL means to find a lasting solution for the problem of human rights 
violations committed and to work towards a truly democratic culture” (BWS, “Annual Report 1996,” p. 
165). 
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on BWS's approach.607 Clearly BWS was also influenced by how similar issues were then 
being addressed by Namibia's South African neighbors. In the months following the 
formation of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Namibian 
papers were flooded with people expressing their support for or opposition to forming a 
similar commission in Namibia.608 From its opening press release BWS weighed in on 
this debate, indicating that following the book launch, a panel would discuss “the 
viability and necessity of a Namibian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (or 
something similar) to deal with the human rights violations inflicted on the Namibian 
people by both SWAPO and South Africa during the war.”609 Favorable references to the 
TRC are made in other BWS press releases and publications over the following year and 
in 1997 the movement invited a TRC commissioner, Dr. Mapule Ramashala, to address 
its Annual General Meeting about “the relevance of the TRC exercise to the Southern 
African region.”610  
 BWS's interest in the TRC also reflected the movement's close relationship to the 
church. From its origins through the initiative of a theologian and church employee 
following their discussion of a pastor's book, BWS associated itself closely with Christian 
institutions, practices and teachings. This point is evident from the previously cited 
passage about BWS's earliest gatherings drawn from the organization's 1996 annual 
report, which emphasizes that meetings took place at the CCN “because  [participants] 
felt most at home there” and that they started “with a prayer and short biblical reflection.” 
Similarly BWS's opening press release on March 20, 1996 cites from a letter that the 
                                                 
607 Dempers 21.11.2007, pp. 24-25. 
608 For example, see articles cited in Dobell 1997, p. 378. 
609 BWS, “Media Release,” 20.3.1996 in “Statements and Clippings,” pp. 51, 51a, 52 and “Chronik einer 
Debatte,” pp. 45-47.  
610 Leys and Saul 2003, p. 346. 
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organization had sent to Archbishop Desmond Tutu, chairman of the TRC: “We wish to 
ensure you that we are no radical group, bent on damaging SWAPO as such. We have no 
ulterior political agenda. The leaders of this initiative are committed Christians... We are 
inspired by Scripture readings and prayer and fellowship.”611 In addition to these 
professions, BWS, unlike the Committee of Parents and ex-detainees before it, also 
achieved some success in mobilizing Namibian church leaders to support its initiatives. 
Following a request from persons participating in the first meetings at the CCN, CCN 
General Secretary Ngeno Nakamhela began to attend them regularly.612 Although the 
CCN declined the request that the Namibian churches launch Groth's book, it did agree 
after its November 1995 meeting that it would take measures “to address the detainee 
issue” the following year. On February 19, 1996 the CCN issued a press statement 
encouraging its members and the broader public to read the book and announcing its 
sponsorship of a series of conferences “on issues related to the ex-detainees,” the  first of 
which would take place between May and July of that year.613  
 If there were any question as to whether Groth's book and BWS presented  a 
threat to some Namibian leaders, this was soon answered. On March 6, 1996, Namibian 
President Sam Nujoma delivered a twenty-minute address on national television in which 
                                                 
611 BWS, “Media Release,” 20.3.1996; letter from Christo Lombard to Desmond Tutu, 13.3.1996 (gift to 
the author). 
612 Ngeno Nakamhela, Interview 21.2.2007, p. 3; Gertze 21.2.2007, pp. 9-10; Kambangula 26.11.2007, p. 
14; Ndeikwila 9.2.2007, p. 9. 
613 CCN, “CCN to sponsor conference on Ex-detainees,” 19.2.1996 in “Chronik einer Debatte,” p. 20 and 
“BWS Statements and Clippings,” p. 12. It should be noted that in BWS' account of the CCN annual 
general meeting, Abisai Shejavali, the former CCN General Secretary and author of the 1985 letter 
which had sharply criticized the Committee of Parents, is described as having been particularly 
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Lombard also mentioned Shejavali in a letter which he addressed to Reverend Nakamhela, indicating 
that, at the AGM, Shejavali had “admitted openly that the churches had let down the people affected, 
and that... a public meeting for reconciliation should be organised” (letter from Christo Lombard to 
Ngeno Nakamhela, 21.1.1996 in BWS 1996, p. 7).  
 211 
he denounced The Wall of Silence, declaring it a “false history.”614 The following week 
SWAPO Secretary General Moses Garoeb issued a press release in which he criticized 
the book and people seen as promoting it in similar terms.615 Later that month, during 
Namibia's Independence Day celebrations, SWAPO members at a rally in Oshakati called 
for the book to be banned and burnt.616 In each instance, histories presented in The Wall 
of Silence were discredited based on the national standing of those rendering them and 
the deleterious effects that they would supposedly have on the nation. For example, in his 
televised speech, Nujoma began by narrating a story about  his own responsibilities and 
accomplishments as President of SWAPO. He then contrasted this with other stories –  
about German wars with Nama, Herero and Ovambo people, about the German Lutheran 
Church in Namibia (DELK) and about the Academy before it became UNAM617  –  each 
of which associated Groth or Lombard to the colonial regime. Having made this case for 
who has the interests of the Namibian people at heart, Nujoma pronounced his verdict on 
Groth's book: “[it] is a well-calculated move to open up old wounds and bring about 
racial and ethnic hatred in Namibian society... It does not tell the truth.”618 Moses 
Garoeb, who argues along similar lines, was even more direct: “SWAPO Party, more 
than anyone else, that is political organizations, church organisations [sic], individuals 
such as the Groths, Lombards, the Nakamhelas and the like, fought and sacrificed for the 
genuine independence of this country... SWAPO cannot allow this country to be made 
                                                 
614 Sam Nujoma, “Response to Pastor Siegfried Groth's book, The Wall of Silence,” 6.3.1996, in “Chronik 
einer Debatte,” pp. 22-23 and “His Excellency President Sam Nujoma's Response to Pastor Siegfried 
Groth's Book: 'The Wall of Silence'” in “Statements and Clippings.”  
615 “Media Statement by SWAPO Party on the so-called Detainee Issue,”  12.3.1996, in “Statements and 
Clippings,” pp. 33-36.  
616 “Calls for Groth book to be burnt,” The Namibian, 26.3.1996 in “Statements and Clippings,” p. 58.  
617 As VEM representative to Namibia, Groth worked primarily with the ELC and the ELOC, both of 
which became members of the CCN and outspoken critics of apartheid, not with the DELK. 
618 Nujoma in “Chronik einer Debatte,” pp. 22-23. 
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ungovernable and to be turned into a chaotic and lawless society by irresponsible, 
unpatriotic elements and remnents [sic] of fascism and apartheid.”619 Neither Nujoma nor 
Garoeb made any mention of Siegfried Groth, Christo Lombard or Ngeno Nakamhela's 
work opposing apartheid, let alone respond to any content of the book with which their 
names had become associated.620 
 These and related efforts to discredit the histories narrated in Groth's book appear 
only to have increased some Namibians' interest in and exposure to it. The day after 
Nujoma's televised address, Namibian bookstores reported that sales of the book had 
been brisk. The book also became the focal point for letters to the editor and editorials in 
Namibian newspapers and the focal point for the chat shows of the Namibian 
Broadcasting Corporation (NBC).621 Later in the year, in conjunction with  Heroes' Day, 
Swapo published its own book, Their Blood Waters Our Freedom,622 listing the names of 
7,792 PLAN combatants who perished between the beginning of the armed conflict in 
1966 and its conclusion in 1989. The timing of the publication, which had been 
announced by President Nujoma as early as 1990 and was expected as early as 1991,623 
suggests that it was motivated as a response to the public debate about exile following the 
publication of Groth's book. For those who read the Their Blood looking for answers to 
“the missing persons,” however, it only presented more questions and material for 
discussion. As the National Society for Human Rights (NSHR), led by former Parents' 
                                                 
619 “Media Statement by SWAPO Party on the so-called Detainee Issue,” p. 33. 
620 While at the Academy in the 1980s, Lombard was part of a campaign to to allow political activity on 
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622 Swapo Party, Their Blood Waters Our Freedom (Windhoek: Swapo Party, 1996). 
623 See “'The supreme price' listed,” The Namibian, 27.8.1990. 
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Committee spokesperson Phil Ya Nangoloh, observed, only 140 of the 772 missing 
detainees that NSHR had listed in its records, had been registered in the government 
publication.624 Moreover, among them were some of the most widely touted “spies,” who 
were now listed in a book commemorating heroes without any explanation for this 
discrepancy or any attempt to clear their names.625 Such points also became objects of 
discussion in the Namibian media over the months that followed. 
 Nonetheless, even as national leaders were struggling to control the dispersal of 
controversial exile histories through BWS, they did ultimately maintain the allegiance of 
key church allies. Correspondence among representatives of the CCN member churches 
about whether the organization should involve itself in the launch of The Wall of Silence, 
suggests that opinions differed over what it would mean to “address the detainee issue” in 
1996. As Bishop Kleopas Dumeni of the Lutheran Church in northern Namibia626 wrote 
in a letter to Pastor Nakamhela shortly before the CCN vote on the launch and repeated 
on a Namibian television program after it, the book in question was “written by an 
'outsider'” and “the contents of the book disturbs [sic] the policy of national reconciliation 
in our country.”627 In opposing the launch in this manner, Bishop Dumeni asserts 
arguments based on national forms of logic that not only resemble those of Nujoma and 
Garoeb in denouncing Groth's book, but also of Abisai Shejavali's when he discredited 
                                                 
624 NSHR 1996, p. 14. 
625 One of the most frequently mentioned contradictions in Their Blood Waters Our Freedom involves 
Tauno Hatuikilipi, the former Political Commissar at SWAPO Defense Headquarters in Lubango. In 
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the Committee of Parents ten years earlier.  
 Divisions among church leaders appear to have widened further after the CCN's 
February 19 press release, when President Nujoma invited a group of CCN 
representatives, excluding General Secretary Nakamhela, to a private meeting with 
him.628 Thereafter, participants in this meeting pressured Nakamhela to drop the 
conferences on the ex-detainees, and Nujoma applied pressure directly when a second 
meeting, including representatives of all CCN churches, was held with the President on 
August 13.629 Around the same time Nakamhela became the object of personal attacks 
and threats on NBC's Oshiwambo Radio service, and SWAPO members were told at 
some public events not to take part in any church-sponsored reconciliation events 
sponsored by the CCN.630 Through all this, plans for the conferences continued to be 
made and, after several delays, were scheduled for 1997, which the CCN declared the 
“Year of God's Grace.” Without the participation of most CCN church representatives, let 
alone SWAPO or South African government officials, however, the conferences 
remained a far cry from the TRC that BWS desired and were disappointing to many who 
participated.631 In a statement issued following its 1997 general meeting, BWS criticized 
the CCN “for failing to adequately address the Swapo detainee issue,” stating bluntly that 
“the 'Year of God's Grace'... has not borne any fruit and is a fiasco.”632  
 Looking back on these years from a more recent perspective, some BWS members 
see them as a turning point in the way Namibians relate to their history. Pauline Dempers, 
                                                 
628 Breaking the Wall of Silence Committee 29.2.1996; letter from Christo Lombard to Desmond Tutu, 
13.3.1996; Leys and Saul 2003, p. 345; Nakamhela 21.2.2007, p. 4. Although Leys and Saul indicate 
that this meeting took place in March, the media release and Lombard's letter both suggest that it 
probably was held at the end of February.  
629 Nakamhela 21.2.2007, p. 4 
630 Nakamhela 21.2.2007, p. 4; Leys and Saul 2003, p. 346. 
631 Ndeikwila 9.2.2007, p. 8; Nakamhela 21.2.2007, p. 5. 
632 Leys & Saul 2003, p. 346, printed in The Namibian, 21.10.1997. 
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current BWS Chairperson recalls that the early 1990s “were very difficult. There was 
intimidation. There were stages when people were also followed [by state security]... 
There was no space in Namibia where we could openly express ourselves... We were like 
a plague, something that people could not associate with.”633 The latter two points appear 
particularly valid for those who had been detained by or fled SWAPO in exile but had 
not, like some who returned from the dungeons of Lubango, openly shared their 
experiences. Referring to himself and other Namibians detained at Mboroma in 1976, 
Jackson Mwalundange indicates that they did not share their experiences in exile openly 
until after BWS was founded, from which point some of them, especially those who had 
already left SWAPO, began to change their position. “Now,” Mwalundange concludes, “I 
do not hide that I am a detainee.”634 Both Dempers and Mwalundange cite BWS's efforts 
to inform Namibians about exile history as important to the increased acceptance of ex-
detainees in Namibian society. To this point, it might be added that with the formation of 
BWS an increased number of people from distinct exile social networks began referring 
to themselves openly as ex-detainees, thereby making it more viable socially for others to 
identify as ex-detainees themselves.635 
 Certainly, BWS has focused attention on “the detainee issue” and fostered a 
community of ex-detainees over the years since its founding. The organization has held 
annual general meetings to discuss its concerns and organized social gatherings on July 4, 
the day that the first group returned from Lubango. Its members have taken various 
                                                 
633 Dempers 21.11.2007, p. 25. 
634 Jackson Mwalundange, Interview 24.11.2007. 
635 It should be noted that the terms “detainee” and  “ex-detainee” are still often used in Namibia to refer to 
those 200-300 persons who returned from the dungeons of Lubango and embraced an ex-detainee 
identity to the exclusion of many others who were detained. At the same time, as some people not 
detained in Lubango have asserted their identity as “ex-detainees,” their experiences have often  been 
conflated with those detained in Lubango. See, for example, Samson Ndeikwila's “A Swapo Detainee 
Speaks Out,” The Namibian, 17.10.2006. 
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events –  including the deaths of other ex-detainees, threats to ex-detainees, testimony 
shared at the TRC, the discovery of unmarked mass graves in northern Namibia, the 
formation of the International Criminal Court and the formation of new non-
governmental organizations and political parties – as opportunities to share their histories 
and raise related concerns in the Namibian media.636 BWS has also welcomed and/or 
courted people interested in its members' experiences, who have, in turn, dispersed this 
information more widely. For example, members worked closely with South African 
filmmaker Richard Pakleppa to prepare “Nda mona,” a documentary on the Lubango 
detentions, which was screened in Windhoek in October in 1999 and became part of the 
“Landscape of Memory” series, shown in other Southern African countries.637 It has 
collaborated with lawyers and law professors to consider how its members' concerns may 
be addressed through international legal instruments and to prepare related applications. 
And clearly this piece, like the articles by Lauren Dobell and Colin Leys and John Saul 
cited previously, has also been shaped by interactions with BWS members, whose 
perspectives are now being shared with others through it.  
 Despite these efforts and some accomplishments, BWS still remains far from 
achieving its central goal: to make histories of human rights abuses in exile, both known 
and unknown, accepted by all Namibians. Like the ex-detainees and the Committee of 
Parents before it, the organization has failed to gain support not only from SWAPO 
leaders, who are implicated in the histories that BWS members tell, but also from 
members of other institutions whose social authority remains closely tied to the ruling 
                                                 
636 In their article (2003) Leys & Saul trace the efforts of BWS to raise the detainee issue  through 2001. 
News clippings filed on the topic “ex-detainees” at the National Archive of Namibia trace related issues 
through to the present.  
637 Since the making of “Nda mona,” BWS has also produced another documentary, titled “Testimony” 
(2003). “Nda mona” is Oshiwambo for 'I have seen.' 
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party and other national representatives in the international system. For a moment in the 
mid-1990s, the Namibian churches, with their widespread membership among 
Namibians, close ties to SWAPO, and affiliation with bodies leading truth commissions 
elsewhere, appeared as if they might use their position in this order to apply pressure on 
SWAPO to participate in a dialog with BWS about the exile past. However, without unity 
among the churches and under pressure from the nation's ranking leader, the opportunity 
was lost. And while the experiences articulated by the Committee of Parents, ex-detainees 
and BWS cannot, based on the evidence gathered here, be described accurately as hidden 
behind “a wall of silence,” the boundaries dividing stigmatized and accepted histories of 






     Chapter 6 
   Reconciliation?: “Silences” and their “Victims” 
 On May 23, 1989 the SWAPO Central Committee issued a press release 
announcing its resolution “to adopt a policy of national reconciliation.”638 According to 
the release, the Committee had met to discuss the policy in Luanda earlier that year, from 
February 8 to 11, as part of “an in-depth review of the political situation within Namibia 
and... the diplomatic efforts aimed at the implementation of the United Nations plan for 
Namibia.” In turn, it had decided that a reconciliation policy was necessary “to enhance 
the chances of peace in Namibia” and “to heal the wounds of war.” As for what practices 
the policy entailed, the resolution outlines several in its concluding points: 
6. The Central Committee, within the frame-work of 
the policy of national reconciliation, issued a general 
pardon to all the misguided elements who infiltrated 
the rank and file of SWAPO with the aim of serving 
the war efforts of the adversary... 
 
9. They have been freed and are already registered with 
the UNHCR to return to Namibia like all other 
Namibians in exile who voluntarily decided to return 
to their motherland – Namibia. 
 
10. The Central Committee of SWAPO calls all 
Namibians to return to the people's fold and work for 
peace, unity and national reconciliation.639 
 
In the two days immediately following the policy announcement, members of UNTAG 
                                                 
638 BAB, SWAPO of Namibia Collection, 89fSLuPR1, “SWAPO Press Release on the Resolution of the 
Central Committee of SWAPO Luanda, May 23, 1989.”  
639 SWAPO Press Release, 23.5.1989, pp. 2-3. 
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and the press visited 199 of “the misguided elements” at camps where they were being 
held outside Lubango. Two weeks later the South African government's Administrator 
General to Namibia, Louis Pienaar, announced an amnesty provision immunizing 
SWAPO leaders from prosecution for crimes that they might have committed prior to the 
implementation of UN Resolution 435. On February 9, 1990, with the adoption of 
Namibia's Constitution, this provision was extended to all participants in the war, and 
Namibian citizens were pledged to pursue “national reconciliation.”  
 From these beginnings, when the word was first attached to statements of policy and law 
by representatives of the Namibian nation, reconciliation has been associated with a 
particular discourse in Namibia. The term has come to entail both a commitment to legal 
provisions negotiated at Namibian independence640 and to a form of historical production 
which denies or avoids referring to histories that threaten Namibia's national narrative, 
especially histories of detention in SWAPO's exile camps. Certainly, there are variations 
in how this discourse has been articulated. To one extreme are utterances, directly in line 
with the 1989 Central Committee statement, which claim that there are no significant 
contradictions to the one true history told by SWAPO about the liberation struggle in 
general and about the detainees in particular. This is the position taken repeatedly by 
SWAPO and Namibian founding President Sam Nujoma, who writes in his 
autobiography, Where Others Wavered:  
The “detainee” issue was the main weapon used against 
SWAPO  in the Independence election in 1989.  It is true 
that we detained individuals who had been detected to be 
South African agents, or for whom there were strong 
grounds for suspicion... If we are accused of ill-treating 
                                                 
640 In addition to offering amnesty to perpetrators of political violence, the new Namibian state, like its 
South African neighbors following apartheid, pledged to protect the political rights of all its inhabitants, 
including the property rights inherited from the previous regime. 
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detainees, this was very little compared to the killing, cruel 
torture and brutal treatment the apartheid South African 
regime inflicted on our people over so many years... We 
prefer to leave that sad story behind us and concentrate on 
national reconciliation, economic reconstruction, nation-
building and a better future for all Namibians.641  
 
Others in SWAPO have taken a somewhat different line. In one of the more penitent 
public statements made to date, Namibian Prime Minister Nahas Angula opened a 2007 
debate in Parliament on national reconciliation with these remarks: “It was a difficult 
decision that SWAPO took to detain these people... Many were caught in the crossfire... 
We are not saying SWAPO never made mistakes. We are human beings and in the 
crossfire of battle mistakes can happen.”642 Despite this and some similar statements 
made by Angula and others, efforts to discuss how “mistakes” occurred and their 
consequences for various people have been resisted repeatedly by the ruling party in the 
name of a reconciliation policy that focuses on a common Namibian future, not a divided 
colonial past.643    
 This chapter examines social consequences of the state-sanctioned reconciliation 
discourse in Namibia. Some of these consequences were considered in the previous 
chapter, which discussed people affected by violence committed by SWAPO  in exile 
who have tried, and largely failed, to challenge an official exile history which glosses 
over this violence and their experiences of it. This piece extends that analysis further to 
                                                 
641 Sam Nujoma, Where Others Wavered: The Autobiography of Sam Nujoma (London: Panaf Books, 
2001), pp. 356-357. 
642 “Some Namibians 'caught in crossfire' during struggle: PM,” The Namibian, 19.9.2007. 
643 In our meeting Nahas Angula did suggest that there is a relationship between studying the history of 
Namibia's liberation struggle and facilitating reconciliation in Namibia (Nahas Angula, Interview 
15.2.2008, p. 8).  His remarks to me resemble others by him that were incorporated into Richard 
Pakleppa's film, “Nda mona” (1999) and transcribed in Colin Leys and John Saul's article “Lubango 
and After: ‘Forgotten History’ as Politics in Namibia,” Journal of Southern African Studies, (2003) 
29,2, p. 348). 
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persons and communities affected by the omissions of exile history whose experiences 
are less easily observed because they have not articulated a counter-narrative to it in a 
widely accessible, public space. To this end, the chapter begins with the story of 
Kaufilwa Nepelilo, a man from northern Namibia whose experiences in exile have no 
place within the Namibian national narrative and who has, to a great extent, been 
abandoned by his family and government. It then considers the funeral service for Emil 
Appolus at Vaalgras, a community in southern Namibia, and how controversies 
surrounding Appolus' and other local exile histories have created tensions within this 
community and impaired community members' abilities to make claims on the state. This 
section is followed by one on  “Living in Exile,” an exhibition of photographs from the 
SWAPO camps, and how viewers' reactions to it highlighted aspects of their relationship 
to other Namibians, including resentment and mistrust of various groups and alienation 
from the national community.  
 Through these studies, the chapter draws attention to the impact of Namibia's 
reconciliation discourse beyond relatively few ex-detainees who were “caught in the 
crossfire” of the liberation war to a national community and the relationships among its 
diverse members. In so doing, the piece highlights how the government's efforts to 
silence controversial histories has produced social relations among Namibians which 
threaten, if not defy, common understandings of reconciliation.644 At the same time, the 
                                                 
644 “Reconciliation” has received widespread attention among social analysts through the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the field of transitional justice which developed in its 
wake. Most authors, however, do not define what they mean when they use this word, focusing instead 
on social phenomena which are thought to promote reconciliation and on reconciliation as a form of 
politics. Among contemporary figures who consider the meaning of reconciliation, the most prominent 
globally is the TRC's chairperson, Archbishop Desmond Tutu. For Tutu reconciliation is fundamentally 
concerned with restoring broken relationships between people made in God's image. Drawing from the 
Nguni word ubuntu defined as “a person is a person through other people,” Tutu maintains that 
perpetrators of violence and oppression treat their victims as less than human and, by denying others' 
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chapter points to work which people do when they articulate controversial stories about 
the past and their relationships to them. As the conclusion suggests, it is precisely the  
production of such histories which is overlooked in much literature on reconciliation, 
which focuses on the “victims” of violence and the “silences” that accompany victims' 
stories rather than on where and how people establish social relations through national 
history. 
       
Tate Nepelilo 
 If not for good fortune and the good will of a colleague, I would never have 
known that Kaufilwa Nepelilo, or anyone like him, exists. On Friday, August 3, 2007 I 
set out from Ovamboland, where I had been conducting interviews the previous week, for 
my home in Windhoek. Having gotten a late start for the journey, I decided to break up 
the trip by stopping for the night in Tsumeb, a town located just below the Red Line 
along the B1, Namibia's main tar road extending between its northern and southern 
borders. Upon my arrival, I contacted Abed Hauwanga, a research participant who I 
thought would be interested in talking about my latest interviews in the North, and once I 
                                                                                                                                                 
humanity, become dehumanized themselves. Reconciliation, therefore, requires perpetrators to 
acknowledge the suffering of the victims, and victims to forgive those who violated them. Through this 
process relationships between man and man and between God and man are restored (See, for example, 
Tutu's book about the TRC, No Future Without Forgiveness, (New York: Doubleday, 1999) and 
Michael Battle's Reconciliation: The Ubuntu Theology of Desmond Tutu (Cleveland: The Pilgrim 
Press, 1997)). Other people involved in the field of transitional justice have written about reconciliation 
from a secular,  national perspective. For example, Priscilla Hayner of the International Center for 
Transitional Justice (ICTJ) in New York writes in her influential book Unspeakable Truths: Confronting 
State Terror and Atrocity (New York: Routledge, 2001) that reconciliation may be evaluated in “a 
society” by responding to three questions: “How is the past dealt with in the public sphere? What are 
the relationships between former opponents? Is there one version of the past, or many?” (pp. 161-163). 
Also, the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in Cape Town has conducted surveys which examine 
how various people perceive the term “reconciliation” (e.g. Erik Doxtader and Charles Villa-Vicencio 
Through Fire with Water: The Roots of Division and the Potential for Reconciliation in Africa 
(Trenton: Africa World Press, 2003); Charles Villa-Vicencio and Fanie du Toit, Truth and 
Reconciliation in South Africa: 10 Years On (Claremont, SA: David Philip, 2006)).       
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had settled in at the Tsumeb Municipal Campground, he came to meet me there. During 
our conversation Abed mentioned a man living in Tsumeb who had previously lived in 
Kongwa, the first SWAPO camp founded by the OAU Liberation Committee in 
Tanzania. When I expressed an interest in meeting this man, Abed offered to introduce 
me to him the following morning. 
 At 8 am Abed and I arrived at the Tsumeb Old Age Home. After entering the gate 
and greeting   some people in the courtyard, we found Tate Nepelilo,645 who had just 
returned from breakfast. After exchanging greetings we accompanied him to his small 
room where Abed and our host assembled themselves on the floor while I was asked to 
sit in the only chair. There Abed began to address Tate Nepelilo in Oshikwanyama, first 
introducing me and then translating as I described in English my research and my interest 
in his experiences. I then asked Tate Nepelilo if he would be willing to be interviewed 
and recorded for a public record, and he indicated that he would, adding in 
Oshikwanyama that he had “nothing to hide.” 
 For the next six hours Abed Hauwanga and I sat in this room, talking with Tate 
Nepelilo about his past.646 Although listed on his Namibian identity card as having been 
born on January 16, 1922,  Nepelilo does not know his day of birth. He believes, 
however, that he was born sometime around 1930. He grew up in Eshoke, a village in 
Ovamboland to the west of Oshikango, the main border crossing for Namibia and 
Angola. As a child he, like many boys in his community, was responsible for looking 
after his family's cattle, and he did not attend school. In 1954 Nepelilo traveled south of 
                                                 
645 Tate is the title used in Oshiwambo to refer to an older man. Abed and I both addressed Kaufilwa 
Nepelilo with this title.  
646 Unless otherwise noted, the information that follows is drawn from Kaufilwa Nepelilo, Interview 
4.8.2007 and citations are Abed Hauwanga's translation of Nepelilo's testimony. 
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the Red Line as a contract laborer for the first time, and in the late 1950s, while working 
a contract in at a fish processing plant in Walvis Bay, he encountered OPO and began to 
attend the organization's covert meetings. It was then, or shortly thereafter, that he first 
heard activists talk about “abroad.”647 According to Tate Nepelilo, “They said if you go 
abroad, if you get educated, your situation will automatically change... Once [the South 
Africans] will leave our country, then we can have the opportunity to replace their 
positions.” Further, he recalls thinking, “The white life, surely, is a good life. And that's 
what motivate[d] [me] to go abroad. [I] wanted to live comfortably as the whites.”648  
 In 1962 Nepelilo did travel “abroad.” Departing from Windhoek he stopped in 
Otjiwarongo, where he and others received information for their journey from SWAPO 
activists. From there the group was transported via Grootfontein to Rundu, the town in 
northeastern Namibia where the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WENALA) 
registered contract workers for the South African mines.649 After registering, they were 
flown to Francistown in Bechuanaland where laborers recruited by WENALA from 
throughout the Southern African collected. There, Nepelilo's group, like other many other 
Namibians who fled into exile during the early 1960s, left the camp for contract workers 
and found their way to Maxton Joseph, the SWAPO official then administering 
SWAPO's Francistown office. Nepelilo and others were then placed in a refugee camp on 
the edge of town where they waited for SWAPO to arrange transport to Tanzania.650 
                                                 
647 Here Tate Nepelilo used the English word. 
648 Nepelilo 4.8.2007, p. 3. 
649 WENELA recruited workers from all over Southern Africa to work on the mines. Workers were 
registered in various WENELA offices and flown to Francistown from where they were transported by 
train to the South African rand. Most of those registered at WENELA's Rundu office were Angolans, 
transported to Rundu from various locations inside Angola. 
650 Although Tate Nepelilo did not identify the name of this camp, it may have been Dukwe, a refugee 
camp administered by the Botswanan government where Siegfried Groth later ministered to exiled 
Namibians.  
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After waiting for several months, Nepelilo and other SWAPO members in the camp 
traveled by truck from Francistown through Livingstone and Northern Rhodesia to Dar es 
Salaam, where the liberation movement's headquarters were located.  
 After spending some time at a refugee camp outside Dar es Salaam called 
“Tameka,”651 he and others from his group were transported by truck to Kongwa, 
arriving at the camp, located five kilometers west of a village of the same name in central 
Tanzania, in early 1964. There they found more than one hundred Namibians living 
together alongside other liberation movement camps, which at that time included South 
Africa's ANC and Mozambique's FRELIMO.652 The entire complex was overseen by a 
representative of the Tanzanian government and the OAU African Liberation Committee, 
Major Shongambele, although the various liberation movements were responsible for the 
day-to-day administration of their respective camps. At that time the SWAPO camp was 
led by the Deputy Commander of SWALA,653 Leonard Philemon “Castro” Nangolo, and 
fourteen other commanders, who were among the first Namibians to receive military 
training in 1962 and to establish the camp at Kongwa in that or the following year.654 The 
                                                 
651 According to another research participant, the camp was also known as “Salvation Camp.” It was 
administered by a church affiliated organization, and most residents were from Southern African 
countries (Silas Shikongo, Interview 26.7.2007, pp. 13, 14).  
652 At various points in time other Southern African liberation movements, including the MPLA from 
Angola, the PAC from South Africa and ZANU and ZAPU from Zimbabwe, also administered camps 
in the same general area near Kongwa. Although UNITA was not recognized by the OAU and therefore 
could not establish a camp at Kongwa, some of its members trained in the SWAPO camp (Nepelilo 
4.8.2007; Ya Toivo Ashipala, Interview 16.3.2007; Paul Helmuth, Interview 13.7.2007, 10.8.2007; 
Nambinga Kati, Interview 11.8.2007; Samson Ndeikwila, Interview 21.7.2007;  Helao Shityuwete, 
Interview  24.7.2007). Tate Nepelilo thinks that there may have been 140 people living in the SWAPO 
camp at Kongwa when he arrived and that 10-20 of them were Angolans affiliated with UNITA. 
653 SWALA was renamed PLAN at the Tanga Conference held by SWAPO from December 26, 1969 to 
January 2, 1970 (Nujoma 2001, p. 192). 
654 According to then SWAPO President, Sam Nujoma, the first SWAPO members to receive military 
training was a group of seven men who were sent to Egypt in July 1962. He further indicates that the 
camp at Kongwa was established on May 27, 1963, two days after the founding of the OAU, by 
combatants who had been trained in Egypt, Algeria, Ghana, China and the Soviet Union (Nujoma 2001, 
pp. 158-159). Nujoma added in our interview that SWAPO and FRELIMO were the two liberation 
movements that first established camps at Kongwa (Sam Nujoma, Interview 4.3.2008). Although most 
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other Namibians in the camp consisted of persons from the Ovamboland region who had 
been recruited to travel into exile either while working on contract in Namibia or while 
returning to Namibia after working in the South African mines.655  
 Even before he arrived at Kongwa, Nepelilo seems to have been concerned about 
what he was and was not finding “abroad.” Shortly after his group arrived in Dar es 
Salaam, they were divided into two. Those with sufficient education and within certain 
age parameters were assigned to attend Kurasini College, a school established in Dar es 
Salaam by the African-American Institute to provide exiles from Namibia and elsewhere 
with the training necessary to attend tertiary institutions in the US and elsewhere.656 The 
others were assigned to Kongwa. Tate Nepelilo remembers listening to Namibians he 
found in Tanzania who were already studying at Kurasini, warning those who had been 
assigned to Kongwa: “Please, if you hear that you are going to Kongwa, don't agree! ... 
There's no education. It's only a bush for fighting.”657  
 At Kongwa, Nepelilo went through the paces of one becoming a “freedom 
fighter.” Every morning he woke before dawn to participate in physical training. After 
                                                                                                                                                 
sources confirm that the first combatants were trained in 1962 and that Kongwa was founded in 1963,  
Helao Shityuwete, who was a Secretary of SWALA and a camp commander in Kongwa in 1965, 
indicates that some members of SWAPO and other liberation movements were first brought to Kongwa 
in 1962 when, following a failed coup attempt, the then Tanganyikan government decided to remove 
trained combatants from the capital city (Shityuwete 24.7.2007, p. 24).  
655 These two forms of recruitment were confirmed by all those former Kongwa inhabitants interviewed for 
this research  (Ashipala 16.3.2007, 25.7.2007; Helmuth 13.7.2007, 10.8.2007; Kati 11.8.2007, 
8.12.2007; Ndeikwila 9.2.2007, 16.2.2007, 2.3.2007, 21.7.2007;  Shityuwete 24.7.2007, 5.6.2008, S. 
Shikongo 16.3.2007, 26.7.2007). In addition to those from Ovamboland, shortly after the merger of 
SWAPO and CANU in November 1964 (Peter Katjavivi, A History of Resistance in Namibia (London: 
James Currey, 1988), p. 51), a group of Caprivians also joined the camp.  
656 To enter Kurasini students had to pass an aptitude test, to have sufficient English language skills and to 
fit within age parameters, which some remember as eighteen to twenty-five (Ashipala 25.7.2007, p. 25; 
Kati 11.8.2007, p. 3; Ndeikwila 2.3.2007, p. 3; Shityuwete 24.7.2007, p. 18; Shityuwete, Never Follow 
the Wolf (London: Kliptown Books, 1990), pp. 96-97). The African-American Institute also established 
a comparable school in Lusaka called Nkumbi College where some Namibians also studied during the 
1960s.  
657 Nepelilo 4.8.2007, pp. 5, 6. 
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returning to his barracks and eating at the camp kitchen, he proceeded to the parade 
where he learned various slogans and songs and his section or platoon was assigned tasks 
for the day. Activities including classes about weapon use, practice on the firing range 
and routine camp maintenance. In the afternoons and during the weekends combatants 
had free time. Occasionally leaders from SWAPO, other liberation movements and the 
Tanzanian government visited the camp to deliver speeches about the liberation struggle 
and related topics.  
 What impressed Tate Nepelilo more than these particular activities, at least in 
retrospect, was the means by which the commanders controlled them and Kongwa's 
inhabitants more generally. As he repeated throughout our meeting, the camp 
commanders were contract workers just like he had been, and few had any formal 
education. They were not older than many of those who were in the camp, most of whom 
were aged thirty and above. Rather, their authority was based on their having arrived in 
exile and received military training first and been given positions by the SWAPO leaders. 
On this basis, “they can just order you [to do] something which you really [don't want to 
do]” or discount questions with refrains such as “This is a military camp” or “Soldiers 
never speak.”658   
 Questions collected around several issues related to daily life in the camp. 
Although soldiers were restricted by their training schedules and limited resources from 
income generating activities,659 they did have free time during afternoons and weekends, 
which they often spent in the village of Kongwa. Soldiers' requests for pocket money for 
                                                 
658 Nepelilo 4.8.2007, pp. 7, 9. 
659 Eventually, some soldiers began to cultivate a garden with maize and other crops near the Kongwa 
camp and to sell their harvest to a local cooperative farm, which in turn sold it at a set rate to the 
Tanzanian government (Ashipala 16.3.2007, pp. 8-9).  
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use on such trips were not well received, however. According to Tate Nepelilo, “Once 
you make a point of money, then the leader [says,] 'You like so much money.' Even while 
he's talking, his whole pocket is full of money. But you, you don't even have a single 
cent.”660 Apparently, such discrepancies were difficult to hide. Although the commanders 
slept in quarters that were separate from the other soldiers and often ate separately as 
well, they lived in the same camp and also spent free time in Kongwa village. Such living 
conditions also made it difficult for commanders to keep other aspects of their lives 
private. Although the commanders warned soldiers, almost all of whom were men, 
against having sexual relationships with women,661 the soldiers thought that some 
commanders were  having such relationships, especially when they did not report to the 
parade and were not found in the camp in the morning. 
 Other concerns, especially in later years, centered on the war. After spending 
several months in Kongwa, Nepelilo traveled with a group to Egpyt for further military 
training, returning to the camp in late 1964 or early 1965.662 He remembers being in the 
camp on March 4, when the first six SWALA members departed from Kongwa via 
Zambia to the Namibian border, which they infiltrated some months later.663 Although, 
when asked, Tate Nepelilo indicated that he did feel some excitement at the time that the 
first group departed for Namibia, his comments focused primarily on the problems that 
                                                 
660 Nepelilo 4.8.2008, p. 16. 
661 Another Kongwa inhabitant, Samson Ndeikwila, recalls, “It was also part of the training that you should 
not be drunk as a guerrilla fighter and you should not be somebody who likes women. It was part of the 
training that if you were going for a war, you don't sleep with a woman. It's a sign of bad luck.” 
Ndeikwila also mentioned during one of our interviews that he knew of only one woman who lived in 
SWAPO's Kongwa camp (Ndeikwila 9.2.2007, p. 5). 
662 According to Ya Toivo Ashipala, who also trained in the same group with Nepelilo in Egypt, the group 
departed for Egypt in May or June 1965 and returned to the camp at Kongwa after six months of 
military training (25.7.2007, p. 13). 
663 For accounts of the first mission of SWALA members, known as Group 1 or G1, into Namibia see 
Katjavivi 1988, pp. 59-60, Nujoma 2001, pp. 159-162.  
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he and other combatants experienced in the years that followed. Although Group 1 (G1) 
managed to establish several bases in northern Namibia, most of G2, which departed 
from Kongwa in February 1966 was arrested by the South African Police in Namibia's 
Kavango Region in May 1966 as were the members of several subsequent groups.664 As 
Kongwa's inhabitants learned about these arrests, rumors spread that they had been 
picked up “like frogs,” i.e. led unwittingly to their capture through the work of a South 
African agent or agents. Suspicions focused on the SWALA Deputy Commander, 
“Castro,” who had participated in the G2 mission but had somehow managed to return to 
Tanzania and had led subsequent groups of soldiers from Kongwa to Namibia.665  
    In this context, Kongwa's order gradually collapsed. Groups were not sent from 
Kongwa to enter Namibia, and Namibians stopped traveling into exile and entering 
Kongwa.666 Soldiers absconded from the parade, and participation in this and other camp 
activities was not enforced, when such activities took place at all. Some persons were 
openly critical of how the camp was and was not being administered and were detained, 
                                                 
664 For information about G2, see the accounts of G2 member  Helao Shityuwete (1990, pp. 101-130) and 
Sam Nujoma (2001, pp. 170-171). The arrest of subsequent groups is confirmed by former Kongwa 
inhabitants interviewed and by Nujoma (2001, pp. 172-173). 
665 According to Castro's own version of events as written from Norway in 1994 (“My History,” a gift to 
the author from Siegfried Groth, who was given the document by Castro directly), he was captured by 
the South Africans but managed to escape his captors before visiting a variety of SWAPO leaders in 
northern Namibia and returning to SWAPO's Tanzanian offices. Castro's version of events is widely 
disputed. In published literature Helao Shityuwete, who was part of the G2 mission and was captured 
with Castro, recounts Castro's participation in his own interrogation (1990, pp. 141-142). Sam Nujoma 
also offers an account of Castro's activities (Nu joma 2001, p. 172). Tate Nepelilo himself offers an 
account of how he accessed information that made him certain that Castro was a spy and of how he 
discussed this information with a Kongwa commander, Peter Hambiya (Nepelilo 4.8.2007, pp. 20-24). 
Among the events widely attributed to Castro are the arrest of OPO founder Andimba Toivo Ya Toivo 
in 1966 and his later imprisonment on Robben Island and the death of SWALA Commander Tobias 
Hainyeko, who was killed in a shoot out along the Zambezi River, just outside Katima Mulilo on May 
18, 1967.  
666 Following the first skirmish between South African and SWAPO soldiers at Omgulumbashe on August 
26, 1966, South Africa began to crackdown on SWAPO, arresting thirty-seven of its members, who 
were tried under the Terrorism Act of 1967, made retroactive to cover SWAPO military activities since 
1962. Some of those convicted in the Terrorism Trial and imprisoned on Robben Island had played 
leading roles in recruiting and facilitating the travel of Namibian exiles, and it is widely accepted that 
the flow of Namibians into exile came to a virtual standstill from then until 1974. 
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such as “the Seven Comrades” a group of educated persons who, after a brief stay at 
Kongwa, presented a critical memorandum to camp commanders in November 1968.667 
Far more inhabitants moved away from the camp quietly. Some slipped into neighboring 
Tanzanian communities, and others made their way to other countries, above all Kenya, 
where some received scholarships to further their education and a community of 
Namibian exiles formed in Nairobi.668 According to Tate Nepelilo, those that went to 
Kenya were at least “a little bit educated” and spoke some English. Without this 
background or this skill, Nepelilo stayed in the camp where he was with others that spoke 
his language and where he and other inhabitants continued to receive food from the 
Tanzanian government. With the exception of a SWAPO sponsored trip for military 
training to the USSR in 1969, he remained at Kongwa until February 1971.  
  In that month, Nepelilo, and forty-nine other Namibians still living in Kongwa,669 
received a visit from several SWAPO leaders, including Secretary of Defense, Peter 
Nanyemba, Administrative Secretary, Moses Garoeb, and Political Secretary, Jesaya 
Nyamu. The visit had been requested by the soldiers through the office of Major 
                                                 
667 “The Seven Comrades” or “Chinamen,” was a group of PLAN combatants who had trained in China 
and were sent to Kongwa in 1968. After living in the camp for several months, the group (with the 
exclusion of one member who was replaced by Samson Ndeikwila, who had not trained in China and 
had begun living in Kongwa the previous year) presented a memorandum to the camp leaders in which 
they expressed their frustrations and called  for Castro's dismissal and a congress, in which military 
strategy could be discussed. From there they were handed over to the Tanzanians, who instead of 
transporting them to SWAPO leaders as they had hoped, sent them directly to the Central Prison in Dar 
es Salaam. They were eventually released from detention in 1970 (Lauren Dobell, Swapo’s Struggle for 
Namibia, 1960-1991: War by Other Means (Basel, Switzerland: P. Schlettwein Publishing, 1991, 2000), 
pp. 37-38; Colin Leys and John S. Saul, Namibia’s Liberation Struggle: The Two Edged Sword 
(London: James Currey, 1995), pp. 43-44; Ndeikwila 2.9.2007, 16.9.2007, 2.3.2007; Kati 11.8.2007). 
Other Kongwa inhabitants were also detained after raising complaints in camp meetings. See, for 
example, Silas Shikongo's account of his arrest (S. Shikongo 16.3.2007). 
668 For more details about the Namibian exile community in Kenya see Ashipala 16.3.2007, pp. 1-2, 
25.7.2007, p. 35; Ndeikwila 21.7.2007, pp. 38-40. Kongwa inhabitants also migrated from Tanzania to 
other countries including Uganda and Ethiopia (Ashipala 16.3.2007, p. 2; Kati 11.8.2007, pp. 12, 15; 
Ndeikwila 2.9.2007, p. 3). 
669 Tate Nepelilo indicates that numbers in the camp increased following his return from Egypt, and other 
former Kongwa residents have estimated that there were 300 or 400 Namibians living in the camp in the 
mid-1960s (e.g. Shityuwete 1990, pp. 99-100, Shityuwete 24.7.2007).  
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Shongambele, and the leaders met with the soldiers one-by-one in the camp hall, 
listening to their grievances and presenting Nyamu as the new commander of the 
camp.670 During his turn Nepelilo recalls Peter Nanyemba explaining the leadership's 
choice to him: “[We] brought some new leadership, new commanders, those that are well 
trained and well educated...because you people don't respect us because we are not well 
educated.”671 The course of events changed, however, when another Kongwa inhabitant, 
Nakale Hukuwonga, took his turn in the hall. Drawing a knife that he had concealed, 
Hukuwonga charged at Peter Nanyemba. Nanyemba managed to avoid the attack, but, 
thereafter, the SWAPO delegation stopped meeting with the soldiers and left the camp. 
Two days later, the remaining camp inhabitants were picked up by Tanzanian officials 
and transported to government prisons in Dodoma and Mbeya. Nepelilo was imprisoned 
in Mbeya until 1972672 when he was transferred to Lusaka where he was again 
imprisoned until 1976. “Six years in prison... Who on earth is six years without doing 
anything? Who?... They put me innocently in prison for six years. Why? They didn't 
bring [me] to the court if [I] did something. Six years!”673 
 As I had learned prior to meeting Tate Nepelilo, there is considerable evidence to 
support details in his story and to suggest overlaps between his other Kongwa inhabitants 
experiences. Although printed references to Kongwa and the people who lived there are 
sparse,674 oral histories of Namibian former Kongwa inhabitants recorded for this thesis 
                                                 
670 According to Tate Nepelilo, Kongwa had no camp commander at all at the time of the February 1971 
visit and had not had one since Castro was imprisoned by the Tanzanian government at SWAPO's 
request in 1969.  
671 Nepelilo 4.8.2007, p. 28. Nyamu had just returned from the United States where he had recently 
completed a bachelor's degree at the University of San Francisco. 
672 It seems most likely that Tate Nepelilo was transferred in 1972 in conjunction with the move of 
SWAPO's base of operations to Zambia in that year. 
673 Nepelilo 4.8.2007, pp. 9-10. 
674 In the Namibian secondary literature there are a few references to Kongwa, but these focus almost 
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offer rich accounts of the past of this community from diverse perspectives, including 
common soldiers and officials, current SWAPO members and dissidents.675 For example, 
other research participants who traveled into exile in 1963 and 1964 also indicate that 
they went there in pursuit of education without any knowledge that SWAPO was training 
combatants for an armed liberation struggle. Once in Tanzania they were assigned to 
Kongwa without being offered a choice or having a clear understanding of where they 
were going although some were warned by students at Kurasini to avoid Kongwa.676 In 
the camp, soldiers came into conflict with commanders who were thought to be overly 
interested in asserting their own authority and disinterested in addressing soldiers' needs 
and concerns.677 Conflict developed around matters emphasized by Tate Nepelilo, such 
as money, women and suspected spies, as well as other issues.678 Some research 
participants also offered details to support accusations made by the soldiers. For example, 
Helao Shityuwete indicates that, after he returned from military training and was 
                                                                                                                                                 
exclusively on the detention of “the Seven Comrades” (see previous footnote) and offer little 
information about the formation and development of the Namibian community there (Lauren Dobell, 
Swapo’s Struggle for Namibia, 1960-1991: War by Other Means (Basel, Switzerland: P. Schlettwein 
Publishing, 1991, 2000), pp. 37-38; Colin Leys and John S. Saul, Namibia’s Liberation Struggle: The 
Two Edged Sword (London: James Currey, 1995), pp. 43-44; Hunter, Justine, Die Politik der 
Erinnerung und des Vergessens in Namibia: Umgang mit schweren Menschenrechtsverletzungen der 
Ära des bewaffneten Befreiungskampfes, 1966 bis 1989 (Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 2008), pp. 77-
80). Two autobiographies have been written by Namibians who spent time in Kongwa, and, while each 
shares some information about the camp, details are limited to a few pages (Shityuwete 1990, pp.  99-
101; Nujoma 2001, pp. 158-160, 171). Documents referring to Kongwa are stored in the Peter Katjavivi 
Collection at the University of Namibia, but few are available. 
675 The following former Kongwa inhabitants were interviewed: (Nepelilo 4.8.2007; Ashipala 16.3.2007, 
25.7.2007; Helmuth 13.7.2007, 10.8.2007; Kati 11.8.2007, 8.12.2007; Ndeikwila 9.2.2007, 16.2.2007, 
2.3.2007, 21.7.2007;  Shityuwete 24.7.2007, 5.6.2008, S. Shikongo 16.3.2007, 26.7.2007). In addition, 
Sam Nujoma and Jesaya Nyamu also offer accounts of their visits to Kongwa in the interviews I held 
with them (Sam Nujoma, Interview 4.3.2008; Jesaya Nyamu 2.4.2008). 
676 Ashipala, 16.3.2007, p. 3; S. Shikongo, 16.3.2007 pp. 4,5; Kati, 11.8.2007, pp. 16, 17. 
677 Ashipala 16.3.2007, p. 23; Shityuwete 24.7.2007, p. 5. 
678 Among the most volatile issues in Kongwa were the treatment of Caprivians. Having first entered the 
camp after the merger between SWAPO and CANU in November 1964, conflict developed among 
Kongwa's Ovambo and Caprivian inhabitants during 1965 and two former CANU leaders were expelled 
from SWAPO. Helao Shityuwete offers detailed accounts of the 1965 conflict (Shityuwete 24.7.2007; 
5.6.2008), and all former Kongwa inhabitants interviewed make some reference to it. It was also one of 
the concerns introduced to the SWAPO leaders in the memorandum written by the Seven Comrades in 
1968 (Ndeikwila 9.2.2007; 16.2.2007; 2.3.2007). 
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appointed Third Secretary of SWALA in May 1965, he became aware that the long-
standing commanders at Kongwa were not dispersing items intended for all its 
inhabitants and that some were disobeying camp rules by sleeping with women outside 
the camp.679 He and others also claimed to have definitive evidence that Castro was 
working as a South African spy.680 By 1967 camp routines, such as attendance at the 
parade and participation in training activities had broken down, and inhabitants had 
begun migrating from the camp.681 
 Even Tate Nepelilo's account of the meeting with the SWAPO officials in 
February 1971 and its aftermath, about which I had not heard prior to our interview, was 
later corroborated in many of its details by Jesaya Nyamu, the official presented to the 
soldiers at the meeting as the new camp commander. Nyamu recalls: 
We went into the camp. We wanted to speak to the 
gentlemen called one-by-one. They said if we wanted to 
speak to them, they wanted to be all present. And we said, 
'No, when you joined, you did not join in a group. You 
joined one by one. So we want to hear the view of each one 
of you separately.' And, of course, finally, one of them spoke 
to us, who was very agitated. And he was literally targeting 
the Secretary of Defense [Peter Nanyemba]. Not so much the 
rest of us, who were not so much known to them you know. 
And then we had another discussion with a second one. That 
one I think pulled out... a knife. I cannot remember. I can 
only remember that there was chaos. Until one of us jumped 
out of the window and went to alert the Tanzanian Defense 
                                                 
679 According to Shityuwete, due to his education relative to other SWAPO commanders, upon completing 
his military training in Ghana, he was made responsible for keeping the camp records at Kongwa. In 
reviewing previous records, he discovered discrepancies between the books at SWAPO's office in Dar 
es Salaam, which indicated that items had been sent to Kongwa, and the books at Kongwa, which had 
no record of these items. He also started keeping attendance records at Kongwa, noting all persons, 
including commanders, who did not turn up at the parade. Within a few months of his arrival, a conflict 
developed which pit him and other commanders who had recently taken up positions in Kongwa against 
the older leadership including Castro. Eventually, Sam Nujoma, Peter Nanyemba and Tobias Hainyeko 
visited the camp and called a meeting, during which both sides expressed their concerns about the other 
and tensions were eased (Shityuwete 24.7.2007, pp. 2-6). 
680 E.g. Shityuwete 1990, pp. 141-142. 
681 Ashipala 16.3.2007, pp. 33-35; Kati 11.8.2007, p. 2. 
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Force, who came promptly to our rescue.682  
 
 Despite these and other overlapping accounts of happenings narrated by Tate 
Nepelilo, such histories remain obscure. Most research participants when asked about 
Kongwa and particular people and events connected to that place demonstrated little 
knowledge of them in comparison with other sites of Namibia's exile history. This point 
applies not only to persons affiliated with SWAPO, whose representatives have focused 
on describing the exploits of the guerrillas infiltrating Namibia rather than on the places 
where they trained and lived,683 but also to the party's critics, many of whom are largely 
uninformed about  the first SWAPO administered camp and the conflicts that developed 
there. 
 To some extent, ignorance of such histories can be attributed to the stigma 
attached to them  prior to the time when most Namibians entered exile. Clearly, the kind 
of story Tate Nepelilo tells does not fit into a national narrative about “freedom fighters,” 
who went abroad so that they could liberate their country through arms, and “comrades,” 
united and equal in their commitment to “the struggle.” Any evidence that could support 
such a story might threaten national leaders and is, therefore, unlikely to have been 
discussed by exiles outside closed social networks. At the same time, those who told 
specific stories similar to Tate Nepelilo's became associated with stigma within the 
Namibian exile community. Kongwa inhabitants who moved to Kenya were labeled 
“deserters,” and SWAPO leaders  discouraged the liberation movement's members from 
having any contact with them.684 Similarly, “the Seven Comrades,” who presented the  
                                                 
682 Nyamu 2.4.2008, p. 5. 
683 See, for example, Katjavivi 1988, pp. 59-64, Nujoma 2001, pp. 157-174. 
684 For example, Nambinga Kati offers the following account of an encounter in 1975 between a group of 
Namibians who entered exile during “the exodus” (See Chapter 3) and the Namibian exile community 
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memorandum to camp commanders at Kongwa in 1968, were identified as an object of 
derision and accused of having been spies. For the majority of exiles, who traveled 
abroad from 1974, any critical histories of Kongwa which they heard are likely to have 
been associated first with the “deserters” and “the Seven Comrades,” and few exiles 
would  have had the opportunity to hear these or other dissidents from Kongwa share 
their views directly. 
 Moreover, communities have not formed around articulating stories about 
Kongwa in the way that they have around other sites of controversial exile histories.685  
While living in exile, there was little impetus for former Kongwa inhabitants to talk 
openly about their experiences in the camp. Some remained in SWAPO camps, having 
been relocated from Kongwa to southwestern Zambia during the late 1960s and early 
1970s.686 Those who were living outside SWAPO's direct administration and who may 
have wanted to justify their flight from Kongwa were also likely to tread cautiously. 
Former Kongwa inhabitants who migrated from Tanzania often avoided mentioning that 
they had any association with SWAPO because it might lead government officials to 
deny them entrance or to reject  their scholarship applications on the premise that they 
were the responsibility of their liberation movement and should return to SWAPO 
                                                                                                                                                 
in Kenya, of which he was a part: “I remember a group that came from Lusaka for education in Kenya. 
We heard that they were coming and so we went to receive them at the airport [in Nairobi]. I was 
surprised to see that these kids were running away from us... Then later on the story came out that they 
were told to be careful... An officer told them, 'You are going to Nairobi, be careful there are rogues 
there. They will even steal your luggage. Don't talk to them at all. Don't allow them to come near you. 
They are not good people.' Then when we went to the airport to welcome them to shake hands with 
them, they had to run away from us” (Kati 11.8.2007). 
685 One might consider, in comparison, groups like the Committee of Parents, the Lubango “ex-detainees” 
and the Breaking the Wall of Silence of Movement, all of which are the focus of analysis in Chapter 5. 
686 According to Tate Nepelilo, while his group was training in the Soviet Union in 1969-1970 those living 
in Kongwa were relocated to camps in southwestern Zambia. Also, some of those detained with Tate 
Nepelilo moved to the Zambian front (Nepelilo 4.8.2007, pp. 34-35). According to Samson Ndeikwila, 
a group of Kongwa inhabitants were turned away from entering Kenya around 1970 and returned to 
SWAPO, where they eventually took up positions in PLAN (Ndeikwila 21.7.2007, p. 41).  
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headquarters in Dar es Salaam.687 At the same time, the relationship of former Kongwa 
inhabitants to SWAPO was ambiguous, and some of them wanted to retain an affiliation 
with the liberation movement and became actively involved in it again in later years.688 
Under the circumstances, even the community of Namibians living in Kenya was 
cautious in making public statements about their experiences in Kongwa.689 
 Independence also initiated processes, which, on the whole, pulled Kongwa's 
former inhabitants apart. As early as the negotiations over Namibian independence 
during the mid-1970s, some exiles living in Kenya accepted offers of protection issued 
by the South African government and returned to Namibia.690 Others repatriated in 1989 
with SWAPO, and still others remained in exile, having integrated themselves into 
communities or passed away there. Although some, especially those who accessed 
education in exile, held regular jobs following their return to Namibia, many have not 
and are highly reliant on social networks, and accepting the political allegiances of those 
within these networks, to meet everyday needs. In 1996 Samson Ndeikwila, one of the 
Seven Comrades, who had lived in Kenya for eight years before repatriating to Namibia 
in 1978, became the founding Chairperson of the Breaking the Wall of Silence 
Movement. Relatively few exiles from the 1960s, however, have associated with BWS 
and its direct challenge to Namibia's official exile history. More have participated in the 
                                                 
687 Ashipala 16.3.2007, pp. 1-2; Ndeikwila 21.7.2007, p. 41. 
688 Kati 11.8.2007. For example, in a public statement issued following the journey of two exiles from their 
site of detention in Mboroma, Zambia to Nairobi in April 1977 (see Chapter 3), the authors refer to 
themselves at one point as “we Namibian SWAPO members in Kenya” (UNAM, Katjavivi Collection, 
Series B1, Category 5, File 8, “Appeal for the Release of over 1,000 Namibians in Detentions in 
Zambia and in Tanzania,” p. 1). 
689 “Appeal for the Release of over 1,000 Namibians in Detentions in Zambia and in Tanzania” is one 
controversial public statement  that the Namibian exile community in Kenya did release. While 
highlighting the conditions and circumstances behind detentions in Mboroma, however, the document 
makes only passing reference to smaller groups of detainees in Zambian and Tanzanian government 
prisons and does not discuss how these detentions relate to Kongwa.  
690 Ashipala 16.3.2007; Ndeikwila 9.2.2007; 21.7.2007; S. Shikongo 16.3.2007. 
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initiatives of various groups of “ex-combatants,” lobbying for support from the Namibian 
government on the basis of their contributions to SWAPO during the liberation 
struggle.691 Many have not associated with any organization making claims on the state 
through references to exile history at all.  
 Even among Kongwa's former inhabitants, some do not know about Tate Nepelilo 
and others' experiences in Kongwa from 1969. During the late '60s as Kongwa's 
inhabitants began to leave the camp for other places, Nairobi became a hub for 
knowledge about Kongwa among those who were no longer living there. New groups 
would depart from Kongwa and arrive in Kenya, and correspondence was maintained 
between Namibians in Nairobi and Namibians in the camp through trusted third parties 
living in Kongwa village who received and mailed letters on their behalves.692 Following 
Castro's arrest in 1969, communication appears to have broken down. Research 
participants who lived in Kongwa during previous years offered vague accounts of what 
they thought had happened to those living in Kongwa at this time, including that they had 
been sent to the USSR for further training, had been stationed with PLAN units in 
southwestern Zambia and that they had been taken to an agricultural camp in northern 
Tanzania.693 No former Kongwa inhabitants who left the camp before 1971 spoke of the 
meeting at Kongwa with the SWAPO officials. And even Jesaya Nyamu claims that he 
was not aware of what had happened to the camp's inhabitants after his 1971 visit. 
                                                 
691 In June 2007 the Committee for the Welfare of Ex-Combatants went on strike in downtown Windhoek, 
demanding renumeration from the government for their participation in the armed struggle. In 
conjunction with this event, I gathered information about the backgrounds of some those assembled at 
the strike. Research participants were also asked about the demographics of the ex-combatants, 
including Alex Kamwi (26.2.2007), the Spokesperson for Committee for the Welfare of Ex-Combatants 
and Helao Shityuwete (24.7.2007), a former Kongwa inhabitant who has interfaced with groups of ex-
combatants on projects over many years.  
692 Ashipala 25.7.2007, pp. 35-36. 
693 According to Samson Ndeikwila, some tried to join others in Kenya but were refused entrance by the 
Kenyan government, after which they joined SWAPO at the front (Ndeikwila 21.7.2007, pp. 41-43). 
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 Such lacunae in social awareness of Namibian exile histories have made Tate 
Nepelilo vulnerable. In 1976 he and others imprisoned with him in Lusaka received a 
visit from a SWAPO official, Richard Kapelwa, who offered him and other inmates the 
opportunity to join soldiers at the front in southwestern Zambia. Although some accepted 
the offer, Nepelilo declined, and shortly thereafter accepted an offer extended by the 
United Nations to become a refugee. In so doing, Nepelilo asserted his agency vis a vis 
SWAPO, which he felt had grossly mistreated him, but, at the same time, stepped 
irrevocably outside the organization and any opportunities that it might have been able to 
offer him in the future. In 1977 Nepelilo was transferred from Lusaka to the UN 
administered Maheba Refugee Camp in northwestern Zambia, where he met Abed 
Hauwanga, our translator, and about 200 other Namibians who had recently left SWAPO 
after having been released following a year's detention under severe conditions at 
Mboroma.694 Although many of the 200 were able to access  scholarships for further 
training through contacts made while living at the UN camp, Nepelilo did not have the 
basic education that he would have needed to access these and, within a year, he and 
some others with whom he had been imprisoned in Lusaka, left the camp. Eventually 
they made their way to Ondjiva, a town 50 kilometers from the Namibian border in the 
predominantly Oshikwanyama speaking part of southern Angola, where they lived for 
several years. In the early 1980s in the context of rising violence around Ondjiva, 
Nepelilo reentered Namibia as an Angolan refugee. After twenty years away from home, 
some of his closest family members had died. Others were critical of him because he had 
“left” SWAPO. Nepelilo did manage to reconnect with an uncle working in a government 
                                                 
694 They were among the soldiers detained at the front in conjunction with the SWAPO conflict in 1976 
(See Chapter 3). 
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office in Ohangwena who was able to give him a residential registration card that he 
could use to identify himself. He was not, however, recognized by the state as a citizen 
either before or after independence.  
 In 2005 Abed Hauwanga and Tate Nepelilo met one another again, this time on a 
street in Tsumeb. By then Abed was an employee at the Office of Home Affairs but Tate 
Nepelilo still did not have a Namibian ID card and was, therefore, not receiving a 
pension from the Namibian government despite the fact that his age should have 
qualified him for it. Through his professional contacts, Abed was able to issue an ID for 
Nepelilo and later arranged for him to enter the Tsumeb Old Age Home, where in lieu of 
a family, he could have a bed and receive regular meals. Since then, Abed had been 
making regular visits to the Home to visit him and bring him the disposable razors that he 
requested – so that he could shave before church services on Sundays.   
 After handing our host a new package of razors, Abed and I stood up to leave. As 
we said our good-byes, I told Tate Nepelilo that I would be transcribing our interview 
and that I planned to return to him and Abed with a transcript to check if I had 
understood all the information that he had shared with me correctly. Tate Nepelilo replied 
that he hoped that I would return, adding “I look forward to seeing my history.”  
 
Vaalgras 
 About 80 kilometers northeast of Keetmanshoop and 50 kilometers east of the B1 
highway lies a place called Vaalgras.695 Like the surrounding region, Vaalgras is dry, 
rocky and sparsely populated, with several hundred people living in modest homes of 
                                                 
695 Vaalgras is also sometimes referred to by  its name in Khoekhoegowab, “/Hei- /gâseb” and German 
“Fahlgras,” meaning 'faded grass.'   
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brick and corrugated iron scattered across a communal land area.696 Most of Vaalgras' 
inhabitants live off of a mixed-economy of small livestock herding and remittances sent 
by family members who reside in Namibia's urban areas or who work on land owned by 
white farmers outside the communal area. Vaalgras also supports a few small shops, 
several churches and a Catholic primary school in Koichas, one of the areas of more 
concentrated settlement within Vaalgras.  
 The community that lives in Vaalgras today traces its history to the 1830s when 
its ancestors moved away from other Herero pastoralists in search of grazing land for 
their cattle to the south.697 During the 1860s, after a few decades living among 
Khoekhoe-speaking communities,698 some traveled into “exile” south of the Orange 
River, where they worked in copper mines and farms in the northwestern part of the Cape 
Colony.699 In 1895 they crossed back over the Orange River into the territory which by 
this time had been claimed as Deutsch Südwest Afrika, and were soon recruited by the 
                                                 
696 In 1993 the population of Vaalgras was estimated to be 607 persons (Santos Joas, Historical and 
Political Background Research on Five Community Schools in Namibia, (Windhoek: Africa Groups of 
Sweden, 1994)). The community has remained fairly stable since then, and, if anything, has probably 
decreased in size as increasing numbers of people move to urban areas. 
697 Jeremy Silvester, “Assembling and Resembling: Herero History in Vaalgras, Southern Namibia,” 
Michael Bollig and Jan-Bart Gewald, eds. People, cattle and land- Transformations of a pastoral society 
in southwestern Africa, (Köln: Rudiger Koppe Verlag, 2000) p. 477; Sarafina Biwa, “The History of the 
Vaalgras People of Namibia,” (Paper presented at “Public History, Forgotten History,” a conference at 
the UNAM History Department, 2000), p. 5. In addition, to these sources two other unpublished 
manuscripts focus on the history of the Vaalgras community and are cited below: K.F.R.H Budack “'N 
Volkekundige studie van die Tses Reservaat (Distrik Keetmanshoop, Suidwes Afrika) met besondere 
verwysing na die geskiedenis en die iner – etniese verhouding van die bewoners” (MA Thesis, 
University of Pretoria, 1965); Johannes Katzao, “The Armed Response to the German Attack at Köes,” 
(gift to the author, 2007). Dr. Katzao and others from Vaalgras have also been interviewed about 
various aspects of the community's history and are cited below. 
698 There was considerable conflict in southern Namibia during this time, and many of those from Herero 
backgrounds living in Khoekhoe-speaking communities became dependents or were imprisoned. 
According to some accounts,  the ancestors of Vaalgras' inhabitants were also mistreated during this 
time (Budack 1965, p. 59; Silvester 2000, p. 477; Biwa 2000, p. 5).   
699 Budack 1965, pp. 60-61; Silvester 2000, pp. 478-481; Biwa 2000, pp. 6-7. In narrating their history, 
people from Vaalgras often evoke the idea of a community which was forced into “exile” and, after 
decades of hardship, managed to return “home.” It should be further noted that the trope of exile has 
been used among other Herero-identifying groups to refer to those who fled into Bechuanaland 
following the Battle of the Waterberg in 1904.     
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Germans to use their oxen, which they had accumulated while working in the Cape, to 
transport  materials from the coastal town of Lüderitz to Keetmanshoop, about 300 
kilometers inland.700 In May 1908 the community's leader, Jan Appolus, signed an 
agreement with the German government to settle at Vaalgras as a reward for their loyalty 
during the 1903-1908 wars which had pitted the Germans against many of Namibia's 
indigenous communities.701 In 1923, following the League of Nations mandate, the South 
African government incorporated Vaalgras into a broader communal area named the Tses 
Reserve, where a variety of communities displaced by the 1903-1908 war were 
resettled.702 Within this arrangement inhabitants of Vaalgras maintained their own 
communal area and retained their distinctiveness as a group by marrying primarily within 
the community.   
 During the latter half of the 20th century, Vaalgras became associated with a 
different exile history. In the late 1950s a group of Namibians living in Cape Town, 
South Africa formed the Ovamboland People's Congress (OPC), a nationalist 
                                                 
700 Silvester 2000, pp. 482-484; Biwa pp. 7-8. The use of the ethnic label “Oorlam” or “Oorlam Herero” to 
refer to people from Vaalgras may be attributed to this migration. Zedekia Ngavirue, a Namibian 
scholar and one of Biwa's research participants, suggests that “Oorlam” was a mispronunciation of the 
Afrikaans word “oorland” used to refer to “overland people” or “foreigners.” As Biwa and Silvester 
also note, the group that crossed over the Orange River in 1895 was following in the footsteps of Jonker 
Afrikaner and others Khoekhoe speakers of mixed racial background who were referred to a century 
earlier as “Oorlam.”  
701 Budack 1965, p. 64.Silvester 2000, p. 484; Biwa 2000, p. 8. In 1899 Oorlam Herero, with the support of 
the German government, built a well in the area of Vaalgras. During the war those who had been living 
in the area around Vaalgras had fled or been removed to Keetmanshoop. It was on this basis, 
apparently, that the land was selected for settlement by the community led by Jan Appolus (Budack 
1965, pp. 62-64). Among those who settled in Vaalgras under Jan Appolus at this time were not only 
persons who had returned from the Cape Colony and worked as transporters for the Germans, but also 
people with common heritage who had settled in areas around Vaalgras, had never crossed over the 
Orange River and had fought alongside the Veldschoendragers and others against the Germans. These 
communities are the focal point of Dr. Katzao's manuscript and he offers a  narrative of how these two 
branches of today's Vaalgras community reunited with one another following the 1903-1908 wars 
(Katzao 2007, pp. 65-66; Johannes Katzao, Interview 3.5.2007, p. 6). Members of the Vaalgras 
community sometimes distinguish between those who did not cross the Orange River from those that 
did by referring to the former as “Nama-Daman” and the latter as “Oorlams.” 
702 Budack 1965, pp. 65, 76; Silvester 2000, p. 484-485. 
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organization focused on the plight of Ovambo workers most directly affected by the 
contract labor system. Among the founding members of the OPC and one of the only 
non-Ovambos was Emil Appolus, a young man from Vaalgras, who was studying 
journalism in Cape Town at that time.703 Following his return to Namibia, he became the 
founding editor of the Suidwes Nuus, Namibia's first nationalist newspaper, and he, Sam 
Nujoma and others were elected executive members of the South West African National 
Union (SWANU), an umbrella for nationalist organizations established under the 
auspices of the Herero Chiefs' Council.704 Following December 10, 1959, when residents 
from Windhoek's Old Location were shot and killed during a protest of their forced 
removal to the apartheid township of Katutura, Appolus and other prominent leaders of 
Namibian nationalist organizations fled  into exile, making their way to Dar es Salaam. 
There, Appolus was named SWAPO's first Secretary for Information and Publicity and 
opened the organization's office in Cairo, where some of the first SWAPO guerrillas 
were trained, and in Francistown, where many of SWAPO's first guerrillas were 
recruited.705 On July 18, 1966 Appolus drafted the response to the International Court of 
Justice's verdict in favor of the status quo in Namibia, formally inaugurating Namibia's 
armed liberation struggle.706 Thereafter, his words were repeated as inspiration by 
SWAPO members committed to resisting South African oppression through armed 
                                                 
703 Katjavivi 1988, p. 20; Paul Helmuth, Interview 13.7.2007, p. 13. 
704 Katjavivi 1988, p. 43; Johannes Katzao, Interview 3.5.2007, pp. 2-3. 
705 Helmuth 13.7.2007, p. 8; Hildegard Pütz, Paul and Sandra Caplan and Ralph and Adeline von Egidy, 
eds. Namibia Handbook and Political Who's Who (Windhoek: The Magnus Company, 1989), p. 124. 
706 In December 1960 the governments of Liberia and Ethiopia initiated a case against the South African 
government at the the ICJ, challenging the legal status of South Africa's continued rule over Namibia. 
On July 18, 1966 the ICJ decided that it could not issue a ruling on the case, effectively supporting the 
status quo in Namibia. SWAPO issued a response to the ruling on the same day. The document was 
signed by Peter Nanyemba, then SWAPO's Chief Representative to East Africa, on behalf of the party. 
According to Peter Katjavivi, Deputy Representative to East Africa at that time, it was Appolus who 
actually wrote the document while he and  Nanyemba offered some comments on it (Peter Katjavivi, 
“Tribute to Emil Appolus,” New Era, 31.5.2005, Peter Katjavivi, Interview 23.7.2008). 
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struggle: “The course has been set. We have no alternative but to rise in arms and bring 
about our own liberation. The supreme test must be faced and we must at once begin to 
cross the many rivers of blood on our march towards freedom.”707            
 Over the coming decades Vaalgras community members' involvement in national 
politics expanded and intensified. In 1964 the South African government issued the 
Odendaal Plan, its blue-print for creating ethnic homelands in Namibia. According to the 
plan, people from Vaalgras were located in “Namaland,” the homeland for Namibia's 
“Nama people.” During the early 1970s, South African officials began to implement the 
Plan by moving people defined by it as Nama into Namaland and by moving those 
defined by it as Herero and Damara to their respective homelands, hundreds of 
kilometers away.708 The Vaalgras community managed to resist removal both on the 
basis of its members' cultural characteristics, above all the fact that they spoke 
Khoekhoegowab rather than Otjiherero,709 and the authority of a treaty made between Jan 
Appolus and the German government in 1908.710 Nonetheless, the process of resisting 
removal and of responding to other happenings in Namibia and beyond politicized the 
Vaalgras community. In 1974 Joseph “Pereb” Stephanus, a student from Vaalgras 
studying at St. Therese, a Catholic mission school on the Tses Reserve, established a 
chapter of the SWAPO Youth League, and he and other students began traveling to 
                                                 
707 UNAM, Katjavivi Collection, Series A, “Unregistered Correspondence 1961-1969,” “Press Release by 
the South West African People's Organisation, Dar es Salaam, 18th July, 1966.” 
708 For a review of efforts to implement and resist the Odendaal Plan in “Namaland,” see Reinhart Kößler, 
“From Reserve to Homeland: Local Identities and South African Policy in Southern Namibia,” Journal 
of Southern African Studies, 26, 3 (2000), pp. 447-462; Christian A. Williams, “Student Political 
Consciousness: Lessons from a Namibian Mission School,” Journal of Southern African Studies, 30,3, 
(2004) pp. 548-549.   
709 Khoekhoegowab is often referred to in Namibia simply as “Nama” or “Damara,” depending on the 
ethnic identity attributed to the speaker. There were a small number of people living in Vaalgras who 
spoke Otjiherero at that time, but Nama and Afrikaans, rather than Otjiherero, were the shared 
languages of the community (Basson 31.5.2007). 
710 Silvester 2000, p. 491; Williams 2004, p. 548. 
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neighboring communities canvassing support for SWAPO.711 In October 1976 Vaalgras 
Chief Jöel Stefanus stood alongside other traditional leaders in Namaland in opposing 
Turnhalle, the meetings organized by the South African government as an “internal 
solution” to the conflict in Namibia, and pledging his community's support for 
SWAPO.712 On November 5, 1976, Willem Konjore from Vaalgras and teachers from 
surrounding communities traveled to Gibeon to protest racial discrimination under the 
South African education system.713 A few days later, on November 11, St. Therese pupils 
led a strike in solidarity with students in Soweto, and several, including Stephanus and 
others from Vaalgras, left the school to join SWAPO in exile immediately thereafter.714 
By the 1980s at least twenty-five persons from Vaalgras had traveled abroad to join 
SWAPO in exile.715 These included prominent SWAPO activists such as Ben Boys, Eric 
                                                 
711 For an analysis of how political consciousness developed among St. Therese students during the mid-
1970s and students' interactions with groups outside the mission, see Williams 2004 and Christian A. 
Williams, Remembering St. Therese (Windhoek: Out of Africa, 2003). More recently, Immanuel Hinda 
narrated to me an account of how St. Therese students' meetings were received in Vaalgras at this time 
(Hinda 19.9.2007, pp. 3-4). 
712 Katjavivi 1988, pp. 99-100; Andries Basson, Interview 31.5.2007, pp. 4-6; Willem Konjore, Interview 
22.7.2008. Pastor Hendrik Witbooi from Gibeon, Stefanus Goliath from Berseba and H. Noeteb from 
Hoachanas also pledged their support to SWAPO on behalf of their communities at this time. Andries 
Basson, Eric Biwa, Ben Boys and Lukas Stefanus, all of whom hailed from Vaalgras and had studied at 
St. Therese, also played a critical role in the lead up to the October 1976 meeting at which Jöel Stefanus 
and others pledged their support for SWAPO, by establishing a SWAPO cell in Gibeon and 
encouraging local leaders to take a stand on national political issues (Basson 31.5.2007, pp. 4-6). 
713 Konjore, 22.7.2008. According to Minister Konjore, who was the Vice-Chairperson of the Nama 
Teachers' Association, he and others traveled to Gibeon on November 5, 1976 to meet the education 
inspector and discuss the unequal dispensation for teachers classified by the government as “Nama” and 
“Coloured” under the Department for Coloured, Baster and Nama Affairs.” When the inspector did not 
come to the meeting, many of the teachers remained in Gibeon on strike from November until January 
the following year. 
714 Accounts of the strike and St. Therese students' flight into exile are also offered in Williams 2003 (pp. 
80-82) and 2004 (pp. 555-557). 
715 Joesph “Pereb” Stephanus, Interview 18.9.2007, pp. 35, 40. In this interview Mr. Stephanus generated 
the following list of names:  Emil Appolus, Dominicus Stephanus, Damianus Stephanus, Willem 
Rukero, Joseph Katzao, Joseph (Boetieman) Katzao, Joseph Hange, Aaron “Hage” Stephanus, Pius 
Stephanus, Joseph “Pereb” Stephanus, Jan Stephanus, Ounooi Stephanus, Joseph Pieters, Theresia 
Basson, Isaack Basson, Andries Basson, Ben Boys, Eric Biwa, Richard Biwa, Elias !Goraseb, Lukas 
Stephanus of the Konjore family, the other Lukas Stephanus, Dominikus Appolus and Johannes 
Konjore. The list excludes former exiles from neighboring communities whose families have more 
distant connections with Vaalgras. 
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Biwa and Lukas Stephanus all of whom were appointed to the SWAPO Central 
Committee and Andries Basson, who became a high-ranking officer with PLAN.  
 At the same time, rifts were developing between SWAPO and people from 
Vaalgras associated with the liberation movement in exile. At the Tanga Conference in 
1969-1970 Emil Appolus was dropped from his position as SWAPO Secretary for 
Information and Publicity. Thereafter he worked in New York and in London as a 
freelance journalist until August 1976, when, shortly after the arrest and expulsion of 
hundreds of Namibians in Zambia,716 Appolus received a letter from SWAPO indicating 
that he had been expelled from the party.717 In November of the same year, Appolus 
returned to Namibia.718 No sooner had he arrived, than he was condemned by SWAPO 
representatives. For example, on November 27, 1976 SWAPO's Gibeon Branch issued a 
statement “Comrades of Vaalgras” on the topic of Emil Appolus' repatriation: 
This is not the same Emil Appolus who left the country 
many years ago. Then he was a fighter and a person who 
had the interests of Namibia at heart. Today, he is an 
instrument of a South African government plan to confuse 
the Namibians, following the failure of Turnhalle... He used 
to be a patriot, but his weaknesses allowed the imperialist 
and colonial agents to buy him over... Be warned, people of 
Namibia: do not listen to or waste time with this  
mouthpiece for imperialism and colonialism. 
 
In December 1976 this statement was published in Namibia News, the newsletter sent by 
SWAPO from its London office to supporters all over the world, as was a cartoon titled 
“Turnhalle Puppets,” which pictures Appolus and other exiles who returned to Namibia 
                                                 
716 For more details, see Chapter 3. 
717 Stephanus 18.9.2007, pp. 41-42; “Returned exiles are tools of SA plot,” Namibia News, 9, 12 
(December 1976) , p. 9. In his account, Stephanus recounts how Appolus described the letter and his 
reaction to it. 
718 Willem Konjore recalls encountering Appolus in Gibeon while he was on strike there with other 
teachers. According to Konjore, when Appolus returned from exile, Chief Jöel Stefanus drove to 
Windhoek to pick Appolus up from the airport. Later, the two of them stopped in Gibeon while 
traveling en route to Vaalgras (Konjore 22.7.2008)   
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in 1976 as marionettes attached by strings to South African Prime Minister B.J. Vorster. 
Other statements issued by SWAPO at the time and in later years also focus on Appolus, 
associating him with the Turnhalle Talks and denouncing him generally.719 Thenceforth, 
relations between Appolus and people from Vaalgras were strained. Following his 
repatriation, Appolus avoided discussing his opinions about politics with people from his 
family and home community, and he rarely visited Vaalgras.720   
  During the 1980s exiles from Vaalgras were among those who were accused of 
spying and disappeared in the SWAPO's Lubango camps.721 They were also some of the 
best known figures to become associated with these happenings. The disappearance of 
prominent persons from Vaalgras was widely reported in letters spread throughout a 
Namibian diaspora living in Europe and in Namibia itself as was the reappearance of Ben 
Boys who “confessed” to his spying on a film first shown in Lusaka on March 4, 1985 
and later in several European capitals.722 Despite efforts made by some Vaalgras leaders 
to glean more information from SWAPO leaders about community members living under 
the liberation movement in exile, their circumstances remained unclear before exiles' 
repatriation. In 1989 only nine from Vaalgras returned, all of them Lubango ex-
detainees.723 “The missing persons” from Vaalgras have never returned.724  
                                                 
719 E.g. UNAM, Katjavivi Collection, Series B1, Category 4, “Memorandum from SWAPO Department of 
Information to Governments, National and International Organizations, 11th January, 1977” and 
“Statement by Comrade Mishake Muyongo, SWAPO Vice-President, Before the Committee of 24, on 
25th February, 1977.” In his autobiography Sam Nujoma offers the following assessment of Emil 
Appolus: “Appolus turned out to be a playboy and useless to us. He drifted away from SWAPO and 
years later came back to join the South African colonial administration of local bantustan political 
schemes” (Nujoma 2001, p. 147). 
720 Stephanus 31.5.2005, 15.6.2005; Katzao 5.6.2007; Hinda 21.9.2007; Konjore 22.7.2008. Interestingly, 
in our interview Willem Konjore maintained that  when Appolus returned to Namibia in 1976, he was 
seen as a disappointment to both SWAPO and the DTA since he was unwilling to talk openly about his 
experiences with SWAPO abroad.  
721 For more details, see Chapter 4. 
722 For more information and references, see Chapter 5.  
723 Stephanus 18.9.2007, p. 40. According to Stephanus, the group that returned at this time were: Aaron 
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 In 2005 I had an opportunity to glimpse how such exile histories shape ways in 
which Vaalgras inhabitants relate to the Namibian nation and one another. On Sunday, 
May 29, I was in Keetmanshoop visiting Joseph Stephanus, when I learned from him that 
Emil Appolus had died the previous day. Stephanus and others were arranging the funeral 
service, scheduled to take place the following weekend in Vaalgras. For me the funeral 
presented a chance both to commemorate the life of a person whom I knew through my 
studies of history and to visit people from Vaalgras with whom I had worked since first 
becoming a volunteer teacher on the nearby Tses Mission five years earlier. With 
Stephanus' encouragement, I began making arrangements to attend.  
 On Friday, June 3, several former St. Therese students and I made the drive out to 
Vaalgras. Arriving in the evening, we attended an informal service during which people 
sat in the open air, sharing stories and singing hymns in memory of the late Emil 
Appolus. For me the most striking remarks that evening were not those made about 
Appolus directly, but rather about visitors who were coming to his funeral. As Andries 
Biwa, the presiding minister, frequently repeated, people must be on their “best 
behavior” at the funeral because many “VIPs” would be there. He further emphasized 
that at the funeral the Vaalgras community's “reputation” would be at stake.  
 The next morning shiny Mercedes with tinted windows and donkey carts drove on 
the dirt road leading to Vaalgras side by side. By 9 am people had assembled at the house 
of a family member of the deceased and began walking towards the AME church where 
most of us packed into wooden pews in the church's nave. Thirty-three guests, however, 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Hage” Stephanus, Joseph “Pereb” Stephanus, Oumooi Stephanus, Theresia Basson, Andries Basson, 
Ben Boys, Eric Biwa, Dominikus Appolus and Johannes Konjore. 
724 One former exile from Vaalgras, Damianus Stephanus, was sent to Nigeria as a school pupil. As he was 
known to be studying there, he was never seen as a “missing person.” He returned to Namibia long after 
most exiles repatriated (Stephanus 18.9.2007, p. 40). 
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entered the church through a separate door and were seated in front of the congregation 
in chairs on a raised stage. Three of those on the platform were pastors, two were 
cameramen affiliated with the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC), who were 
covering the funeral for a national television audience, six were family members of the 
deceased and the rest dignitaries. The latter included OPC founder Andimba Toivo Ya 
Toivo, Namibia's former Prime Minister Hage Geingob and the then Chief Whip for 
SWAPO in Parliament, Ben Amathila.  
 The service proceeded around ten tributes to Emil Appolus delivered by various 
persons seated on stage. The first was a song performed by Namibian music legend and 
former exile, Jackson Kaujeua.  This was followed by tributes from five family members, 
including Appolus' niece Maureen Hinda and his two children, Jomo Appolus and Norah 
Appolus. Four messages were offered by dignitaries, including one delivered by Toivo 
Ya Toivo, addresses read on behalf of the Namibian President Lucas Pohamba and 
SWAPO President Sam Nujoma and a final offering by Vaalgras Chief Jöel Stefanus. 
The tributes were interspersed with hymns and were followed by a sermon, offering and 
announcements led by Reverend Biwa.  
 Throughout the service speakers associated with the local community made 
considerable effort to engage social elites in their midst. All remarks made in 
Khoekhoegowab and Afrikaans, the dominant languages in the region, were translated 
into English, the national language. Comments welcoming and expressing appreciation to 
guests were made repeatedly, and particular visitors, above all Toivo Ya Toivo, Geingob 
and Amathila, were singled out. At the same time, speakers at the funeral with close 
connections to Vaalgras were evoking a reciprocal relationship between the elites and the 
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community. Towards the end of the service, Andries Biwa and his son announced the 
church's plan to build Vaalgras' first and only guest-house. According to the pastors the 
facilities would give dignitaries a place to stay when they returned to Vaalgras for a visit. 
At the very least, it was suggested that Jomo and Norah Appolus, both of whom were 
born in exile and have become successful professionals, would need to visit their father's 
grave. For such occasions the guest-house would be there for them. The most explicit 
appeals to leaders' social responsibilities were made in conjunction with the offering at 
which time Biwa spoke for several minutes about the importance of people giving gifts 
that were “appropriate to their place and station.” Later in the service the offering count 
was announced to the congregation and congregants thanked repeatedly for their 
generosity.   
 It was through histories of Emil Appolus' life, however, that members of the 
Vaalgras community asserted reciprocal relations between themselves and elites 
associated with SWAPO  most forcefully. In this respect, the tributes to Emil Appolus 
delivered by Maureen Hinda and Jöel Stefanus are particularly noteworthy. Hinda 
focused her comments on a narrative of Appolus' life that she claimed Appolus had told 
her shortly before his death. Like many other stories about Appolus reported in the media 
over the preceding week and those offered by Toivo Ya Tovio and on behalf of Nujoma 
and Pohamba at the funeral, Hinda's focused on Appolus' involvement in national 
politics, from his time in Cape Town during the 1950s through his leadership with 
SWAPO  in exile during the 1960s. In contrast to other stories, however, Hinda focused 
primarily on the brief period during which Appolus lived in Namibia between his years in 
Cape Town and in exile, especially Appolus' activities in Vaalgras during this time. 
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According to Hinda, in 1959 Appolus had shared his political views with people in 
Vaalgras and established a “SWAPO cell,” the first in Namibia.725 Through Appolus' 
“cell,” Hinda associated Vaalgras with SWAPO at the very beginning of the liberation 
movement's rise to power, long before Vaalgras had begun to affiliate officially with 
SWAPO in 1976, by which time it was supported by many Namibians.  
 A second theme which ran through Hinda's account was the importance that 
Appolus placed on his relationship with Vaalgras. According to Hinda, before his death, 
Appolus had spoken to her specifically about the significance he placed on his ties to the 
community. His words were repeated as a mantra throughout Hinda's oration: “I have 
been to the top and I have been to the bottom. But my roots were always here in 
Vaalgras.” Hinda also spoke at some length about Appolus' belief in God – a point which 
she used to counter the alleged concern of Vaalgras inhabitants  that Appolus had lost his 
faith because he had not attended Sunday worship services since his return from exile. By 
emphasizing Appolus' belonging to Vaalgras  in such ways, Hinda attempted to bridge 
the gap that had developed between Appolus and Vaalgras, both in the minds of local 
residents and of visiting SWAPO leaders.    
 Like Hinda, Chief Stefanus offered a history of Appolus' involvement with 
SWAPO, including his activities in Vaalgras prior to leaving for exile. Unlike Hinda, 
however, Stefanus was living in Vaalgras in 1959 and therefore could lend added detail 
                                                 
725 In this and other instances, Hinda did not make distinctions between SWAPO and other nationalist 
organizations, including the OPC, the OPO and SWANU with which Appolus was affiliated in the late 
1950s and 1960s. Although OPO was founded in Windhoek on April 19, 1959, the organization did not 
adopt the name SWAPO until June 1960 (Katjavivi 1988, pp. 22-23, 44-46). When asked about Emil 
Appolus' political activities in Vaalgras, Immanuel Hinda, who was raised in the same house with Emil, 
mentioned that Appolus had held some meetings with Vaalgras leaders before he went into exile and 
that Toivo Ya Toivo had once come to Vaalgras and participated in a meeting. He emphasized that the 
meetings were closed, however,and that he and others in Vaalgras were largely unaware of Appolus' 
perspective on politics (Hinda 19.9.2007, p. 3). Immanuel Hinda also emphasized that people in 
Vaalgras did not speak openly about SWAPO during the 1960s (Hinda 19.9.2007).   
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and credibility to Hinda's story. Remembering his encounters with Appolus at that time, 
Stefanus described him as a leader whose vision of politics and the future were beyond 
what Stefanus and his peers could see. Stefanus also discussed the decision made by 
Vaalgras to support SWAPO in October 1976. While acknowledging that, as Chief, he 
had formally taken this stand on behalf of Vaalgras, Stefanus credited Appolus for 
influencing his and other traditional leaders' decisions. The Chief further emphasized that 
the choice had not only been important for Vaalgras, but also for SWAPO, establishing it 
as premier political party among Khoekhoe-speaking communities living south of 
Windhoek. Later, Chief Stefanus referred generally to the costs of this choice: the 
harassment of various community members by the South African police, the closing of 
the school in Koichas and the exclusion of the community from various government 
services.726 He also mentioned the on-going poverty in Vaalgras and the lack of 
development projects in the community. In juxtaposing such remarks, Chief Stefanus 
suggested that SWAPO owed something to Vaalgras for the community's loyalty and 
sacrifices over many years.  
 Unlike Hinda and other speakers at the funeral, Stefanus also briefly discussed 
Appolus' return from exile in 1976. As the Chief explained, he was surprised when 
Appolus returned to Namibia only a few weeks after he had thrown Vaalgras' allegiance 
                                                 
726 In January 1977, following the Nama Teachers' Association strike at Gibeon, the South African 
government issued instructions that Willem Konjore, the school principal at Koichas and a staunch 
critic of South African policies, must transfer from Koichas to Witkrans. In response, Konjore resigned 
from his post, and parents pulled their children out of the school. In 1983, when the school reopened as 
the Ecumenical Community School Koichas, one of five community schools in Namibia to adopt an 
alternative to the South African syllabus and offer English medium instruction prior to independence, 
school teachers and pupils were subject to harassment from soldiers (Konjore 22.7.2007; Joas 1994, pp. 
19, 55). In 1978 following an extensive drought, the South African government refused to offer fodder 
to farmers in Vaalgras unless they were willing to support the Turnhalle government. Later, the state 
also refused to maintain Vaalgras' windmills, the means by which people accessed water through bore-
holes deep in the ground although the CCN intervened to assist Vaalgras with this essential service 
(Konjore 22.7.2007). 
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behind SWAPO. Stefanus carefully skirted the issue of why Appolus had left exile, 
indicating that Appolus had never told him. Rather, he focused  on a lesson that he had 
apparently learned from Appolus: “There are some things better left unsaid in politics.” 
The Chief further indicated that Appolus told him that he was “doing the right thing” in 
aligning Vaalgras with SWAPO and gave him his blessing to carry on with the party 
which, according to Stefanus, he has done faithfully ever since. In this manner Stefanus 
turned himself into Appolus' flag-bearer, eclipsing the broken relationship between 
Appolus and the liberation movement. 
 At only one point during the funeral proceedings did someone direct attention to 
histories that could unravel the carefully interwoven narratives binding Appolus, 
Vaalgras and SWAPO. At the cemetery, immediately before the internment of Appolus' 
body, Immanuel Hinda, a Vaalgras elder who grew up in the same house as Emil 
Appolus, offered a final tribute. While thanking God for the life of Emil Appolus and his 
contributions to the Namibian nation, Hinda made the statement that Appolus belonged 
“with those killed at Cassinga and those killed at Lubango.” Cassinga refers to the 
SWAPO camp attacked by the South African Defense Force on May 4, 1978, and is 
central to the national narrative told about sacrifices made by Namibians during the 
liberation struggle. Lubango refers to the site of SWAPO camps where accused spies 
were tortured, detained and disappeared which  fundamentally threatens this narrative.727 
Merely by juxtaposing the words “Cassinga” and “Lubango,” Hinda presented an 
alternative to histories told earlier that day, all of which were compatible with a socially 
accepted national narrative, suggesting instead that the nation rewrite its history so that it 
can incorporate people whose experiences heretofore have been excluded from it. 
                                                 
727 For more details about Cassinga and Lubango, see Chapters 2 and 4, respectively. 
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 Although an isolated comment at Appolus' funeral, Hinda's words are deeply 
rooted in debates  within Vaalgras about how to respond to the histories of former exiles 
from the community. Immediately after the ex-detainees flew from Lubango to 
Windhoek on July 4, 1989, Jöel Stefanus and several other elders from Vaalgras traveled 
to the capital. There they held a private meeting, during which exiles talked freely about 
their detentions and the missing persons from Vaalgras and indicated that they would 
speak publicly about these experiences and oppose SWAPO in the elections. In turn, 
Stefanus and others tried to dissuade them from this strategy, suggesting that they should 
support SWAPO at least until it had won the election and South Africa and the DTA had 
been defeated.728 Shortly thereafter the returned exiles were driven by the elders to 
Vaalgras, where a service was held at the AME Church to mark their arrival. From their 
seats on the raised platform, the group shared stories about what had happened to them in 
Lubango and about those who had not returned.729 People who were present remember 
the service as a solemn occasion. Many in the congregation wept openly, and the 
presiding ministers, Andries Biwa and Willem Konjore, offered words of consolation and 
encouragement to those who had survived.730 In the days following the service, people in 
the community spoke with the returned exiles about their and others' experiences and 
debated over whether the detainees should tell their stories openly before the elections.731 
                                                 
728 Stephanus 18.9.2007, p. 88. 
729 Stephanus 18.9.2007, p. 40; Basson  22.9.2007, pp. 28-29; Konjore 22.7.2008.  
730 Stephanus 15.6.2007, pp. 19-20; 18.9.2007, p. 40; Basson  22.9.2007, pp. 28-29; Konjore 22.7.2008. 
According to Joseph Stephanus, after the returned exiles had told their stories, Willem Konjore said that 
“as far as he is concerned, these guys are not spies. They are heroes.” Konjore recalls telling the 
congregation that “these people are coming from a difficult situation. They need healing. We need to 
calm down these people... bring them to a normal life.” 
731 Ex-detainees ultimately split over this issue. Within a few weeks of their return Eric Biwa became the 
President of the Patriotic Unity Movement (PUM), a political party founded by ex-detainees which 
aligned with the UDF; Joseph Stephanus joined SWAPO-D led by former SWAPO leader and detainee 
Andreas Shipanga; Ben Boys formally made amends with SWAPO and rejoined the party; others 
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Among those who spoke to returned exiles during those first months was Emil Appolus 
himself. After many years of hearing about Appolus, some of the returned exiles spoke 
with him directly about his experiences with SWAPO abroad and the circumstances in 
which he had left the party in 1976.732  
 Sixteen years later at Emil Appolus' funeral, controversial exile histories were 
harder to hear. They did not take narrative form. There was no open debate about how to 
react to them, and, with the exception of one passing reference, they were not mentioned 
during the funeral service at all. And yet, in every comment about Emil Appolus' 
contribution to SWAPO and every appeal to assist the community then and now, they are 
there. Drawing from shared knowledge of past wrongs in exile, spokespersons from 
Vaalgras appealed to Namibian leaders' sense of responsibility to the community of Emil 
Appolus, a legitimate father of the nation. But Appolus' qualifications as a national hero 
are questionable, Vaalgras' past of SWAPO support is undermined through the official 
history of exile and the electoral stakes for SWAPO in such a small community outside 
the ruling party's traditional support base are few. As a result, Vaalgras residents have 
relatively little leverage to make claims on those who govern the nation. They must 
rather hope that its leaders will be benevolent.  
 
“Living in Exile” 
 While conducting fieldwork in 2007, I assembled a photo exhibition titled 
“Living in Exile.”733 As explained in a brief introduction, the exhibition examined exile 
                                                                                                                                                 
partially or totally withdrew from the political limelight. 
732 Stephanus 18.9.2007, pp. 40-42. 
733 The exhibition is also discussed in Chapter 1 and appears in Appendix 2. Photographs of the exhibition 
appear in Appendix 3. 
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through the SWAPO camps, first, because most Namibian exiles lived in these camps 
and, second, because there is a rich archive of camp photos, which, together with former 
exiles' memories, illuminate the experiences of those who lived there. Photographs, 
drawn from the National Archive of Namibia and a few private donations, were collected 
under several sections titled: “Where were the camps?,” “Who lived in the camps?,” 
“What did people do in the camps?” and “How did war affect the camps?” They were 
accompanied by a map of Southern Africa, which marked where camps were located, 
captions, which offered contextual information about camps collected through my 
research, and  questions, which invited viewers to share additional information with me 
for use in a public record. 
 The exhibition was launched in Eenhana, a town in northern Namibia, on 
Saturday, August 25 and Sunday, August 26, 2007 in conjunction with the Namibian 
government's commemoration of Heroes' Day. Despite difficulties securing approval 
from the ruling party to display the photographs, permission was eventually obtained to 
place them at the Eenhana Youth Centre, where several Heroes' Day activities were 
hosted. All day Saturday and part of Sunday I sat near the exhibit, observing the several 
hundred people who stopped to look at them and chatting with those who approached me 
or who seemed particularly interested in the photos.734 Reactions, in turn, suggested 
different kinds of relationships that the viewers had to the exhibit, to the exile past and to 
national history.  
 Frequently, viewers' association of the exhibit with the exile past and national 
                                                 
734 While the exhibit was on display in Eenhana, I was briefly joined by Martha Akawa and Lovisa 
Nampala, graduates of the UNAM History Department and native speakers of Oshiwambo, who offered 
to help me as research assistants. Unfortunately, they were only able to come to Eenhana during the late 
morning and afternoon  of Sunday, August 26, at a time when no guests were visiting the Youth Centre.  
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history appeared undifferentiated. For example, often when I asked viewers a question 
about a particular place pictured in a photo, they responded by saying that they knew 
about this place because they had been “there” themselves. In some cases, a story 
followed which placed the viewer in a particular place or at a particular happening 
pictured in a photo, but oftentimes “there” was associated with something more general 
evoked in viewers' minds by the exhibit like “the camps,” “exile” or “the struggle.” On 
several occasions, when I asked a question about the exile past, a viewer responded by 
reading directly from one of the captions, all of which I had written. Such responses 
seemed not only to reflect confusion over my relationship to the exhibit and an eagerness 
to trust the authority of the written word, but also an association between this exhibition, 
presented at this venue, and an authoritative, national history.  
 Viewers did make some comments which broke the direct line of association 
between exhibition, past and national history. For example, some gleaned that I was 
associated with the exhibit and asked me why I had assembled it, why I was displaying it 
in Eenhana and what group I represented. Such questions suggested consciousness that I 
was presenting the history from a particular standpoint, if not a suspicion of some hidden 
political agenda that was motivating this presentation. A few persons pointed to captions 
which could be improved through added nuance. Others drew from the exhibit to contrast 
it favorably with other representations of exile. As one woman said to me after sharing 
information about a SWAPO camp where she had lived: “This is good. Namibians need 
to know these things. We're only told about the leaders, not the ordinary heroes.” Several 
indicated that they had never seen the particular photographs which were displayed or 
images of the camps which were discussed. Particularly striking were comments from 
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several viewers that they had not seen the pictures of people living in Cassinga, despite 
the significance of this camp in Namibia's national history and the frequent display of 
images of a mass grave where hundreds were buried following the South African attack 
of the camp. I did not hear any comments about what people thought had been 
deliberately excluded from the exhibition. 
 Although reactions to the exhibit were generally similar on the other occasions 
when I displayed it in Ovamboland in the North, they were considerably different when, 
a few weeks later, I took the exhibition to the South. On Monday, September 17, the 
same day on which Prime Minister Nahas Angula addressed Parliament on national 
reconciliation and made his remarks about those who had been “caught in the crossfire,” 
“Living in Exile” went on display on an open wall next to Bank Windhoek in 
Keetmanshoop. Several hundred people stopped to look at the exhibit and to chat with 
me and two local research assistants: Antoinette Mostert, then curator of the 
Keetmanshoop Museum, and Steve Swartbooi, a political activist and ex-detainee. 
Together the three of us amassed considerable evidence of how viewers disassociated the 
exhibition from the exile past. In some cases, disassociation took a form similar to that 
which I witnessed in Eenhana, with viewers questioning Steve, Antoinette and me about 
our relationship to the exhibit so as to situate our relationships to this representation of 
history. Particularly interesting were different ways that people who knew Steve 
reconciled his presence with his particular background.735 One local SWAPO leader 
asked Steve directly how he was undermining the liberation movement through the 
exhibit. Others, who decided that the exhibit was national history, asked Steve why he 
                                                 
735 At the time the exhibition was created, Steve Swartbooi was a member of the Congress of Democrats, a 
political party. More recently, he has become the Vice President for the All People's Party. 
 258 
was trying to make amends with the ruling party.  
 Unlike in Eenhana, however, we heard many comments which focused on local 
histories which had been excluded from the exhibition. Remarks were sometimes made 
to us directly, but more often were overheard in conversations, above all in 
Khoekhoegowab, of which Steve is a native speaker. Comments included: “We do not 
see ourselves in these exhibits;” “So many people left for exile from the South but I do 
not see any such persons here;” “Where are our children?”“Where are our people?” 
“Where are the Nama people?” Some people made reference specifically to people from 
Keetmanshoop and the surrounding area who had been detained and/or disappeared in 
exile but did not appear in the exhibit. In making comments about those who had been 
excluded, viewers often dismissed persons and groups which had been included. For 
example, one person stated that “It is a good thing that Sam [Nujoma] appears because he 
is the root of all evils.” Others asked, “Are there only Vambos here?” “Is this a Vambo 
thing?”736 In one particularly striking instance a woman confronted me directly. 
Addressing me in a loud voice so that everyone could hear, she asked me “Where is 
Lubango?” When I walked her to a photo of people assembling guns at the Tobias 
Hainyeko Training Centre, a SWAPO camp near Lubango, she responded “That's not 
Lubango” and walked away. 
 There were other reactions to the exhibit in Keetmanshoop to be sure. Like in 
Eenhana I talked with viewers about particular photos, and people showed me those 
whom they recognized or the places where they had been. Some of these people were 
former exiles from Keetmanshoop and neighboring communal areas, all of whom had 
been detained in Lubango and were known to me before the exhibition. Others who 
                                                 
736 “Vambo” is a derogatory version of the ethnic label Ovambo. 
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spoke to me were new acquaintances and shared stories about the circumstances in 
which, they, since independence, had moved from the North to Keetmanshoop. Several 
of these persons had taken up jobs in the town in the Regional Office737 and in the local 
police force. I was speaking to one civil servant from the North when a local youth 
walked by the exhibit and shouted loudly “Dit's kaak!” (Afrikaans for 'That's shit!'). In 
response, the man to whom I had been speaking said to me, “The people who say 'dit's 
kaak' are the same ones who left the struggle behind.” 
 The week before and after the display of “Living in Exile” in Keetmanshoop, 
Steve Swartbooi and I met with and interviewed families of people from neighboring 
communities who had traveled into exile, most of whom had disappeared while living 
abroad.738 Through these meetings we not only learned more about those who had been 
excluded from the exhibition but also about how such exclusions had affected their 
families. For example, several research participants talked with us about the difficulties 
that they had experienced personally because they did not know whether a family 
member who went into exile was dead or alive.739 Although the likelihood that he or she 
was living diminished with each passing year, people struggled to move on with their 
lives. One spouse of an exile told us about the process she went through deciding if she 
should remarry and of the struggles that she had, twenty-eight years after her husband's 
                                                 
737  Keetmanshoop is the capital of Namibia's Karas Region.  
738  These visits were part of a sustained effort to conduct research with the families of former exiles in 
Keetmanshoop and surrounding communities. In July and August 2007 Steve Swartbooi held informal 
interviews with several such families, and in September 2007, he and I held interviews together, a few 
of which were recorded and transcribed for a public record (Maria Higoam, Sophia Kahuika and Emma 
Motinga 14.9.2007; Immanuel Hinda, Interview  19.9.2007; Julia Thomas, Interview 20.9.2007). 
Together thirteen interviews were conducted in Keetmanshoop, Vaalgras, Tses, Berseba and Gainachas. 
These interviews do not include those which I have held with Lubango ex-detainees, some of whom 
come from communities near Keetmanshoop and had close family members in exile, or my interview 
with Willem Konjore, whose brother, Lukas Stephanus, also lived abroad (Willem Konjore 22.7.2008). 
739  E.g. Higoam, Kahuika and Motinga, 14.9.2007, pp. 4-5. 
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departure for exile, of receiving a death certificate that would make remarriage possible 
for her. Others talked about their wish to hold a funeral or perform a burial so that they 
could commemorate their family members' life and move beyond his or her death, but 
they felt that, under the circumstances, they could not hold such a ceremony. Knowing 
that the ruling party had provided  information about deaths to the families of other exiles 
but not to them or other families who they knew personally made this lack of information 
difficult to accept and a source of  bitterness.740   
 Research participants also discussed the consequences of such exclusions for their 
relationships with members of various communities of which they are a part. Immanuel 
Hinda, the man who was raised with Emil Appolus and mentioned Cassinga and 
Lubango at Appolus' funeral, told us about how isolated he feels when, as an elder in 
Vaalgras, he makes references to the community's tortured relationship to SWAPO only 
to be seen as “a [stalk of] wheat in the midst of grass.”741 Joseph Stephanus, who not only 
lived in exile, but influenced many others, including his brother, to travel abroad talked 
about his “guilty conscience” at having returned to Namibia without being able to tell 
families what had happened to those who did not return.742 Julia Thomas, the sister of 
Samuel, Cornelius and Wilhelmina Thomas discussed in Chapter 5, described what it has 
been like to be in a family of long-standing SWAPO supporters with close personal 
contacts to party leaders and then to be “forgotten” after Independence.743 Thomas and 
several others also referred to “the pain” that they experienced on holidays when 
                                                 
740  For a discussion of Their Blood Waters Our Freedom (Windhoek: Swapo Party, 1996) and other 
measures taken by the Namibian government to record information about persons who died in exile, see 
the section of Chapter 5 titled, “Breaking the Wall of Silence.” 
741  Hinda 19.9.2007, p. 6. 
742  Stephanus 18.9.2007, p. 39. 
743  Thomas 20.9.2007, p. 7 
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participants in the liberation struggle were decorated by the nation as “heroes” while 
people from their own families are excluded from these ceremonies because they were 
labeled “spies.”  
 At the same time that interviewees highlighted how they had been negatively 
affected by their family members' exclusion from an official history, their comments 
suggested how, in their reactions to this exclusion, they were also perpetuating it. As 
many indicated, the pain which they associated with histories from exile deterred them 
from speaking about what they had heard or listening to what others had to say about it. 
As the mother of one of the missing persons explained: 
 “Where there is pleasure or what you derive pleasure from 
is something you are fond of following or you are likely to 
follow. But what causes pain in you, you will do anything to 
hide from that... If probably I had a son who had returned 
home and claimed his rightful place in Namibia, then 
probably I would be proudly referring to what has happened 
in exile or following what people are saying. But as a person 
who is... in emotional agony, there is no way.”744  
 
Under the circumstances, remembering former exiles has become a very private activity 
for most of the people with whom Steve and I met. Some indicated that when they were 
reminded of a lost family member who had lived in exile that they kept these memories 
to themselves or emphasized that when they talked about their family member that they 
avoided any reference to exile or the circumstances of his or her possible death. Most 
who talked about controversial histories from exile said that they did so only among their 
most intimate social relations. Youth were rarely a part of these discussions because they 
were said to be “disinterested” or more concerned with “material things.” “Politicians” 
were often said to be avoided because they were seen as unreceptive to families' 
                                                 
744  Higoam, Kahuika and Motinga, 14.9.2007, p. 6. 
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questions or because they might taint the memory of loved ones by using it in public 
discussion for their personal gain. Some had spoken with ex-detainees, like Steve, about 
their family members shortly after they repatriated in 1989, but others had avoided  
listening to ex-detainees' stories at that time and most had not revisited this sensitive 
topic with ex-detainees since Independence.745 Several indicated that they did not pay 
attention to programs on national holidays such as Independence Day, Cassinga Day and 
Heroes' Day because they reminded them of people close to them whose heroism had not 
been acknowledged. Some emphasized that their family member is “a hero” by 
disassociating how they remember him or her personally from the social construction of 
heroism in Namibia. 
 Among those interviewed, there were a few who argued that their family 
member's exclusion from recognized histories was a lesser evil than if people were more 
aware of what happened to those they knew who had lived in exile. As Willem Konjore, 
Namibia's Minister of Youth, National Services, Culture and Sports and the brother of 
Lukas Stephanus from Vaalgras, maintained in our interview: 
Everybody would like to know what happened to your 
relative or family member... But whatever you hear now, I'm 
not so sure whether it will heal the wounds... Even if I'm 
now told that my brother is killed for example and they 
would even tell me that it was so and so who killed him, I 
will not get my brother back. This in turn may only create 
some hate feelings personally to somebody, which will also 
not be helpful. For that matter, I'd say it's even better if I 
don't know... [My brother] has sacrificed for this country 
and for the freedom of its people. That is the price that he 
                                                 
745  Steve had spoken with some of the families that we interviewed following his 1989 repatriation and has 
close personal connections with many of them as well. These factors seem to have alleviated fears that 
research participants might otherwise have had about sharing their experiences with a “politician” or a 
little known  foreigner like me. Nonetheless, research participants did ask us questions about how 
exactly we would be using our interviews and one expressed concern explicitly about Steve's “politics.”  
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paid and this is the price that we paid as a family.746   
 
Perhaps for Minister Konjore and his family, the price for freedom has been paid. It is 
clear, however, that for some families of former exiles and for others who viewed 
“Living in Exile” they continue to pay this price because they remain alienated from 
other Namibians and the resources which the state  allocates to its citizens. For them, “the 
sad story” of conflict in the SWAPO camps is not “behind” them, as apologists for 
Namibia's reconciliation policy have said that it should be, but it is alongside  them and 
in front of them as long as they remain marginal to the narratives which are told about the 
nation. Although, for the time being, most remain focused on their personal survival and 
eschew overt political action, the public display of a few photographs on a few occasions 
was sufficient to highlight grievances and mistrust that exist among diverse Namibians 
which are mediated through their exile history. As people who live at the margins of this 




 Clearly, the impact of the Namibian government's reconciliation discourse 
extends beyond those who were “caught in the crossfire” in SWAPO camps and whose 
exile histories remain most directly associated with stigma. They extend to the families 
and friends of those stigmatized, some of whom never returned from exile and whose 
“disappearance” has not been accounted for. They stretch further to other Namibians 
whose current struggles are poorly understood and are not addressed because happenings 
                                                 
746  Konjore 22.7.2008. 
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in the past that have shaped them pose a threat to the struggle, enshrined in national 
history. Ultimately, they reach to all Namibians by defining the status of histories 
through which its citizens relate to one another in the post-colonial nation.  
 One might conclude that Namibians are “victims” of the “silences” which 
surround their exile history. Nonetheless, to use such language, so prevalent in human 
rights literature and historiographies of violence, would undermine one of the main 
points of this chapter and dissertation: namely, that people articulate stigmatized histories 
and establish social relations through them regardless of whether they do so in an easily 
accessible form in a highly public space. To render those whose histories have been 
excluded from a socially accepted narrative as “victims” and to reduce the social life of 
these histories to “silence” divests marginalized subjects of the agency that they do have 
and assert through articulating such narratives. By listening to them across different 
social spaces, one may gain insight into how people establish their relations to others 
through representations of the past as well as how their possibilities for action are 
constrained by official discourse in particular contexts.        
 Such a perspective on “victims” and their “silences” should be important not only 
for this study of exile history in Namibia but for any inquiry into the effects or efficacy of 
policies aimed at reconciliation. Most literature on the topic has done little to attend to 
such issues, however. Dominated by the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) and the field of transitional justice which has formed around it,747 
                                                 
747  Established shortly after South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994, the TRC was mandated to 
compile a report on human rights abuses committed from March 1, 1960 to May 10, 1994, to grant 
amnesty to perpetrators for full disclosure of their abuses and to recommend reparations for those who 
were abused. Although preceded by other international truth commissions, the TRC was the first to hold 
public hearings, which made the stories told by victims and perpetrators widely accessible. Since the 
TRC hearings were completed in 1998, organizations promoting similar approaches to political 
transition have been formed, including the ICTJ, established in New York by the TRC's Deputy 
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work focuses on whether the TRC enabled those which it defined as “the victims” to 
voice their experiences of apartheid era violence or if it in fact imposed new “silences” 
on them. In turn, literature projects from the TRC to “reconciliation,” associating a social 
phenomenon with one or another analysis of the Commission's public hearings.748 While 
such debates about “silence” and “victims” may be significant for analyzing the TRC or 
transitional justice as an object unto itself, they privilege what participants do or do not 
say during a particular kind of public event at the expense of many other spaces in which 
people establish social relations through reference to the past wherein they do not 
necessarily act as “victims” and certainly are not “silent.”749  
 As the cases considered here suggest, reconciliation is undermined not through 
                                                                                                                                                 
Chairperson Alex Boraine. The ICTJ has been involved in establishing truth commissions in Ghana, 
Sierra Leone, East Timor and Peru and in asserting “the right to truth” as a basic human right.   
748  From the perspective of  Desmond Tutu and many other advocates of the TRC, enabling the victims of 
apartheid to tell their stories was critically important to the Commission's efforts to promote national 
reconciliation. Accordingly, Tutu and others' descriptions of the TRC highlight cases in which people's 
dignity was restored through stories told at the Commission and of the gestures of apology and 
forgiveness which were initiated through such stories. In contrast, Mahmood Mamdani criticizes the 
TRC for defining “victims” in relation to “perpetrators” of individual acts of violence rather than vis a 
vis “beneficiaries” of an oppressive social system. In so doing,  he argues, the Commission had 
excluded most of those who would need to participate in any genuine reconciliation process 
(“Reconciliation without Justice,” Southern African Review of Books 46 (1997), pp. 3-5). Submissions 
to Commissioning the Past (Deborah Posel and Graeme Simpson, eds. (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand 
University Press., 2002)) point to other problems with the TRC's approach to reconciliation, 
maintaining that it had pushed victims to suppress the expression of important emotions and that some 
who spoke before the TRC had become embittered by the experience because the Commission was 
unable to confirm the stories which they told there. Richard Wilson highlights how the TRC privileged 
certain subjects at the expense of others  to legitimate South Africa's post-apartheid social order (“The 
Sizwe Will Not Go Away: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Human Rights and Nation-
Building in South Africa.” African Studies 55, 2 (1996), pp. 1-20; The Politics of Truth and 
Reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimizing the Post-apartheid State. (Cambridge University Press, 
2001), a point which Claire Moon also considers in her recent work on “reconciliation politics” 
(Narrating Political Reconciliation: South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2008)). 
749  Silence, moreover, may have its own language. In her work on the TRC, Fiona Ross points to how 
several women communicated during the Commission's public hearings even when they did not speak 
(“Speech and Silence: Women's Testimony in the First Five Weeks of Public Hearings of the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” in Veena Das, et al. eds., Remaking a World: Violence, 
Social Suffering and Recovery (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Bearing Witness: 
Women and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, (London: Pluto Press, 2003)). 
Ross' argument highlights the value of an approach to histories of violence which is ethnographic, 
illuminating contexts in which silence conveys meaning. 
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the silencing of history, but rather through forms of historical production in which 
representations of the past are highly constrained and the social relations constituted 
through them are very unequal. Tate Nepelilo's story remains unacknowledged by the 
Namibian government and his family not because Nepelilo or others have never talked 
about it, but rather because of the association of those like him with a story about the first 
“freedom fighters” which has often been told and which stifles other stories that cannot 
be incorporated into this narrative. Similarly, Vaalgras residents struggle to make claims 
on the state not because the experiences of exiles from the community have been silenced 
but rather because the histories which national leaders and community members discuss 
among closed social networks are not accepted nationally and responses to this condition 
have divided Vaalgras community members. Viewers of “Living in Exile” expressed 
their alienation from other Namibians and national history not through silence but by 
expressing how their experiences were or were not represented in the exhibition. Even 
family members of exiles who were deliberately excluded from the exhibition and who 
rarely or never speak of their kin who lived abroad are influenced by what others have 
said about exile history and may communicate their relationships to their loved ones and 
the nation in what they do not, as well as what they do, say. 
 It follows that one of the challenges in studying reconciliation is tracing how  
people articulate their relationships to past conflicts across a range of social spaces. Once 
I was introduced to Kaufilwa Nepelilo through Abed Hauwanga, the space of a formal 
interview was sufficient for eliciting stories whose circulation had been confined to a 
small number of living persons. Contextualizing exile histories in Vaalgras required 
moving across a range of spaces, including Emil Appolus' public funeral, archives and 
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libraries which have printed information about him, and formal and informal  
conversations with people from the community with whom I have established 
relationships over years. “Living in Exile” created a new space wherein people whom I 
did not previously know reacted to a presentation of their history even as the exhibition 
opened opportunities for me to speak with people in other spaces as well. In each case, 
effort was made to access histories which are audible to few. If such histories seem to 
have been silent, however, it is only due to a national history which has been projected so 




      
 
 
     Chapter 7 
 Conclusion: “One Namibia, One Nation” 
 In February 2008, towards the end of my fieldwork, Nahas Angula published a 
series of editorials in New Era, a Namibian newspaper.750 Therein, the former 
administrator at the Old Farm and then current Prime Minister registered his concern with 
the violence which had recently engulfed Kenya and interpreted its significance for 
Namibia. At the root of the problem in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa, Angula argued, 
has been the move of leaders away from nationalist goals and towards ethnic politics, 
which some have mobilized to attain power and pursue narrow interests. Namibia, 
Angula warned, “seems to be following the same political development trajectory” 
particularly since the formation of the Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP), an 
opposition party launched by former SWAPO leaders Hidipo Hamutenya and Jesaya 
Nyamu the previous November.751 Nonetheless, the Prime Minister reminded citizens 
that they have the “glorious history of anti-colonial struggle” to guide them through these 
difficult times. As Angula emphasized, national liberation “was fought on personal 
sacrifice, selflessness and commitment to all the people.” It is only if “material 
considerations and comfort interfere with the spirit of the liberation struggle” that “things 
                                                 
750 New Era, “Which Way African? Multi Party Democracy and Violence in Africa,” 1.2.2008; “Namibia 
at Political Crossroads,” 8.2.2008; “Threat Posed by Ethnic Political Entrepreneurship in Namibia: Part 
2,” 15.2.2008; “Towards an Inclusive, Fair and Just Political Order in Africa” 22.2.2008. All articles 
were attributed to “Citizen” Nahas Angula. 
751 Allegedly, RDP leaders were appealing to the Ovakwanyama, the largest of the seven sub-units among 
the dominant Ovambo ethnic group, to divide the Ovambo and attain power. 
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will... fall apart.” 
 While the context in which Angula published his articles was unique, the kind of 
argument which he made about the meaning of the liberation struggle certainly was not.  
Since being granted political independence, citizens of Southern African nations have 
often appealed to their unity and idealism during the recent past as they respond to 
tribalism, corruption and other daunting problems facing them in the present. In Namibia 
the phrase “One Namibia, One Nation” is frequently used to advance such a perspective. 
Once a slogan chanted by those resisting South African apartheid rule, the phrase has 
since accrued further meaning, used to criticize divisive politics and to remember a time 
when the critique of apartheid united people in the pursuit of an inclusive, just social 
order. In this way, “One Namibia, One Nation” has come to encapsulate the meaning of 
Namibia's late colonial history, “the spirit of the liberation struggle” as one influential 
columnist writes,752 without acknowledging any of the contradictions inherent to it and its 
legacy. 
 This dissertation offers a different perspective. While drawing attention to the 
most noble aspirations of those who resisted South African apartheid rule, “One Namibia, 
One Nation” may occlude the circumstances in which the Namibian nation was formed. 
One key space in this formation was the SWAPO camps. There, in the midst of war, with 
resources limited and possibilities for misfortune high, the liberation movement first 
governed Namibian citizens. Through encounters in camps, a social hierarchy emerged in 
which certain individuals and groups were granted power to look after their fellow 
Namibians. At the same time, a national history formed through which those at the 
nation's pinnacle legitimated their own positions of power at the expense of others with 
                                                 
752 Gwen Lister, “Political Perspective,” The Namibian, 13.6.2008 
 270 
competing claims. This hierarchy and this history have reproduced themselves in an 
independent Namibia, where citizens continue to access resources from people whose 
authority derives from socially accepted narratives about their contribution to, and others' 
subversion of, a nation. To equate “personal sacrifice, selflessness and commitment to all 
people” or “One Namibia, One Nation” with “the spirit of the liberation struggle” is to 
overlook qualities of the recent past that continue to undermine inclusive and just social 
relations in Namibia today. 
 One might conclude that if Namibia is ever to approach the dream “One Namibia, 
One Nation” then it will need a new national history – one which includes spaces, people 
and memories that have been excluded from or stigmatized by an official narrative. 
Indeed, authors of seminal works about Namibia's liberation struggle have seen 
themselves as contributing to such a history. Peter Katjavivi, who served SWAPO as its 
Secretary for Information before becoming a professional historian, has written histories 
highlighting Namibian resistance to colonial rule, a perspective which, as Katjavivi 
noted, was previously neglected in the literature on Namibia's past.753 Later, Siegfried 
Groth published The Wall of Silence, wherein he encouraged Namibians to remember 
stories like those he shared from “the dark days of the liberation struggle” to promote 
national reconciliation.754 In the same year Colin Leys and John Saul likened Namibia's 
liberation struggle to a “two-edged sword” and argued that both “sides” must be 
examined in order “to grasp its history as a whole.”755 And most recently, Justine Hunter 
                                                 
753 SWAPO, To Be Born A Nation: The Liberation Struggle for Namibia. (London: Zed Press, 1981); Peter 
Katjavivi, A History of Resistance in Namibia (London: James Currey, 1988). 
754 Siegfried Groth, Namibia – The Wall of Silence (Wuppertal:  Peter Hammer Verlag, 1995), pp. 178-
180, 184-189. 
755 Colin Leys and John S. Saul, Namibia's Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword (London: James 
Currey, 1995), p. 16. 
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has highlighted the need for a more holistic approach to remembering South African and 
SWAPO human rights abuses during the war in order for Namibia's democracy to 
flourish.756   
 In framing their histories, each of these authors identifies limits to others' accounts 
of Namibia's past. None, however, considers the tensions between identifying limits of a 
national history and writing the history of a nation. These tensions are significant. By 
selecting “Namibia” as the frame for their work and narrating this nation's past, Katjavivi, 
Groth, Leys, Saul and Hunter limit their narratives in particular ways. Their writings, in 
turn, have become part of the national community which they represent, where citizens 
draw from them, with their inclusions and exclusions, to make historical claims. Some 
texts, such as Groth's Wall of Silence, have become central to a social movement set on 
changing a nation's founding narrative. Others, while known to a relative few and 
invoked infrequently, still lend authority to those who cite them and influence national 
debates.757 And all national histories reinforce the idea of the nation, strengthening the 
legitimacy of this form of community, with its arbiters of truth and its mechanisms of 
power. 
   In preparing this dissertation I have not aimed to rewrite Namibia's recent history, 
but rather to assemble histories which interrogate the nation. By examining how certain 
people achieved the authority to speak on behalf of Namibians in camps, the piece 
                                                 
756 Justine Hunter, Die Politik der Erinnerung und des Vergessens in Namibia: Umgang mit schweren 
Menschenrechtsverletzungen der Ära des bewaffneten Befreiungskampfes, 1966 bis 1989 (Frankfurt am 
Main: P. Lang, 2008). 
757 For example, as Nahas Angula's articles were appearing in New Era, Keshii Nathanael, the former SYL 
President and SWAPO-detainee,  wrote a letter to the paper in which he defended himself against 
accusations made by the Prime Minister in one of his articles (“PM Angula Must Provide Proof,” New 
Era, 22.2.2008). In the exchange which followed both Angula and Nathanael referred to Colin Leys and 
John Saul's article “Liberation without Democracy” (Journal of Southern African Studies. 20,1 (1994), 
pp. 123-147) to support their claims (“He Should Read the Article,” New Era, 29.2.2008; “PM Angula 
should own up to Swapo's dark history,” Informanté, 20.3.2008). 
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illuminates the social structure in which the narrative is told. Although this structure 
constrains historical expression, it also opens possibilities for creating alternatives to 
national history as people engage the limits of dominant stories in their efforts to be 
included within a nation. Drawing from some of the spaces where Namibians engage 
these limits, the dissertation weaves together narratives which do not compete for 
attention in a nation as much as they highlight the limits of national history itself. 
 This approach to national history has been shaped by my view of exile. Upon 
crossing international borders, migrants are often compelled by the violence which 
threatens them and the resources which they can and cannot access abroad to represent 
themselves as “exiles,” people bound by their relationship to a national home. In turn, 
groups and persons representing exiles draw from their control over spaces like the camp, 
where so many transnational migrants live, to secure their social status by affirming this 
form of community. While national history need not support the organizations or leaders 
representing a particular exile group and may be used to undermine them, it does accept 
the nation as a social unit. In so doing, it renders “the exile” and “the refugee” as social 
types defined by their relationship to a given nation, thereby obscuring the various 
particularities of transnational migrant populations and the processes through which they 
form. And it strengthens nationalism's authority among people whose access to nationally 
administered resources is unequal, especially those living in the camps themselves. 
 There are risks entailed in using exile to challenge the nation as the primary frame 
for historical work. By focusing attention on differences within an oppressed nation 
whose members have fled persecution to travel abroad, such work may be seen as 
drawing attention away from the oppressive nation which initiated exiles' flight. This 
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issue should especially concern readers interested in Southern Africa, where, through 
racist ideology and organized violence, the apartheid state and its allies created the 
conditions in which exiled nationalist organizations formed. Identifying national history 
and exile as topics of study should not move us away from the critique of apartheid, 
however. On the contrary, a critical approach to nationalism is necessary for observing 
legacies of the apartheid past that are easily overlooked in competing narratives wherein 
violence is reduced to acts committed by one or another national agent. And exile, when 
seen through the stories and experiences of people living in camps, offers material 
through which these legacies, and national history's relationship to them, can be 
examined.  
 Consider, for example, Namibian histories of the purge of accused spies in 
Lubango, Angola. While it is inaccurate to attribute the torture and murder of Namibians 
in that place to the work of physical spies, it is also insufficient to attribute these acts 
solely to SWAPO or some collection of the liberation movement's leaders. One context 
that is critical for comprehending Lubango is the camp, a space in which Namibians were 
constantly threatened by South African violence. Another is the memory of camp 
inhabitants, many of whom had previously been violated by South African officials in 
Namibia or had encountered spies, or suspected spies, among members of their villages, 
schools and families. Still another is the discourse through which camp residents 
expressed their fears of South African spies, including the witchcraft idiom considered 
here. By focusing narratives of Lubango on “the South African spies” or “the SWAPO 
leaders,” competing histories hold national agents responsible for the purge at the 
expense of many contexts which are critical for comprehending it. In turn, they enhance 
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the power of those who draw from uncertainties about what happened at Lubango to 
divide people who have been affected by these happenings and to discredit those who 
seek recognition for their suffering there. And, most ironically, they perpetuate the tactics 
which the South African state first used to sow mistrust among its subjects in Namibia 
and to threaten its enemies in camps.  
 By rewriting national history, scholars may recreate the camp in other respects as 
well. Consider, for example, the extent to which “camp” may be used as a metaphor for 
Namibia and other post-liberation nations. As in the past, the camp is governed by the 
liberation movement, now ruling party. Party officials are the primary conduit of 
resources among many inhabitants, most of whom lack capital to go into business on 
their own and skills desired by private employers. Accusations are rife that inhabitants 
with connections to officials are more likely to find jobs, receive aid and access tenders 
while those from certain ethnic and regional backgrounds are discriminated against. 
Inhabitants live separated from one another, with officials and other elites able to reside 
in wealthy neighborhoods and private farms while others are relegated to poorly serviced 
townships and communal reserves. The party uses “the parade” of state-funded television 
stations, radio services and newspapers to privilege perspectives favored by its senior 
leaders and to denounce opposition, especially when it originates from those who have 
left the party and who have allegedly betrayed the nation. 
  Certainly, there is much more occurring in Namibia than the camp metaphor can 
encompass. Multiple parties have contested for votes in regular elections, which 
international observers have declared “free and fair.” An independent judiciary and civil 
society have made efforts to hold government accountable to processes of governing 
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proscribed by a Constitution. Church leaders have spoken about moral issues that face 
their congregations, and non-governmental organizations and media have expanded the 
range of those who can express their views and participate in debates about social issues. 
Global markets and internet technology increasingly expose Namibians to influences that 
are not easily controlled by a national government, as does higher education, which 
growing numbers of students access every year. Through the research and writing of 
history, we historians can conflate these communities with the nations of which they are a 
part. Or we may recognize and engage them, shaping forms of citizenship that do not 
begin and end with a nation-state. 
 This dissertation considers three paradoxes of exile history which may create 
space for recognizing trans- and intra-national communities. First, despite the fact that 
exile is represented as part of the history of a given nation, it is, by definition, located 
outside of it. Therefore, when people portray their lives in exile, their representations may 
be directed away from an isolated nation and towards other communities of which they 
are also unquestionably a part. Rather than focus on a particular trans- or intra-national 
community, this dissertation has touched on several: of Namibians, Angolans and Cubans 
who lived alongside one another at Cassinga and of the administrators who first ran that 
camp; of people detained by SWAPO, of detainees' relatives and friends who mobilized 
awareness of SWAPO abuses and of the national elites and international organizations 
which upheld the status quo; of Vaalgras village in Tses and of families of former exiles 
living in and near there. By illuminating these and other groups, it is possible to see social 
entities which have been left outside or collapsed into a national narrative. Moreover, it 
becomes easier to recognize nationally embedded language – marked by words such as 
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“humanitarianism,” “human rights” and “reconciliation” – through which these 
communities have been systematically obscured.  
 Second, by virtue of their common reliance on SWAPO's political leadership and 
vulnerability to South African violence, Namibian exiles were compelled to unite in 
opposition to a common enemy. At the same time, the forces pulling exiles towards unity 
became sources of division as those who differed with leaders asserted their interests and 
as leaders used suspicions of difference to consolidate their power. “Exile History” has 
examined a number of instances of difference and division, including the crisis that 
enveloped SWAPO in Zambia in 1976, the wide-scale detention of accused spies in 
Lubango during the 1980s and other instances which affected smaller groups of exiles. In 
so doing, it highlights how national leaders and citizens have become invested in 
asserting the unity of Namibians during the liberation struggle, even as people alienated 
from the nation highlight how Namibians mistreated one another in the past as they now 
attempt to assert their status and recover their dignity in the present. Thus, the “glorious 
history of anti-colonial struggle” “fought on personal sacrifice, selflessness and 
commitment to all the people” is inextricable from the conflicts that occurred during the 
struggle in exile and subsequent social divisions.  
 Third, due to the power which SWAPO leaders still wield over the national 
community which they represent, histories of exile which do not align with the former 
liberation movement's narrative often seem to be silent. And yet, it is precisely these 
“silenced” histories which Namibians voice frequently and fervently and which some 
were intent on sharing with me during my research. Here, I have examined many such 
histories, including them in narrations of happenings in exile and considering the 
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circumstances in which I accessed particular stories through private interviews, social 
encounters and the “Living in Exile” exhibit. In so doing, the dissertation exposes how 
the structure of the nation gives voice to these histories as people position themselves in a 
national community, while the threat posed by such voices compels those most invested 
in the national order to attempt to silence them.   
 These three paradoxes have not only been central to the text of “Exile History,” 
but also to the practice of preparing it. A growing awareness of the hidden communities, 
blurred divisions and silenced voices obscured by the dominant exile history pushed me 
to seek sources which could articulate them. It also challenged me to find ways of 
eliciting such perspectives from the sources which I had with their diverse relationships 
to a national community. To achieve this end, I often drew from my own paradoxical 
relationship to Namibia which made it difficult for people to associate me with a 
particular bias on national political issues. From the vantage of my knowledge of 
different Namibian histories and naiveté as a foreigner, my personal commitment to 
Namibia after years of volunteer service and scholarly disinterest, I presented research 
participants with anecdotes from others' histories of exile. In response, I hoped to hear 
narratives which would not defend or contest a particular “side” of the story as much as 
illuminate national history's paradoxes and the limits of prevailing representations. 
 Certainly, these research practices have not prevented my work from becoming 
associated with particular positions on Namibian history. As previously noted, when I 
presented “Living in Exile” it was, on different occasions, perceived as a threat to 
national history, an escape from national history and as a reflection of national history 
itself. More than likely, the histories I have written here about SWAPO camps will be 
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taken up by different groups which wish to make claims through representations of 
camps and events that occurred there. While these scenarios pose challenges to my future 
work, the paradoxes of nationalism suggest a response to them: to draw attention, once 
again, to views which are not encompassed by competing national histories and to 
encourage interlocutors, old and new, to respond to these views. For while close 
association with a particular position may restrict access to certain people and spaces, it is 
only through on-going dialogue that students of nationalism may fulfill their potential to 
create knowledge and promote understanding among diverse publics –  especially among 
members of the divided communities which we often study. 
 The emphasis here on deconstructing a nation should not demean those who have 
dedicated their lives to building one. Over the past few centuries nationalism has inspired 
both the worst and best in humanity, and Namibia has been the focus of some of 
nationalism's better moments, joining diverse individuals within that country and around 
the world to liberate people from oppression and to create a new community based on 
individual equality and social justice. Historians, and others committed to developing a 
critical perspective on history, must have a different vocation, however – particularly 
those who work in Southern Africa, where a national history, saturated in the struggle, is 
so often used to legitimate inequality and support injustice. In such a context, the critique 
of nationalism is far from nihilistic. Rather, it is prerequisite for imagining kinds of 
community which may pursue noble social goals that, heretofore, have been conflated 
with nationalism. And it is essential for breathing new life into “One Namibia” and other 







































































Appendix 2: “Living in Exile: An Exhibition of Photographs from the SWAPO Camps”* 
 
From 1960 to 1989 many Namibians left their country of origin to live in exile. During the early years 
only a few hundred resided abroad, most of them studying in tertiary institutions or training as guerrilla 
soldiers for an armed struggle against South Africa's colonial government. But as the Portuguese 
empire collapsed abroad (1974) and as oppression increased at home, thousands fled across Namibia's 
borders and joined the liberation movement SWAPO. Only in 1989, after a ceasefire had been signed 
and arrangements for democratic elections made, did most Namibian exiles return to their native land.  
 
Many know this general history of exiled Namibians' struggle to liberate their country. But how much 
do we know about the different experiences of those who lived abroad? And how might we learn more 
about exiles' diverse contributions to a history that continues to shape Namibia, Southern Africa and 
the world? 
 
This exhibition, “Living in Exile,” draws from photographs taken of the Namibian camps and the 
knowledge of those who lived in these camps to increase understanding of Namibia's exile history. The 
exhibit focuses on the camps for two reasons. First, most Namibian exiles lived in camps. Even those 
who were not residing in the camps visited them to work on projects, to distribute materials and 
information, or to visit family and friends. One cannot begin to understand how Namibians were living 
in exile without understanding the camps. Second, there are many photographs of Namibians living in 
the camps that are open to the public, and many former exiles who might know the people, places and 
events pictured in these photographs. Camp photos, together with people's memories, are a rich, 
untapped source of information about Namibia's exile history.  
 
Since January I have been using photographs, including the ones displayed below, to ask former exiles 
questions about their experiences abroad. By displaying these photos and captions here, I wish to share 
some material that I have gathered during my research. At the same time, the exhibit is an invitation for 
you to share any information that you may have about the camps with me. This information could, in 
turn, be shared with others through future photo exhibitions, publications and a doctoral dissertation 
that I intend to produce in the coming years.   
 
I have several questions about every photo in this exhibit: Do you recognize who is in the photo? Do 
you know where the photo was taken? Do you remember who took the photo? Do you recall the 
occasion on which the photo was taken? I also have specific questions about specific photos. All 
questions are marked in italics.  
 
If you can contribute information about any of the photographs displayed here or have any questions or 
comments about the exhibit, please speak with me or write me a note with your name and details and 





                                                 
*     This appendix replicates the content of “Living in Exile” as it was displayed at several locations in Namibia between 
August and October 2007. Additional information about photographs discussed in this dissertation has been added to the 




Where were the camps? 
 
Most of the photographs in this exhibit were taken in three camps. The first is the Namibian Health and 
Education Centre located in the Kwanza Sul province of Angola and almost 300 km southeast of 
Luanda. 'Kwanza Sul', as the camp was widely known, was the largest Namibian camp in exile from its 
founding in 1979 until Namibian repatriation in 1989.  The second is the camp at Cassinga, located in 
the Huila province of Angola, 260 km north of the Namibian border at Oshikango. Many Namibians 
passed through this camp between its founding in 1976 and the South African attack on May 4, 1978. 
The third is the Namibian Health and Education Centre at Nyango, located in Zambia's Western 
Province near Kaoma, east of Mongu. This camp was built in late 1975 and remained in operation even 
after most Namibian exiles moved into Angola in the late 1970s and 80s. Finally, there is one photo of 
the 'Old Farm,' the first SWAPO camp intended for Namibian civilians, established just outside Lusaka 
in the early 1970s. By 1976 the residents at Old Farm had been transferred to Nyango. 
 
Most Namibians who lived in exile passed through Kwanza Sul, Cassinga, Nyango or Old Farm at 
some time. There were, however, many other camps in Southern Africa where Namibians lived, 
primarily in Angola and Zambia (see map). It is unlikely that photos were taken in most of these other 
camps. People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) combatants were often stationed in or around the 
camps, and there were security risks and fears associated with taking photographs wherever Namibians 
were living. However, some of the photos in this exhibit may picture other camps even if their location 
is not listed in the accompanying caption. Some also portray people moving between the camps. Being 






































































(NAN Photo No. 13174, Mayibuye/IDAF) 
 
The picture is of the road entering Kwanza Sul. The National Archive's caption reads: 'Students greet 
delegates of the Int[ernational] Commission of Inquiry, 1 February, 1981.' 
 











































(NAN Photo No. 12369, Mayibuye/IDAF) 
 
Supposedly, this picture is of Cassinga, taken before South Africa's attack on May 4, 1978. The 
National Archive's caption reads: 'Cassinga before SA massacre, group of refugees inside house around 
fire-tin.'  
 
Were Cassinga residents living in accommodations like this one pictured here? Could this be one of the 













































(Private donation to the author)1 
 
The picture is of the Old Farm. It was taken after a church service held there in August 1975. 
                                                 
1 The photo was taken by Pastor Siegfried Groth during his only visit to the Old Farm and was given to me by him in 











































(NAN photo no. 13130, Mayibuye/IDAF, by Rita Hodgson) 
 
The National Archive's caption to this photo reads: 'Swapo Angola, Mabviedzi Refugee Camp, 1978[.] 
Young mother knitting.'  
 














































(NAN photo no. 12376, Mayibuye/IDAF) 
 
Sometimes the war forced exiles to create new camps at a moments' notice. This photo pictures an 
impromptu camp created by survivors of the attack on Cassinga  
 














































(NAN Photo No. 13199,  Mayibuye/IDAF) 
 
These are the trucks that transferred Namibians between many of the camps. The National Archive's 
caption reads: 'Namibian boys at Kwanza Sul, in truck to be transferred to SWAPO settlements in 





Who lived in the camps? 
 
Thousands of Namibians lived in exile (at least 43,000 according to statistics recorded by the United 
Nations during repatriation and thousands more according to SWAPO's estimates during the struggle). 
Almost everyone passed through a camp at time or another; some lived all their years in exile there. 





































(NAN Photo no. 12305, Mayibuye/IDAF) 
 
Dr. Libertine Amathila treating a child at Nyango. She worked as a medical doctor at this camp. She is 













































(NAN Photo no. 13181, Mayibuye/IDAF)  
 
Nangolo Mbumba standing on the left near a parade ground at Kwanza Sul. He served at Kwanza as 
school principal and as one of the centre's directors. He is currently Namibia's Minister of Education.  
 













































(NAN Photo no. 13161, Mayibuye/IDAF) 
 
The caption from the National Archive reads 'Nekongo, Director of Namibia Health and Education 
Centre, Kwanza Sul, briefing Intelligence Commission Delegates, 1 February 1981.' Nekongo refers to 
Max Nekongo who was the director of Kwanza Sul in 1981.  Iyambo Indongo appears to be sitting next 



































(NAN Photo No. 14119) 
 
The picture is of leaders of PLAN at Cassinga. It is taken from a role of film which the South African 
Defense Force (SADF) claims to have captured from the camp on the day of the attack. Some people 
think that the man on the far left was PLAN Political Commissar Greenwell Matongo and that the man 
in the middle was PLAN Military Commander Dimo Hamaambo.2 
 
Do you recognize any of the combatants here?  
 
Do you recognize the house with white columns behind the combatants? Could that be the camp office 
at Cassinga? 
 
                                                 
2 According to Darius “Mbolondondo” Shikongo, formerly the Commissar at Cassinga, the photo pictures PLAN 
commanders entering the Cassinga parade in front of the camp office (Interview 3.9.2007, pp. 71-72). He, Charles 
Namoloh and others identified the commanders in the first row (from left to right) as Greenwell Matongo, Dimo 














































(NAN Photo No. 13951, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting)  
 
SWAPO President Sam Nujoma also visited the camps. The National Archive's caption to this photo 













































(NAN Photo No. 11220) 
 
Some representatives from organizations assisting Namibian exiles could also visit the camps. The 
photo pictures Justin Ellis from the Namibia Refugee Project on his way to or from a visit at Nyango. 
He is accompanied by Canner Kalimba, who coordinated the SWAPO Literacy Program, and Erastus 














































(NAN Photo No. 12320, Mayibuye/IDAF)  
 
This photo was taken at Kwanza Sul. 
 








































(NAN Photo No. 12314, Mayibuye/IDAF, by Joost Guntenaar) 
 
The photo was taken at Kwanza Sul in 1981. 
 
Did boys dress up in army clothes like this often? Where did they get them?3  
 
Were most school children living in tents like those that can be seen behind the boys or in barracks? 
 
                                                 
3 Several research participants discussed how boys in the camps liked to dress up in military uniforms and indicated that 
the uniforms which the boys are wearing here are actually Cuban. For more discussion of Cuban uniforms see NAN 












































(NAN Photo No. 11255) 
 
This photo was taken in 1982 in Zambia, probably at Nyango. 
 
Did many children decorate their rooms with SWAPO magazines like this? How were they distributed 










































(NAN Photo No. 12371, Mayibuye/IDAF) 
 
The National Archive's caption reads: 'Cassinga before SA massacre, two women outside house.' 
 
Were Cassinga residents accommodated in shacks like the one pictured here? Were they using 
corrugated iron?4 
 
                                                 
4 All research participants who lived at Cassinga doubt that this photo actually depicts the camp, particularly since none 




What did people do in the camps? 
 
Despite differences between the various Namibian camps, there were similarities in the activities that 
people did in all of them. People went to the parade ground to communicate information and express 
solidarity; they attended training courses to improve their skills in different fields and worked to meet 
the daily food and health needs of the camp community. Some of the settlements with large civilian 
populations, like Kwanza Sul and Nyango, also supported other activities including church services, 


























(NAN photo no. 12778, Mayibuye/IDAF)  
 
The picture is of people assembled on the parade ground at Cassinga.  
 
Is this photo of a daily, morning parade or does it mark a special event?  
 
Who do you think took this photo?5 
 
                                                 
5 According to Per Sanden, he took this photo on May 3, 1978 during a parade at Cassinga held in honor of him and his 
colleague Tommy Bergh, who with Sanden had been collecting footage for a documentary film commissioned by the 
SWAPO leadership. The attack on Cassinga took place the day after the photo was taken, and the image was reproduced 
in several SWAPO publications, including on the front page of Namibia Today in the issue published immediately after 














































(NAN Photo No. 12310, Mayibuye/IDAF by Joost Guntenaar) 
 






































(NAN Photo No. 12396, Mayibuye/IDAF) 
 
The National Archive's caption reads: 'Commanders of SWAPO detachments receiving political 
indoctrination and military training at an Angolan base near the Namibian border.' 
 
Where could this base be? Somewhere near Lubango?6 
 
 
                                                 
6 Several research participants indicated that this photo probably depicts a building where PLAN combatants received 
military training outside Lubango. Hans Pieters, a former commissar at the Tobias Hainyeko Training Centre, added that 
the hall was part of the original Hainyeko built by the Soviet Union in conjunction with SWAPO's shift of its military 
operations to Angola in 1976 and 1977. Pieters further stated that the hall was abandoned after South Africa attacked 
Hainyeko in late 1978 or 1979 and the new Tobias Hainyeko Training Centre was built (Interview, 19.11.2007). It is this 
photo which I showed to the woman in Keetmanshoop who, after viewing “Living in Exile,” asked me “Where is 








































(NAN Photo No. 11227)  
 
The National Archive's caption reads: 'In the clinic of camp A in Kwanza Sul: a nurse is cleaning 
malaria films in the laboratory, January 1985.' Camp A was the part of Kwanza Sul for nursing mothers 
and children. It was one of several camps within the settlement at Kwanza Sul. For example, in 1980, 
there were four 'sub-camps': a centre for education, a kindergarten camp, a camp for the elderly, 
disabled and war victims, and a medical centre. By the late 80s there were at least sixteen sub-camps, 
most of them maintaining a clinic like the one pictured here.  
 














































(NAN Photo No. 11218) 
 
The National Archive's caption reads: 'Secondary school children doing agricultural work at Nyango, 















































(NAN Photo No. 12321, Mayibuye/IDAF) 
 
Children cooking at Kwanza Sul. Many exiles received all of their food in the camps.  
 













































(NAN Photo No. 11248) 
 
The National Archive's caption reads: 'Depicting the life-style of Namibian refugees in Zambia 1982.'  
 
Is this a store where items were purchased near Nyango? In your experience, how often did camp 












































(NAN Photo No. 11275) 
  
The National Archive's caption reads: 'Congregation after Church service at Kwanza Sul.' Reverend 
Erastus Haikali, who served as a pastor to Namibian exiles for many years, is pictured in his clerical 
gown. He is located on the left side of the photo to the right of the other pastor.  
 












































(NAN Photo No. 11225) 
 
The National Archive's caption reads: 'SWAPO Pioneers at a parade, 7 May, 1984.' Many youth who 
lived at Kwanza Sul participated in this organization. 
 
What were the Pioneers' regular activities? Was there an age limit for the Pioneers? Was there a 












































(NAN Photo No. 11210) 
 
The National Archive's caption reads: 'Women performing traditional dances at the Namibian Health 
and Education Centre, Nyango.' 
 






How did War affect the camps? 
 
The lives of people in the camps cannot be separated from the wars raging around them, both the 
liberation war fought between SWAPO and the South African government and, from 1975, the 





































(NAN Photo No. 14108, by Tor Sellstrom) 
 
The photo was taken at Cassinga shortly after the attack. 
 












































(NAN Photo No. 12400, Mayibuye/IDAF) 
 
The National Archive's caption reads: 'Swapo PLAN Combatants receive training, Angola.' It was 
common for men, women and children to receive a basic military training from SWAPO combatants 
when they entered exile in southern Angola. 
 








































(NAN Photo No. 12360, Mayibuye/IDAF) 
 
The National Archive's caption reads: 'SWAPO children in Angola protected by women with rifles.'  
 
Were these children also being given some kind of military training? Or were they posing for a photo 
intended for solidarity organizations overseas?7 
 
                                                 
7 Several research participants indicated that the “rifles” in this photo are probably made of wood and that youth in the 
camps often shaped pieces of wood to make them appear like guns. Darius Shikongo drew from this photo to speak 
about children marching with wooden guns at Cassinga. (Shikongo, Interview 11.6.2007, p. 25; see NAN Photo No. 














































(NAN Photo No. 12415, Mayibuye/IDAF, donated by the Namibian Support Committee in London) 
 
When Namibians moved between the camps they often traveled as part of a military convoy. Even 














































(NAN Photo No. 12383, Mayibuye/IDAF) 
 
The National Archive's caption reads: 'PLAN combatants on patrol.' These patrols might take place 
around the camps to protect them. Combatants also passed through camps as they moved to and from 







































(NAN Photo No. 14120) 
 
This photo appears to be taken at Cassinga when a group of PLAN combatants were marching through 
the camp. It is also part of the role of film that SADF alleges to have captured.  
 
Can you remember anything about the event photographed here?8 
                                                 
8 According to Darius Shikongo, this photo depicts people leaving the Cassinga parade. All groups would march past the 
SWAPO officials, including Shikongo himself, who are assembled on the right side of the photo. Youth at the parade 
were frequently wearing military uniforms, which they often received from Cuban soldiers based in Angola, and carried 













































These photographs were taken of “Living in Exile” shortly after I had assembled it in the foyer of the 
Eenhana Youth Centre for Namibia's Heroes' Day Commemoration on August 25 and 26, 2007. 
 
                                                 
*    Here I have displayed several of my personal photographs of “Living in Exile.” All were taken by me with the exception 















































These photographs were taken of guests viewing “Living in Exile” on August 28 in Engela, a village 
near the Namibian-Angolan border at Oshikango. The exhibition was displayed on the walls of a local 















































The first photo was taken of guests viewing “Living in Exile” on an open wall adjacent to Bank 
Windhoek in Keetmanshoop on September 17, 2007. The second photo pictures research assistant 
Steve Swartbooi, (left) and me (right) in front of the exhibition later that afternoon.  
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This photograph of the Cassinga mass grave was printed on the front cover of the SWAPO bulletin 
“Massacre at Kassinga" in June 1978. Since then, it seems to have been the most widely spread image 
of the grave, reproduced in many publications, including Their Blood Waters Our Freedom, SWAPO's 
official record of Namibians who died in exile during the liberation struggle (Windhoek: SWAPO, 
1996, p.xvii). A copy of the photograph is available at the National Archives of Namibia (NAN, Photo 
























This image was printed in Namibia Today (2,2 1978, p. 4) and offers an example of how reporters' texts 
were used to frame photographs of the Cassinga mass grave. The photo itself appears identical to the 
one taken by Gaetano Pagano on May 6, 1978, included in "The Kassinga File" (Geneva: International 


























These two photographs are the most graphic images of bodies in the mass grave available at the 
National Archive of Namibia (NAN, Photo Archive, Nos. 13186, 13187). Both were printed 




















I took these photos of the mass graves when I visited Cassinga on September 2, 2007. Above is a 
picture of the larger mass grave which appears in all the other mass grave photos. Below is a picture of 
the smaller mass grave which does not appear in any photographs that I have previously seen. 
According to Theopholous Kalimba, a former Cassinga inhabitant who helped to prepare the graves 
and Galiano Ntyanba, the Angolan government administrator for Techamutete and the surrounding 
region, the smaller grave was prepared for “a mixture of soldiers and civilians” whereas the larger 
grave was for civilians only. Kalimba also reports that the larger grave was reopened when the 
reporters visited Cassinga whereas the smaller grave was not. Today both graves are covered with 
concrete. At the far side of the larger grave there is an inscription marking the “Massacre at Cassinga, 
May 4, 1978” and its renovation on May 4, 1988. According to Ntyanba, people in the surrounding 
villages come to the graves annually on May 4 to clean them. Namibia, however, has not 
commemorated Cassinga Day at this site, and few Namibians have visited the mass graves.  
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This photograph appears to be one of the first photos that John Liebenberg took upon arriving at the 
female detainees' camp. Two weeks later the photo was printed in The Namibian alongside an article 
by Liebenberg. According to him, "the angry, frustrated-looking women standing with arms crossed in 
front of reporters, some with children and babies in their arms, were all adamant that they were 
innocent of any charges against them and that they had been imprisoned without reason" (John 
Liebenberg, "Detainees Speak of Ordeal," The Namibian, 9.6.1989).  
                                                 
*    These photographs were all taken by John Liebenberg, a photographer for The Namibian, on the occasion of the 



















This photo depicts several people who were present for the detainees' release to the journalists 
including SWAPO Secretary General Andimba Toivo Ya Toivo (center, gesturing) SWAPO 
Administrative Secretary Moses Garoeb (next right), another veteran SWAPO leader, Eliaser 
Tuhadeleni, (next right) and an Angolan government representative (far right). Some research 
participants indicated that the children in the photo were those of female detainees. The image, and the 
one on the following page of Leefa Martin speaking with an East German journalist, elicited stories 
from ex-detainees about how they first began to share their experiences with the journalists. Pauline 
Dempers narrated the unfolding scene in this way: “It [was] a lady from France... [who] said, 'Tell us, 
who are these?' She asked Ya Toivo. But Ya Toivo didn't want to say it. He said, 'No, you will hear 
from them.' And she insisted saying that you are leading this delegation, you have to tell us who these 
people are. And that's when he started saying that 'These are the spies.' Then the lady... asked, 'Did you 
also imprison children?' Then Ya Toivo just couldn't answer that. I remember he could not say 
anything. He just said, 'You will hear from them.' That is what he was saying. And with that the whole 















































This photograph pictures Othniel Kaakunga preparing to read a statement on behalf of the male 
detainees when the journalists arrived at their camp later on the same day. Upon seeing the photo, 
Joseph "Pereb" Stephanus, remembered how he and other detainees had learned of the journalists' 
pending visit and developed a strategy the night before their arrival for how to address them: “There 
was a group that insisted that we should not tell the truth about what happened to us until we have 
arrived back at home. But then [a larger] group... said that, 'No, I think this is the hour of truth.'" 
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UNICEF Area Office Brazzaville, “Report on a mission to swapo centres for namibian refugees in angola 
from 10 to 14 april 1978.” File A.614. 
 
Personal Collection 
Letter from Amies Isaacks to Wilhelmina Thomas, 4.3.1985. 
 
UNHCR, “Voluntary Repatriation to Namibia, Registration Form” for Joseph “Pereb” Stephanus, 
19.5.1989. 
 
Willem Meyer, “I left the country on the 15th of November, 1976,” 1990. 
 
Leonard Philemon “Castro” Nangolo, “My History,” 1994. 
 
Letter from Christo Lombard to Desmond Tutu, 13.3.1996. 
 
VEM, Siegfried Groth Collection 
UNHCR BO Angola, “Notes on Issue of Ex-Detainees.” File No. 1311. 
 
“Ex-SWAPO Detainees, Press Statement August 10, 1989.” File No. 1335. 
 
“Report of the United Nations Mission on Detainees,” 11.10.1989. File No. 1335. 
 
UCT, African Studies Library 
Timothy Dauth, “Namibia – the Wall of Silence – review,” 1996. BAP 322.42 DAU. 
 
UNAM, Peter Katjavivi Collection 
“Press Release by the South West African People's Organisation, Dar es Salaam, 18th July, 1966.” In Series 
A, “Unregistered Correspondence 1961-1969.” 
 
“Application for Assistance South West Africa People's Organization,” 30.4.1971. In Series B1, Category 
15.   
 
“Namibian Educational and Health Centre,” 1973. In Series B1, Category 2. 
 
Keshii Nathanael and Sheeli Shangula, “A Statement from the SWAPO Youth League Members that 
Entered the Republic of Zambia,” July 1974. In Series B1, Category 14, File No. 3. 
 
Letter from Hans Beukes to “Bishop Auala, Daniel Tjongerero and Other members of SWAPO,” 14.5.1976. 




“Report of the Findings and Recommendations of the John Ya Otto Commission of Inquiry into 
Circumstances which led to the Revolt of SWAPO Cadres between June, 1974 and April, 1976,” 
4.6.1976. In Series B1, Category 3, File 2.  
 
“To the Zambian Government, To the A.L.C. of the O.A.U.,” 20.7.1976. In Series B1, Category 16.  
 
“Oh World Hear Our Cries,” 7.8.1976. In Series B1, Category 16. 
 
“Oh World Hear Our Cries,” 11.8.1976. In Series B1, Category 16.  
 
Letter from Sam Nujoma to Dr. Leonard Auala and Dr. De Vries, 1.9.1976. In Series B1, Category 15. 
 
Ben Amathila, Letter to the Editor, 19.10.1976. In Series B1, Category 14, File No. 3. 
 
“Report on the morale, problems and needs of SWAPO internal” (undated document from late 1976 or 
early 1977). In Series B1, Category 14, File No. 3. 
 
“Report to the President: Office of the Administrative Secretary,” 1977. In Series B1, Category 3, File 1.  
 
“Memorandum from SWAPO Department of Information to Governments, National and International 
Organizations, 11th January, 1977.” In Series B1, Category 4.  
 
“Statement by Comrade Mishake Muyongo, SWAPO Vice-President, Before the Committee of 24, on 25th 
February, 1977.”  In Series B1, Category 4.  
 
“Appeal for the Release of over 1,000 Namibians in Detentions in Zambia and in Tanzania,” 27.4.1977. In 
Series B1, Category 5, File No. 8. 
 
“For Immediate Release,” 4.5.1978. In Series B1, Category 5, File No. 9.  
 
“For Immediate Release,” 6.5.1978. In Series B1, Category 5, File No. 9.   
 
“For Immediate Release” 7.5.1978. In Series B1, Category 5, File No. 9. 
 
“Press Release,” 8.5.1978. In Series B1, Category 5, File No. 9. 
 
“Address Given by Peter Katjavivi, SWAPO Secretary for Information and Publicity to the World 
Conference for the Eradication of Racism and Racial Discrimination, Basle, May 18-21, 1978.” In 
Series B1, Category 4.  
 
3.) Interviews*  
Ailonga, Salatiel & Anita            23.3.2007; 22.6.2007 
Amagulu, William  (29.5.2008) 
Angula, Nahas    13.2.2008 
Angula, Oiva    (14.7.2008) 
Ashipala, Ya Toivo   16.3.2007; 25.7.2007 
Basson, Andries    30.5.2007; 22.9.2007 
                                                 
* The following list includes the names of people with whom I held recorded interviews for use in this 
dissertation and the dates of these interviews. Most people listed reviewed the transcript of their interview 
and agreed to donate a revised version of it to the NAN for use at a future date. Interview dates marked in 
brackets have not been transcribed and donated to the NAN.  
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Basson, Theresia   1.6.2005 
Beukes, Erica    10.3.2007; 13.5.2008 
Dempers, Pauline   23.5.2007; 21.11.2007 
Engombe, Immanuel  25.3.2007 
Engombe, Immanuel, Junius Ikondja, Ndamono Ndeulita & Hizipo Shikondombolo 17.6.2007; 29.7.2007 
Gertze, Kala   21.2.2007   
Groth, Siegfried   (24.6.2006); 26.10.2006 
Haihambo, Pelita Tabitha  16.6.2007 
Haikali, Valde Panduleni  27.3.2007   
Hamutenya, Hidipo  2.4.2008 
Haundjojo, Josephine  30.3.2007 
Hauwanga, Abed   26.7.2007; 3.8.2007 
Helmuth, Paul   13.7.2007; 10.8.2007 
Higoam, Maria, Sophia Kahuika & Emma Motinga  14.9.2007  
Hinda, Immanuel   19.9.2007  
Ikondja, Junius   18.3.2007; 10.6.2007 
Kahuika, Michael   16.5.2007 
Kahuika, Michael & Joseph “Pereb” Stephanus  20.9.2007 
Kalimba, Canner    2.4.2007; 13.6.2007 
Kalimba, Canner, Theopholus Kalimba & Galiano Ntyanba (2.9.2007) 
Kalimba, Theopholus  2.9.2007 
Kambangula, Emma  15.2.2007; 26.11.2007 
Kamwi, Alex   26.2.2007 
Kati, Nambinga   11.8.2007; 8.12.2007 
Katjavivi, Peter   (23.7.2008) 
Katzao, Johannes   3.5.2007 
Kerina, Mburumba  (31.5.2008) 
Kober, Gudrun   9.3.2007  
Konjore, Willem   (22.7.2008) 
Kweenda, Saima   21.3.2007 
Lombard, Christo   (5.5.2009) 
Meyer, Willem   16.6.2005; 17.6.2005 
Mupopiwa, Liberty  7.3.2007 
Mupopiwa, Mwetufa “Cabral”    (26.7.2008) 
Musialela, Ellen   6.3.2007 
Mwalundange, Jackson  9.2.2007; 16.2.2007; (24.11.2007; 23.4.2009) 
Nakamhela, Ngeno  21.2.2007 
Namhila, Ellen   (25.7.2008) 
Namoloh, Charles  (18.6.2008; 19.6.2008; 9.7.2008) 
Ndeikwila, Samson  9.2.2007; 16.2.2007; 2.3.2007; 21.7.2007; (1.5.2009) 
Ndeulita, Ndamono  18.3.2007; 10.6.2007 
Nehova, Kandi   7.4.2008 
Nekondo, Phillip   24.3.2007 
Nepelilo, Kaufilwa  4.8.2007 
Nghipangelwa, Lahya  18.5.2007 
Nujoma, Sam   4.3.2008 
Nuukuawo, Tangeni  17.2.2007; 23.2.2007; 10.3.2007; (3.7.2008) 
Nyamu, Jesaya   2.4.2008; 3.4.2008 
Pieters, Hans   21.5.2007; 9.9.2007; 14.11.2007; 19.11.2007; (22.7.2008) 
Sanden, Per   5.2.2008 
Schikwambi, Airah  1.5.2007 
Shalli, Martin   (9.7.2008) 
Shamena, Erastus   1.3.2007 
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Shangula, Sheeli   25.3.2007  
Shifidi, Hendrina   29.3.2007  
Shikondombolo, Hizipo  17.6.2007  
Shikongo, Darius “Mbolondondo”  26.3.2007; 11.6.2007; 20.8.2007; 3.9.2007  
Shikongo, Silas   16.3.2007; 26.7.2007 
Shipanga, Andreas  20.3.2007 
Shityuwete, Helao  24.7.2007; (5.6.2008) 
Shixwameni, Ignatius  (30.5.2008) 
Stephanus, Joseph “Pereb”  29.5.2005; 31.5.2005; 15.6.2005; 17.6.2005; 2.7.2007; 18.9.2007; 
18.11.2007 
Stephanus, Joseph “Pereb” & Steve Swartbooi  (25.4.2009) 
Swartbooi, Steve    29.1.2007; 21.9.2007 
Swartbooi, Willy   12.12.2007  
Thomas, Julia   20.9.2007 
Toivo Ya Toivo, Andimba  (3.7.2008) 
Ulenga, Ben   (6.6.2008; 12.6.2008) 
Ya Nangoloh, Phil  19.2.2007 
 
C. Photographs 
Photographs discussed in this dissertation are referenced and displayed in the appendices. 
 
D. Audio/Visual Programs 
 
BWS Archives 
“Nda mona,” film produced by Richard Pakleppa, 1999. 
 
“Testimony,” film directed and produced by BWS, 2003. 
 
NBC Radio Archives 
News Broadcast 4.6.1996. CA96/103. 
 
News Broadcasts 6.6.1996 and 7.6.1996. CA96/115.  
 
News Broadcast 8.6.1996. CA96/121. 
 
SPARC 
“Here is Namibia: Inside the Liberated Areas and Beyond,” unedited footage filmed by Per Sanden and 
Tommy Bergh in 1978. 
 
 
 
